National Defence Committee on Sept. 14th, 2017

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Again, what are our options going forward in terms of BMD? The United States is not going to ask us again to join; they've already done that. If we choose to, are we just going forward as supplicants? What realistically can we do at this point in terms of participating in BMD?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Could I interject here?

Let's be clear on one thing. We don't know what the costs are or what the Americans would require from us at this point. In other words, if we start saying that we're drawing away substantial resources for a price tag for participation, that may or may not be the case.

We are moving ahead, as has been mentioned, with the renewal of NORAD, so it's entirely conceivable that if we were the ones to initiate some form of participation within the American ABM system we might be able to negotiate it in that context, because we are going to have to take some very expensive internal moves for the modernization of the north warning system and satellite systems that the Liberal defence policy says we are going to be doing.

In this context, I want to put a brake on the assumption that it's as though if we do ABM with the Americans it's going to cost us a whole lot of money. They may have a price tag; with Donald Trump as President, who knows? On the other hand, though, given the fact that we can see clearly the way the threat has been developing, to ensure that we have some form of participation—it will be junior, and it's silly to think it's going to be anything but junior participation—we want to lock ourselves in for that possibility. As I said earlier, if the North Koreans start getting into the situation that they can start overwhelming the system, we want to make sure we are involved at least in some part so that the Americans are thinking of us in a crisis situation. I think that's really what we're trying to get ourselves involved with at this point in time.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

The threat of an electromagnetic pulse seems to be far more advanced than analysts had thought up until recently. The concern is that an EMP would go off, take down our electrical grid, knock out the ABM system, and then they would be free to launch without the concern of interceptors from North America.

How do we deal with that potential? Based on that, even if we had BMD in place, we're still not protected. What would you suggest as a solution? How do we counter that?

[Dr. Michael Byers]

I think you heard this morning that the military systems are likely protected against an EMP attack. Given a choice between an EMP attack and its consequences for civilian functionality, I'd still take it over a hydrogen bomb on a major city. It's one of a range of slight risks that are out there. Let's keep our eye on the opportunities for Canada. If we join missile defence, we'll likely freeze ourselves out of diplomacy with Pyongyang. That's to start with.

Second, it's not clear the Americans want us in missile defence. Until we know the answer to that question and how much they would charge, we shouldn't be recommending anything.

There are serious threats. I'm not naive about this. North Korea is extremely dangerous. Joining missile defence is like saying, “We have to do something; what can we do?”, and you reach for the one thing and it's purely symbolic. Let's get serious and do real, meaningful things.

[Danny Lam]

If you allow me to interject, as of September 7, President Trump issued a shoot-down order for any missile heading towards the United States. I don't have the specifics of the order yet, but my understanding of the order is that it will be shot down during what's called “boost phase”—that is, literally, when it flies from North Korea at the very early stages—which means you're doing it with missiles based in Japan on vessels or on land. You're not even going to give them a chance to get to Alaska, get over the horizon, because you can't take a chance. A shoot-down at boost phase, if you think about it, is incredibly provocative. They have concluded they could not take the chance of a surprise attack. They have concluded that North Korea is likely to do a surprise attack.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

We have had quite a discussion on the threats from the air. We know that the marine-borne, especially nuclear, threat vector exists. Canada has 10 times more coastline than the United States has, and we have at most, at any one time, three submarines. The United States is under way with a radiation detection system for surface vessels, but Canada has nothing. Given that people or drugs can be smuggled through maritime operations, probably components for a nuclear bomb could be smuggled as well. How do we safeguard and protect Canadians against that sort of threat?

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

I'm going to have to ask you to hold your answer on that because I have to yield the floor to Mr. Garrison.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Thanks very much, Mr. Chair.

I do want to thank my colleague, Ms. Gallant, for continuing to raise the maritime security issues, because I think those are the kinds of things we're talking about that are tangible and real and something we might be able to do something about.

Mr. Byers took away my first question, because I was going to ask him, and also Mr. Robertson, about the chances for diplomacy if we chose to join ballistic missile defence. I think Mr. Byers was quite clear that a role for Canada in diplomacy in this region would probably be eliminated by joining ballistic missile defence. I wonder if Mr. Robertson would agree with that.

[Colin Robertson]

No, I would not agree.

Right now, if we're talking particularly about North Korea, we need to change our current policy to have engagement with North Korea and accredit our ambassador in Seoul to Pyongyang as well, and let him go up and see. Just as our national security adviser has done recently, I would do that as a piece of the puzzle. I'm not convinced that signing on to ballistic missile defence for Canadian reasons will have any effect on the relationship with North Korea. I don't think it will. Countries make their own decisions for their own reasons, and I think we would make this decision now because of the heightened threat to Canadians. Ultimately, and partly to answer Ms. Gallant's comment, there are many threats to a country and you're constantly doing risk assessment of them and making decisions accordingly.

NORAD provides us a great deal of protection, because we're able to build on that partnership with the United States. We are the smaller partner, but we benefit hugely from the investments the Americans make. This is a little piece of the puzzle. One of the questions Mr. Byers asked earlier was, are the Americans asking us? I do not believe the Americans will ask us, because we have been asked. They're going to stay away from this because, although Mr. Trump is unpredictable, certainly I think those around him feel that it's not something they want to get involved in with Canada. It would be for Canada, for Canadian reasons, to say, “Okay, we're interested; how much is it going to cost, what do you want from us, and what will be our ability to manage the system?” I think those are important questions that we need to get answers to, and we do it not because we're partners with the Americans as allies but because we want to defend Canadians.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Mr. Byers, on the question of diplomacy, could you elaborate?

[Dr. Michael Byers]

If Canada were to approach the United States on joining missile defence, I would recommend that it be done very quietly, so that Pyongyang would not find out that we are asking questions about things like what the United States would need from us and how much it would cost.

It's perfectly fine to ask those questions or have a discussion, but don't recommend joining until you know what it entails. That's my message to this committee, right? Doing that is foolish and uninformed. Go and find out the information. Ask the Americans.

The other thing to realize is that a lot has changed technologically since 2004. Back in 2004, the Americans were interested in putting a radar base in Labrador and Newfoundland. They were also interested in getting information through the NORAD system. Technology has improved. BMD is going to be serviced mostly from space-based sensors, from satellites, in the next decade and beyond.

They don't need Canada as much as they did just 13 years ago. That needs to be part of the discussion too. Do they need us? What would they like us to do in terms of strengthening the defence of North America, given the pressure from the White House to increase defence spending? They're not asking for missile defence. They're asking us to increase defence spending, and that is air force, navy, and army, not missile defence.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

I want to come back to the unique opportunity that people are talking about for Canada as a country that has the ear of the United States and is not identified directly as an enemy of North Korea. With the success we had with the controlled engagement policy most recently, is there an opening for Canada at this point, perhaps even in pursuing something like turning the 1953 armistice into a peace treaty, to take initiatives that don't directly go at the threat but that would reduce tensions in the region?

Mr. Byers and then maybe Mr. Huebert can answer.

[Dr. Michael Byers]

I have a very simple answer. I don't know, but we should try. You don't know until you try. This is an extremely dangerous situation. We may have an opening. I think we as a country have an obligation to pursue that, because we might be able to dial the temperature down.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

If I could interject, I have to take an opposite position. I do not see, on the limited amount that we have for diplomacy.... In terms of the cost for diplomacy with the North Koreans, the North Koreans are not going to pay attention. I don't even know if they necessarily know we exist.

If we are going to be placing diplomacy, it should be to reassure the front-line states that are facing.... In other words, we should be talking with the Japanese who are constantly trying to get our attention on many of these security issues, talking to the South Koreans, and, I would also suspect, talking to the Australians and the New Zealanders.

The more that we can provide some means of diplomacy, thus providing a very clear front against the North Koreans, I think is a much better use of our diplomatic efforts, rather than going off on what I would characterize as a bit of a fool's errand and trying to get the North Koreans' attention on us. It just simply is not going to be there.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Mr. Robertson.

[Colin Robertson]

I'll just add that first of all you need to have diplomatic relations, which we do not have.

For example, we were useful recently to President Obama in his opening to Cuba. As you know, a number of private meetings were held in Canada. Doing that was possible because we have and maintain diplomatic relations with the Cubans. We were able to very quietly provide Canada as a venue for this kind of thing. It was not known until after the fact and only because the president thanked us.

We could not do that right now with North Korea because we don't have the relationship. I would say to first get the relationship and then see what you can do.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Mr. Robillard.

[Yves Robillard, Liberal, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

My question could be addressed either to one of you or to all of you. Since this meeting is about the threat North Korea represents for Canada, can you recall for us some of the instances in which Canada was singled out by North Korean rhetoric? What was it about and why were we singled out?

[Danny Lam]

Specifically, we have not been singled out recently, but on August 20, the U.K. and Australia were singled out because they participated in military exercises with South Korea.

[Colin Robertson]

I'm not aware of it. You'd have to go back to the Korean War before you would see a Canada engagement. You could ask Global Affairs. They could probably give you a readout on that.

[Dr. Michael Byers]

There was one tweet from the North Korean information office that was making some unpleasant fun of our Prime Minister, but it wasn't—

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Now that's where we draw the line.

[Some hon. members]

Oh, oh!

[Dr. Michael Byers]

I do want to add something, if you'll just bear with me for five or 10 seconds. Canada also has a strong relationship with the People's Republic of China, and China is one of the very major players in this situation. If we're doing any foreign policy with regard to North Korea, we should at least be talking with the Chinese to make sure we're not stepping on their toes, because that's the only country that can really solve the problem. If there's a role for Canada, it has to be in concert with the Chinese.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

[Technical difficulty—Editor] any tweet or anything that the Koreans have in fact singled us out, though I would add that we have to be careful not to get too focused on whether we are in fact concerned if we have been singled out. Recognize that if we are dealing with an aggressor state that we can characterize as a bully, to give too much credibility when they do single us out, or to say that we had better not do anything because we might get singled out, is to basically give in to the type of aggressive behaviour that we see them using against the Japanese and South Koreans.