Evidence of meeting #67 for National Defence in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was nato.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Walter Dorn  Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Defence Studies, As an Individual

3:30 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Stephen Fuhr

I call the meeting to order. We have a quorum.

I'd like to welcome everybody to the defence committee, and especially welcome Dr. Walter Dorn from the Royal Military College in Kingston.

Thank you for coming. I realize you have an engagement with Minister Freeland at the bottom of the next hour and you need to be there on time. I'm going to get right to it and let you have your opening remarks. Then we'll get right into questions so that you can meet with the minister on time.

Sir, the floor is yours.

3:30 p.m.

Prof. Walter Dorn Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Defence Studies, As an Individual

Thank you, sir, for your consideration, and thank you for the honour of testifying before this important committee.

My past testimony before parliamentary committees has been on arms control, Afghanistan operations, peacekeeping, and the United Nations. Those subjects are in my comfort zone. I have to say that NATO isn't in my area of expertise, but NATO is an organization that has premier status in the institutions in which I teach military officers, namely the Royal Military College and the Canadian Forces College.

I'd like to use my presentation to compare Canada's role in NATO with its role in the United Nations. The last time I testified to the Senate, the question was, which would you give emphasis to, NATO or the UN? I realize that some people may view them as dichotomous; in my case, I view them as complementary institutions. Both are vital to Canadian and global security, and Canada can do more for both.

As you know, Canada, and particularly the diplomat and politician Lester B. Pearson, played an important role in the creation of both organizations. In 1945 the Canadian delegation in San Francisco negotiated hard for an economic dimension in the UN Charter. Similarly, in the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO's charter, Canada pushed for article 2, sometimes known as the Canadian article, to include political and economic co-operation along with military co-operation in this new treaty. There will be more about the current implementation later.

The UN was created as an organization for collective security to deal with threats globally, including threats created by its own members. In contrast, NATO was created as an organization for collective defence to deal with external threats, namely the menacing rise of the Soviet bloc. It also had other functions: as Lord Ismay, the first NATO Secretary General informally put it, “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”.

Over time, the organization realized that there was no reason to fear that Germany would rise again as a menacing military power, but the Russian threat has recently risen again, and there's a need to keep Russia out of the affairs of many states—not only its neighbours, such as Ukraine, but also, in our cyber age, the democracies of Europe and North America.

Both organizations run military operations. It might surprise people to know that the UN has more military personnel on operations than NATO has. Currently, the UN Secretary-General has 84,000 military personnel under his operational control in 16 peacekeeping operations, while those under NATO number some 20,000: 13,000 in Afghanistan, 4,500 in Kosovo, 4,500 in the Baltics, and smaller numbers in naval operations.

It should be noted that NATO had at its peak 130,000 troops under NATO operational control in Afghanistan, with Canada contributing 3,300, mostly in Kandahar. Currently the Canadian Armed Forces has deployed 450 members, plus 250 temporary members, in Latvia, and our navy contributes to NATO exercises. The air force is now contributing to NATO air policing in Romania. Until 2014 the air force also provided personnel for NATO's airborne early warning and control force. Maybe Canada should reconsider joining that program again.

Canadian generals have played major leadership roles in both organizations. In the UN, General Tommy Burns was the first commander of the UN's first peacekeeping force, created at Pearson's urging to end the Suez Crisis of 1956. In the 1990s, Canada provided the military adviser to the Secretary General, General Maurice Baril, and seven military commanders of seven UN missions, though none so far in this century.

In recent NATO history Canada provided the chair of the military committee, General Ray Henault, from 2004 to 2008, and the commander of its mission in Libya, General Charles Bouchard.

I hasten to add that the NATO mission in Libya was under Security Council mandate and was very well executed, in my opinion. The problem in Libya was that afterwards, both NATO and the UN shied away from any post-conflict peace force, thinking erroneously that the job was done, leaving Libya a deeply fractured country to this day.

In the past, NATO has not only done defence and enforcement but also peacekeeping, and done it well. After the UN protection force was unable to end the conflict or the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, NATO provided a very capable force, composed of many nations that had contributed to the UN force, but now with much better equipment and organization and, I add, at much greater financial cost.

Here I come to a major difference. In NATO, the player pays—that is, each contributing country covers its own costs—while in the UN, there is a reimbursement scheme that allows for a significant portion, if not all, of the nation's costs to be recovered with UN funding.

Like the UN, NATO operations are a combination of national contributions, but NATO features advanced western countries providing cutting-edge equipment—again, at their own expense—to the NATO operations. Plus, NATO has spent almost 70 years developing a high level of interoperability among its members, even while growing from 12 to 29 countries, while the interoperability among the UN's current 125 or so peacekeeping contributors is much poorer. The range of equipment quality among the developed and developing countries is much wider; however, the re-engagement of European countries in UN peacekeeping is raising the technological standards of UN missions.

Canada can do much more to contribute to UN missions across the range of functions from personnel to training, from aircraft to reconnaissance vehicles, from night vision to long-range surveillance, including by using Canadian experience in NATO.

There is much that the UN can learn from NATO on military operations: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, otherwise known as ISR; command and control; logistics; standardization agreements; industrial coordination; and particularly exercises and simulations, among many things.

Like the UN, but on a much smaller scale, NATO also has co-operation programs outside of the military domain. In a handout, Dr. Danielle Stodilka, a senior fellow at the Canadian International Council, and I summarized three important NATO programs: the science for peace and security program, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, and the NATO centres of excellence, or COEs.

We found that Canada was under-represented in all these activities, and we make some concrete recommendations, so here I go.

In the next year, Canada should host a NATO science for peace and security information day, led by a high-level delegation from NATO's emerging security challenges division, to explore possible partnerships with Ukraine and other countries. It should also increase support for programs of the NATO Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre.

In other conclusions, showing my nuanced approach to NATO, one, there is a danger that the world will march into a new cold war. The UN experience shows that it is important to keep talking even while exposing Russian wrongdoings. Deterrence will have its value, but both sides have to ensure that extremist arguments and extremist weapons do not win the day. While there is clear aggression on the Russian side, the conflicts are not entirely black and white. There are shades of grey, with measures needed to protect Russian-speaking minorities in the “near abroad”, as Russia calls it. Some sensitivity to Russian arguments should be shown, even as military, political, economic, and legal measures are all taken against misbehaviour.

Two, the UN has made major advances to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction. Through treaties, tens of thousands of tonnes of chemical weapons have been disarmed and biological weapons have been banned. Also, much progress has been made in nuclear weapons disarmament, the latest advance being the nuclear prohibition treaty negotiated at the UN and opened for signature in September.

Nuclear weapons belong in the dustbin of history, along with other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological weapons. No one could or should seriously consider incinerating cities and killing millions of people. The only sane approach to end the mutual assured destruction, or MAD, strategy of nuclear deterrence is nuclear abolition, so NATO should drop its faith in nuclear weapons as the “supreme guarantee” of peace. It should move the world along the path of mutual balanced reductions in nuclear forces so that one day there will be no nuclear weapons that can fall into terrorists' hands, be used during escalation of tensions, or be fired by accident. We should be careful not to succumb to the strong-arm tactics of the nuclear nations.

Three, NATO can be an important instrument for the United Nations. This was seen in Kosovo with the UN-mandated and NATO-led Kosovo Force, KFOR, working with the UN mission in Kosovo. It was also seen in Libya in the execution of Security Council resolution 1973 to protect civilians, though the follow-up peacekeeping force should have been implemented and should still be implemented by the UN.

Overall, UN-NATO co-operation should be encouraged, especially as UN peacekeeping seeks to modernize and become better equipped.

Four, NATO has 24 centres of excellence, but none on peace support operations, or PSOs, and none in Canada. Since the Minister of National Defence is mandated to lead international training efforts in peace operations, creating a PSO centre of excellence in Canada would be a major step forward. Since the closure of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in 2013 due to lack of government funding, Canada lacks a place where military, police, and civilians from different countries can train together.

Finally, speaking to parliamentarians, NATO has a parliamentary assembly, which had a Canadian MP as president at its founding conference and which serves as a consultative body to the North Atlantic Council. That can be a model for a future UN parliamentary assembly, bringing together legislators from all member states. The NATO PA accepted NATO members and then went further by integrating parliamentarians from the European Parliament and associated countries.

I have just a couple of other final points. As the UN modernizes, NATO could provide the UN with many technologies and procedures. NATO already has someone stationed at UN headquarters, and it has provided satellite imagery of Syria, for example, to the UN, but it could do much more.

It wouldn't be fair unless I had a note on women, peace, and security, where NATO's policy is built on UN Security Council resolution 1325, but NATO is considerably behind the United Nations and many member states, including Canada, in its implementation, so Canada could certainly push in that area.

I thank you for your attention and for letting me share some thoughts and ideas with you.

3:40 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Stephen Fuhr

Thank you for your testimony, Dr. Dorn.

Just before we start with questions, I have two options, given the fact that Dr. Dorn has to be out of here in 40 minutes. We could run the questions as agreed, and it ends where it ends when we get to 4:25, or I could reduce it to five, four, and two minutes and get everyone through.

I see heads shaking, so we will take the normal course.

Mr. Fisher, you have seven minutes.

3:40 p.m.

Liberal

Darren Fisher Liberal Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and to you, sir, for being here. Your testimony is certainly appreciated.

In Canada's new defence policy, our government is moving forward and will conduct, I quote, “active cyber operations against potential adversaries in the context of government-authorized military missions.” It's clear Canada has taken an aggressive approach to the cyber domain.

Is NATO's cyberdefence pledge enough? Is it enough to ensure that NATO is evolving the way it needs to?

3:40 p.m.

Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Defence Studies, As an Individual

Prof. Walter Dorn

This is an area where we have to tread very carefully. Because we want the norm to be non-intervention and non-attack, we have to make sure that Canada and other NATO allies are not pushing the envelope.

I am a strong believer in defensive measures against cyber-attacks and direct response in the form of self-defence under imminent threat, but creating an overall strategy for active or offensive cyber-operations is a very slippery slope that could lead the international community into a perilous domain in which real democracies will suffer most.

3:40 p.m.

Liberal

Darren Fisher Liberal Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS

Article 5 has apparently only been invoked once. What's the state of readiness amongst all of the NATO nations if something were to happen? We talked about ballistic missiles coming towards North America and “all for one and one for all”. What's the state of readiness of the NATO members?

3:40 p.m.

Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Defence Studies, As an Individual

Prof. Walter Dorn

NATO is the most powerful alliance in the world. It funds far more than any adversary. I would say—given that the U.S. spends well over $600 billion on defence and has formed the backbone of NATO—it's as good as you can get in the world of human affairs.

The sense of “all for one and one for all” is important. An attack against North America—or an attempted attack, because I don't believe that North Korea has the missiles to be able to reach North America, and certainly not with a nuclear warhead—would result in a huge amount of sympathy and solidarity, but the co-operation of other nations in that domain, far out of NATO's traditional sphere of operations, for me is still an uncertainty. It's such a unique type of issue to be thinking about NATO for North America rather than NATO for Europe.

3:45 p.m.

Liberal

Darren Fisher Liberal Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS

Fair enough. Just to clarify, the state of readiness amongst individual nations.... NATO as a whole might be ready because some of the bigger players are ready, but are some of the smaller players ready as well, and is there an expectation that they be at a certain level of readiness?

3:45 p.m.

Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Defence Studies, As an Individual

Prof. Walter Dorn

There is an expectation. There are standards, but at the same time you have to ask if it is necessary that the smallest nations be ready. Their contribution will be relatively minor compared to the bigger players, but we do want to increase everyone's standards, and that's why NATO coordination and co-operation are so vital.

3:45 p.m.

Liberal

Darren Fisher Liberal Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS

Thank you.

We've heard lots of testimony that Canada's playing an important and very successful role through Operation Unifier in Ukraine, and there's been lots of talk about the 2% of GDP. At our current level of spending, where do we rank? Where would we relate compared to other NATO countries, as far as contributions to NATO and as far as operations and security go?

3:45 p.m.

Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Defence Studies, As an Individual

Prof. Walter Dorn

It depends on which figures you use. If you use the percent of GDP, we're down on the list, around 1%, but if you look at threat and risk versus what Canada contributes, I'd say Canada is contributing what people can expect of it. Turkey, next to a civil war in Syria, will naturally spend six times the amount that Canada does. There are good reasons for that. I think that the contribution to defence, or defence spending, should actually meet the nation's needs, and the 2% that NATO has suggested is only a guideline. Both the previous government and the current government don't consider it to be a mandate or a requirement from NATO.

3:45 p.m.

Liberal

Darren Fisher Liberal Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS

With relations between NATO and Russia in such a mess, do you feel that Russia has increased military spending in response to NATO's enhanced forward presence along the eastern border?

3:45 p.m.

Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Defence Studies, As an Individual

Prof. Walter Dorn

I think Russia's increased military spending comes out of its general view towards its position in the world. It wants to regain a superpower status. In so many areas, with the Russian economy declining, with population declining, and with so many challenges, they look to that as being one of their premier ways of showing that they are a force in the world. Yes, they may use NATO's presence in the Baltics as one of the reasons, and it may change the way that they position their forces, but at the same time, it's a much deeper problem than just Russia responding to what they call NATO's aggressive measures.

3:45 p.m.

Liberal

Darren Fisher Liberal Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS

I have a question that I've asked numerous witnesses here before. Is Ukraine a buffer between Russia and NATO or is Ukraine part of a legacy of empire-building by Putin?

3:45 p.m.

Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Defence Studies, As an Individual

Prof. Walter Dorn

The Russians do call the former Soviet Union states the “near abroad”. They consider it a special status and they may view it as a kind of buffer to NATO. I don't like the term because it makes Ukraine look like it's a pawn in a chess match. Ukrainians are people who deserve to live in security and prosperity ,and they shouldn't be subjected to the great power politics.

To a certain extent, in reality it forms a buffer, so you can't have an invasion through the country. However, on the other hand, it's a country in its own right that has the right to stand up among the nations and have its ability to defend itself against all forms of encroachment on its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

3:45 p.m.

Liberal

Darren Fisher Liberal Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS

Excellent. Thank you so much.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

3:50 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Stephen Fuhr

Dr. Dorn, if you see me going like this when you're responding, that means to please wrap up within 30 seconds so I can get to the next person.

3:50 p.m.

Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Defence Studies, As an Individual

Prof. Walter Dorn

I appreciate your efforts.

3:50 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Stephen Fuhr

It's a pleasure.

Mr. Yurdiga, you have the floor.

3:50 p.m.

Conservative

David Yurdiga Conservative Fort McMurray—Cold Lake, AB

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Dr. Dorn, for being here today. This is a very important subject of mine and for everyone around the table, I assume.

Given the recent China-Russia naval co-operation, do you believe that strengthening relations between the two nations gives NATO cause for concern?

3:50 p.m.

Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Defence Studies, As an Individual

Prof. Walter Dorn

I'm not very concerned about it, because the co-operation is not strong in the military domain. It's more in the economic domain, with China needing resources and Russia, as the largest country in the world, having abundant natural resources. That kind of co-operation, like the Shanghai Co-operation Organization and others, is primarily in the economic domain. I don't see the ideologies of the two countries meeting. Even during the Cold War, there was one version of Communism that was Russian and another version that was Chinese, and they didn't see eye to eye. There's so much that divides them, and there are even challenges on their borders. No, I don't actually see the danger of a renewed Warsaw Pact or alliances that could challenge the NATO alliance.

3:50 p.m.

Conservative

David Yurdiga Conservative Fort McMurray—Cold Lake, AB

Thank you.

Given the current perceived position of the U.S. on NATO, do you foresee the United States making drastic changes to their NATO contributions? If that happens, will our allies, the other members of NATO, have to contribute more money?

3:50 p.m.

Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Defence Studies, As an Individual

Prof. Walter Dorn

Well, asking an academic to predict the future is a very dangerous thing. Our crystal balls are not very good. At the same time, I do appreciate that the United States government is acting in ways that aren't as predictable as they were for 70 years. We have to be aware that we might find ourselves in situations that will require new solutions to new problems coming from new sources.

3:50 p.m.

Conservative

David Yurdiga Conservative Fort McMurray—Cold Lake, AB

Thank you. It's a real concern for everyone that if the U.S. does pull back, somebody is going to have to fill the void. Looking forward, I think governments have to look at that possibility very seriously.

We talked a bit about the buffer zone and using Ukraine as a buffer zone. We had the ceasefires and treaties, and they always failed for one reason or another.

From your perspective, why have these treaties failed? Do you believe Russia will agree to a UN peacekeeping mission that sees UN peacekeepers within disputed areas?

3:50 p.m.

Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Defence Studies, As an Individual

Prof. Walter Dorn

That's a great question.

I don't feel that you can look on a binary success or failure for the treaties. The Minsk II treaty is still an important element of keeping the conflict in eastern Ukraine from becoming a war. We can look at it on a scale, and there could be much larger levels of fighting. There could actually be things like missiles and other forms of weaponry used. By moving it down on the scale through political means, I think Minsk II actually does help the process. I still support it, although I see that it has built-in mechanisms that are bound to fail. There are so-called poison pills in the Minsk II agreement.

I would like to see the agreement better supported, with the OSCE doing better monitoring and a UN force positioned in the Ukraine. The major dilemma or the decision point is on how far the UN force would be extended. If it went all the way to the Russian border with Ukraine, Russia would very much object. They would like to have the ceasefire line now become frozen so that they can solidify control in the Donbass region. We have to make sure, in my opinion, that it actually respects the territorial integrity of Ukraine and that a peacekeeping force does cover all of the Ukrainian territory.