No, I don't.
Evidence of meeting #69 for National Defence in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was turkey.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Evidence of meeting #69 for National Defence in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was turkey.
A recording is available from Parliament.
4:05 p.m.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
Okay.
Dr. von Hlatky, thank you very much for your presentation. It's not a perspective we always get, so I think it's very important.
When you said—I believe I have it correctly—that Canada should become a global leader in gender analysis and the implementation of the results, can you talk a little more about what you mean by Canada being a global leader? What specifically would you want to see Canada do in that area?
4:10 p.m.
Associate Professor and Director, Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University, As an Individual
What I'm going to say is going to sound like we're going to compete with the Nordic countries a bit in this case, and that's true. Right now, for training our own gender advisers, we send them on a course in Sweden. Sweden is a partner with NATO, not an ally, but it has a bit of a monopoly over gender training at the highest levels.
More recently, we've seen some new initiatives in Canada, like the appointment of gender advisers, which is an initiative that was rolled out last year by the CDS. Since then, we've been looking to some of our traditional allies, like the U.K., the United States, and Australia, for best practices. In Australia, they've set up a pilot course on gender for their own forces, which they will open up to allies and partners. Canada could very well do the same kind of thing: develop a Canadian-branded gender training course that would focus on the full spectrum of operations.
When I look at training materials right now, my sense is that they focus a lot on peace-building and nation building, but training approaches should be considering the full spectrum of operations, because that's what our Canadian Armed Forces face in terms of global engagement. For the gender training to be fully comprehensive, you have to look at how gender might impact, yes, a peace mission, but also, for example, targeting decisions.
When we talk about mainstreaming, I think we've done it well in certain areas, but we need to broaden the skill sets to make sure that training covers any contingency. Canada has a lot to contribute in that.
4:10 p.m.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
Under whose responsibility or whose authority do you think creating such a course would fall?
4:10 p.m.
Associate Professor and Director, Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University, As an Individual
It starts at the very beginning. We have to look at the cadets, for instance. There is a curriculum review that's under way right now. I believe it's led by military personnel generation. The idea is to look at the entire curriculum and to see it in terms of the education piece and where we can bring that knowledge in, because there needs to be some baseline awareness. Then you look at the various training institutions. You would like to see a gender component in all of them, whether it's the annual military exercise out west, Maple Resolve, or whether it's at the Peace Support Training Centre. The Peace Support Training Centre already does a bit of gender training through pre-deployment, but it could be more comprehensive, of course, as there are more and more demands placed on their training centre.
4:10 p.m.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
If I understand what you're saying, and certainly it's what I've observed, sometimes the gender things are reserved for the peace-building and nation building aspects. I guess what you're really saying is that it would take someone like the chief of the defence staff to say, “I want to see these elements in everything we do.”
4:10 p.m.
Associate Professor and Director, Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University, As an Individual
Yes, and I think he has said that, and now the gap is to make sure that gender adviser capacity is bolstered. Right now you have some gender advisers in some missions. You have some gender advisers in CJOC and CANSOFCOM and strategic joint staff, but you need a whole lot more if you're going to implement it throughout all of the training institutions and military exercises.
4:10 p.m.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
I guess there are two ways you could approach that in the military. One would be a separate budget to fund those things, and the other would be allocations in every piece of the budget to fund those things. What's happened so far?
4:10 p.m.
Associate Professor and Director, Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University, As an Individual
Right now, as far as I can tell, there has been the creation of new positions—not necessarily a reallocation of funding in terms of training, but just a request to emphasize the gender piece in existing training programs, which don't necessarily have budgetary implications. In my view, if there is no money for additional gender advisers, what you can do is a network of gender focal points. These would be certain individuals whose primary task is not gender, but who have the necessary background knowledge and training to support their teams in implementing that broader vision, which you correctly described.
4:15 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Stephen Fuhr
I'm going to cut it off there, Mr. Garrison. I let you go a minute over.
Mr. Robillard.
4:15 p.m.
Liberal
Yves Robillard Liberal Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
My questions are for Mr. Brodeur.
You were the Canadian ambassador to Turkey from 2005 to 2007, and you were Canada's permanent representative to NATO from 2011 to 2015.
Could you tell us briefly about the importance of the Bosporus Strait for NATO and for Canada, historically and in the current global context?
4:15 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs, As an Individual
We have to refer to the Montreux Convention, which regulates naval shipping on the Bosporus and allows transit through the seaway. This allows NATO ships to travel to the Black Sea and Russian ships—at that time, they were Soviet ships—to pass and use the Bosporus seaway.
It's an important strategic route. I'm not going to give you a history lesson, but we can refer to the Battle of the Dardanelles. It was already strategically important.
As you know, part of the NATO fleet was active in the Black Sea, and it still is. It must pass through the Bosporus, which is controlled under the Montreux Convention.
4:15 p.m.
Liberal
Yves Robillard Liberal Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC
In the context of Canada's being a member of NATO and a partner of its member allies, can you give us an idea of the crisis management required by the crisis created in 2015 by a Turkish F-16 that shot down a Russian air force combat aircraft?
What is the Canadian reaction when incidents like this occur? What is Canada's place in NATO actions under such circumstances?
4:15 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs, As an Individual
What happened is quite simple. Turkey, as a member of the North Atlantic Council, and therefore an allied country, convened a special briefing of the council to make it aware of the events. The council therefore obtained the details that Turkey kindly provided. Canada, as a member of the council and of NATO, was at this meeting. It would be quite accurate to say that all countries around the table, not just Canada, were interested in the issue and worried about developments. This did not require a NATO response, as Turkey did not request it. Turkey just wanted to inform its partners of the situation. The crisis has been managed by Turkey itself. It has become a bilateral topic.
4:15 p.m.
Liberal
Yves Robillard Liberal Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC
My next question follows on the last one. What kind of crisis management situation created the attempted coup in Turkey in July 2016. What about the aftermath of its failure and the measures taken by the Turkish government against the actors involved?
4:15 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs, As an Individual
All I can give you is a very personal opinion, because I was no longer the Canadian representative at that time. I don't know how NATO reacted within the institutional framework of the organization. I can't tell you at this point what impact it has had on relations between Turkey and NATO, apart from the fact that the secretary-general, Mr. Stoltenberg, certainly reacted. There are probably some press releases available. Beyond that, I would not want to comment, since I wasn't at the table.
4:15 p.m.
Liberal
Yves Robillard Liberal Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC
From Canada's perspective and given its connection with NATO, could you tell us, diplomatically, what the Turkish situation looks like vis-à-vis the Kurdish population? How does NATO perceive the situation on Turkish territory, in the Kurdish regions of Iraq, Iran and Syria? What does this mean for Canada?
4:20 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs, As an Individual
As far as Canada is concerned, I will let the people developing our policies and our points of view on this to answer your question. It's not my issue.
In terms of the Kurdish question and Turkey, I will offer a general comment. With respect to the internal circumstances of the Atlantic Alliance member countries, unless they have an immediate strategic impact on the alliance, such as threats to the alliance, these are subjects that are part of the bilateral component of the nations. So the national interest of the nations is at stake at this time.
As far as I know, Turkey didn't want to bring these issues to the NATO table, and I very much doubt that NATO is doing it itself.
This question can be difficult and worrying. It certainly is for me, in any case. However, NATO officials would tell you that, for now, this isn't an issue of concern to NATO. It's an issue being managed by Turkey. And, without wanting to put myself in the place of the Turkish ambassador, I would say that the Turks would no doubt tell you that it's a question that doesn't concern NATO right now.
4:20 p.m.
Liberal
Yves Robillard Liberal Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC
Thank you.
My next question is for Dr. von Hlatky.
You've written twice this year about NATO and the notion of deterrence. How has the role of NATO as a deterrent been articulated in recent years, particularly because of developments in Eastern Europe?
4:20 p.m.
Associate Professor and Director, Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University, As an Individual
Thank you for your question.
With regard to deterrence, there has been a fairly interesting evolution since the end of the Cold War. After it ended, we saw NATO try to focus on other pillars, such as crisis management and security cooperation. The deterrence and collective defence component never went away, but it was emphasized less. It is also seen in the way the nuclear dimension is expressed in key strategic documents as the strategic concept. It is noted that the role of nuclear weapons, as described in these documents, is more political than military.
It is really the current debate that led to the development of the defence and deterrence document as part of the NATO position, which Mr. Garrison mentioned earlier. It was truly a pivotal moment to determine whether NATO deterrence would give more or less space to the nuclear dimension. In the end, we realized that it was more the status quo. As well, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 really reinforced or endorsed this change.
Let's come back to 2017. I personally believe that there haven't been huge changes in NATO's deterrent position, because there are still three key capabilities: the nuclear dimension, which remains; the conventional dimension, which has been reinforced by NATO's enhanced forward presence; and the anti-missile shield dimension. So, it's a fairly stable position, but the conventional dimension has grown considerably since 2014.
4:20 p.m.
Liberal
Darren Fisher Liberal Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Professor von Hlatky, thank you for your testimony. I'm moving my first question aside so I can talk to you a bit more about gender equality.
With our defence review and assigning a GBA lens, and with reference to your comments about being behind the Nordic countries, when implemented, does the defence review bring us in alignment with those Nordic countries? Are we proposing the right things to get us where they are?
4:20 p.m.
Associate Professor and Director, Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University, As an Individual
Thank you for the question, because this is a message that I want to highlight.
We don't necessarily have to emulate what the Nordic countries have done. I think it's okay to have a Canadian approach to how to do this gender mainstreaming strategy. I think the gender-based analysis tool that has been in place for several years is a well-designed tool. Where we need, I suppose, to speed up our efforts is in how we adopt those tools to security and defence challenges.
The baseline tool is great as a primer and as a baseline, but it's an additional challenge to see how the guidelines within that tool kit can then be applied to complex security and defence challenges, whether those are policy challenges, or operational planning, or mission-specific challenges. I think it's that leap that we still need to do.
I'm not saying that Nordic countries are doing it.... They have a training infrastructure to provide training at the leadership level and for gender advisers. However, when I look at training approaches writ large, even the UN training approaches, what's missing is that tailoring. It's teaching people to know how to assess their operational environment as a social ecosystem, to understand what their presence will be like locally, and understanding the differentiated impacts on women, men, boys, and girls locally. Then it's how gender is incorporated as sometimes even a tactic in adversarial strategies.
It's that piece where a lot more work needs to be done. I'm not seeing anyone leading the way on that, which is why I think Canada should seize on this opportunity. What I'm seeing is a lot of baseline training. It is very focused on peace-building and nation building, as I mentioned before. However, when it comes to being able to tailor to a broader range of operational context, I think this is where the exciting developments lie ahead.
4:25 p.m.
Liberal
Darren Fisher Liberal Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS
How would ensuring a gender-specific perspective on all future NATO missions enhance security? How does that change the way things are being done right now?
4:25 p.m.
Associate Professor and Director, Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University, As an Individual
Some of the deeply held gender biases that we have and we harbour can lead to faulty operational planning sometimes, or incomplete policies. I think we only need to look at missions of the past to see that those are lessons we tended to learn the hard way.
Bringing this forward in the planning process, in terms of building that into policies and operational planning, as opposed to finding stuff out while on mission and then calling that back home to tweak the approach, would be preferable. That would mean, within the force generation process at NATO, already building in some gender requirements and capability asks to make sure that is built in from the very beginning.
Gender analysis is very useful also for identifying early warning indicators. When building links with host communities, as well, I think that the tendency has been towards ignoring women's voices, which leads to an incomplete social picture of the operational context where we send our troops.