National Defence Committee on Feb. 6th, 2018

[Kerry Buck]

I think I can get back with a written answer on that one, if that's all right.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Perfect. That would be helpful.

I am happy to circle back and give you some more time. We will have time for that.

I'm going to yield the floor to Mr. Bezan.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I have just a quick question for General Whitecross. It's a difficult posting you have in Rome—nothing to see there and no places to visit.

You talked about how the NATO Defense College has had to evolve and stay current, especially with the way the threat environment has changed in the last four years. In your tenure there, what have you seen of how the program has changed?

I was also just curious as to whether the NATO Defense College has seen a big change in the doctrine of how NATO operates and how you pass that on to the officers who are there for training.

[LGen Christine Whitecross]

This is a really difficult post in Rome, so thanks for that.

I have a couple of things. In the last year, we've undergone an academic curriculum review that looked at what kind of education the NATO Defense College provides based on the future security environment. We did that based on the fundamental documents that have come from NATO headquarters, ACT and ACO in Norfolk, and, in Mons, SACEUR.

We put those together and looked at the objectives that were currently in mind, and then we identified whether or not we needed to make changes. I'm happy to say that the curriculum review has identified a number of what I think are good, substantive changes, particularly a refocusing on Russia, for obvious reasons, in a seminar format that we hadn't done in the past, a refocusing on China, and a larger influential engagement on the MENA region in terms of the “projecting stability” pillar of NATO. In terms of the academic curriculum review, we've done that in the last year, and we're just starting to implement those changes.

We're also in the process, as I mentioned in my opening comments, of doing a strategic planning effort for the college to take it into whatever the NDC will look like in the future in the 2020-30 time frame, to make sure there aren't gaps that we're missing in our responsiveness to nations' needs in the alliance. I think there's more that the college could do, for example, in distance learning and the like. There is a huge increase in the appetite of our partners to get into some of the courses, but coming to Rome could be a bit to endure given the cost, so it's good to be able to provide another alternative. We're looking at different ways to spread the message, as it were.

On the last point in terms of the doctrine work, we're constantly in discussions with the headquarters, but within the college we also have a research division that has links to think tanks around the world in many countries, including here in the headquarters in Brussels. We're constantly relooking at how we're providing the education. As I mentioned, we don't have in-house faculty who do that. We actually take from the outside the academics, the government folks, and the military folks from around the world, and we bring them to the college so they can provide current and relevant information to the course members.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you.

Ambassador Buck, as you know, coming up in April, the North Atlantic Treaty will have been signed 69 years ago. The articles haven't really been updated in quite some time.

Of course, we always talk about article 4 as the ability to consult, and about article 5 as an attack on one being an attack on all, but it always specifies an armed attack, but, of course, war has changed dramatically. We have cyberwarfare and we have electronic warfare, and those operations just as easily could take out air defence systems, tracking systems, and the ability to keep the security and peace within a region. There's also hybrid warfare, where now we have non-state players or people who are being used by other states, but you know, little green men, fake news, terrorist organizations....

How do we evolve as an alliance to ensure that article 5 can be used when need be in the event of our dealing with something that's not considered an armed attack, but definitely would have the same type of impact, whether it's a missile or, when you look at cyberwarfare and electronic warfare models, an invasion?

[Kerry Buck]

Article 5 has grown with the times. It is embedded in international humanitarian law, the law of self-defence. It's clear that this body of law has evolved over time to recognize that an armed attack can take different forms, and yet will still reach that article 5 threshold. For instance, in Warsaw, leaders recognized that a cyber attack could amount to an article 5 attack.

The challenge for NATO these days is that there's what we call a grey zone. It's that grey zone that the Russians occupy so well. For instance, General Gerasimov is the Russian chief of defence staff. His doctrine talks about a continuum of warfare wherein about two-thirds of their tools of warfare aren't armed attack. The Russians will use active campaigns of different disinformation throughout every stage of warfare. Dealing in that grey zone becomes a challenge for NATO and for other countries seeking to respond to attacks that are just below that article 5 threshold.

The good news is that there's a much deeper understanding of hybrid threats and cyber threats. NATO has done a lot, and I mean a lot, to update plans, strategies, to harden cyber infrastructure inside NATO and among allies so we can respond and prevent such attacks that fall below the article 5 threshold.

NATO has also done a lot to increase its situational awareness with a real investment in the intelligence analysis, hybrid fusion cells, active steps to counter misinformation, and to keep eyes on those hybrid or asymmetric threats that could amount to something, or to prevent them at source.

We're living this in a very real way in our battle group in Latvia. There are active and constant Russian misinformation campaigns targeting our battle group and the other battle groups in the Baltics and Poland. We've hardened our cyber capacity. We've trained our troops during pre-deployment training about preventing and not being susceptible to misinformation. We've got people at the centre of excellence, StratCom, and we're working with the centre on hybrid.

A lot is going on to respond to that grey zone and to limit the grey zone and to know when to act.

That was a long answer, I apologize.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

No, that was very much appreciated.

I'll let the next couple of questions run long. I think the committee needed to hear that answer, and thank you for it.

I'm going to turn the floor over to Darren Fisher, and I'll be very liberal with your time, as I will with Ms. Benson.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

General Hainse, you mentioned 40 extra targets that NATO tasked Canada with. Are you able to provide a little more detail? I assume that some of that is public or you can share some of that with us.

Are you able to confirm that these 40 extra targets are reflected in our new defence policy?

[LGen Marquis Hainse]

As you can appreciate, sir, I'm not able to give you the details of those targets. I might have said 40, but there are actually a bit more than 40 if I compare them to the last cycle. What I can say to you is that Canada was given 222 targets this time. At this particular juncture, those 222 targets are based on two principles: the principle of fair burden sharing and the principle of “reasonable challenge” to those targets.

Fair burden-sharing, obviously, is based on what NATO, as an alliance, thinks that Canada should contribute in terms of its forces and its size and its wealth. The challenge is based on what we think Canada can do in the various time frames. As we negotiated this process with regard to those targets, and as we were going through the negotiations, the defence policy review was happening at the same time.

Is this totally in sync? Not everything is perfect. I'm not sure it is totally in sync. Was it considered? I can guarantee you that it was considered. Is there still more work to be done? There's absolutely no doubt that there's still more work to be done, but we are deeply involved in this process. At the end of the day we have accepted all of our targets. Some, again, are for the medium term. Some are for longer terms. Then we will see how these things will evolve.

That's part of the five steps. We are required to report on those every second year. We are going to report on them, and we're going to do some follow-up on those targets attributed to us. We will pay attention to what is being contributed by the other nations also, to make sure they are also responding to those targets.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you.

Ambassador Buck, I don't want to put words in your mouth, but you mentioned striving towards meaningful dialogue with Russia. Is there any dialogue with Russia? Is there even a conversation happening right now?

[Kerry Buck]

There is indeed. You will recall that at the Wales summit, NATO took a decision that it would suspend practical co-operation with Russia. That was following the illegal annexation of Crimea. Since then the Russian destabilizing activities in the Donbass have increased exponentially, so we're still very much in that situation of sending a clear message to Russia that violating those norms of international behaviour is not okay.

At the same time we need the dialogue; we need to keep the channels of dialogue open. We've met in the NATO-Russia Council three times this year. We've discussed such issues. Ukraine's always the first issue on the agenda. We've talked about Afghanistan, and we've talked about risk reduction and transparency. There was an agreement at the last NATO-Russia Council that we would exchange mutual briefings on military exercises, so the dialogue is happening.

Russia paints NATO as an adversary when it speaks to its own population, when it speaks internationally. I think it's fair to say that this dialogue with Russia certainly isn't a meeting of minds when we meet in the NATO-Russia Council, but it is a very important opportunity to express our views—at times, you can imagine, very firm views on what they're doing in Ukraine, for instance. We do meet. We expect to be continuing those meetings in the NATO-Russia Council.

There are also some military-to-military conversations between the Russian chief of defence staff and the chairman of the military committee at NATO. With the supreme allied commander in Europe, there's a plan as well for conversation there.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Can I just ask one more quick one?

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Sure.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

What could Canada better do within the NATO construct?

[Kerry Buck]

Just for NATO?

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Yes.

[Kerry Buck]

I'm going to start with Latvia, and I cannot overstate how important the signal was of Canada taking on that framework-nation role in Latvia. As General Hainse said, Canada's back in Europe in some kind of sustained presence. It also showed that we cared about the alliance and that we're there. Then, if I extrapolate, as I said before, we participated in very meaningful ways in every single NATO mission operation activity since the alliance began. Where the alliance needs to do new things—like ISR; cyber; women, peace, and security, inclusive security—I think it's fair to say that we're a real thought leader as well. We help push the policies, and then we show up with the right people who can do a really good job. We have very respected troops. Keep doing more of the same is what I'd say. I'm proud of it. We have real leverage here at NATO, and we've earned that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Ms. Benson.

[Sheri Benson, NDP, Saskatoon West, SK]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ambassador Buck, could Canada, being a founding member of the alliance and already being a staunch supporter of international efforts to reduce the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, use its influence within NATO to initiate the dialogue for the nuclear prohibition treaty within the alliance? Further to that, would using the annual NATO conference on weapons of mass destruction, WMD, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation be a really good place to continue the dialogue on the nuclear prohibition treaty?

Finally, in your view, could Canada further discussions on this by hosting the next conference?

[Kerry Buck]

The challenge with the ban treaty is not only in relation to NATO's nuclear deterrence, but also to the non-proliferation treaty. In many respects, it undercuts the NPT and can be seen to be undercutting some of the mechanisms embedded in the NPT. Honestly, we don't think that the ban treaty is the tool to use to move forward the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. That being said, the sentiment that led to the ban treaty is a very valid one, and a core pillar of Canada's nuclear policy, forever, has been to work towards disarmament and non-proliferation. We, along with other non-nuclear weapon states, including some of those who participate in the sharing arrangements at NATO, were very clear proponents of the disarmament non-proliferation agenda here too, while benefiting from the nuclear deterrence. We sent both of those messages here inside NATO.

I have information on the conference. The last one was held in May in Finland—the NATO conference on proliferation challenges. It talked about a whole host of issues: non-proliferation regimes, regional proliferation challenges, etc. My nuclear policy officer here participated in that.

As for the next conference, an ally has already spoken to host it. I don't know the date; I believe it's in the fall. It's a conference that we participate in, but as I said, non-proliferation, disarmament, and the nuclear deterrence is a very live debate inside the alliance right now at the NAC and the subsidiary committees.

[Sheri Benson, NDP, Saskatoon West, SK]

You may have said this, but I'm just wondering who is chairing the NATO committee on proliferation.

[Kerry Buck]

We have a lot of nuclear expertise here. The chair is William Alberque, a member of the NATO international staff. The deputy secretary general of NATO, Rose Gottemoeller, is a colleague of mine whom I've been working with for a long time, and she, too, is an expert in all matters nuclear, including non-proliferation and disarmament. We have a lot of expertise here.

[Sheri Benson, NDP, Saskatoon West, SK]

This might be a hard question to answer in a minute.

Maybe you can speak to how Canada's interests have changed in NATO since it began in 1949.

[Kerry Buck]

Our interest in the international rules-based system has remained constant. How NATO expresses that has shifted over time. During the Cold War, there was a very clear focus on collective defence. With the end of the Cold War, there's been a very clear focus on out-of-area crisis management operations. Now we're back, post-2014, to a world in which we have to do it all at the same time. Coupled with that has been a rise in asymmetric threats of terrorism, for instance, for which NATO has a role to play but it has to work very carefully with its partners. NATO shifted to create over 40 partner states, for a really big network and much deeper relationships with the UN, EU, OSCE, etc.

We're still there in the middle of NATO, but NATO is shifting, and it's kind of in the middle of concentric circles of bodies and states working on international peace and security. It serves Canada's peace and security interests even more in a way.

[Sheri Benson, NDP, Saskatoon West, SK]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.