Evidence of meeting #11 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was arctic.
A recording is available from Parliament.
3:35 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Ladies and gentlemen, I call this meeting to order. It's good to listen in on a conversation among academics and to hear about all of the trials and tribulations of academics and whether they have classes or don't have classes.
It's good to see Professor Fergusson again. I think the last time was in Washington, but I'm not absolutely certain.
3:35 p.m.
A voice
I think so.
3:35 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
I assume our intrepid officials have conducted the complete weather report across Canada, from Manitoba to Calgary to Ottawa. All we lack is a sports report now.
I apologize for starting a few minutes late, but we had a vote. Members are coming in. We have a quorum, so we are prepared to move forward.
I'm going to call you in the order on the order paper, starting with Dr. Fergusson, Professor Huebert, and then Dr. Saideman.
Dr. Fergusson, it's good to see you again. You have five minutes. Go ahead, please.
3:35 p.m.
Dr. James Fergusson Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
Thank you.
I will be brief and focus my remarks on the assessment of the threat to North America. The first thing to recognize is that the threat assessment really hasn't changed despite the ongoing war in Ukraine. The issues confronting North American defence have been known for some time now. You can go back a decade to the development of long-range cruise missiles, which basically made the North Warning System obsolete. Since about five years ago or so, the development and deployment of hypersonic vehicles by the Russians has posed another significant challenge to North American defence.
In simple terms, North American defence faces significant and severe capability gaps and command seams. With respect to capability gaps in particular, you confront the problem of long-range cruise missiles that will be able to launch well over the high Arctic, if not, depending on Russian developments, from Russia itself—long-range, ground-launch cruise missiles—which the North Warning System simply cannot deal with. It can pick them up very briefly as they sort of fly over, but there's no capacity to really detect them, track them and vector interceptors to them.
Hypersonics pose another very distinct challenge. The North Warning System is not calibrated to, nor does it have the power to be able to look up and find these weapons. The American ballistic missile warning network, which feeds into the NORAD ballistic early warning mission, is calibrated to deal with ballistic missiles, which fly much higher and much faster than hypersonics do. Therefore, we have two significant gaps in defence.
Second, in terms of command seams, in the past North America has always been limited to Canada and the U.S. when we have talked about NORAD and North American defence. There are significant problems in that structure, particularly in terms of Greenland. Greenland is North America. The U.S. has closer links than we do. We have none, actually. Greenland has always been made out as looking east. In the U.S. unified command plan, it is attached to U.S. European Command, when in fact it should be attached to U.S. Northern Command and NORAD. This extends also to Iceland.
There are command seam problems; there are capability gap problems, and it becomes a very complicated air defence or aerospace defence environment, not least because hypersonics blur the distinction between air and space for ballistic missile defence.
These are big issues that the Government of Canada, along with our ally to the south, the United States, faces with respect to coming up with an effective defence capability and command structure to ensure that we can actually detect, deter, defeat and defend against potential and future threats.
[Technical difficulty—Editor] here. There are a lot of cost implications involved here, but I think I'll leave it there as a basic overview. In the question period, I'll happily provide more details about the problems we face.
3:35 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Thank you very much, Professor Fergusson.
Professor Huebert, you have five minutes. Go ahead, please.
3:35 p.m.
Dr. Robert Huebert Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to come to share some thoughts with the committee on the good work you're doing.
I have two major focuses within my introductory comments. The first is the challenges that Canada has today and has traditionally faced in regard to its threat assessment and its capability. The second is a focus on what those threats are as they develop against Canada.
The first issue, dealing with and trying to come to terms with the threats, and coming up with the ability to then operationalize them is threefold, in my view.
The first part is the absolute overshadowing of the United States over Canadian assessments of threat. One of the issues, dating all the way back to the beginning of the Second World War, is the fact that, ultimately, the United States will ensure that any safety of North America is its top priority. As a result, it has to a certain degree confounded Canada's ability—or even willingness—to engage in a threat assessment that is independent and outside of an allied framework. That is both good and bad in terms of how we try to go forward into this future.
The second element that challenges our threat assessment is that out of all the allied countries, Canada has one of the most highly politicized procurement processes. As a result, there has been an ongoing challenge in terms of coming to an understanding of the threat we face and being able to match together the necessary tools required to meet it. Because the Americans will ultimately be there to protect for any type of threat assessment, there is almost the perception of discretionary funding, which has been one of the major challenges Canada has faced in responding to the types of dangers that Dr. Fergusson has just referred to.
The third aspect is that these two realities have created a strategic culture within Canada whereby we've become very good at the tactical level. In terms of knowing how to be interoperable with our allies and how to respond with a maximum [Inaudible—Editor] with a minimum of expenditures, we do an outstanding job. Canadian leadership, as demonstrated in Operation Reassurance, is testament to this.
The challenge we have, however, is our ability, from the strategic perspective, to understand the threat from a purely Canadian context. The reality is that many will contend that we do not have to ever do that, and that it is only in the context of the North American and western European appreciation.
In terms of understanding the changing threat environment, this is reflected in a somewhat late response to a very rapidly changing international system. I agree with what Dr. Fergusson said, that the challenges Canada is facing have been well known and developing for quite some time.
My timeline would go slightly differently. I would suggest that what we started seeing with the arrival of Putin as president of the Russian Federation was both an intent and a desire to once again return Russia to a great power. He began a series of processes that were probably not fully understood within the Canadian context. There was an effort to maintain dialogue on the Arctic co-operation side, but within the context of Arctic exceptionalism, as it is referred to.
However, even more problematic, there was a basic approach of more or less downplaying the Russian statements and actions. They had difficulties in some of their initial moves to procurement, but many of these weapons systems that Dr. Fergusson refers to did not simply appear in 2022. We can trace their initiation to the period roughly between 2005 and 2010, once again giving us warning, specifically in terms of the hypersonics, of underwater autonomous vehicles and other types of delivery systems that are a direct threat. These started becoming known as early as the 2010s.
We also saw the use of force to redraw the maps of Europe. Chechnya probably gave us a first indication of the Russian way of war. The war in Georgia clearly indicated that the ability of states to choose to join NATO was no longer going to be allowed for any neighbouring state to Russia. The beginning of the Ukrainian war in 2014 illustrated this very clearly.
Once again, the threat to Canada in the context of both collective security and its own northern security were probably telegraphed to us as early as 2012-13, but now is the time that we're starting to really give full attention to it.
I'll conclude by also observing that we have great difficulty in trying to come to terms with the threat the changing element of China represents. There are, of course, those who do not see China as a direct military threat but perhaps an economic threat, or perhaps something in between—a hybrid threat—and this is of course something we are going to have to be paying greater attention to as the international system further resets itself after the events of the Ukrainian war.
I'll leave on this point and will be happy to take any questions on this.
Thank you.
3:40 p.m.
Liberal
3:40 p.m.
Dr. Stephen Saideman Paterson Chair in International Affairs, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual
Thank you for the opportunity to [Technical difficulty—Editor]
It may sound strange at a time when much of the focus of the world, including Canadian leadership, is on the war between Russia and Ukraine, but the most important threats facing Canada and the CAF are climate change and its own abuse of power crisis. In this statement, I'll briefly address the threats we are facing and how well DND and the CAF are preparing for dealing with these threats.
I come at this based on my expertise on civil-military relations, my work as a scholar of international relations—
3:45 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Excuse me. For some bizarre reason, we're getting English into French, and I don't know whether we're getting French into English.
Could you please go back to the beginning? I apologize.
3:45 p.m.
Paterson Chair in International Affairs, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual
It's okay.
3:45 p.m.
Paterson Chair in International Affairs, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual
In my first 10 years in Canada, I lived in Montreal, but my French never really got that good.
Thank you for this opportunity to speak.
It may sound strange at this time, when the focus of much of the world, including Canadian leadership, is on the war between Russia and Ukraine, but the most important threats facing Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces are climate change and its own abuse of power crisis.
In this statement, I'll briefly address the threats that we are facing, and how well DND and CAF are preparing for dealing with these threats. I come at this based on my expertise on civil-military relations, my work as a scholar of international relations, my interactions with various elements of the defence and security community, and in my role as the director of the Canadian Defence and Security Network.
I have two big caveats to start with. I am not an expert on any particular military technology—or Zoom, apparently—so my opinions about procurement are less well informed than my views on the CAF and the crisis it's been undergoing for years.
Second, contrary to my two colleagues here, I am an Arctic skeptic. If the Russians can't provide logistics for a conventional military campaign next door, I can't see how they're a huge threat to the north.
We do need to invest in modernizing our warning technology in the north, but the key is that this requires greater consultation with the people who live there. Our best protection against northern threats is a better relationship and more investment in the people who live there. The Canadian Rangers system works precisely because of the local trust and buy-in.
To go back to my main topic, people used to talk about climate change in abstract terms. This fall, storms and floods isolated Vancouver and severed Canada's connection to the Pacific more effectively than a Russian or Chinese first strike. Before the pandemic, General Eyre, when he was army chief of staff, noted that assistance to civil authorities was increasing in intensity and frequency.
The pandemic itself, in which more Canadian civilians died than in any attack or war, was yet another emergency requiring much CAF effort, yet we continue to see domestic operations as an afterthought. It's always mentioned as a priority, but always the least of priorities. This has to change. It has to become a more important priority for the Canadian Armed Forces.
The second threat is the CAF itself. Sexual misconduct is just one part of the larger abuse of power crisis. We've seen numerous generals and admirals lose their positions because of poor behaviour, and this creates a chilling effect that is not new. Soldiers, sailors and aviators have long known that folks at the top do not want to hear bad news and do not respond to it well.
Meanwhile, promotions have been an old boys' club, where the CDS gets to pick his command staff, with little oversight. There are many stories of resentment and feuds between the two towers, between DND and CAF, that are just getting out now, but it's long been the case.
Civilians, who were supposed to be responsible for civilian control of the military, have largely abdicated their responsibilities. Given this environment, plus a good job market, we should not be surprised that people do not want to join or stay in the CAF. General Eyre has used the phrase “existential crisis” to describe the challenges the CAF faces, as we are something like 10,000 short of our recruitment and retention goals. That's more than 10%, and it's closer to 16%.
Perhaps people choose not to join because they fear they will be abused. People may leave because of such abuse. They certainly fear reporting their abuse to the chain of command. Yet, we had in place a minister and a CDS for several years who did little or nothing, or worse, to change things. Indeed, the CDS picked, as head of personnel, a man who had a nickname earned from his successful efforts to escape responsibility, the Mulligan man.
The good news is that we have a new minister who is much better equipped and much more serious about making these changes. So far, the CAF talks a good game of changing its culture, but one of the most serious challenges is this: Will the CAF accept serious civilian control of the military? The minister's job is more than just picking the CDS. She understands that. Her role is more than that, and she understands that far better than her predecessor. I'm not sure the mid-level officers of the CAF do.
General Eyre and Minister Anand have started the process of making serious reforms, but they need to be institutionalized and we need to learn from past failures.
I have a few suggestions as the committee goes forward.
You should take a closer look at the National Defence Act and consider whether it provides adequate authorities and tools [Technical difficulty—Editor]. Does the deputy minister have the tools needed to make sure people can do their jobs?
I suggest two potential changes. Apply a similar but stronger restriction than the United States has. The United States is not supposed to have a recently retired senior military person as its Secretary of Defense. It has waived that twice in recent years.
In our experience, with both Liberal and Conservative governments, senior military officers became ministers of national defence, and that has been predictably bad. They were too close in mindset and in networks to have the adequate distance to be sufficiently critical.
Similarly, the United States and most other democracies have regular, quadrennial reviews, and Canada should as well. We need to adapt. We need to have benchmarks that we regularly evaluate. Much has changed since the last defence review. This would also build up DND's muscles and habits for regular evaluations.
I have mentioned the recruitment crisis. I have one other suggestion for that: Have military service as a pathway to citizenship. The U.S. has long offered citizenship to people elsewhere who then become citizens along the way. This would not be easy, but it would help to develop a wider, deeper and more diverse pool of recruits. People will push back and say that security clearances get in the way, but this is something that the U.S. has managed to finesse. Just because it's hard doesn't mean we shouldn't try to do these things. We can do it too.
The very least we can do is reduce the obstacles to immigrants already living here, as we need their skills, their diverse perspectives and their energy. With populations of the usual pools of recruits declining, we need to be more imaginative and more determined.
Thank you.
3:50 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Thank you.
With that, we'll go to our six-minute rounds, starting with Madam Kerry-Lynne Findlay.
3:50 p.m.
Conservative
Kerry-Lynne Findlay Conservative South Surrey—White Rock, BC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to all the witnesses for being here today. It has been very informative.
Professor Huebert, you said that Canada has one of the most highly politicized procurement systems. I'm wondering if you could flesh that out a little. Who are you comparing us to, and what do you mean by that?
3:50 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
To give you a direct example, just look in terms of the issue of the replacement of a fighter aircraft. If we go to Finland, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands or Britain, we see they do tend to have a process that contains politics—all of the western countries do, let's be very clear on that—but they are able to compact the process by which they achieve that decision. We see a country such as Finland, which has always, traditionally, gone for supporting its Swedish friend and neighbour; of course, within a two-year period, as it felt more threatened, it was able to make the decision on the F-35.
We can also look at the Australians, who have all sorts of difficulties in terms of trying to get some of their systems up and working, but once again there has been more or less a bipartisan approach to how they approach the overall decisions. We see this with Japan in terms of the maintenance of their naval capabilities. There is a multipolarity acceptance in terms of the major systems that go ahead. In other words, these systems, these procedures, that the Americans, the British, the Japanese and Australians have are by no means perfect, but they are able to achieve a speed of decision that Canada simply hasn't been able to equal.
Once again, I would contend, it's a bit of a sense that the threat is going to be covered by someone else.
3:50 p.m.
Conservative
Kerry-Lynne Findlay Conservative South Surrey—White Rock, BC
Thank you.
Dr. Fergusson, how do you view China's recent fractional orbital bombardment system test coming from the south? Is NORAD prepared to deal with such a threat?
3:50 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
Basically, no. There were developments in the 1960s. The Soviet Union tested a fractional orbital bombardment system, but gave it up. This is a potential threat, and it's important for Canada [Technical difficulty—Editor] on the North Warning System, that northern line of radars. We have yet to get our minds around the fact that North America is a 360º continent that needs to be defended. In the NORAD relationship with the United States, we pass this on to the Americans—this is their problem—and they need to develop more advanced radars and sensor systems, which I think they're about to do.
At the end of the day, I don't see the test as anything really significant in terms of Chinese intent and capabilities. If you look at Chinese military doctrine, Chinese military thinking, the strategic political overview, you see that they're primarily concerned with what the U.S. has labelled as anti-access and area denial capabilities. The Americans are regionally focused right now. They're developing long-range capabilities to be able to threaten North America, and they can, of course, with their land-based ICBM fleet and growing SLBM capability. By and large, the Chinese, for the time being, are more a regional problem of the Asia-Pacific than they are a threat to North America.
3:55 p.m.
Conservative
Kerry-Lynne Findlay Conservative South Surrey—White Rock, BC
Professor, I'd also like to ask if you believe that Russia or China—or North Korea, for that matter—differentiate between a missile strike on Canada and a missile strike on the United States.
3:55 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
No. Because of [Technical difficulties—Editor] and the demographic reality that Canadian cities are located close to the border and to American cities, issues about the accuracy and the guidance systems of potential threatening long-range ICBM capabilities, and the fact that they understand very clearly that we are economically integrated, they see this, as far as I'm concerned, as one target set.
What their specific priorities for threatening or [Technical difficulties—Editor] is difficult for us to know—
3:55 p.m.
Conservative
3:55 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
Pardon me.
3:55 p.m.
Conservative
Kerry-Lynne Findlay Conservative South Surrey—White Rock, BC
I'm sorry, but we're losing the connection with you. I thought you had finished.
3:55 p.m.
Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual
That's okay.
Basically, this idea that somehow everyone separates Canada from the United States is a Canadian myth, for political purposes. We are one target area, and it's confirmed by our close relationship with the United States.
3:55 p.m.
Conservative
Kerry-Lynne Findlay Conservative South Surrey—White Rock, BC
This is perhaps a question for Professor Huebert again.
How do you think Russia and China view Canada's Arctic and the Northwest Passage, in strategic terms?
3:55 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
We have to be careful in strategic terms, because there's a bit of a tendency to say that the sovereignty issue surrounding the Northwest Passage is a security issue—that somehow the Chinese and the Russians may want to take advantage. The Russians actually have a position that's quite similar to Canada's, in terms of their own northern sea route in the Northeast Passage. It's more the security issue that we have to be concerned about.
At this point in time, one has to wonder whether the Russians, in particular, see the Canadian efforts to not modernize to the same degree that we said we would in 2017. I would also add that our northern European allies have been quite active in modernizing their surveillance and reactive forces since 2016. Whether or not we are seen as a weak link.... Now, “A weak link to what?” always becomes the question.
Therefore, in that context, the answer to your question is that we don't know Putin's thinking or what he means. The danger we face is.... Remember that Putin suggested the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons when the crisis began in the second phase of the Ukrainian war, and he's had a long-term policy for at least a year or a year and a half. It's called “escalate to de-escalate”. We're not quite sure what that means, but whether or not a demonstration of Canadian weakness.... Quite frankly, we don't know, but that does remain a possibility.
The Chinese—