National Defence Committee on Nov. 3rd, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Having resolved our technical issues, I bring this meeting to order.

This is the 38th meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence.

We have with us today Dr. Lajeunesse from St. Francis Xavier University, and Dr. David Perry, who is here in person, from the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

Both of you are familiar with the procedures of the defence committee. Each of you will have five minutes for your opening statement.

We'll start with Dr. Lajeunesse.

[Dr. Adam Lajeunesse, Associate Professor, St. Francis Xavier University, As an Individual]

Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here to take part in these important discussions.

My research and expertise lie in the field of Arctic defence and policy, and it's in that area that I'd like to offer some comments. However, I can answer questions on a broader array of northern security issues, including China's evolving role in the region, which I've written on extensively.

To begin with, the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation has obviously upended Canada's understanding of global security and great power competition. The concern has naturally extended into the Arctic, where we are neighbours with Russia across the Arctic Ocean. Canada is reconsidering its defence policy, and I suspect its Arctic policy as well, which has not had a clear policy refresh in over a decade.

I'd like to offer some advice on better ways to frame our thinking on Arctic defence in this new geopolitical environment.

Both Canada and the United States have long approached northern security with a sense of insecurity. This is apparent in the academic literature, in the media and from many politicians, frankly. Russia and even China increasingly exist in our security paradigm as serious threats that outclass us in every respect. The Russian icebreaker fleet, its array of northern bases and sophisticated air and sea defence spread across Siberia are constantly cited in the media and by politicians as a peril that threatens Canada, with our own and even American assets in the north paling in comparison.

This narrative, which could have been written in Moscow and in fact is one of the most common stories told by Russian state media and proxy news sites, is to highlight its own strength and western weakness. The problem is that this narrative is rubbish. We're buying into it, and it's impacting our strategic thinking.

Let me offer a different and, I think, more realistic framing for our policy. Russia is not strong or confident in the Arctic. It is terribly insecure and vulnerable. Russia has over 24,000 kilometres of Arctic coastline that it has to defend, and based on its recent national and service policies, it places a very high value on that defence.

That makes sense. The Russian Arctic holds that country's future. That's where the largest and newest natural gas and oil deposits are, the development of which is existential to the future of the Russian state as it currently is constructed. The Russian Arctic is home to much of the country's strategic nuclear capability, fast mining operations and a strategic sea route.

Russia's northern military deployments are rooted not in confident visions of power projection, but rather in a terrible sense of insecurity that these vulnerable resources and industries are at risk. Indeed, a quick look at the systems the Russians have deployed into the north shows that defensive mindset.

The North American Arctic is not a strategic centre of gravity. From a military and economic perspective, there is simply nothing there that, struck by the Russians, would cripple or do serious damage to Canada or the United States, or to our economies or our ability to wage war. Canada and North America more broadly are not vulnerable to Russian attack in the Arctic. Russia is vulnerable, and the government in Moscow is well aware of that.

To put it simply, Russia has very little capability to project power into the North American Arctic in a manner that would not be swiftly defeated or contained. NATO strikes against the Russian Arctic would be devastating. Highlighting Canadian weakness or NATO inferiority in the region not only is a misinterpretation but also supports Russian narratives. Canadian policy should not exaggerate Russia's ability to project power across the Arctic or underestimate NATO forces in that same region.

We might also look at Russian Arctic deployments from a different perspective in the future. The far north is a difficult and expensive place to deploy. It is also, for the most part, isolated. It may seem counterintuitive, but I would argue that Russian deployment of high-end military hardware into the north should be tacitly encouraged by Canada and its allies. The Russian defence budget is not infinite, and its stock of advanced precision-guided munitions is dwindling, as we know. It is in the west's interest that an insecure Russia is forced to place these assets in coastal Siberia rather than in Ukraine or western Russia, close to our NATO allies.

Messaging is therefore important. Canada must stop pretending that Russia dominates the Arctic, and if there is anything we can do to exacerbate existing Russian insecurities over its own safety, those efforts may pay strategic dividends.

Thank you. I'd be happy to take any questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Dr. Lajeunesse.

Dr. Perry, you have five minutes, please.

[Dr. David Perry, President, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for the invitation to speak to you today about Arctic security.

I would also place the discussion today against the backdrop of Russia's brutal war against Ukraine, which is demonstrating to me in a very real manner the implications of the return to great power competition identified in the 2017 “Strong, Secure, Engaged” defence policy. Both Russia and China continue to invest in military modernization programs, and they employ those modernized armed forces in concert with other elements of state power in ways that threaten western and Canadian interests.

Given both those countries' demonstrated and expressed interest in the Arctic and their increasing capability to take military action, either through the Arctic against targets in the rest of Canada or North America or against targets in the Canadian Arctic itself, Canada needs to act with an urgency that it is not demonstrating yet to strengthen its Arctic defences.

The announcement this summer of a package of investments supporting NORAD modernization is a good start to bolstering our Arctic defences, but we should look to build on those investments in defence infrastructure and aerospace assets by adding subsurface naval capabilities and integrated air and missile defences to improve our ability both to understand what is happening in our coastal waters and to defend Canada against missile threats.

However, unless substantial changes are made, we can expect that those investments could take between two and three decades to actually produce operationally employable defence assets.

Let me cite a few somewhat depressing examples to illustrate how glacial the pace of our Arctic defence investments has been recently. The Nanisivik naval refuelling station was launched as a government initiative in 2006, but after repeated delays, the last information I could find was that it is not slated to open until 2023.

Of the five projects intended to renew the Canadian Armed Forces core equipment platforms in the 2008 “Canada First” defence strategy, three of them—the replacement of our frigates and destroyers, new fighter aircraft and maritime patrol planes—would meaningfully improve our Arctic defences. None of the three projects that I just cited has yet resulted in the delivery of a single plane or ship. Under current schedules, they won't until between 2025 and the mid-2030s.

The observations I would make relevant to the committee's study about our demonstrated very slow ability to improve Arctic defence capability are twofold. First, we need to spend at least as much time and effort on improving our ability to implement the defence policies and funded investments that we have today as we do on considering additional future plans and investments. Second, when taking decisions today about the future, we need to account for our ability to respond to possible future changes in our security environment in the decades to come, not just our assessment of the world around us right now, given the time it takes to implement these types of decisions.

With respect to my first observation, I'd encourage the committee to focus throughout its study on what the Government of Canada collectively is doing to improve its ability to actually deliver more Arctic-focused information management, information technology infrastructure and equipment investments.

With respect to my second observation, I'd encourage the committee to think about the practical implications of how long it takes us to improve our Arctic defences and the impact of that on how we should assess military threats to the Canadian Arctic. When people talk about potential military threats, they're generally assessing the military capabilities that countries like Russia and China possess, how they could be employed to threaten Canada's Arctic, and whether or not they actually will be employed. In other words, they're evaluating a combination of the military capabilities that already exist right now with the potential hostile intent to use them.

As we're seeing today in Ukraine, autocratic great powers can and do use the military capabilities they develop with hostile intent when they deem it important. They do so in ways many of us in the West have difficulty understanding. Since those great powers have already developed the military capability to threaten Canada's Arctic and their intent to do so could change in a matter of days or weeks, the fact that it would take us decades to do anything about it should cause us some significant concern.

We need to start acting with significantly increased urgency to improve our Arctic defences today and start planning for the future on the assumption that the threats to our north are already real now and will worsen over time.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Dr. Perry. We seem to have a divergence of views, which is very helpful, actually.

With that, we go to our six-minute round, and Mr. Kelly.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

Thank you.

Dr. Perry, I'd like to talk about lapsed funding. Public accounts show $2.5 billion in lapsed funding. You spoke of delay. Maybe explain and get on the record the effect of lapsed funding and how that impacts our ability, in this case, to defend the Arctic.

[Dr. David Perry]

Lapsed funding effectively means the money that was allocated, which was drawn through the estimates, that doesn't actually get spent on whatever it was intended to purchase.

I'm not sure specifically. I haven't seen the explanation for exactly why the number last year amounted to $2.5 billion, but the net result of that is $2.5 billion that didn't go to whatever it was supposed to acquire and produce in terms of military capability.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

You're saying $2.5 billion was approved by Parliament, allocated through the estimates and not spent. We're not even spending the money we've agreed to spend, let alone the additional commitments that would be necessary to adequately fulfill the requirements you've outlined. Is that correct?

[Dr. David Perry]

Yes. I'd say it's actually worse than that, because there's also an additional amount over and above what Parliament allocated and what was approved through the estimates, compared to the amount that was intended to be spent and set aside in the fiscal framework under “Strong, Secure, Engaged”. That additional amount is about $2 billion to $3 billion over and above the amount that was called for in the estimates and then lapsed.

The real delta between execution and the available funding is probably closer to $4 billion or $5 billion when you add the lapse that was in the estimates and then include the amount that wasn't even drawn on but could have been.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

The government announced money that was then not authorized by Parliament or included in the estimates, and the money that was allocated by Parliament has not been spent. Okay, thank you.

You spoke about the need for subsurface capability in the Arctic. What kind of priority would you ascribe to replacing the Victoria class submarines? How quickly does that need to happen? What is the current state of subsurface defence capability?

[Dr. David Perry]

I don't think the current state is nearly as good as it should be. Our existing submarine fleet doesn't have nearly as many operational days at sea as I think are warranted given the current circumstance.

We need to broadly be looking at replacing those submarines with either new submarines themselves or a system of underwater vehicles that could be operated remotely—perhaps working in conjunction—as well as additional sensing capability to be able to detect other people's submarines that could be working in Canadian coastal waters and approaches.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

Carry on with the importance of that. Describe some of the threats we're trying to deal with.

[Dr. David Perry]

Essentially, without improving that significantly, we don't know who's in our waters. We might be able to get some of that information from some of our allies if they're there, but if we don't have our own submarines there, we don't have a good understanding of what's happening within our coastal waters.

Given the modernization of the Russian forces in particular, they have sophisticated new submarine capability that I think can pose a significant threat to both Canada and wider North American interests.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

Was the funding announced by Minister Anand for the modernization of NORAD sufficient?

[Dr. David Perry]

I don't think it's sufficient, in the sense that it basically is restricted, as far as I understand it, to only a set of infrastructure and aerospace investments. It doesn't include money for any of that naval capability that I just discussed, so in that sense, no.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

The current announced modernization of NORAD is not adequate to Canada's defence needs.

[Dr. David Perry]

That would be my assessment, yes.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

Thank you.

Going back to the issue of lapsed funding, what needs to change in order that we don't have lapsed funding? This is not the only department that has significant lapsed funding. It would be one thing if the government would say that in the name of economy, they have decided to not undertake something. That would be one thing. We could have an argument about whether that's wise or not in any particular policy area, but when Parliament has actually authorized an expenditure and the government can't get the money out the door and fulfill the objectives it has stated, this has extraordinary implications for our own security in this area.

Can you talk about the procurement process? What are the problems the government has with getting money that's been authorized by Parliament out the door to fulfill the needs for which it was authorized?

[Dr. David Perry]

I'd say that the fact that this has been happening since the late 2000s indicates a series of systemic issues in addition to some that are more localized in the last couple of years.

The implications of the pandemic on supply chains and workforce issues would have some immediate effects, I would imagine, on the amount of money that lapsed in the last fiscal year specifically. Beyond that, we don't have enough capacity in our procurement system to move the money that's earmarked as fast as we want to. There aren't enough people. They don't have enough specific preparation and training.

Given the mismatch between capacity and intent, there's not enough prioritization, I don't think, on which projects need to move as a matter of priority. There's also a need to have a better central focus from the entire Government of Canada, from the cabinet level on down, to really drive this if it's an important priority for the Government of Canada.

There are a number of other things, but those are three that I'd focus on.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you.

Mr. May.

[Bryan May, Liberal, Cambridge, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First of all, I want to thank both of the witnesses for being here today.

We've been very lucky, I think, to get so many amazing witnesses on this study and, as the chair said earlier, very divergent opinions. There doesn't seem to be a single, clear path on a number of the issues regarding the north.

My questions are going to be for Dr. Perry, and this may be one of those issues on which we hear different opinions.

Earlier in this study, the chief of the defence staff stated that “policies related to ballistic missile defence are becoming less and less relevant”—I believe that was his quote—and that “[i]ntegrated air and missile defence is the concept of the future.”

Mr. Perry, I would like your thoughts on this. Do you agree? Can you elaborate on these concepts and provide any recommendations with respect to missile defence?

[Dr. David Perry]

Sure. I would say, basically, two broad things. We are facing a broader array of missile threats than we did 20 years ago. Ballistic missiles are one part of that, but advanced cruise missiles and hypersonics are additional evolving components of that. To say there's a specific need to focus on just one type of those, I think, is an incomplete answer at best, because there's a range of possible scenarios that we need to improve our defences against.

With regard to the integrated component of that, the way to think about it, as we're seeing play out in some cases in Ukraine right now, is that the best defence is to have a layered, integrated set of systems that can defend against a range of incoming missiles rather than having individual, disaggregated systems that have to look, identify and basically assess an individual type of incoming missile and then make a determination about whether or not it's something you want to be able to, effectively, shoot down. A system that can deal with a broad array of different missile threats in a way that is cohesive and integrated, that doesn't have to rely on distinct sets of pieces of technology being cobbled together but was designed to be integrated from the beginning, I think, would be an ideal scenario.

[Bryan May, Liberal, Cambridge, ON]

Given our current situation, our current status with this, what would be the first couple of steps Canada needs to take to get to that scenario?

[Dr. David Perry]

We need to build off the investments committed to this summer and actually make some investments in additional sensing/warning that could feed into those missile systems, as well as some actual mechanisms to potentially shoot down a missile if we wanted to.

For example, we're building ships that I think are going to have a capability to play some role there, but it's not clear whether or not they're being designed in a way that would allow them to explicitly be integrated into a wider North American system of missile defence, which would include things that are being done by the Missile Defence Agency in the United States, as well as by the United States Air Force and the United States Navy.

[Bryan May, Liberal, Cambridge, ON]

Given its history and, of course, geography, Canada has a range of military obligations. We have seen pressures involving multiple fronts, including Europe, the Indo-Pacific and, of course, the north, as well as aid to civil authority, which we just finished an entire study on.

In your opinion, can Canada significantly contribute to security in all of those areas? How can it successfully balance its efforts?