National Defence Committee on Feb. 17th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Colleagues, we'll commence our meeting now.

Before we do, I just thought I'd ask James to speak to the committee. James's family has been going through a really difficult situation and some of us have been a little bit more involved than others.

James, I thought I would give you a minute to update the status on your grandson.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

I wasn't expecting to say much, but Jack, our eight-month-old grandson, had open-heart surgery nine days ago. He's had complications ever since—an RSV infection, pneumonia and a UTI. He's in a fight, so we're just asking for prayers and everybody's best wishes.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thanks, James.

Those of us who have kids and grandkids know that this is very difficult to deal with. You have our thoughts and prayers.

Thanks, James, and all the best.

With that, I'm again calling to order meeting number 51 of the Standing Committee on National Defence.

We adopted a motion on February 10 to get a briefing today on high-altitude surveillance balloons from the People's Republic of China. Of course, I anticipate that we'll go into subsequent events as well.

We have with us Lieutenant-General Alain Pelletier. It's good to see you again, sir. You're very familiar with the committee.

We also have Major-General Prévost. Again, I think we're going to start issuing frequent flyer points for your, sir. We appreciate your attendance here this morning.

With that, I'm going to ask Lieutenant-General Alain Pelletier—I'm assuming—for an opening five-minute statement.

[Lieutenant-General Alain Pelletier, Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Department of National Defence]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good afternoon, committee members.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today.

If I may, I would like to take 15 seconds to pass on our best wishes to Mr. Bezan and his family. Having lived similar circumstances, I can only empathize with what you're going through.

My name is Lieutenant-General Alain Pelletier and I'm the deputy commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which is headquartered at Peterson Space Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado.

As deputy commander of NORAD, I support the commander of NORAD, U.S. General Glen D. VanHerck, in the execution of NORAD missions, responsibilities and functions outlined in the NORAD Agreement and the NORAD Terms of Reference. More specifically, I oversee Aerospace Warning, Aerospace Control and Maritime Warning.

Joining me in today's virtual appearance is Major General Paul Prévost, director of staff — strategic joint staff.

Every day, NORAD monitors the approaches to North America across all domains. Over the past two weeks, we have detected, identified, monitored and engaged a PRC high-altitude surveillance balloon and other objects across North American airspace. These activities are well aligned with our mission of aerospace warning and aerospace control.

This balloon and the three following objects were not operating in accordance with standard aviation requirements. They were not transmitting their positions and were not in communication with air traffic control agencies. Following standard NORAD procedures, fighters and air-to-air refuelling aircraft were scrambled to locate, investigate, identify and characterize these radar contacts.

At the direction of national leadership, four objects have been taken down over U.S. and Canadian airspace within the respective sovereign airspaces and territorial waters in order to protect the population while maximizing the ability to recover the debris. These were the PRC high-altitude surveillance balloon taken down on February 4, an object over Alaska on February 10, a suspected balloon over the Yukon on February 11 and another object over Lake Huron on February 12.

Throughout these recent operations over North America, Canadian and American personnel from the Canadian, Alaskan and continental U.S. NORAD regions successfully detected, tracked, positively identified and monitored the high-altitude surveillance balloon and the subsequent three objects.

For each of these objects NORAD had further discussions with the U.S. and Canadian leadership on the risk the objects posed to national security, to civil aviation, to our civilian populations and to infrastructure on the ground/waters.

Once decisions were taken to take action and employ weapons, we also carried out risk assessments for potential collateral damages to boats and mariners and our infrastructure, as well as to people on the ground.

NORAD personnel planned and executed their mission exactly as we've been doing it over the last 65 years, and we worked collaboratively with inter-agency and intradepartment partners to ensure public safety throughout.

The detection, tracking and monitoring of these objects have highlighted some challenges for NORAD. Some of these objects have been small in size and slow in speed, with low radar cross-sections. This makes them difficult to detect and track on radar, challenging to locate with airborne assets and difficult to categorize. NORAD works every day to improve domain awareness by integrating intelligence and sensor data and reviewing previous data to improve and to help us see more.

While these objects may not have showcased hostile acts or hostile intent, their paths in proximity to aviation routes, populated areas and sensitive defence infrastructure have raised concerns.

There is much we do not know about the high-altitude surveillance balloon and more so about the three subsequent objects—that's why Canada and the United States are hard at work recovering the debris to better understand their nature and purpose.

Through intensive efforts in Canada and the United States, inter-agency teams are putting in intensive work to locate, find and collect debris for further investigation.

NORAD has a history of evolution. As we have seen during recent events, the threat to North America has rapidly evolved from northern approach long-range aviation to a 360° threat and from all domains.

I believe this is the first time in the history of NORAD that Canada or the U.S. has taken kinetic actions against an airborne object in Canadian and American airspace, and it is important that we maintain the necessary capabilities to continue to do so.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the opportunity to address the committee. I look forward, with General Prévost, to addressing any questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, sir.

Mr. Bezan, you have six minutes, please.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I appreciate the kind words, General. It's good to see both General Pelletier and General Prévost back at committee.

First and foremost, I want to thank you, all of the Canadian Armed Forces and everyone at NORAD for their efforts over the past week and a half in dealing with these flying balloons and other objects that have been causing so much uproar within the media and in the general public as well.

We know that the last three balloons that were shot down looked to be more benign in nature, but we won't know that until recovery efforts have taken place.

In your professional opinion, what was the intended purpose of the first surveillance balloon, and will you confirm that it was launched from the People's Republic of China?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Thanks, Mr. Chair, for the questions.

We have assessed that the first balloon was launched from the PRC and is in fact a high-altitude surveillance balloon. That's the balloon we're talking about that was actually shot down on February 4, the balloon that we were able to actually track across the skies of Alaska and Canada and the U.S.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

U.S. lawmakers, as well as some in the U.S. military, have said that first balloon flew over multiple U.S. military bases and nuclear missile installations. Can you confirm if the balloon also travelled over any Canadian Armed Forces bases?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

I can tell you that we—NORAD here—monitored the flight path of the balloon for most of its flight path over Canada. As has been discussed in the media, there were some radar gaps throughout some of its flight path. As far as the actual oversight location is concerned, the high-altitude surveillance balloon of the PRC came in proximity to some of the Canadian bases, but I cannot speak of the actual response of those Canadian bases. If you allow, I'll turn to General Prévost to potentially address that aspect of the question.

[Major-General Paul Prévost, Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence]

I can surely do that.

First, Mr. Bezan, our thoughts, prayers and courage go to your family, your grandson and you. You've always been a fan of the members of the Canadian Forces, and we'll keep you and your family in our thoughts and prayers.

To answer the question, the high-altitude balloon was actually launched from China. It flew over Canada around January 30 and January 31. It came down pretty much from Alaska, down into Yukon and into central B.C., pretty much between the border of Alberta and the coast. There was no Canadian Forces infrastructure of significance along its path.

If you can picture a line straight down the middle of B.C., so far—

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Okay. It wasn't where our bases are stationed through Alberta or go far enough west to go over Comox and Esquimalt.

[MGen Paul Prévost]

That's right.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Okay. When we're looking at these balloons that are being launched by the People's Liberation Army, what types of threat do they pose to Canada beyond the issue of surveillance equipment?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

The threat is currently being assessed.

Obviously, in the considerations for the first high-altitude surveillance balloon from the PRC, our main concern was around its collection ability based on the quantities of sensors that were assessed to be on board.

As for the other objects that have been detected in the skies and for which NORAD is responsible, the assessment is yet pending. In order to have a better characterization of the capabilities of those objects, we're going to need to actually put our hands on the systems that have been downed in order to better analyze the capability that came with those objects.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Are you aware, both from the standpoint of the Canadian Armed Forces and NORAD, that it's been reported on Chinese state television going back to 2018 that the People's Liberation Army has been testing high-altitude balloons as a launch platform for hypersonic glide missiles as well as electromagnetic pulse weapons?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

From my access to intelligence here, I'm not tracking those capabilities being tested right now by the PRC. Maybe General Prévost—

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

But they have in the past.

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

General Prévost, do you have anything to add there?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

The one thing I would add, Mr. Chair, is that we were aware of those capabilities of the balloons. On exactly what they can and cannot do, we're still trying to get assay on this. You've seen the balloon. There was quite a scaffolding of arrays hanging off it.

What I'll say is that when General VanHerck, the commander of NORAD, was first made aware of those balloons approaching North America, his first mission was to go and investigate what he could see on that array there to ensure that there were no weapons, no kinetic effects that could be delivered. We had good confidence at that point that this was not the case.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

What was—

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I'm sorry, Mr. Bezan. I'm going to have to cut you off at this point and turn to Mr. Sousa for six minutes.

[Charles Sousa, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you both for your presentation.

We reference the origin of the balloon being China, yet there's some uncertainty in terms of the subsequent ones. President Biden referenced the fact that the last “three objects were most likely balloons tied to private companies, recreation, or research institutions studying weather or conducting other scientific research.” If that's the case, are you following the origin of those balloons?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Right now, as I pointed out earlier, we have an understanding of the origin of the first high-altitude surveillance balloon. Right now, during the intercept time, and going back with the data that was available from the radar, we have been unable to actually ascertain or pinpoint the origin of the other balloons.

Some of them have entered the airspace via the Alaskan NORAD region, but for the others that have been detected in lower Canada transiting into the U.S., the first indications of the objects travelling across the airspace were on radar.

Collecting or actually recovering the objects that are on the ground is important so we can not only characterize the capabilities and the threat they pose to North America but also determine the origin and, hopefully, the intent behind such a launch and capabilities.

[Charles Sousa, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you.

As involved with NORAD as you are, with the modernization proposals being put forward—the $40 billion to be invested over 20 years—do you foresee a need to reassess some of those plans, given your recent initiatives with NORAD?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Obviously, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, NORAD is an evolving organization. We always attempt to remain relevant, not only to the Canadian government and to the public but also to our allies and, most importantly, to potential adversaries.

We're always looking internally at whether we have the right capability. This is where NORAD modernization is going to help. It's going to provide enhanced sensors to increase our air domain awareness against the evolving threats that exist out there that may be coming mainly from Russia and China but also potentially from other countries.

The additional piece—Strong, Secure, Engaged—is going to provide additional air capabilities to NORAD in the form of the F-35s that were recently announced, as well as the strategic tanker capability, which is going to give us increased reach and increased capacity across our areas of operation.