National Defence Committee on Feb. 17th, 2023

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Let's switch gears and follow up on Mr. May's question about NORAD modernization.

We've technically always been worried about Russian air incursions, but now, with the People's Liberation Army in China becoming more aggressive, and now a new platform that we have to deal with, how are we going to deal with changing our focus on the multiple levels of potential aerial threats and maritime threats that North America is facing?

When we talk about continental security and NORAD modernization, how are we going to change installing our over-the-horizon radar systems, updating our North Warning System, dealing with our RADARSAT and installing more low-earth orbit satellites to ensure we can detect all of these threats, whether it's high-altitude balloons that have potential to carry weapons, or fighter aircraft or bombs or hypersonic missiles that we're starting to witness being used more?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Even with Mr. Bezan's additional free 17 seconds, he's way past time. I'm sorry.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

I'm sorry about that, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Mr. Sousa, you have six minutes.

[Bryan May, Liberal, Cambridge, ON]

No, I'll take it, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Okay, Mr. May.

[Bryan May, Liberal, Cambridge, ON]

I'll try to leave you a little more time in which to elaborate on your earlier question, Mr. Chair.

I was just saying to Mr. Sousa that Mr. Bezan stole my question, so this is perfect. My question was going to be that given the NORAD modernization strategy and the events of the last couple of weeks, what has changed, if anything, in that assessment of what we need? Obviously, if you want to answer Mr. Bezan's direct question as well....

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Okay. Thanks for the question. Actually, I'll roll all the questions from the chairman and the two members into an answer, hopefully.

First of all, General VanHerck expressed that Russia and China have been monitoring our activities for the last 20 years while Canada and the U.S. have been focused abroad on counter-VEO, on countering violent extremist organizations. They've developed capabilities that challenge NORAD right now. We haven't talked about hypersonic vehicles and the advancement in cruise missiles, let alone...and that's only of the threat; it's also the same thing with the delivery vehicles.

NORAD is monitoring closely, with the intelligence community, the evolution of capabilities so that we're positioned to actually face that threat. NORAD has done the pivot to focus on not only the north-south and over-the-Arctic Russian potential threats; we're also including Russia in our cross-checking and in our planning as well, so that our plans are relevant to the threats of today and tomorrow. General VanHerck has mentioned that Russia is the threat we face right now, and China is only five to seven years behind with capabilities that will threaten North America in the near future.

That pivot has happened in our planning. We're looking at not only our pure capabilities—that is, fighters, missiles, tankers, and airborne early warning capability—but also sensors and basing as well so that we're postured in the future to be able to actually counter the threat, whether it comes from Russia or from China, through a lens of not only north or west but rather through a lens of 360° and across all domains.

Even though our mission is focused on airspace warning, airspace control and maritime warning, we're dependent on all domain information sources to better understand and characterize our potential adversaries' activities.

[Bryan May, Liberal, Cambridge, ON]

Thank you, General.

I believe my colleague Mr. Fisher might have a quick question.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you, Mr. May.

General Pelletier, I think you may have actually answered this question before I asked it when you talked about threats of today and threats of tomorrow and a pivot in planning.

Is there a group sitting down now, talking about these current events and coming up with a plan for a procedure on how to deal with something like this, after this fourth one has occurred? Is this something that's happening now? Is there a planning session on how to proceed in the future?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

In NORAD, related to the current event, there's been an ongoing assessment of the activities from not only an intelligence perspective but also an operational perspective involving the regions involved. That happened literally after the high-altitude surveillance balloon and continued after the first object was detected and the one that was actually shot down in Alaska. There's a continuing assessment of the capabilities and also the procedures and processes we follow so that we can seamlessly execute and so that our information exchange with each respective national leadership is as seamless as we can make it. It is happening.

Plus, I had the privilege to be in Ottawa and have discussions this week with colleagues. At the end of the day, what makes us successful is not only those of us in uniform; we're leveraging those intradepartmental colleagues in order to actually get us to mission success. This includes our collaborations with the Federal Aviation Administration in the U.S., Nav Canada, Transport Canada and a number of other agencies and departments so that we can actually deliver the mission.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

We still have a minute left, Mr. Fisher.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

I'll give it to Charles.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Go ahead, Charles.

[Charles Sousa, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you again.

To reaffirm the question by the chair, could this be a ruse by China to test our defences and capabilities, given that it would be so obvious that we would see the balloon out there and it would be caught pretty quickly? Could this be China testing us?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Thanks for the question.

As discussed by General Prévost—and I believe this as well—this could be one of the options, especially as it relates to the high-altitude surveillance balloon. Again, with regard to the other three objects that were detected, it's too early to tell where they're coming from, what their capabilities and capacities are, and the intent behind the actual use itself.

I think we shouldn't rule out options. We need to continue to look at how our daily activities, responses, postures and capabilities could be looked at and exploited in the future. We have a tendency to think short-term. Other nations have a tendency to look at their long-term postures as well.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Sousa.

Mrs. Desbiens, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Caroline Desbiens, Bloc, Beauport—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île d’Orléans—Charlevoix, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Gentlemen, I assume you may both be from Quebec based on your family names, your first names and the quality of your French. We are very proud to have you with us and to know that you are perhaps from Quebec.

With that in mind, for the Quebecers watching us, you mentioned earlier that you quite regularly—seven, 10 or even 15 times a year—observe and intercept foreign aircraft in neighbouring airspace, mostly along the West Coast.

What about the East Coast? Have you made the same type of intercepts in Quebec or along the East Coast of North America, for example?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Thanks for the question.

Yes, in the past, we have had intercepts on the East Coast or the northeast flank of NORAD near the Arctic Archipelago. That's why we maintain forward operating locations that allow us to respond to those incursions into the air defence identification zone, and not into the immediate airspace of Canada or the United States. These bases mean that we can respond on the East Coast, northeast flank, northwest flank or West Coast.

We last saw any such aircraft on the West Coast, not directly in Alaska, in 2014 or 2015.

[Caroline Desbiens, Bloc, Beauport—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île d’Orléans—Charlevoix, QC]

Since then, have you seen any suspicious activity in Quebec?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

No, nothing. To characterize the aircraft approaching our shores, we need to identify them, determine if they have any weapons on board and analyze their behaviour to see if they pose a threat.

We also analyze existing intelligence from the preceding weeks and months to ensure there is no hostile intent towards Canada or the United States. This analysis is done on a regular basis, whenever Russia or any other nation deploys strategic assets approaching Canada or the United States.

[Caroline Desbiens, Bloc, Beauport—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île d’Orléans—Charlevoix, QC]

Thank you.

My next question is for Major General Prévost or Lieutenant-General Pelletier.

As elected officials, we sometimes get the opportunity to ask the government about its intentions, plans or how much it wants to invest in the future to secure our territory.

After this two-hour meeting, what would you recommend to the members here in the room?

What could we do to support you, to carry your message further?

Do you have any specific requests or pressing needs that are more urgent, which we could rally around and make sure your message is heard?

I know you're able to get your message out very directly, but we too have a job to do as parliamentarians.

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

I'd like to thank the member for the question.

We had the privilege of welcoming the senators here to NORAD Headquarters last week. First, I'm going to tell you the same thing I told them. I'm grateful for the committee members' interest in national defence and defence in general.

What's important to us is that the Canadian public and committee members understand our mission and our desire to be transparent. Canadians need to understand that the threat continues to evolve. We're in a very complex operating environment around the world, and we owe it to ourselves to continue to monitor that environment in terms of the threat that it may pose not only to Canada directly, but to the democratic system we live in and value.

To do that, we need to continue to assess the needs of the Canadian Armed Forces and NORAD so that they can fulfill their mission, which is precisely what the Canadian government did in the NORAD announcement. That information is intended to ensure that people understand the mission and the limitations, but also the improvements for which we are advocating so that the Canadians and Americans involved in the mission can continue to meet the Canadian people's expectations.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Madame Desbiens.

The final word goes to the NDP for six minutes.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Amazing.

A lot of my questions were actually brought up by the chair and my other colleagues, in fact, about testing by the Chinese government about how they're watching our speed of reaction, the processes we use and how we communicate.

If this is the thought process that we have to be aware of and careful of, how do we ensure that we continually remain transparent to the Canadian public? I know there's a lot of information going back and forth. There was a lot of confusion. It's led to the confusion here in our many questions. How do we ensure that transparency and clarity are maintained?

I'd also like to throw this in there. In terms of our reaction, the Chinese government has responded by saying these are not hostile balloons. What does our seemingly somewhat hostile reaction do to the overall level between both of our...well, the NORAD group, but the Chinese government? Is it seen as as hostile reaction?

How do we factor NORAD and the decisions that are made into the risk assessments that you talked about earlier?