Evidence of meeting #28 for Public Safety and National Security in the 43rd Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was chair.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

David McGuinty  Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
Sean Jorgensen  Director of Operations, Secretariat of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
Clerk of the Committee  Mr. Mark D'Amore
Robin Whitehead  Committee Researcher

3:50 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal John McKay

I don't think we really need to go through the drill of all the various things that you do to open a meeting, other than to say that this is the 28th meeting of the public safety committee.

With that, welcome back again, Mr. McGuinty. We look forward to your report—

May 5th, 2021 / 3:50 p.m.

Conservative

Shannon Stubbs Conservative Lakeland, AB

Chair, I'm sorry to interrupt you.

Before we start and get to Mr. McGuinty...and I agree about the crucial information we need to hear from him. I wish we could have him here for eight hours, actually, although that's not very considerate of his own life.

I just had a [Technical difficulty—Editor] other night with our forthcoming schedule, and if that's been circulated or it could be done right away.

3:50 p.m.

A voice

It was circulated earlier today.

3:50 p.m.

Conservative

Shannon Stubbs Conservative Lakeland, AB

Fantastic. Thank you.

3:50 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal John McKay

Maybe it didn't quite make it to Alberta.

3:50 p.m.

Conservative

Shannon Stubbs Conservative Lakeland, AB

I don't know. Would anything surprise us?

3:50 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal John McKay

No.

We're really keen to get to Mr. McGuinty, Mr. Motz.

3:50 p.m.

Conservative

Glen Motz Conservative Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB

I know we are, Chair. It's about that.

I'm wondering whether there would be a will to extend the chair's time today to be able to hear the Q and A for at least 20 minutes to half an hour, if possible.

3:50 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal John McKay

The chair...?

3:50 p.m.

Conservative

Glen Motz Conservative Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB

No, the chair of the NSICOP.

3:50 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal John McKay

I see. I didn't think you wanted to hear from me. That would have been a bit of a surprise.

I'm rather hoping to get through three rounds of questions, which would probably take us through more than the allocated hour. If Mr. McGuinty is available, then I'm sure that members will be accommodating.

Mr. McGuinty, you may also be accommodating, I hope.

Let's get launched for the first hour and see where that leaves us, but I think there's probably an appetite to go beyond the allotted hour, based on his last appearance here and that we had a lot of interest on the part of members.

David, please start your presentation.

3:50 p.m.

David McGuinty Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Honourable members of the committee, thank you very much for the invitation to appear again today at this committee.

It's a great pleasure to speak with you about the 2020 annual report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP.

Joining me today is Sean Jorgensen. Mr. Jorgensen is the director of operations for the committee's secretariat and is here to assist with answering questions and providing technical information.

Colleagues, since 2017, NSICOP has conducted seven reviews, which were included in three annual reports and two special reports. We are currently conducting two new reviews, one on the security and intelligence activities of Global Affairs Canada and another on cyber defence, and we've initiated yet a third on the RCMP's federal policing mandate.

This 2020 annual report is the only consolidated overview of national security threats to Canada.

I would like to emphasize that NSICOP reports are unanimous and nonpartisan. We prepare and finalize reports through consensus. All members agree on final content, assessments and recommendations.

Let me now turn to the Jim Judd report, completed pursuant to the critical election incident public protocol.

As the committee documented in its 2019 review of foreign interference, a number of states tried to interfere in Canada's electoral processes. They used a number of methods, including covertly trying to influence, for example, riding nominations or trying to promote one candidate or undermine another. It may involve illegal campaign contributions and efforts that seek leverage over officials to apply pressure.

This happens to all parties, across all orders of government. Officials may be wittingly or unwittingly subject to foreign interference activities. In the cyber realm, it could involve foreign efforts to amplify social divisions, stoke hatred online or sharpen partisan differences.

That latter point is important. Foreign states try to use partisan groups, even political parties, to pursue their own agendas.

As a result, NSICOP supported Mr. Judd's recommendations to re-establish the critical election incident public protocol well in advance of the next federal election, and to extend the protocol's mandate to the pre-writ period.

NSICOP also believes that the government should consider four other issues.

Number one, ensure that the mandate of the protocol includes all forms of foreign interference.

Number two, consider including prominent Canadians as members of the panel. If a foreign state is trying to manipulate partisan groups, it may be more effective for a prominent, respected Canadian to alert the public about what's happening.

Number three, absolutely ensure that all political parties understand the purpose of the protocol and the process for raising a potential issue.

Number four, consider how the panel would actually inform Canadians about an incident of foreign interference. This is important. Foreign states try to stoke partisan differences, and we will want to be careful about publicizing such efforts and attributing behaviour to particular countries.

I will now turn, Mr. Chair, to the annual report's overview of five national security threats to Canada: terrorism, espionage and foreign interference, cyber-threats, organized crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

I will focus on the first three as they have changed the most since 2018 when NSICOP first addressed these threats.

First is terrorism.

The defeat of Daesh in Syria and Iraq in 2019 was a significant milestone in global efforts to counter Salafi-Jihadist terrorism. However, it created other problems. We're wondering what to do with Canadians who had travelled to the area to support terrorist groups. As NSICOP knows well, those individuals may continue to pose a threat to Canada and its allies.

At the same time, we've seen the growth of other ideologically motivated violent extremists. These include individuals and groups that embrace xenophobic violence, anti-authority violence and gender-driven violence.

While the restrictions imposed as part of the COVID lockdown, such as limitations on travel, have disrupted terrorism facilitation efforts, the pandemic and the concurrent anti-racism protests have increased anti-government rhetoric connected to ideologically motivated violent extremism.

Regarding espionage and foreign interference, I should be clear that espionage and foreign interference are quite distinct. Espionage involves the theft of information. Foreign interference involves the use of clandestine means or threats to promote a certain position or objective. However, the security and intelligence community usually treat them as a single threat because the perpetrators, foreign states, often pursue them in tandem.

In 2019, the committee found that foreign interference posed a significant threat to the security of Canada, and that continues today.

The most significant change has been to the threat posed by espionage. Foreign states are increasingly targeting Canada's science and technology sectors.

The pandemic created opportunities for foreign states, including Russia and China, to target Canada's health sector, most notably in the area of vaccine development.

Regarding malicious cyber-activities, there are a wide array of cyber-threats facing Canada. In terms of sophisticated, state-sponsored threats, Russia and China remain the most significant.

These countries continue to target government and non-government systems, including those that provide critical infrastructure within Canada, and more recently those involved in vaccine developments.

We've also seen state actors conduct online disinformation campaigns in Canada and among our allies. Those same actors also use sophisticated methods to target, harass or threaten dissidents within Canada.

Mr. Chair, in conclusion, threats to the security of Canada are fluid and they are changing. These are all things that we, parliamentarians from across the political spectrum, should continue to pay attention to and seek ways to address through our hearings, our work on legislation and our engagement with Canadians.

I'd be happy to take questions, Mr. Chair, through you to the committee members, reminding committee members that members of NSICOP have waived their parliamentary privilege, so of course I will have to be circumspect in answering questions with any detail that might take me into classified information territory.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

4 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal John McKay

Thank you, Mr. McGuinty.

This will start our first round of questions of six minutes.

Mr. Kurek is having difficulties with the gap between the translation, and we're not quite sure what the issue is. There does seem to be a bit of a lag between when you switch languages from English to French or French to English.

Mr. Motz, I see your hand is up.

4 p.m.

Conservative

Glen Motz Conservative Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB

Yes, thank you, Chair.

It's something that we mentioned previously. When the speaker is done speaking French and then whoever makes the switch between the volume from the French translation to the actual English pickup of the speaker.... There is a lag of sometimes eight, 10 or 12 seconds and you have to crank up your volume or sometimes you can't even hear what they're saying. It's not the first time we've had this experience. It happens in the House as well.

4 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal John McKay

The clerk is looking into it to see if we can shrink that timeline. That's the best I can do under the circumstances, but we are on it as best we can.

With that, Ms. Stubbs, you have six minutes.

4 p.m.

Conservative

Shannon Stubbs Conservative Lakeland, AB

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

Thanks, Mr. McGuinty, for being here, for your testimony and your very important work with the other members of your committee.

I know that China has recently released its 6G strategy, which called for every action user to be registered, traceable and exposed to censorship. It seems that China seems completely undeterred by western bans and maybe western countries' domestic decisions. I note too that your report says that one cyber-tool could be used to track individuals in 45 countries.

I wonder if you would expand on that issue to the degree that you can, and if you have any thoughts about what is needed at this time to prevent countries like Russia and China from employing that type of censorship and manipulation. Also, could you comment on whether or not a ban goes far enough or if there are other actions western countries could take?

4 p.m.

Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians

David McGuinty

I think I detected an oblique reference to Huawei in this question, but I want to be clear that the committee has not conducted a review of this issue. We have been briefed by CSE officials on the measures CSE has put in place to test Huawei products that are present in Canada's existing telecoms market, but I can't comment further than that on that particular issue.

I also want to point out to committee members that the report is replete with references to China. That is a deliberate choice by committee members. In fact, in many different contexts, in 15 separate paragraphs, there are direct references to China and the activities they may be pursuing in a Canadian context.

I can't go much further in giving you more detail on how the government or the security and intelligence community might respond more appropriately. It is important to remind members though that we did make a major recommendation to the Government of Canada in our 2019 report, asking the government to bear down on questions around the activities of China and to come to the fore with a whole-of-government approach. It seems that the Minister of Public Safety, Minister Blair, has begun that process, but we are waiting to see more information from the government eventually, to see, Ms. Stubbs, what that whole-of-government approach looks like.

4 p.m.

Conservative

Shannon Stubbs Conservative Lakeland, AB

Certainly your report, as your testimony has done, outlines the clear threats of foreign intervention and interference in Canadian national security and economic security, threats to us as a country as a whole and to individual Canadian citizens, and it repeatedly mentions Russia and China as consistently bad actors.

It seems, in the case of China, that it's been happening for a long time, but do you have any comment or can you comment on whether there has been a difference or an uptick or a change in China's approach to Canada since the arrest and extradition, and then also the imprisonment of the two Michaels? Can you make any comments on that?

4:05 p.m.

Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians

David McGuinty

I don't think our report examined the foreign actor scenario from 2018 to 2020 in terms of the quantum of activity by China. I might ask, if I may, my research colleague Sean Jorgensen to respond to you, Ms. Stubbs, if that would be helpful. I think he might have a bit more detail for you.

4:05 p.m.

Conservative

Shannon Stubbs Conservative Lakeland, AB

Sure.

4:05 p.m.

Sean Jorgensen Director of Operations, Secretariat of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

If I may, Madam Stubbs, I would point to the 2019 report, in which we identified a particular period of 2012 when Xi Jinping became essentially the president of China and took a very different approach to foreign interference globally.

We documented, for example, some very specific threats to Canada in which Chinese officials were coming to Canada to apply pressure on either Canadian citizens of Chinese origin or people who had come to Canada in their immigration process. That was a very distinctive change in 2012, which, as I understand it, continues today, not just in Canada but among some of our closest allies as well.

4:05 p.m.

Conservative

Shannon Stubbs Conservative Lakeland, AB

Thank you.

On page 18, your report notes that “Foreign states are increasingly targeting Canada's science and technology sector,” and it points to China's thousand talents program as a perpetrator and says that, through that program, “intellectual property is often transferred to China”.

Your report notes an increase in that. Can you expand with any details on that point?

4:05 p.m.

Chair, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians

David McGuinty

I would welcome the opportunity to do so, but beyond what's in the text, Ms. Stubbs, under the rubric of “Espionage”, it's very difficult for me to go into more detail.

I think it's fair to say that increasingly our science and technology community in Canada, our academic community in Canada, is becoming more aware of the inherent risks. We understand that CSIS is now reaching out on a regular basis to brief academic experts and academic administrators on the reality of the situation. We hope that this will raise the profile of the need to address this and to be aware.

That's a very important question. Thank you for raising it.

4:05 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal John McKay

Thank you, Ms. Stubbs.

I'm advised by the clerk that this is a system-wide problem. If those speakers who are switching from English to French or French to English could just give a little bit of a pause to let the system catch up as they switch languages, it would be helpful to everyone.

Mr. Lightbound, you have six minutes, please.

4:05 p.m.

Liberal

Joël Lightbound Liberal Louis-Hébert, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today.

Mr. McGuinty, thank you for joining us. One thing that stands out in your report is the changing nature of the terrorist threat in Canada. You spoke of the growing threat of ideologically motivated violent extremism in Canada. You specifically referred to the rather disturbing 320% increase in incidents related to this type of extremism from 2013 to 2018. That's not counting the tragedies in Christchurch, El Paso and Germany, which are linked to ideologically motivated violent extremism.

At the same time, you said in your report that this type of extremism differs from the extremism inspired by ideologies such as that of Daesh or al-Qaida. The extremism is less tied to one group and less centralized. It often involves constellations of dispersed actors.

This is a new threat. The threat is organized differently from the somewhat more traditional threats that we've seen in recent decades. What challenges does this present to our intelligence agencies in Canada and to our allies?

How are our agencies adapting to this threat, which you describe as growing?