Public Safety Committee on May 12th, 2021

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

I'd like to thank all of our witnesses for being here today, especially on such short notice. Your testimony is very valuable to us.

My first question is for CSIS.

You mentioned online hatred and the prevalence of “echo chambers of hate”, whereby mobilization to violence can occur quite rapidly. The National Firearms Association is a group that shares offensive images online and has shared tweets that have been sympathetic to groups alleged to have IMVE affiliation. In one of them, the tweet said, “If the police will not protect you during a violent riot, you will have to protect yourself and others”.

I have personally been the subject of their comments. Recently, this committee voted to condemn remarks made by the group that discussed guillotining parliamentarians who support gun control, describing what is happening in Canada as “tyranny”.

My question for you is straightforward. We've seen far too many examples where language is later masked as jokes and then turned into real-world violence, either by those making the remarks or those following. I'm just wondering; what impact do these kinds of comments have on individuals who may be radicalized by them and should we be calling it out for what it is?

[Timothy Hahlweg]

That's an excellent question, and I think it would be useful at this time to give a snapshot of how we investigate in this space, from a CSIS perspective. I think it will help articulate the space we hold vis-à-vis other people in this landscape.

The way that we look at it organizationally is really in three tiers.

We have the first tier, which is passive engagement. There are a lot of books out there, and there are videos and chat rooms. A lot of people are listening to some of this violent, abhorrent content, but these people are passive. They're not moving to violence at this stage.

When those individuals move to our second tier of threat actions, it is a more active engagement. This is where we're seeing people not just listening but putting some propaganda out there. They're adding content, communicating and letting their voices be known. A lot of this still falls in with freedom of speech, but some of it starts to bleed into what is the third tier. That's where the service gets involved.

The third tier sees these people mobilizing to violence or potentially mobilizing to violence. In the third tier, we're seeing a lot of increased operational security by these individuals. They're not staying in the open. They're going into more private chat rooms and more encrypted forums. We're seeing them go to a lot of alternative platforms. When we look at this third tier, from a service perspective it's really important that we look at what triggers the CSIS mandate. We have done a lot of work in this space over the last couple of years with our partners in the S and I community.

What do we require to actually investigate these threats? We need a willingness to kill or inspire others to kill; a threat of serious violence; an attempt to effect societal change, so not just a personal narrative but something bigger; and an ideological influence. Once we have those triggers, we're able to investigate these threats. We deconflict on a regular basis with our police colleagues, especially the RCMP, and then we decide who's best positioned to deal with them.

I hope that answers your question.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

It does, sort of.

I'm going to turn to the RCMP, in a similar vein. There has been rampant growth of this type of content online, and you remarked that you were gravely concerned with extremist views that are first fostered online and can lead to and have led to actual physical violence. Our colleague at CSIS listed a number of cases that did result in injury and death.

Who is being targeted? Do you see this being race- and gender-based hatred? Are you seeing it tied to these anti-mask rallies, where we're seeing neo-Nazi flags being flown?

[D/Commr Michael Duheme]

What we're seeing is that vulnerable groups, as I'll call them, are more targeted than the general population. It's important to note that we make a distinction between IMVE and hate-motivated crime. We're dealing with a lot of hate-motivated crime and with comments that are covered under the Criminal Code of Canada. There is a difference there. There are specific sections in the code to deal with hate-motivated crime. On the other side, as Tim mentioned earlier, with the IMVE, there's a deep-rooted ideology that's more complex than just hatred to things.

I don't have any information to say there are links with the different flags being shown at protests. We take every complaint seriously and investigate every complaint that is reported to us.

Mark, I'm not quite sure if there is anything you wish to add.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

It was on the CBC—at a rally in Saskatoon—where I saw that.

I think that's my time, Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Yes, you're at six minutes. Thank you very much.

Ms. Michaud, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the witnesses for being here. I am very grateful to them.

Last week we had Mr. McGuinty from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, who presented his annual report to us. He explained how the members of that committee were taking stock of the situation and making recommendations to the government.

How does the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness react to this status report? What does it do with it?

Terrorism is still recognized as the greatest threat to Canada. I was wondering if you perceive this whole rise in ideologically-based violent extremism as a form of terrorism right now.

My questions are for Mr. Rochon from the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. If officials from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Communications Security Establishment want to add anything, I invite them to do so.

[Dominic Rochon]

Thank you for the question.

I think it would be more appropriate for the RCMP and CSIS to talk about their definition of threats.

That said, I can give you a quick answer. As my colleagues have said, this is a team effort on a very complex topic. It is true that, until now, terrorism was really the most challenging threat. Violent extremism is a sub-category of that threat. It is part of terrorism, but as my CSIS colleagues have explained, we need better definitions.

We are in the process of defining these different categories so that we know exactly where these threats are coming from and can better respond.

That is my answer to your question. Perhaps my colleagues at the RCMP or CSIS would like to add something.

[D/Commr Michael Duheme]

In response to your question about IMVE, I would just add that sometimes crimes do not at first appear to be ideologically driven violent extremism, but during the course of the investigation we discover that there is an IMVE aspect.

In May 2020, an attack occurred in Toronto, and the investigation revealed that the individual was part of an unlisted involuntary celibates group. Now, because the act was ideologically motivated and intended to create consequences, we were successful in filing terrorism charges against this individual.

So, the RCMP's approach to IMVE is really a terrorist approach, now that groups are on the terrorist list.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you very much.

We know that extremist groups rely heavily on social networks and platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter and other platforms that have even been banned, to recruit people and to misinform and radicalize them. Some people believe that shutting down certain platforms would not be beneficial because it would send people to private networks on the Internet.

Even if it's not on these private networks and it's on the platforms that we know and access every day, how can the government and the RCMP intervene to detect this kind of violent extremism, whether it's violent speech or video sharing?

Should there be collaboration with the private companies that own these platforms, or could the government and RCMP intervene directly?

[D/Commr Michael Duheme]

I'll talk about what the RCMP can do with respect to websites.

The majority of the investigations we conduct into hateful comments spread on social networks are triggered when we receive reports from people who have observed this on a site and report it to us. In most cases, we trigger an investigation.

Of course, if the social networks remove the information without notifying us, we don't have access to that information. It's no different than when someone calls the police to make a report and the police initiate an investigation, except that it happens on social networks.

If the platforms remove this information without notifying us, we can no longer take informed action on the complaint.

Members of Parliament often receive derogatory or hateful messages on social media. In these cases as well, the RCMP initiates an investigation and we follow through. Sometimes that's a challenge because people can use all sorts of mechanisms on social media to avoid being found.

I won't hide from you that this is one of our concerns, and it's not just about social networks. When you implement a new law or a new process, people always find ways around that through other mechanisms.

You've all heard of the dark Web. There are probably already many IMVE groups on the dark Web.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Unfortunately, your time is up, Madame Michaud.

Mr. Harris, go ahead for six minutes, please.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for enlightening us on some of these issues that are increasingly concerning.

First of all, perhaps Mr. Hahlweg could deal with this question.

It's been suggested to us by the NSICOP report that there are more than 300 of these types of groups, IMVE groups, active in Canada. That seems to be an enormous number. Is it the tier three that makes them a group? How organized do they have to be to be considered such?

[Timothy Hahlweg]

It's a great question.

I would respond first by saying that this is how complex this investigative effort we undertake is, because a lot of the personal grievances and a lot of the conspiracy theories are not tied to one solid ideology that motivates a lot of other people. There are a lot of individuals who might move from one to another very quickly. From a CSIS perspective, it is absolutely crucial that we reach the threshold of violence or threat of violence and the four steps I talked about a little bit earlier before we can actively investigate.

In terms of the overall numbers, yes, if we look at this like a funnel, in that top tier I discussed, there are hundreds of different narratives out there, different ideologies, different conspiracy theories. A lot of that still falls into the free speech space. A lot of those individuals will just remain passive. They will not mobilize to violence, ergo not affect our act, from a CSIS perspective.

I hope that answers your question.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

It does to some extent.

In these tier-three groups—I guess that's where these 300 we're talking about are—is there any one particular type? We're talking about the propensity to violence or plans for violence or suggestions of violence. Is there a predominant group in the 300? We don't have 300 categories. We have outlined several, such as those motivated by a particular ideology or white supremacy or anti-authority or xenophobia, with some overlap obviously.

Can you categorize those for us and tell us what the predominant group is, if there is one?

[Timothy Hahlweg]

The predominant ideologies are the ones I discussed at the outset. Those are the ones from our perspective anyway. The neo-Nazis and ethnonationalists are one of the major groups. Anti-authority and targeting government and law enforcement is also an ideology, both in the United States and here, that is of concern. Some of the attacks I mentioned that have taken place on our soil were driven in whole or in part by a gender-driven violent misogyny ideology. Then the other category we discussed involves somebody who doesn't have an affixed ideology but who has some personal grievances and a lot of different things going on. Again, those are the predominant ideologies, but there's a lot of movement in that space. The fluidity of that space makes it one of the most complex to investigate.

I'll defer to my other colleagues, but I'll say I've been in this business for well over 20 years and have been actively engaged in these investigations for a long time, and it is a complicated space for all of us. However, with our various mandates working in concert and together, I think we're making a dent in not only identifying and making sure we are up on the threat.... To do that, in all honesty, from a CSIS perspective, we have to ensure we have the right mandate. We have to ensure we have the right tools at our disposal, and that includes having modernized legislation to make sure we can deal with these threats as they emerge.

Thank you very much.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Can you tell us whether you have figured out—and this is probably something that you all wonder about—what motivates an individual, or can you identify what triggers someone to move from tier two to tier three? Is that something beyond your ken or are you just watching to see what happens?

[Timothy Hahlweg]

It's definitely something we analyze every day, all day.

The movement between the tiers is an interesting one. Unlike in a lot of the RMVE or other groups, the movement can happen very quickly. People can mobilize to that third tier and mobilize to violence very quickly. We've seen it go from the first tier to the third tier without much warning in between. We've also seen the opposite. We've seen that people have gotten to that third tier and have said, “Oh, boy, we didn't realize this was what we were getting into”, and they have moved back to that more passive space.

We've really seen a mixed bag on this, but it is absolutely something we monitor actively.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I have a quick question. The Proud Boys were declared a terrorist group and have disbanded. What does that mean? Does that mean they have dispersed into other groups? That doesn't mean that they've changed their ideology, thoughts or beliefs, I wouldn't think. What do you think happens?

[Timothy Hahlweg]

I'm not sure on that case. I can't speak of things that were monitored actively in the investigation space.

The Proud Boys are probably indicative of a lot of other areas. There will be some pockets of it. The broader ideology might be mobilized to violence. There will be others who are still up in that top tier. It doesn't mean—just because somebody is a Proud Boy—that they're actively mobilized to violence.

We see that different strata all the time in these groups. That's what makes it very difficult to monitor actively.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Harris.

Now we'll move to the second round. We'll have five minutes with Mr. Van Popta, followed by Mr. Fisher.

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley—Aldergrove, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all of the witnesses for being with us here today and enlightening us on this very important topic.

I'm just going to follow the previous line of questioning with Mr. Hahlweg, if you don't mind.

There's been quite a bit of talk today about the three different categories of motivation for violent extremism. I wonder how important it is to define those different categories. For example, one of the witnesses mentioned the 21 deaths that occurred at the hands of ideologically motivated extreme actors, one of them being the Quebec mosque shooting. I would have thought that maybe that falls within the religiously motivated.

How important is it, Mr. Hahlweg, to get those categorizations right? How is that a tool for CSIS to keep Canadians safe and for prosecutions?

[Timothy Hahlweg]

I think it's an outstanding question. Thank you.

The way we look at this is from a service lens. I can articulate that the mosque shooting.... We look at things that trigger our act. In section 2 of our act, paragraph (c) is what defines whether or not we get involved from a service perspective—the serious acts of violence. Whether that falls into the RMVE space, the religiously motivated, or the IMVE space, that is actually where we mobilize and prioritize our investigative activity from an internal perspective. It is the trigger of our paragraph 2(c) threshold in our mandate that dictates whether or not we're going to go into that space.

I think it is very important to really articulate—and it's why we chose to do so in 2019 in the IMVE space—the complexity of this investigation so that we can actively portray what is going on and can actively decide when our threshold and our mandate is triggered. Otherwise, that deconfliction with the RCMP and others in the community is crucial. At the end of the day, we're all looking to prevent threats of violence.

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley—Aldergrove, BC]

Thank you.

What tools does that give you for prosecution? You talked about the four trigger points. Maybe you could just expand on that a little bit so that I understand it better.