Public Safety Committee on April 7th, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

I call this meeting to order. Good morning, everybody.

Welcome to meeting number 18 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

We will start by acknowledging that I am meeting on Treaty 1 territory and the home of the Métis nation.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the House order of November 25, 2021. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely by using the Zoom application. Members and witnesses participating virtually may speak in the official language of their choice. They have the choice at the bottom of the screen of “floor”, “English” or “French”.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motions adopted by the committee on Thursday, March 3, 2022, the committee is resuming its study of the assessment of Canada's security posture in relation to Russia.

With us today by video conference, as individuals, are David Etkin, professor, disaster and emergency management, York University; Dr. Paul Goode, McMillan chair in Russian studies, Carleton University; and Dr. Adam Lajeunesse, Irving Shipbuilding chair in Canadian Arctic marine security, Brian Mulroney Institute of Government, St. Francis Xavier University.

Up to five minutes will be given for opening remarks, after which we will proceed with rounds of questions. I have a 30-second reminder card for everybody. That is just part of the constraints of committee work.

Welcome to all. I now invite Mr. Etkin to make an opening statement for up to five minutes.

Sir, the floor is yours.

[Professor David A Etkin, Professor, Disaster and Emergency Management, York University, As an Individual]

Thank you very much.

Thank you for inviting me. It's an honour to be here.

In terms of our stance towards Russia, the first comment I'd like to make is that in the long term, running forward to think in terms of decades, the world is going to have to co-operate in terms of dealing with global risks such as climate change and other things. Whatever stance we take towards Russia, I believe we should keep in mind that at some point we're going have to be co-operative with them and other countries that we meet.

I'm going to be speaking from the perspective of the emergency management system in Canada, which is where I live professionally. I really can't speak to the military side of things. I'm going to be speaking more from a civil society perspective.

I have put together a list of recommendations that I think, in a very practical way, would enhance our ability to manage some of these threats. I divided them into the categories of capacity, research, training, and governance. Again, this is just speaking from my particular areas of work in disaster risk reduction.

In terms of capacity, I think it would be of great help if Canada had an interdisciplinary national centre of excellence on disaster studies so that people from different disciplines and fields, as well as academics and professionals, could coagulate around that and work together.

From a local community perspective, all local communities need to do risk assessments, which is a difficult and complicated process that tends to be poorly done. There is a lack of support for local communities in terms of doing these things. I'd recommend that the Government of Canada, perhaps under the leadership of Public Safety Canada, create a group of people, of experts, who could assist local communities with methodologies and access to data and interpretation of data so that they could do the risk assessments.

Critical infrastructure is a particular area of vulnerability from a threat perspective. There's a lot that we don't know about the interconnections between them. It's a complex, tightly connected system. I'd recommend funding a long-term study looking at the interconnections and vulnerabilities of critical Canadian infrastructures.

Under training, Emergency Preparedness Canada used to have an emergency management college, which performed a very important function. It was disbanded a number of years ago. Even though colleges and universities in Canada now have programs in emergency management, they do not replace the functions that were carried out by the emergency management college, which particularly addressed mayors and local people involved in emergency management who would never go to a program at a college or university. It had the function not just of education and training but also of creating a community and culture across Canada of people involved in emergency management issues.

Finally, on the governance side, about 85% of Canada's critical infrastructure is owned within the private sector. That creates, I think, a tension in terms of priorities. One of the main priorities of the private sector is creating profit and serving the interests of their shareholders, whereas I would argue that critical infrastructure is basically a public good. The role of governments in terms of owning and [Technical difficulty—Editor] critical infrastructure. I think it needs to be revisited, because many of the disasters we've seen have resulted from reductions in safety that originated in a neo-liberal economic environment.

Our system of emergency and disaster management is rooted historically. Particularly, it evolved out of civil defence after World War II, but we live in a world that is now moving in a direction that is very different. I would want to take a close look at the system we have now and see to what extent it's serving our current needs and future needs.

I will end my remarks there.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

Thank you very much.

I will now turn to Dr. Goode.

You have five minutes to make an opening statement, sir. The floor is yours.

[Dr. Paul Goode, McMillan Chair of Russian Studies, Carleton University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

As a recent arrival in Canada, I'd first like to say that it is a great honour to be invited to speak before this committee, and I'm grateful for the opportunity.

This committee has so far heard witnesses who have focused on a variety of near-term threats to Canada's security. As an expert on Russia's domestic politics and more broadly on nationalism and authoritarianism, I'd like to take this opportunity to explain why we need to think about this war as a long-term concern and what this means for Canada.

First, we should not expect any political change to emerge from within Russia's elite that would end the war. Russia is a personalist autocracy, meaning power is exercised through clientelist networks that pervade both the state and the economy. Autocratic rule is sustained by granting subordinates access to jobs, resources, wealth or status. In turn, subordinates compete to demonstrate their loyalty and value to their superiors.

Today Putin has no real political challengers. Members of the elite initially appeared dismayed by the decision to go to war, which does not appear to have been shared widely among Putin’s inner circle. Nevertheless, they have doubled down on Putin’s war as they attempt to outbid one another in demonstrating their patriotic credentials. As sanctions and the cost of war continue to squeeze Russia’s economy, elites are thus more likely to turn on one another rather than turning on Putin.

Second, we should not underestimate the power of nationalism and disinformation as sources of popular support for the war. The Kremlin has promoted a Soviet style of patriotic education since the early 2000s, which dovetails with neo-imperial visions of Russia as a civilizational power in Eurasia. This form of patriotism was fused with anti-westernism, especially following electoral revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, which the Kremlin viewed as the machinations of western intelligence agencies.

In 2014, the annexation of Crimea stimulated a burst of patriotic sentiment that saw Putin’s approval ratings soaring upwards of 80%. In my own research in Russia between 2014 and 2016, I found that many ordinary Russians understood official patriotism to mean loyalty to the Kremlin, and loyalty, in turn, was associated with being ethnically Russian. Putin has combined this ethnicized patriotism with anti-westernism and dreams of Soviet power to forge a neo-imperial form of nationalism, culminating today in the claim that Ukraine is not Ukraine and Ukrainians are not Ukrainians.

The domestic information environment is a big part of popular support for Russia’s war. I am currently tracking Russia’s war narratives on broadcast media, and they are aswirl with western conspiracies and enemy images of inhuman fascists. Domestic disinformation emboldens opportunists to attack critics of the war, and it leads ordinary Russians to disregard information about the war, to dissimulate and to disengage. While more than 15,000 brave Russians have been arrested for anti-war protests so far, this is just 1/100 of 1% of Russia’s total population.

In sum, Russia’s war is here to stay. There is little reason to expect that there will be any significant movement for regime change arising either from Russia’s elite or the masses.

In preparing for a long war, I would suggest two ways that Canada can enhance its security.

First, this is the time to build expertise in the region. Canada is already regarded as a global hub for Ukrainian studies. The longer Russia remains a closed regime that threatens its neighbours, the more important area expertise will become for international security. Canada can take the lead now in decolonizing and bridging between expert communities in Russian studies in the United Kingdom and in the United States.

Second, Canada can provide refuge for scholars, journalists and activists who are persecuted for opposing Russia’s war. We know from experience that the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada played a key role in shaping Ukraine’s independence and its democratic development. Today we need the Russian diaspora as allies rather than bystanders, and we can advance that cause by providing shelter for Russia’s moral and intellectual leaders.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

Thank you very much.

I invite Dr. Lajeunesse to give us up to five minutes in an opening statement. The floor is yours, sir.

[Dr. Adam Lajeunesse, Irving Shipbuilding Chair on Canadian Arctic Marine Security, Brian Mulroney Institute of Government, St. Francis Xavier University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. It's a pleasure to be here and take part in these important discussions.

My research and expertise lie in the field of Arctic defence, safety and security, and it's in that area that I would like to offer some comments.

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Canada has been forced to reconsider its national security situation. Given the proximity of our Arctic to Russia's, the north has naturally featured heavily in these discussions.

The first point I would like to make is that in considering the Arctic defence and security dynamic, the committee should keep in mind that there is no such thing as an Arctic defence and security dynamic. One can no more speak of Arctic security than Asian or African security with any precision. The Arctic is a big place, and the different sub-regions must be viewed through very different lenses.

While the European Arctic is absolutely seeing a resurgence of hard security threats, I would caution the committee not to see these as common circumpolar dangers. Simply put, the Russian threat to the Arctic is largely confined to the European Arctic now and for the foreseeable future. Discussions of stationing Canadian forces in the north or of adding more combat capability to defend the Canadian Arctic miss the point and risk stranding resources in a region that is not the centre of gravity of this new geostrategic contest. This assessment stems not from any naive belief that Canada's Arctic is somehow detached from global security; rather, a simple survey of the Canadian Arctic raises the question of what, if any, strategic value a Russian attack could achieve.

This is not to say that there is no military dimension to the Canadian Arctic. The region has long been an avenue through which the Soviets—now Russians—may project power. Ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as submarines, could use the Arctic as a transit route to hit critical infrastructure further south or to strike at the Atlantic sea lanes of communication.

Given this threat, new investments should be made to upgrade NORAD's aerospace and maritime detection capabilities, and I know the government is already looking at those options. I also know that other witnesses have provided analysis and recommendations in this area, so I won't belabour the point.

What is needed to augment Canadian Arctic safety, security and defence is not, therefore, a ground military presence, or even a military guard against Russia per se, rather a more comprehensive system of surveillance and situational awareness. The renovation of Canada's aerospace surveillance to detect Russian bombers and cruise missiles is a part of that.

However, the threat to the north is now far more complex than it was when either the DEW line or the north warning system was developed. As Canada works with the United States to augment and expand NORAD's capabilities in the region, what we need now is all-domain awareness. That means tracking not just incoming weapons systems but also illegal fishing vessels, trespassing craft and other hybrid threats. The Arctic is opening up, and an ice-free or ice-reduced future means that more activity must be monitored and policed. These threats span the safety, security and defence spectrum, and while Russian hypersonic weapons pose the most dire threat, their deployment is unlikely. Meanwhile, illegal fishing by, for instance, Chinese state-backed fleets or trespassing by criminal organizations is less dangerous but far more likely to emerge.

Canada has important elements of this all-domain system already. There's the RADARSAT constellation, a growing fleet of navy and Coast Guard icebreakers and patrol ships, and the ongoing DRDC efforts to build choke point surveillance and above-ice and under-ice detection systems. These are dispersed assets that can be tied together into a bigger picture as part of this effort.

What this means is that the renewal of NORAD's capabilities in the north must be all-domain, looking at aerospace, maritime and even under-ice detection and monitoring. These systems have been under development in various stages for decades, but there has never been a concerted push to realize a system of systems. The Russian threat to use the Arctic as an avenue of approach is real. So too is China's emerging Arctic interest. Coupled with the increasing accessibility of the Arctic Ocean and Canada's internal and territorial waters, the time to take a holistic view of northern surveillance has clearly arrived.

This is only a very basic overview, of course, but I'm certainly happy to take questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

Thank you very much.

Questions are where we are now. The opening round of six minutes each will be led by Ms. Dancho.

Ms. Dancho, you have the floor whenever you're ready.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our expert witnesses for being with us today for this important study.

My opening question will be for you, Dr. Lajeunesse. I'm wondering if you believe that Canada should meet its 2% NATO target. If so, where do you think those funds should be directed?

[Dr. Adam Lajeunesse]

Absolutely I believe that the 2% should be our minimum target. I think we do need to be a little more specific in directing those funds towards the most significant state-based threats. That means taking a clear-eyed look at who future great-power adversaries may be—in this case, it's clearly Russia and/or China—and what forces we will need to fight future conflicts.

In this sense, I would say that our historical defence spending priorities are a little bit askew. In the future, I would suggest spending on the air force and the navy, as any war against either Russia or China would be expeditionary in nature, and the navy and the air force would be more valuable.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Do you suggest that we increase our naval and air force spending to be on a par with army spending, or where do you think that should land?

[Dr. Adam Lajeunesse]

I can't give you any specific numbers. That's a degree of complexity that I won't get into, but historically the Canadian army has received the lion's share of Canadian defence spending. There is probably a rationale for adjusting that to provide more consideration for the navy and the air force.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Can you comment on our surveillance technology and where we should direct resources to improve it? We've heard consistently from witnesses that our surveillance is not nearly what it needs to be to accurately assess any incoming threats.

[Dr. Adam Lajeunesse]

Well, surveillance in the north is not up to the challenge of detecting modern incoming conventional weapons. Russian hypersonic weapons, for instance, cannot be detected with any accuracy with the north warning system. I believe you heard from Dr. Huebert on this question yesterday.

From a maritime threat perspective, Canada lacks both underwater and under-ice detection capability. As well, simply because of the size of the Arctic, we do not have a very good idea of what surface ships are operating—at least, outside the Northwest Passage. Right now that's not a critical threat, because ice renders most of those areas inaccessible, but over the next 10 years it's very likely that we will see the emergence of new civilian and hybrid threats using those waters.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Can you comment on Canada's technology sector? Halifax has a company called Kraken that invests in autonomous underwater vehicle technology. Would the government be well placed to look at utilizing the made-in-Canada advanced technology that we have? If so, how would we best use it?

[Dr. Adam Lajeunesse]

Canada actually has a long history of maritime surveillance capability. We were one of the pioneers in the underwater autonomous vehicle sector. Halifax and several technology start-ups and more established companies here have quite a bit of very useful technology that is dual purpose and is used for civilian purposes to survey underwater pipelines and so forth. With the application of a passive sonar array, we now have UAVs capable of travelling up to 2,000 nautical miles, give or take, semi-autonomously, powered by AI and feeding information back into mother ships or ground-based stations.

If we are going to surveil and maintain active surveillance across a large area like the Arctic, then yes, absolutely we are going to lean more heavily on underwater autonomous or above-water autonomous vehicles using artificial intelligence and various sensor systems that Canada is actually in a good position to provide right now.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Can you comment on investment in new submarines generally and in our F-35s? Are these areas in which we should be seeing, or in which you'd like to see, investment or further investment in the budget that's being announced today?

[Dr. Adam Lajeunesse]

Absolutely. If you listen to the Ukrainian fighters and to what the Ukrainian army is saying on the ground when they're asked what concerns them most, the answer is almost always air power. Looking forward at a great-power conflict, air power is crucial. Canada absolutely needs to speed along its acquisition of the F-35s.

From a maritime perspective, submarines are a strategic asset. They are extraordinarily important. They can greatly expand Canada's surveillance of a maritime area and also its ability to exclude hostile powers from that area. The next major capital acquisition that Canada will need to decide upon—and very quickly, might I add—is the purchase of a new conventional submarine fleet.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Can you comment on some of the challenges we're seeing in procurement? Do you feel that the government should prioritize that to a greater degree than they have?

[Dr. Adam Lajeunesse]

Absolutely. The question is asked about how much more money the Canadian military needs. I think that question somewhat misses the point. Money is obviously very important, but the ability to spend it effectively is just as important, if not more so.

Canada has a very long bipartisan tradition of doing procurement poorly. At least since the end of the Cold War, a big part of this stems from a prioritization of industrial benefits, jobs and the political partitioning of benefits to different sectors around the world.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

Thank you.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

The next six-minute block will go to Mr. Chiang.

Sir, take the floor whenever you're ready.

[Paul Chiang, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank all the witnesses participating today for your expertise and your time.

My question is directed to Dr. Goode.

Doctor, nowhere is Russian disinformation more rampant than in Russia itself. What strategy does the Russian government use to block narratives that run counter to their propaganda?

[Dr. Paul Goode]

Thank you for that question.

The government's approach is multipronged. On the one hand, there has been an active effort to block platforms that provide people with access to alternative or countervailing forms of information that would challenge the government's narratives as well as its lexicon. That means that prominent platforms such as Facebook have been formally blocked within Russia, although they are still accessible for those who have access to VPNs. That's a loophole that may be closing at some point.

The goal has been to drive people to state-sponsored or state-controlled media, including social media. These are not just the major broadcast media but also organizations like VKontakte, which is the Russian version of Facebook, which are very much under the control of state managers.

The other approach is a common tactic in all disinformation campaigns, which is to sow the airwaves and social media channels with multiple and sometimes contradictory narratives. The idea here is not necessarily to persuade anybody of any particular narrative, but rather to generate a distrust in all potential narratives. It's to drive people away from the search for information and confirmation and to generally create the likelihood that it is impossible to find the truth, so people shouldn't bother.

In this regard, disinformation succeeds insofar as it reinforces the ambivalence of people towards the war and makes them feel powerless to do anything about it.

[Paul Chiang, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

Thank you, Dr. Goode.

Having said all that, how can the Canadian government counter these strategies of disinformation?