Status of Women Committee on April 13th, 2021

[Dr. Alan Okros, Professor, Department of Defence Studies, Royal Military College, As an Individual]

Thank you, Madam Chair. We all appreciate the joys of connectivity these days.

I am speaking to you from Toronto, the traditional territory of the Mississaugas of the Credit, the Chippewa and the Wendat peoples.

I've been engaged on issues of harassment in the CAF for over 40 years, both in uniform and as an academic. I see strengths and weaknesses in the current version of the movie.

We know that Operation Honour has not had the results intended. You want to know why. The reason has been an incomplete understanding of the issues, which has led to incomplete solutions, underpinned by an unwillingness to critically analyze certain aspects of CAF identity and culture.

The first problem is that the issue has been framed as being about sexual misconduct. Yes, there are CAF members who annoy people with overtures, but the key issue is not about sex. If I hit you with a shovel, you wouldn't call it inappropriate gardening. It's about power. It's about sexually and racially coded language to create and police social hierarchies about who is important and who is not.

This death of a thousand cuts damages an individual's self-worth, identity and sense of belonging. You heard last week that military sexual trauma represents a deep moral injury.

The path starts to expand the framing of the problem. It acknowledges that there are cultural factors that can increase incidents of sexual misconduct, but the door is opened only very slightly. The key omission is the continued reluctance to name power and militarized masculinities. This requires a careful and critical analysis of how the military constructs the soldier, sailor, aviator and equally the leader and commander. We need to examine the institutionalized and systemic processes that shape military identity and ask how much of one's identity they have to give up in order to be successful in the CAF.

Most of those leading the CAF have not had to think about this. Left-handed people know they live in a right-handed world, but right-handed people don't. It isn't apparent to us when the world is constructed to fit us. The CAF was a good fit for most seniors. They continue to use terms and narratives that they believe resonate with all but that actually serve to accentuate the dominant identity, and hence increase the social hierarchies and leave some feeling isolated, ignored or not valued for who they are.

As part of analyses, I highlight the 2016 U.S. equal opportunities commission report that identified 12 factors that increase the risk of workplace harassment. The CAF is at the high end for several: significant power disparities, encouraging alcohol consumption, a young workforce, use of coarse language, single-gender dominated culture, and a homogeneous workforce. Only two are reflected in the current path.

Proper considerations of institutional and systemic factors that create the conditions where sexualized language is used to diminish others requires the CAF to shift away from the current focus on the individual. Harassment incidents and lack of reporting are not because people haven't read the definition or don't know how to file a report. Strong social factors, which are intentionally created by the CAF, set these conditions. Addressing these factors means challenging some central tenets of the profession, things that are key to success but can create unhealthy conditions: obedience to authority, normative conformity and group loyalty, the use of power, and the practice of judging others to see if they measure up.

Finally, it has become clear that some seniors have not dealt with sexual misconduct issues effectively. There are examples of some becoming ethically mute and morally numb, but there are also CAF members living in parallel universes. We have men who honestly do not understand how women or diverse folk navigate their careers, their workplaces or their teammates. They assume that all others have the same experiences they do. They haven't critically examined issues of privilege and advantage. They have not seen how others are shunned, marginalized or disadvantaged. They can't see the informal social mechanisms that those subject to harassment use to get the message to the idiot to stop.

Seniors may hear that there was an incident in the mess but learn that the two parties talked it over and settled it all—no harm, no foul. They don't recognize that the most the offended party can hope for is a grudging apology that leaves them still harmed, still looking over their shoulder and still carrying that moral injury.

Some seniors honestly say, “I’ve never seen incidents of sexual misconduct.” That’s because they're wearing cultural glasses with blinders that allow them not to see it. This is a key element of the culture change that the CAF needs to embark on.

My question for this committee is this: What guidance are you going to provide CAF leaders to do so effectively?

I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Marilyn Gladu]

We're going to start our first round of questioning with Ms. Wong for six minutes.

[Alice Wong, Conservative, Richmond Centre, BC]

Thank you very much.

I'm so proud to be among historians, because formerly, as a professor, I used to teach world history and also do a lot of research on culture, so this is really hitting home.

Dr. English, on February 26 you appeared before the national defence committee as a witness for their recently now shut down study on sexual harassment in the CAF. In your opening remarks in that appearance, you indicated that over the last 30 years the CAF has consistently failed to implement “comprehensive cultural change”.

Operation Honour was the CAF's most recent attempt at such a change. In your opinion, do you think Operation Honour was a success? In what way has Operation Honour failed? You did mention that in your opening remarks, but I would like to ask you to shed more light on that.

Thank you.

[Dr. Allan English]

Thanks. I'm glad to be here as a historian. I'll let Professor Okros speak for himself, but he's not a historian.

[An hon. member]

Oh, oh!

[Dr. Allan English]

At any rate, that's okay.

Basically, I think the main failure of Operation Honour was simply.... Justice Deschamps' primary recommendation was that the cause of most of the bad behaviour was the culture of the CAF, this toxic, highly sexualized culture, and she called for “comprehensive culture change”.

From the very beginning, the first response was from General Tom Lawson, who was CDS at the time, who said, “I do not accept from any quarter that this type of behaviour is part of our military culture.” That has continued right through the latest sexual response strategy, “The Path to Dignity and Respect”, which only calls for cultural realignment, as though it's sort of minor.

I think the major failure of all these activities in the last 30 years has been that the CAF is unwilling or unable to change its culture.

[Alice Wong, Conservative, Richmond Centre, BC]

Thank you.

Again, this is a question addressed to you, Dr. English. Are there any parallels you're able to draw between Operation Minerva and Operation Honour, be they failures, lessons, successes or approaches, etc.? This is a pretty open question, Dr. English.

[Dr. Allan English]

Thanks for that. I'm a history prof. I'm used to open questions.

Operation Minerva was part of a group of responses to what Maclean's characterized as the rape crisis in the Canadian Armed Forces in the nineties, and it was also part of the gender integration of the Canadian Forces required by the Canadian Human Rights Commission. For Operation Minerva, there's actually a chief of review services report that's still available online and documents how it failed.

It failed in almost exactly the same way as Operation Honour. There was no real commitment on the part of senior leadership to carry it out. The actions were many but ineffective. There was no ongoing evaluation of it, which has been a huge problem with Operation Honour. In the end, it went exactly like Operation Honour. An original first team set up to execute it was absorbed back into the organization and down-ranked continuously until it just faded away.

I suggested in a 2016 report that I wrote for the strategic response team on sexual misconduct that, actually, if they just read the chief of review services' 1998 report on Operation Minerva, they'd know exactly what things to avoid. I'm not sure if anybody did, but that's the short answer.

[Alice Wong, Conservative, Richmond Centre, BC]

Thank you, Dr. English.

You noted that Operation Honour lacked a “guiding strategy”. Who would be responsible for creating such a strategy? Would this be something the minister's office would be involved in? What role, if any, do you view the Minister of National Defence playing in the establishment of such guidelines? Was there a role for the minister in ensuring Operation Honour met its goals?

[Dr. Allan English]

My understanding of this was simply that the minister delegated that responsibility to the chief of the defence staff. The chief of the defence staff, in Operation Honour, on August 15, 2015, directed that the vice-chief of the defence staff write a strategy for Operation Honour within 45 days, by September 30, 2015. That was never done. Without any external oversight or anyone seeming to notice internally, Operation Honour never had a strategy, even though the CDS directed that it be written.

[Alice Wong, Conservative, Richmond Centre, BC]

Dr. English, you also mentioned in previous testimony that leadership “buy-in” is essential to Operation Honour succeeding. You also mentioned that a “lack of acceptance” permeated through leadership in the CAF.

Given the testimony of other witnesses both at national defence and here—specifically the ombudsman—it would appear that a lack of leadership “buy-in” is not limited to just the CAF. The minister—

[The Chair, Conservative, Marilyn Gladu]

I'm sorry, but that's your time.

We're going now to Ms. Hutchings for six minutes.

[Gudie Hutchings, Liberal, Long Range Mountains, NL]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I'd like to thank both witnesses for being here today. The knowledge that you're sharing with us is certainly invaluable.

Professor Okros, the committee has a unique opportunity to study sexual misconduct using gender-based analysis, as well as a survivor-centric and trauma-informed lens. You've done considerable work to enhance military operational effectiveness with research on women and diversity.

Can you share how policy and culture change on sexual assault can directly impact operational effectiveness in the military?

[Dr. Alan Okros]

I have a couple of comments to make. One of the critical ones is that the military gets everything done as a team. The first principle for any leader is to build cohesive effective teams that work together. When we have these kinds of behaviours within teams and when team members are being marginalized, shunned and harmed, you cannot have an effective team. That goes to the core of what challenges operational effectiveness.

To me, we're back to the questions you're asking about what can be done. There should be an emphasis on building inclusive teams so that every team member feels valued and they're able to fully contribute. It goes beyond that as well, because, again, one of the things we recognize is that diversity within teams is a real strength. When we have different people who see things through different lenses and different eyes and bring different lived experiences, it strengthens the team. This a real challenge in the military because part of the professional socialization is to convert the civilian into the soldier, sailor or aviator. Part of that causes everybody to become the same and to think the same, so some of the professional socialization processes actually stunt the diversity that is essential for mission success.

[Gudie Hutchings, Liberal, Long Range Mountains, NL]

Thank you for that, sir.

Professor English, you've researched military culture from a Canadian perspective. Based on your findings, what is a military culture and what are some of the distinctions between sexual assault in the military environment and in civilian cases? How do we address those specific challenges?

Finally, in your international approach to addressing sexual assault in the military, what have you encountered in your research? How would examples from other international approaches inform policy changes in the CAF?

[Dr. Allan English]

I'll try to be brief.

We could run a two-hour seminar on that.

Basically, culture tells people how things should be done. There's a formal culture: the rules, regulations and whatnot, and there's an informal culture. Someone said culture eats policy every time. It's the informal culture that drives what really happens in the organization. The leaders come and they tell you what they'd like to happen. Then you hear from other people what really happens. That's the key—this informal culture. Everyone learns in every organization that's not really the way we do things here.

The difference between the civilian and the military culture is simply the power of the hierarchy and the power that people have. A commanding officer has the legal right to order someone into harm's way. That's the only profession in Canada where they're allowed to do that so it's incredible power.

As Professor Okros said, it's the necessity of working in teams. As Lieutenant-Colonel Eleanor Taylor said, sometimes it is worse being excluded from the team than to tolerate the sexual misconduct, so sometimes that's what people do.

I'll stop there because otherwise I'll go on too long. I hope that helps.

[Gudie Hutchings, Liberal, Long Range Mountains, NL]

It does.

Do you have a comment about other international approaches to address sexual assault in the military that we could use as examples to inform policy changes at CAF?

[Dr. Allan English]

Very quickly, we have become most closely attached to the American military culture, which American researchers have found to be even more toxic than the Canadian military culture. It actually encourages and enables sexual assaults within the U.S. military, so they're not a very good model.

I don't know a lot about too many others, other than a little about Australia and the United Kingdom. Their records are no better than ours, so I'm afraid I'm at a bit of a loss there.

[Gudie Hutchings, Liberal, Long Range Mountains, NL]

Let's hope we can be leaders in this.

Professor Okros, given the operational impacts of military sexual assault, what are your recommendations to address the root cause of this? You've talked about the hierarchy and you've talked about power. What are your recommendations to address the root cause?

[Dr. Alan Okros]

I have a couple of comments with regard to this.

It's knowledge and awareness. This is not education, and it most definitely is not PowerPoint training. It's knowledge and awareness of how people see themselves and how they see others. This is part of what I was talking about in my opening statement. We have too many people in uniform who assume everybody else has the same lived experience as they do. We need to start with their recognizing that others experience their military careers very differently. That's my starting point.

I know time is running out, so I'll stop here.

[The Chair, Conservative, Marilyn Gladu]

Very good.

We'll now go to Madame Larouche.

You have six minutes.

[Andréanne Larouche, Bloc, Shefford, QC]

Mr. Okros and Mr. English, thank you very much for your testimony. Your historians' points of view remind us that the issue, the culture and sexual assault cases in the Canadian army go back a long way. Some things have been done, but the situation has not changed quickly enough.

There is so much to say on this. First, Mr. Okros, you talked about the culture in the Canadian army. I would like to hear you speak to Operation Honour, the path to dignity and respect.

What concern do you have regarding the criteria for appointing leaders covered in the path to dignity and respect strategy?

Talk to us about the process involving a culture change. What do you think about the path to dignity and respect?

[Dr. Alan Okros]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

As I indicated, I think two key changes need to be made.

The first, as I mentioned, is a shift to inclusion. The military operates very strongly to socialize people into a single identity, so the military needs to authorize and accept inclusive teams.

The second part is that more emphasis needs to be given to assessing the capacities and the effectiveness of leaders creating effective teams. We have cases where leaders are rewarded because they got the job done, but people don't spend enough time looking at the cost.

We have teams that get left behind that are tired, they're broken and they're not functional. I think part of it is holding leaders accountable for the teams they create and the teams they leave behind when they move on to new positions.

[Andréanne Larouche, Bloc, Shefford, QC]

So there is an obligation for leaders to be accountable, but there is also the matter of training.

I would like to come back to that.

Julie S. Lalonde testified before the committee.

How do you explain what happened to her during the training she provided at the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, where she said she received many disgraceful comments from people participating in the training?

Are you surprised at the reaction of military members while Ms. Lalonde was trying to educate them about assault cases, among other things?

[Dr. Alan Okros]

One thing I will point out is that, as a member of the department of defence studies, most of my teaching is at the Canadian Forces College rather than the Royal Military College. However, I would suggest, first, that unfortunately the circumstances by which Ms. Lalonde did her presentation were not well set up. I don't think it was well introduced. I don't think it was well understood. I don't think there were senior leaders in the room to ensure that a respectful conversation happened. I think there were lessons learned by officials at the Royal Military College on how subsequent sessions could be conducted more effectively.

Second, I think some of the messages that she wanted to convey to the cadets were new to cadets. She was tackling and naming rape myths, and at most Canadian universities there had been very good conversations amongst students on these issues. I don't think there had been conversations amongst the cadets at RMC on these issues, so I don't think they were well positioned to listen, to hear and to respond to them. I know there have been other subsequent efforts at RMC to ensure the cadets have a better understanding on some of these issues.