Transport Committee on Nov. 30th, 2009

[Dennis Bevington, NDP, Western Arctic, NT]

Outside of the interviews you conduct, are they done in a random fashion with employees throughout the company, or are they done on a prescriptive basis, on an appointment basis?

[Marc Grégoire]

That's a good question.

Martin may know the answer.

[Martin Eley, Director General, Civil Aviation, Department of Transport]

They're done on a sampling basis, depending on what it is you want to look at. They've decided they need to do so many at a certain level, and then the way they choose people is on a random basis, quite often. It's not picking particular people. The idea is that it's not biased either way.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you.

Ms. Hoeppner.

[Candice Bergen, Conservative, Portage—Lisgar, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

At the end of the day, Canadians want to know that when they fly, they're safe. That's what they're looking for. As we have already recognized, we have a strong record in Canada of aviation safety, and moving forward, we want to continue with that.

I think the people who do know very well how safe an aircraft is, and the procedures, are pilots. The Airline Pilots Association International issued a press release in February 2007 that said pilots support the bill to enhance the safety culture at Canadian airlines. Captain Brian Boucher, senior director of flight safety for the Air Canada Pilots Association, was here and he said,

We understand that the rationale for the bill is to enhance the safety of Canada's aviation system and we believe that SMS is an important advance in this area.

Can you very briefly tell Canadians why this is a measure that will make them safer, and that fear-mongering is not productive in promoting safety in aviation?

[Martin Eley]

The thing we haven't mentioned here is that quality assurance is common in a lot of companies. We're trying to rely more on the companies having effective quality assurance systems to make all of their systems effective, but particularly with respect to safety. If they're doing the job in the right manner, there's much more confidence that they will comply every day. We still need to go and verify that, and we will continue to do that. It's really building that confidence into their systems.

[Marc Grégoire]

But the system is safe. We all fly regularly, and I feel we're far safer in an airplane than in a car, I guarantee you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

With that, I'll thank you for your input today.

We're going to take a brief two-minute break and then we'll be back with our second set of guests.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Welcome back to part two.

Joining us now from the Canadian Federal Pilots Association is Mr. Daniel Slunder, national chair. From the Union of Canadian Transportation Employees, we have Christine Collins, national president, and Kerry Williams. From the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers in Canada, we have Carlos DaCosta, airline coordinator.

You know the routine, so I'll open with 10 minutes of presentation and then we'll go to questions.

Thank you.

[Daniel Slunder, National Chair, Canadian Federal Pilots Association]

Good afternoon, and thank you for the invitation to address you.

My name is Daniel Slunder and I'm the national chair of the Canadian Federal Pilots Association.

The association represents licensed pilots who are civil aviation inspectors at Transport Canada, the Transportation Safety Board, and Nav Canada.

Before you there should be a book of slides, and you should probably also have a book with tabs. I'll be talking to those.

Do you have them? I guess they didn't get distributed.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Go ahead. We'll get that distributed. We are a little tight for time, so I'm going to have to keep you on schedule.

[Daniel Slunder]

All right.

I regret to inform you that TC aviation inspectors now spend more time pushing paper than inspecting airplanes. With the introduction of aviation SMS, Transport Canada has systematically dismantled the key components of its prudent surveillance program in contravention of ICAO requirements to evaluate and inspect an operator's procedures and practices at least once a year, augmented by periodic random inspections. Transport Canada cancelled enforcement action in 2006. There has not been a single enforcement action against a large commercial air carrier in two years, despite Transport Canada's being aware of serious violations of safety regulations. You can find those at tab 3.

The national audit program was cancelled in March 2006, and Transport Canada quit conducting pilot proficiency checks in 2007. As a result, there are now unqualified pilots and pilots with expired licences operating aircraft in Canada. I'll refer you to correspondence at tab 6 for one example, and there are more. In addition, TC has delegated licensing and oversight of entire segments of the aviation industry to lobby groups like the Canadian Business Aviation Association, and that is in direct defiance of our international aviation safety obligations.

Most recently, the requirement for operational inspections on a mandatory frequency was cancelled in January of this year. Instead of regular and comprehensive inspections, Transport Canada inspectors simply conduct paper reviews of company safety management systems and follow up with superficial on-site validation of the paperwork. With SMS, we are simply not watching.

Because of the shortness of time, I will relate only three examples of airlines that have broken safety rules while we were not watching. These examples point to systematic problems with SMS. Under normal circumstances, a reliance on assessing and evaluating management systems, rather than actual aviation operations, means that Transport Canada aviation inspectors do not see these incidents. Each of these examples documents incidents that would put lives at risk.

The first example relates to an application for a flight permit. I refer you to tab 8 of the “Book of Documents”. This is an application to modify a passenger-carrying airplane. In this case they had fuel capacity in order to travel distances far exceeding its normal maximum range. This was to include a temporary installation of a high-frequency radio. The operators applied to TC, promising that the installation met all requirements and regulations. Under SMS, an inspector's job is to review this application and sign off that the paperwork is in order, nothing else. As you can see on the next slide, the installation fell far short of the paper promises. The electrical installation is held together with masking tape. Under SMS, this clearly dangerous installation slips under Transport Canada's radar because we're not watching. Slide 5 shows that the power feed had been improperly hot-wired through the instrument panel, and that's a potential for an electric short. Slide 6 is an example of the use of illegal parts.

Under the SMS, TC inspectors no longer conduct pilot proficiency checks. Companies check their own pilots. For inspectors this has closed an important window on flight operations, especially since TC's policy is to replace audits and inspections with paper reviews. This image was taken by an inspector who stumbled upon this plane. Through a combination of extraordinary circumstances this inspector conducted a pilot check ride. When he saw the condition of the airplane, he refused to fly in it. As you can see, the bolts used to attach the wing to the fuselage are clearly not intended for this purpose and could potentially fail as a result of the stress they are not designed to withstand. The inspector also found parts anyone can buy at Canadian Tire improperly installed in this airplane's electrical system. This airplane is not safe to fly, yet it has carried passengers in this condition, all because its state of disrepair was not visible through an assessment of this company's SMS.

Shouldn't TC's oversight be adequate enough to ensure planes in this condition are not allowed to fly?

The next example I will describe is chilling in its similarity to the crash of the Air Ontario jet that killed 24 people 20 years ago at Dryden, Ontario, a seminal event in Canadian aviation that led to a full inquiry and the rewriting of Canadian aviation regulations. On October 9, 2009, Air Canada flight 271, with passengers and crew, diverted to Grand Forks, North Dakota, due to the closure of the Winnipeg airport. This led to a series of life-threatening decisions that could easily have resulted in tragedy. The first breach of the regulations occurred when the aircraft was refueled with engines running while the passengers were still on board. Why would the captain allow such a dangerous procedure that contravenes the CARs? It turns out the airplane was dispatched without having the equipment necessary to restart the engines in working order. These were the same circumstances that caused the captain of the ill-fated Air Ontario airplane to take off from Dryden airport without de-icing. Second, even after being advised by a passenger, who was also an airline captain, that the jet's wings were contaminated by ice, the Air Canada pilot decided to take off anyway. In effect, he was acting as a test pilot, with crew and passengers on board.

We know about this nearly disastrous incident because of the passenger report that came to me personally. In the words of the pilot passenger, “Is this how Canadian operators are allowed to operate? Where's the regulatory enforcement required to keep the travelling public safe? Why were my fellow passengers and I subject to such illegal and unnecessary risk?”

Transport Canada's response was to let Air Canada's SMS handle it. This was in spite of the fact that the corrective action Air Canada put in place two years ago following a de-icing incident obviously failed. We have steadily lost track of aviation safety as a result of TC's SMS. These examples show an industry that is taking decisions and adopting practices that are endangering the public while we're not watching. Isn't it time someone stepped in to safeguard the public? Wouldn't it be better to have the next full-scale inquiry into the state of aviation safety before a major accident, not afterwards?

Some members of this committee regularly travel to Winnipeg, so this is personal. We travel the same skies. I want to assure you that I personally brought details of these examples to the attention of the senior management of Transport Canada. The decision to freeze the rollout of the safety management system for 703 and 704 operators is good news, but it highlights concerns about the safety of all air carriers for which SMS is a requirement. The problem this decision acknowledges undermines the safety of the big airlines, which carry the vast majority of travellers. We no longer are confident that the major carriers are compliant with safety regulations. To address the current situation, we recommend a number of critical measures that I would be pleased to address. They are in the document I handed out.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you.

We'll go to Ms. Collins.

[Christine Collins, National President, Union of Canadian Transportation Employees]

Thank you.

The Union of Canadian Transportation Employees, UCTE, is the national union for most government transportation employees. We represent transportation workers at Transport Canada, Canadian Coast Guard, Transportation Safety Board, Canadian Transportation Agency, airport workers, Nav Canada, and others.

At Transport Canada, UCTE represents the majority of unionized workers: 3,116 of 4,698. We represent approximately 1,000 inspectors in the aviation, rail, marine, and road safety divisions. In aviation safety, UCTE represents 50% of the inspectorate. Our members are the technical inspectors and aircraft mechanical engineers responsible for maintenance and engineering inspection.

Our members are classified as technical inspectors, TIs, a broad classification in multiple government departments and agencies. When applied to most transport inspection functions, this broad classification is inappropriate and completely out of date. This outdated and irrelevant classification results in situations in which inspectors who are doing the same job are paid vastly different wages, as well as situations in which our members are supervising people who make a lot more money than our technical inspector supervisors.

Today there are approximately 115 vacancies in the aviation inspectorate at Transport Canada—and that figure comes from senior management attending a civil aviation meeting just 10 days ago. One of the reasons we have such significant shortages is that Transport Canada has been preying on its aviation safety management systems to reduce safety budgets. In fact, over the past few years and in estimates going forward, Transport Canada has been capturing most of its 5% program review cutbacks from aviation safety budgets. We will send this committee part III of the Transport Canada estimates following this meeting. Another reason we have significant shortages is that most inspectors are recruited from the aviation industry, and the wages paid by government are up to 25% less than those in the private sector.

We urge you to consider Transport Canada's SMS in the context of the listeriosis crisis. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency introduced a similar self-regulation model into the meat industry prior to the crisis. It's also important to recognize that Transport Canada's aviation safety management system is unique in the world. Canada's implementation of SMS is far ahead of any other nation's, and some of the processes and systems in place in Canada are not being replicated elsewhere, nor are they recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO.

UCTE and our members do not oppose SMS. However, we believe there are aspects of Transport Canada's SMS that are wrong and need to be changed. UCTE is not suggesting reform in a vacuum. In fact, we are working with Transport Canada at the most senior levels to promote our perspective and to communicate openly with Transport Canada on these matters of deep interest to all travelling Canadians.

Our discussion paper, “Implementation of the Transport Canada Aviation Safety Management System: What's Not Right and Why Change is Necessary”, has been distributed widely at Transport Canada and to many other stakeholders, including members of Parliament.

UCTE's recommendations for change originate from the inspectors themselves. The people in the field doing the inspections, working for Transport Canada, are the people who are driving our campaign for change.

This is a critically important fact that parliamentarians need to keep in mind: inspectors no longer inspect aircraft. We hear this from all inspection regions. All inspectors do now is check off airline reports. Many inspectors do not even leave the Transport Canada office. They spend their time verifying the airline safety management reports. Don't get me wrong: SMS check-off is an important feature of SMS program verification and it needs to be done. However, airline reports may not be sufficient to protect the travelling public. Airline reports may not contain a sufficient amount of oversight, or may not contain the full facts with respect to internal accident corrective actions.

This leads us to a first important recommendation. Inspectors need to return to the practice of direct and sometimes random audits and inspections, without prior notification to the airlines. The intensity and prevalence of these random inspections should relate to risk, including whether or not a carrier is SMS-licensed or not. At the end of the day, the inspector must have the discretion and the authority to inspect randomly and without notification. This is the only way the Minister of Transport can be assured that his statutory obligations are met.

Second, we do need whistle-blower protections. You will hear about some of the serious problems in airline employee reporting and lack of protections from management reprisal, and lack of oversight and oversight definition from Transport Canada. Similar problems arise with the inspectorate. When inspectors have a complaint or a safety concern that they cannot address due to management or systemic constraints, they write up this concern and post it to the civil aviation issues reporting system, CAIRS, which was referred to by the previous group.

I have seen many of these reports and I've seen the Transport Canada responses. Nothing comes of them. It is simply an exercise of “I said, you said”. It is similar to an employee telling their boss they are not doing a good job. Well, you can imagine the response from the boss. And you can imagine the response from Transport Canada management.

The U.S. has not even implemented SMS, but on September 23, 2009, the Obama administration announced that the Federal Aviation Administration was clearly working for the public, not the airlines. The administration created an independent office out of a separate central agency to oversee aviation whistle-blower protections. This office will oversee the FAA Administrator's Hotline, Aviation Safety Hotline, Public Inquiry Hotline, Whistleblower Protection Program Hotline, and the safety reporting system, which is similar to our CAIRS. UCTE believes that Canada needs to follow the U.S. lead and establish an independent aviation safety whistle-blower office, attached to an independent agency such as the Transportation Safety Board or even Treasury Board.

UCTE does not believe Canada should delegate aviation safety to trade associations. There is a clear conflict in doing so. Canada is the only jurisdiction in the world to delegate aviation safety to trade associations. Transport Canada calls these delegations “safety partnerships”, but the name is a misnomer. Canada is delegating oversight and inspection to the very trade associations that depend on the airlines for their existence. Trade associations collect membership dues from commercial operators. The chief executives of the airlines sit on the boards of directors of the trade associations and run and manage the affairs of the association. It is a clear conflict of interest for an association run by the airlines to be responsible to the travelling public for aviation safety.

It is important to differentiate between professional associations and trade associations. Professional associations for pilots and engineers have a legitimate interest and responsibility in ensuring certifications and standards are applied to the professions. There is no conflict of interest when the professions are empowered to ensure the highest level of professional competence. Transport Canada has delegated SMS oversight to the Canadian Business Aircraft Association, known as CBAA. This association represents private commercial aircraft operators. An application from the Helicopter Association of Canada is also being considered. It is only a matter of time before an application from the association for Canada's largest airlines is also considered and accepted.

Last month the Transportation Safety Board published an aviation inspection report for an accident involving a CBAA-certified operator in Fox Harbour, Nova Scotia. The TSB report contained a lengthy discussion of the CBAA program and Transport Canada oversight. It contained the following facts: CBAA directors were concerned about liability and constructed a system whereby independent consultants were exclusively responsible for implementing the SMS oversight program; CBAA operators were free to choose their own consultants and frequently used the same consultants over and over, leading to the strong possibility of regulatory capture; UCTE members report that CBAA operators sometimes retained the same consultant responsible for CBAA oversight to develop the protocols for the operator SMS; Transport Canada audited the CBAA program and recommended significant changes to that program, but Transport did not follow the recommendations of the audit.

Our view is that a system that gives inspectors the authority to inspect will ensure redress of systemic problems such as lack of action in addressing the CBAA audit. Our view is that trade associations are in a conflict of interest when they are responsible to the public for aviation safety while accountable to airline management for their existence.

To summarize, UCT does not oppose SMS. We oppose the way Transport Canada is implementing SMS. We recommend a policy of direct and unscheduled audits and inspections by Transport Canada inspectors. We recommend an independent office for whistle-blower protection. We oppose SMS delegations to trade associations--it's a clear conflict. We welcome the motion of the committee and are interested in any opportunity to privately and publicly share our views on this matter of national importance.

We look forward to further discussions.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you.

Mr. DaCosta.

[Carlos DaCosta, Airline Coordinator, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers in Canada]

Good afternoon. My name is Carlos DaCosta. I'm an airline coordinator for the IAMAW for Canada. We represent aviation workers, as many as 17,000, in all areas of aviation, of whom 8,000 are mechanics involved in maintenance of various airlines going from Air Canada, Air Transat, Bearskin, and Air Labrador. One-third of the licensed technicians in Canada are represented by the IAM, and they're contained within the 8,000, so it's probably about one-third of that as well.

In my previous career I was a mechanic for Air Canada for 20 years before going on to the union path career. I have worked on the floor on various wide-body aircraft as a mechanic.

As an airline coordinator, I and other people in the IAM have written articles on SMS based on research conducted in the United States and Canada and by personally attending Transport Canada SMS sessions held across the country to inform the public of the details of the SMS process. The IAM believes, based on this research, that the SMS system is flawed, and have recently started collecting data to see if it supports our theories of the flaws that we have discovered in doing the research.

The main problem we have with SMS is that there appears to be a conflict of interest in having a company that has the best interest of operating a company and operating a budget be also responsible for safety. Again, it's a hunch, and unless we have the data to support it, it becomes a theory. That's why we have some data to support the fact that some of these incidents are starting to appear, which is alarming.

We are specifically also concerned about the lack of Transport Canada oversight on what's going on at the SMS-level process, and especially below that process--in other words, on the floor while the aircraft are being repaired.

Transport Canada, in its claims, states that it's another layer on top of regulations, which is basically a quote lifted from the ICAO document. In reality, we are not seeing it as a second layer but an alleged process that is not working. It's an alleged process that does not contemplate checking below this SMS process level.

It was interesting to hear the previous speaker saying that the inspectors are only inspecting the paperwork, but that is what our mechanics are starting to tell us. That is all they see. They don't see anybody on the floor any more doing spot checks. Obviously, by not going below this SMS process level, Transport Canada cannot begin to understand what is actually happening on the floor.

As I stated earlier, we have a few incidents to report. Unfortunately, they've only come from one airline, one of the larger ones in this country, but as our process is put into place over the next several months, we will be collecting data from other companies that we represent.

Clearly, the concerns I'm about to raise support some of our fears. I'm not going to get into names or specific situations, but I'll give you a flavour so that you understand what is happening and why the Transport Canada SMS process is not capturing these.

What we've seen recently at the one airline is the practice of the airline disciplining employees when their names are uncovered as a result of an action through an SMS process. Clearly, this is a violation of the SMS process as put forward by Transport Canada. If it becomes a punitive process, then where is the incentive for someone to come forward in the future and volunteer information that they made a mistake and it should be corrected so that others don't make the same mistake?

We had a situation in Vancouver where a lead licensed mechanic was disciplined. He followed procedures correctly as per the manual. The manual indicated that this is how you do the job and this is how you install the tool. He proceeded to install a tool that was not approved by Transport Canada. He questioned that. He was more or less led down the path where he was told that it was fine and just follow the procedures. He went on to do that.

The next shift comes along and a new group of mechanics take over the job. They follow the procedures in the manual. They don't recognize the tool because it is not labelled and it's not painted differently from the standard tools that are used. As a result of a mistake in the maintenance manual put out by Airbus--and it has been confirmed by Airbus that it was a mistake--they did not remove it because they didn't know that it was a tool that was already installed. When the SMS process and the investigation kicked in to find out what was going on, the employees who did not remove the tool were disciplined.

Where is the incentive for SMS to work? Where is the example to show other mechanics in the future, “You know, I've made an honest mistake, I'd like to come forward and I'd like you to tell me where I've erred, because I think there's something wrong”? It's not there. And that's only one incident.

We had another incident in Winnipeg where a mechanic was trying to repair a seat in the cockpit. Something went wrong in the system. The seat got sidetracked somewhere else. The employee was then asked to grab a seat and improperly fill out a tag so that it could be properly used on that airplane. He was instructed to do so by his manager. He was told that he'd better follow instructions or he would be disciplined. He refused. He was disciplined. An investigation is taking place, as I was advised this morning, and we'll see what comes of that. But this is the atmosphere in which an airline, who is supposed to be a partner in the SMS process, is practising.

We have two incidents in Toronto. One is where workers were asked to do repairs on an aircraft during the midnight shift, in dark weather, with improper lighting, improper tooling, improper equipment, and stands so that they could access it. They asked that the airplane be routed to the hangar for proper repairs, something I have done in my previous career. Sometimes you can be accommodated, sometimes you can't. If it is serious enough, they will postpone their repairs and the aircraft gets delayed, or they switch it with another aircraft.

The employees were told there was no such ability and they'd better do the job or else. Because they were put in that hostile situation, they refused to perform the job under the Labour Code. Labour Canada came in, and within their capability and their knowledge and training, they deemed the situation was not a dangerous one. The employees were then threatened by being told by the company, “You'd better not do this again. Learn your lesson and tell others that you cannot refuse to work. When we tell you to do something in a certain location, you'd better do it and do what's best for the airline to get the airplane out on time.”

We had another situation in Montreal, where an employee who works in a shop where they overhaul individual parts for an aircraft noticed a trend whereby shortcuts were being taken and the maintenance manuals were not followed. You have to understand that when you work on an aircraft, it's not quite the same as working on a car. You can't simply do what you think is right; you have to basically follow the manual and then apply your knowledge and experience in doing the repairs.

As a result of these shortcuts that were being taken, rightfully or wrongfully, he believed there was something wrong. He filed an SMS report. The SMS report has buried his incident. He has gone to Transport Canada, to no avail. They would not speak to him unless they spoke one on one.

At the end of the day, what we have is an atmosphere.... And I've been talking to employees. What they're saying is, what is the purpose of coming forward and saying there's an incident, that they've found a mistake, that they found an error, or found somebody who did something wrong, though he probably doesn't realize what he did? Where is the advantage in doing so when you know your friend is going to get disciplined? What they will do, in turn, is hide and deal with the issues themselves. As a mechanic, I know they will not take shortcuts on maintenance, I can tell you that much. But if left to your own measures, where does that lead the whole aviation industry in the future?

We're talking about a reputable airline. If you look at what happened with Southwest, they are no less nor more reputable than all the airlines in Canada; neither is American Airlines and neither is Continental. Yet the Americans have a rigorous system whereby they do spot audits and so on. As a result of the whistle-blower protection, employees came forward and some of these airlines were grounded and fined.

What makes you think it won't happen in Canada? We're all human beings. We all have a vested interest in where we work. As a manager, I might be looking at operations and budgets over safety. As a worker, I might be looking at how to get home on time, how to do the job safely, cover my butt, and make sure that when that airplane takes off, it takes off and lands safely, because it could be my cousin up there or it could be my brother.

At the end of the day, the system is definitely flawed. Some of these examples are starting to come forward. Over the next few months, as I get more and more data, I will definitely be directing these at Transport Canada and anybody else who will listen.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you.

Mr. Volpe.

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to the witnesses for coming and sharing your views and your experiences with us.

I take, collectively, what you say as a great condemnation and a complete rebuttal of what Transport officials said not an hour ago. I'm not sure whether my impression is an accurate one. Is that what you tried to convey to me?

[Daniel Slunder]

Personally, I just wanted to bring examples of where SMS is not working for us and why we don't have faith in SMS, the way it's being presented to us as a replacement for the types of inspections and audits we've conducted in the past.

[Christine Collins]

I certainly would say that some of the comments made by Transport Canada representatives were inaccurate at best.

[Carlos DaCosta]

I'm trying to understand your question, but what I believe is they're not involved enough to understand what's going on, so in their belief and in the involvement they have, everything seems to be working fine. Until they realize what's happening below the wing, below the process--

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

I'm trying to understand what it is that they understand works.

I read through your briefs, Madam Collins and Captain Slunder, and I listened to what you were saying, Mr. DaCosta. It seems to me all of you have, to quote a phrase generated by Transport Canada, “common concerns”, and those common concerns are that, one, people are not recognizing there is a conflict of interest between those who are looking for the business model and those who have to make a decision on the public's safety. They should be one and the same. I can't imagine that a company providing a service to people 20,000 or 30,000 feet above ground is not concerned about safety. There's only one way down if there's an error. Second, you're concerned that there are no longer the kinds of spot checks you'd anticipated earlier on. Third, you're concerned that the regulator should be the inspector--otherwise what's the purpose of making regulations--but that the regulations are actually enforced by a party that is making the regulations necessary.

What is it about this that tells you Transport Canada believes it's doing the right thing?

[Carlos DaCosta]

If you were to ask me whether or not I believe SMS is a good process, I'd have to say yes and no. If you take out the human element, it's probably a good process. If you introduce a human element, we're all going to take shortcuts. We all have vested interests.

If I'm a manager under pressure and I'm looking to perform and look good, I'm going to take what I think is a reasonable shortcut in order to get the airplane out on time, not understanding what someone's going through as a mechanic in doing his job and what someone else is going through as the other person who's supporting him. At the end of the day, there is a conflict of interest, yes, and that's why I believe SMS is flawed. You have to put strict measures in place and have a proper whistle-blower protection system in place, which is run by an independent company, not by Transport Canada, not by the airline, and not by CBAA. It has to be neutral and it has to instill confidence in me so that when I report something, I know it's going to be looked at seriously and I know I'm protected.

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

When I hear you say that, I hear a really severe rebuke of the system and of the regulator, Transport Canada. You're telling me in no uncertain terms that you don't believe the thing can possibly work because the information cannot be gathered accurately. That's what I hear you telling me.

[Carlos DaCosta]

There are too many conflicting and competing interests, and there are too many humans involved in the process. It is therefore bound to fail.

I've seen some of the examples already, such as the ones I have listed, and I'm sure there are more. I've gathered these in just the last two or three weeks, and there are more out there. It's just a matter of getting people to be comfortable enough to come forward and tell me.

They're telling me that the system is failing, just as it has in the States. I know the Americans don't have SMS in place, but they have a rigorous system in place under which they do spot checks, and yet Southwest was caught with its pants down. What does that tell you--if they put in SMS it's going to get better? I mean, they were purposely hiding from the FAA the fact that they weren't doing these inspections, so why would SMS make it any better? They're already telling you that they're not professionals, that they're not acting in the best interests of their passengers and safety, so why would SMS make it any better? It just gives you another tool to therefore continue to operate in the way you have been so that nobody will find out what's going on.

The difference between the Americans and us is that they have a much better whistle-blower protection system in place. They've done a lot of research into it; we have not. I believe ours is still sitting in the bill somewhere on one of the shelves in Parliament. Bill C-7 hasn't come forward yet.