Transport Committee on April 22nd, 2010

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Ms. Brown.

[Lois Brown, Conservative, Newmarket—Aurora, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen. I found this very interesting.

In fact, earlier this week when I flew in from Pearson to Ottawa, I was exceedingly surprised—I guess this has come about as a result of this discussion we've been having in the committee—to have a woman sitting across the aisle from me who was doing some knitting, which for any other mode of transportation you would say is a very gentle occupation and something that is admirable. But she was using a pair of metal knitting needles, and it occurred to me that they could very easily become a weapon in the hands of the wrong person. I suppose we are all becoming more sensitized to these issues.

Mr. Salter, in preparation for this discussion today, I did a bit of research online last night. In the introduction to the book Politics at the Airport, you used two terms that I wish you would define for me. They were “governmentality” and “assemblage”. You said that things are incomplete, they're fragmented, and there's a “dispersed nature” of airport politics.

Is this what you're referring to when you talk about the multitude of issues or areas that have to impact our airport security? Could you talk about that for us this morning?

[Dr. Mark Salter]

Wow. Thank you. That's very kind. I appreciate that there's someone other than my parents who has even looked at my book online.

“Governmentality” is just a way of looking at the rules that guide the formation of other rules. One thing that speaks to the question of subcontracting is that modern government attempts to be as efficient as possible, and so when CATSA looked at the screening operations, they asked, is it more efficient for us to have these be federal employees or subcontractors? They said that because of the flexibility of the workforce, because of the task required, it's more efficient for us to do it with subcontractors than to do it ourselves.

So they simply hired the people who were already doing the job to now wear the CATSA uniforms and they have now gone through several rounds of repeating the contract. “Governmentality” is just that way of thinking about how the rules are made.

I think you're exactly right--well, I think I'm right--in saying that the modern security system is dispersed. Mr. Sela has mentioned ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, which sets the standards of recommended practices for airport security. There's a universal security audit program, which ICAO runs. Canada has participated—it was the first country to participate—and yet those results are not made public. They must exist; they must be available to you, but not to the general public.

Under the Chicago treaty, we should have a national aviation security agency, one agency that's responsible for aviation security. Canada does not; we have a number of agencies and ministries that are responsible for different parts of it. And then we have carrier sanctions. The air carriers are responsible for security on their planes, but there's also the secure flight program. There are lots of different rules and regulations and agencies.

My argument would be not that larger government is better and that it would be better to have one big agency that was responsible for every part of the system, although I certainly take Mr. Sela's point that this works in the small case of Israel. Rather, my point would be that all of these different agencies combine to make a system that is extremely complex, and that this complexity could be resilient and could also be confusing.

I also went through Pearson yesterday. There was a large crowd outside the security checkpoint, because they were putting in pat-downs all across the screening points. I said to the screener, “This is new”, and she said, “Yes, the regulation came down yesterday. It may be gone tomorrow.” I said, “Do you not know?” She replied, “Why would anyone tell us?”

Now, I would make the argument that it would be good to tell us, the passengers, because then we would know to leave half an hour or an hour early for security at the airport. To not tell the front line staff what the regulations are and what the expectations are seems to be a negative result of this kind of synergy of all these different regulations, all these different competing components.

[Lois Brown, Conservative, Newmarket—Aurora, ON]

So to your point, Mr. Sela, in an article in which you are quoted, it says: Most airports don't see themselves as a business. They're a budgeted service provider. They have fixed budget and a mandate to give service to airlines and passengers. If they can't do that within their budget, it's not a problem for them--they simply raise the airport taxes, which the passenger ultimately pays for.

You go on to talk about how that's mandated.

If an airport is looked at as a business, is there not, then, an opportunity for a corporate mandate or a corporate vision to be put in place?

[Rafi Sela]

Absolutely. You're right; the Ben Gurion airport, which nobody wants as a gold standard, and I believe it, is run like a business. They actually make money on security. You won't believe it, but they do. They are so efficient and so good that people who are going through security first of all are not harassed. They feel very comfortable. They have enough time to get all their money out at the duty free. They have created the Buy and Bye, an Israeli patent, for people who are going abroad to visit somebody. They can buy the duty-free, leave it in the airport, and when they come back they can pick it up. The Ben Gurion airport is one of the most efficient airports in the world.

I want to comment on something Professor Salter said. The Israeli ISA is probably one of the smallest security organizations in the world, not the largest. And it's not because Israel is small. It's because the security agency is very efficient. We have also a lot of government agencies that are responsible for different areas in the security of Israel, but one--only one--regulates the system and says what needs to be done. If that is clear, you can have 17 jurisdictions at the airport. If they know exactly what the rules and regulations are, they can follow each one by themselves.

The other point I want to make is this. If you have so many jurisdictions responsible, why don't you train and drill them? I have never seen a drill that has involved everybody at the airport, for whatever scenario you want to do, without disrupting, of course, the airport's operation.

I'll give you an example. The other day I arrived from Toronto on a direct flight with Air Canada to Tel Aviv. I'm some kind of a VIP, and I go through the airport very fast. All of a sudden, somebody stops me in front of customs. I say, “I want to see my grandchild. What's going on?” He says, “Just one minute, sir”. And I say, “Okay, it's a drill”, but he won't tell me it's a drill. He says, “Just a minute, we have a situation. It will take just a minute.” It took about two and a half minutes and they let the crowd through.

It was a bomb drill in the middle of the secure area in customs. It was drilled by all the forces. It took two and a half minutes of the customers' time, but the forces were drilled and the lessons were learned.

You need to take this seriously. If, God forbid, something happens in one of your airports, you will never recover. You will always point fingers as to why we didn't do this, why we didn't do that.

There are solutions that are not explosive. They just need to be carried out in the right way.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you.

Ms. Crombie.

[Bonnie Crombie, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

That was very dramatic, Mr. Sela. Thank you.

This government's very excited about the purchase of the 44 new body scanners that were announced at Christmastime. Mr. Salter is a strong advocate for the scanners and Mr. Sela says it's a useless waste of money, as we've been hearing. Mr. Sela says behavioural screening is what's needed; Mr. Salter says behavioural screening is very close to profiling, which is dangerous.

We understand that the Canadian geopolitical environment is quite different from what we have in Israel. That's understood. But things could change.

Mr. Sela wants airport security, not aviation security. He says that's what's needed. And Mr. Salter says airport security is very complex. So we have two very diametrically different and opposing views, polar views.

But this government, nonetheless, has made this $11-million investment in the 44 scanners. Given the investment and given that we're raising another, whether it's $1.5 billion or, as we heard yesterday, $3.2 billion through a new airport security tax, how can we best build on the scanners for a reliable airport and aviation security management system?

It's to you both.

[Dr. Mark Salter]

Thank you.

My understanding is that CATSA is running up a test bed on behavioural profiling. I would hope that CATSA would be able to provide some kind of data as to whether or not that's effective.

I think the differences between Mr. Sela and I are clear. The one thing that will help with that is data--if this actually works in the Canadian context.

I could not agree more with Mr. Sela that more drills and more red teaming are necessary, and that in fact the Canadian aviation system needs to act as if it were united, even if it were not. I think the idea of drills, the idea of red teaming—where you get folks in the room and they pretend they are terrorists and they seek out the weak parts of the system—is excellent, and one of the best practices used not only in Israel but also in the United States. Those are practical things.

[Bonnie Crombie, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

I have two more questions, and I want to get Mr. Sela in as well. Thank you.

Mr. Sela, do you have a brief response as well, or do you want me to go on to the next one and then respond...?

Actually, this might lead into it as well. My next question really has to do with your behavioural screening approach, which I think is very worthwhile.

Currently here in Canada we use a very random screening approach. You have to step on a mat and you're told whether to go for random screening or not. I know that many MPs are chosen for secondary screening every week, and I'm not sure that's a good use of resources. In fact, my three children and I were set aside for random screening once. I'm not sure if that was a good use of resources either.

How does your approach, Mr. Sela, differ from...and specifically, the behavioural screening approach versus the approach we have now?

If you want to dovetail into my first question, which was how we have a better and more integrated system building on the body scanners, then feel free.

[A voice]

Did they take your tequila?

[Bonnie Crombie, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

No. I didn't have any tequila.

[Rafi Sela]

The body scanners are not your decision but the TSA's decision, which Canada is just following.

My best advice is stop the purchase, but I know they will not do that.

I want to tell you about profiling. I have no bad connotation about behavioural profiling. I don't think behavioural profiling is the first thing you need to jump into. I think what you need to do, again, is assess them. Create a system of trusted traveller and trusted worker, which can be the same system on different databases. Then start to alleviate your screening procedures with sniffing machines, and then look at passengers for more behavioural signs. I don't believe that to do behavioural profiling without having a whole system behind it is worth anything.

[Bonnie Crombie, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Thank you.

I'm wondering if Professor Salter could comment on the random approach to screening that we have now.

[Dr. Mark Salter]

I appreciate that. I think “random”, and the fact that you have been selected, is good news, because it demonstrates that it's random.

The issue with trusted traveller systems, if we look at NEXUS, for example, which is the example in the United States, is that we see extremely low uptake, because people are not willing to give up that much of their private information.

So at the very least, if we are going to implement the trusted traveller system in Canada, there needs to be a much better public sell that this will increase both efficiency and security in exchange for that private data.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you.

Monsieur Laframboise.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

My question is for Mr. Salter.

Earlier you said you were in favour of subcontracting. Subcontracting results in contract renewals and changes in the businesses that handle security. This is often done by staff who have never worked in the aviation sector. You agree with that. So there will be public calls for tenders.

Personally, this is what I question: using the private sector, making public calls for tenders and making staff changes in certain fixed years. This is a choice, this is our way of acting, and it's a choice we make.

However, you said that CATSA was stuck between international practices and Transport Canada's regulations. I'd like you to explain that to me more.

[Mark Salter]

All right. I'll answer in English, since it's a complex matter.

That's not to say that the other question wasn't complex also.

The best practice for international security, as demonstrated by Mr. Sela, is precisely risk management, it is to identify those who are high risk and those who are trusted travellers. The way that the random screening system works with CATSA now is that every single passenger is treated the same way.

This is the tension that I was talking about. The best systems, as Mr. Sela rightly identifies, separate out those who are risky and those who are trusted, but our current system treats everyone exactly the same way.

CATSA right now simply cannot, under its legislative mandate, treat individuals differently. It cannot. It cannot do investigation. It cannot look at your identity documents. It cannot participate in that trusted traveller system.

So there is a tension between CATSA's desire to emulate best practices and the regulatory instrument that describes that everyone must be treated exactly the same.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

My next question is for you, Mr. Sela.

Terrorists are definitely changing and refining their actions. How does it work when you are informed of new developments concerning the terrorist communities? Do you have a way of informing other partners in the world, the Americans and others? Is there a system in place for quickly transferring data from Israel to Canada or the United States, for example, or with other countries in the world?

[Rafi Sela]

I want to make one quick comment on Professor's Salter's viewpoint.

My viewpoint is very different. There is no democracy in security. There is no politics in security. Security is a defined way of protecting people.

My idea of having a random search at the airport is like Russian roulette. It's exactly the same deal. How do you know you get the right people? People get through because you have no method of screening.

To your question about intelligence, I will share with you a quick story. When Mr. Ariel Sharon was the prime minister, he gave an order. He was a general, but even when he was a prime minister he never forgot he was a general. He gave an order to all the intelligence agencies in Israel to share information from today on.

We know that will never happen. It will never happen in Israel and it will never happen in any other place in the world.

Within three months, the Israeli Security Agency has put together very sophisticated computer software in which each agency puts in its real-time alerts and it puts out a unified database that can be shared in real time. We are doing it right now only with the United States, but I'm sure that government to government we can share it with other allies as well.

But this is basic for airport and aviation security: sharing intelligence in real time.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Mr. Jean.

[Brian Jean, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Athabasca, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing today.

My questions zero in on two particular issues. One is the trusted traveller program, or a synopsis of that.

I recently applied for NEXUS and a CANPASS, just to see what the system was and to understand better the issue of aviation security. To be honest, I never found it to be at all intrusive, but of course, I haven't gone for my interview yet. We'll see what happens there.

I had a chance a year and a half ago to travel to Israel with my mother and 30 people from a synagogue in New Jersey. It was quite interesting when I came back to Ben Gurion airport. Our vehicle got stopped and I was in the front, so they asked me a whole bunch of questions. I got out. He asked for my ID, and I told him I was a member of Parliament from Canada. As I gave him my ID and they started to take the luggage out of the back for five or six people who were in the same van as me, as soon as he saw my identification he immediately told them to stop taking the suitcases out, he put the suitcases back in, and sent me on my way, along with all my passengers.

This is versus the situation in Canada, where I travel pretty much every week or very frequently. I get asked what I do for a living and they send me to another second or third layer of security, which I've always found to be very interesting. As I say, I go though airports a lot, and I have, I would suggest, probably one in three times gone through another level of security screening, although I can come here to this place and walk around with total freedom and sit beside anybody I want, including cabinet members and the Prime Minister, without any issue of security screening. So I agree that there is an issue in relation to what we do.

In Israel in particular and other democracies across the world, is there a more robust system of trusted traveller, and to what extent do we exclude people? What percentage, would you suggest, of those people would be excluded as a trusted traveller versus the people who go through the first layer of security and the potential other layers of security?

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Mr. Sela.

[Rafi Sela]

In Israel, as I said before, I will make Professor Salter's worries go away. We have done away with interviews for trusted traveller cards. We now have an automatic system that looks like a passport photo booth in which there is a computer and a mouse, and you sit and answer 10 questions.

Once you have done that, the system delivers a “yea” or “nay.” If it delivers a “yea,” you get a card.

You need to go through this procedure every year, and you are a trusted traveller. There is no person involved, no person-to-person interviews. If you fail the system, you have to go and see somebody.

I'll tell you how good the system is. When I was asked to check the system and I went to the manufacturer, the guy who actually greeted me at the port was an ISA agent. He said, “Take my ID card, because you can't get into the system without a valid card.” So he gave me his ID card, and I put it in my pocket.

I went to the machine and answered all the questions, and I was flagged. When I got out, I said, “Why did you flag me? What am I, a terrorist?” He said, “Yes, you lied to the machine.” I said, “What do you mean, I lied to the machine? I can't lie to the machine.” He said, “The machine asked you if somebody gave you anything before you entered, and you said no.” I thought, “Oh my God, right; he gave me his card.”

Even unintentionally, the machine found out that I was hiding information.

So we have systems--that's what I'm trying to say--that can ease the tension and can make people much more comfortable in acquiring trusted traveller cards.

[Brian Jean, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Athabasca, AB]

Thanks, Mr. Sela.

First of all, is it possible to provide information in relation to those questions, what basis they come from, psychological profiling or whatever the case may be? I have to move on to another question, but I would be interested in more information about that program, if you could provide that to us.

The question I have next is in relation to profiling. Quite frankly, I did some research on profiling generally. I came across a Canadian Human Rights Commission report, The Effectiveness of Profiling from a National Security Perspective, and I note that profiling is not just racial profiling. There are examples of different types of profiling, including behaviour, geographical, perspective, and of course, the last one, being consumer profiling, or racial profiling in essence.

I think that would be a dangerous road to enter, but certainly security, as you say, crosses all boundaries of politics and sometimes reasonableness to make sure that Canadians and other countries are secure.

Are you suggesting, Mr. Salter, that we eliminate any sense of profiling and get to a point where, except for the trusted traveller program and people who are exempted from the second or third levels of screening, we screen everybody? Do we come to a point where we forget who the person is, forget what their history or background is, and just issue them an edict where they have to go through every level of security?

[Dr. Mark Salter]

Thank you. I appreciate that.

First of all, for the NEXUS program, the problem is not once you're in the system. The problem with uptake is the number of people applying for the system. It's not because of the actual giving up of information but the perceived giving up of information. Again, it's a matter of selling and public diplomacy as much as it is about a real exchange between privacy and security.

If we could be certain that profiling worked and was reliable, with a one-to-one match, I would then be all for it, because it would be effective. The Christmas Day bombing, in particular, demonstrates the degree to which we simply cannot connect the dots.

What Mr. Sela is not saying about the trusted traveller system and the Israeli system is that there's an enormous database and enormous security apparatus behind those ten questions that provide intelligence for the Israeli security agency to allow them to make those decisions. Our legal and political culture is simply different in Canada. It would not tolerate that degree of surveillance and intrusion into our private lives to get to the point where we would accept those types of questions.

At the moment, I think random profiling is better than broken profiling.