Transport Committee on Feb. 25th, 2020

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Turnbull.

Thank you, Mr. Barsalou-Duval.

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

It's already over?

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

It goes fast.

Mr. Bachrach.

[Taylor Bachrach, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Turnbull, for appearing before the committee today.

I'd like to follow on my colleague's question on the validation process.

On November 19, 2018, after the Lion Air crash, Transport Canada and the FAA signed the “Validation Improvement Roadmap”, as you know, which expressed a vision that both authorities are committed to taking progressive steps to reduce, if not eliminate in-depth technical involvement by the validating authority based on level of risk.

I'm curious. Does Transport Canada intend to continue with this road map towards harmonization in light of these events?

Was it a mistake to sign on to this agreement at a time when concerns about the safety of the 737 Max were already being expressed?

[Nicholas Robinson]

We did sign that agreement, as you mentioned, on November 19. That doesn't preclude—and I have to stress this—the independence of our decision-making. Where we identify a risk, where we are uncertain of the certification process that the state of design, whether it be the FAA, EASA or ANAC has undertaken, or where we want to further expand our knowledge or understanding of how they feel this aircraft complies with a common set of standards that we expect all aircraft to have in order to operate safely globally, we still have that right to turn up the volume, as my colleague Dave said, or further expand our review of that.

That improvement map allows us to continue to work to understand where we have similarities, where we have commonalities or, where we don't have commonalities, how we can actually have processes that are more common to allow us to certify an aircraft more consistently.

[David Turnbull]

If I may add to that, I think it's important to recognize that “Validation Improvement Roadmap” as a work in progress. I have—I'll be completely honest—stated my concerns with the objective that you just read as it is stated. A big part of my job is not only to ensure that the minimum safety standards are met for everything that I sign off on in Canada but also to make sure that there is a level playing field amongst the various manufacturers. It's a highly competitive business. Certification costs a lot of money. For every decision that we may make to say, “No, manufacturer, you have to do one better or you have to do one more test,” I have to consider whether that is a fair and level approach vis-à-vis how the other authorities treat their manufacturers.

If we were to, as that phrase states, move to complete reciprocity on all products, we would lose the ability to calibrate those decisions against what those other authorities are doing. I believe that's a very important element. That said, there are certain categories of products we have already today for which we have direct reciprocity with no review. That's done on a risk basis. It's not done for large transport aircraft such as the Boeing 737. Personally, I don't think it will ever get there. It's simply an evolution of the degree to which we can rely on, if we choose to, the work of the other authorities.

[Taylor Bachrach, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Thank you for that response.

I'm curious as to what extent the certification process with these other aviation authorities was audited before Transport Canada signed on to the harmonization agreements.

Could you speak to that a little bit?

[David Turnbull]

Before we sign any of those agreements, there is a review.

With regard to the case in point, the one we're working on with Brazil right now, it involved a team going to evaluate their systems and processes to see if they are sufficiently equivalent. However, it's not just that; it's also experience. It would be very unusual for us to establish a full BASA, bilateral aviation safety agreement, with a country that had just come to the table and had not been in the business of producing that product type for some time.

It takes time and experience to learn how to build aircraft, design aircraft, and also, from the authority's perspective, to certify them. That is why we are deliberately cautious in entering into agreements with some of the newer players. They have to build that experience to establish their credibility to a certain extent.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you.

We're now going into the second round.

First on the docket is Mr. Baldinelli.

[Tony Baldinelli, Conservative, Niagara Falls, ON]

Thank you, Chair. Congratulations on your election.

Thank you to the witnesses for appearing.

This is my first opportunity to ask some questions.

I want to build on a comment from my colleague opposite, who talked about the certification management team. I guess the CMT was also hoping to reach a level of policy alignment and confidence for each authority to fully accept certification by the other three nations that are participating, without the need to conduct additional technical assessments.

Because of the accident, has this policy changed this, or are we continuing to advance that policy goal?

[David Turnbull]

In many respects, what we're seeing in the changes to the agreements are in the subordinate procedural documents that define how we interact. It's not just about reducing involvement; it's about improving and refining the process to make it more efficient.

I'll give you an example. When we go to validate an aircraft—and this works in both directions—we don't want somebody coming in and asking questions with a never-ending list. We're working towards what we call a work plan concept, where the validating authority assesses the new areas, the areas of risk, the areas where we may have struggled in our own certifications and there's a similar piece of technology in that other aircraft. We will define a work plan that defines in advance the exact areas we will look into, implying that with regard to other areas, we will totally rely on the other manufacturer.

That's an example of a process refinement that is more efficient and yet maintains a sufficient mutual knowledge of what each other is doing to maintain that level playing field concept that I described earlier.

I don't want you all to be left with the impression that because we're advancing these agreements, it is necessarily driving us to being forced to having mutual acceptance without review. That's not necessarily where this is going. There's a lot more to it.

[Tony Baldinelli, Conservative, Niagara Falls, ON]

Okay, thank you.

Next, in terms of the operational evaluation report for the 737 Max, which was conducted I believe on November 30, 2017, my understanding is that the OER outlines in some detail the technical differences between the 737 Max and some of the older models that have a lengthy and proven track record. However, it's this section on operational suitability that is extremely brief. It simply notes that the aircraft in general is operationally suitable for private operators and airlines under the Canadian aviation regulations.

Why is that? Were there not difficulties or technical issues to be addressed or indicated, including advanced pilot training, for example?

[David Turnbull]

Let me back up a bit and explain what the operational evaluation does for you.

At each change to an aircraft design and, in this case, stepping from what we call the NG version, or the previous generation to the Max, the manufacturer will propose a training program that bridges, from the pilot's perspective, the knowledge and awareness they have to operate the aircraft from one model to the next.

The OE, in its simplest form, is a joint board that evaluates the appropriateness of that training material to get a pilot who has flown the NG to fly on the Max. It's as simple as that. If the OE board determines that the training proposed is sufficient, then the conclusion is that it is operationally suitable.

If there are issues when the evaluators go through the process.... There are always naive candidates who are selected. We try not to get people in there who have predisposed knowledge or are biased in any way. We're putting regular, average line pilots in there. They do the evaluation. If there are issues, if they struggle and are failing on the simulator, that is a clear indication that the training proposed by the manufacturer is not sufficient, and there will be an iterative process to improve the training.

[Tony Baldinelli, Conservative, Niagara Falls, ON]

Thank you for your response.

Just as a follow-up based on that, you mentioned the three additional concerns that you expressed to the FAA—flight control systems, minimum training, hours worked. Will they be expressed in any way in that OER?

[Nicholas Robinson]

Yes. The joint operational evaluation board will review the minimum training requirements for flight crews. As part of that, and to ensure that we truly do have a strong representation of Canadian aircrews who will be flying those aircraft, we are working with the three Canadian operators as well as the three pilot associations that represent the pilots of those three Canadian operators. They have committed to sending two of their representatives, along with Transport Canada representatives, to that JOEB process, that OE process, to ensure that the training that's being proposed is adequate enough for the crews operating in Canada to appropriately operate those aircraft.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Baldinelli.

Mr. El-Khoury.

[Fayçal El-Khoury, Liberal, Laval—Les Îles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for being here Mr. Robinson and Mr. Turnbull. I would say that this is a good opportunity to hear from you and get an idea of the efforts you are making to ensure passenger safety.

My question is for you, Mr. Robinson. Could you tell us more about the measures brought in place by Transport Canada after the first Boeing crash in Indonesia? Could you also tell us how long it took following the crash in Indonesia for Transport Canada to put those measures in place?

[Nicholas Robinson]

Thank you for the question.

Following the Lion Air crash that took place on October 29, 2018, we were examining that accident with the state of design, the FAA. The FAA issued their measure on November 7. They issued an AD, an airworthiness directive, which was adopted by Canada as well as globally.

On November 8, 10 days after the accident, we issued our own changes, in working with the three Canadian operators, to the quick reference handbook, and to ensure that our aircrews were memorizing the full five-step procedure to address the runaway trim stabilizer condition. Those were the additional measures Canada put in place, on top of what was adopted globally as issued by the FAA. Our measures were additional. Those were implemented within two weeks after the accident.

[Fayçal El-Khoury, Liberal, Laval—Les Îles, QC]

Thank you.

And now my second question: is there a difference between the measures taken by the FAA and those taken by the other authorities? Did Boeing and Transport Canada have any concerns about these measures and if so, what were they?

What was Transport Canada's reaction, Mr. Robinson?

[Nicholas Robinson]

When we implemented those measures, as part of common practice, we informed the FAA that our operators were making these additional changes. It wasn't a request; it was information that we were moving forward on that. We received word back from the FAA later on that they acknowledged those changes. There was no negative reaction against any of those changes that we made.

I have to also emphasize that this was in full collaboration with our three Canadian operators. This was a joint effort. It wasn't Transport Canada unilaterally making these changes. This was working with our operators and recognizing that there was a potential additional measure we could put in place to assure the safety of those flying in Canada and on Canadian-operated aircraft.

[Fayçal El-Khoury, Liberal, Laval—Les Îles, QC]

Mr. Robinson, do you believe that these additional measures, such as training, might have prevented a crash like the one that happened in Ethiopia? If so, to what extent? To what degree of certainty are you convinced?

[Nicholas Robinson]

Désolé, I can't say with any confidence that this would have prevented that Ethiopian accident. First, the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 investigative report has not been released yet, so we still have things to learn with regard to this accident. We still have more to garner from here. We won't know whether the crew operating that aircraft used that unique Canadian procedure and could have recovered from what they were experiencing. That's something we won't be able to determine.

What we do know is that this measure helped to reduce.... By memorizing those procedures, what we were doing was decreasing the reaction time for crews on Canadian-operated aircraft to recognize and respond to this sort of event happening in the flight deck, and that may have or would have helped them prevent that sort of issue from escalating.

I'd be in no position to determine if that would have prevented the Ethiopian Airlines accident.

[Fayçal El-Khoury, Liberal, Laval—Les Îles, QC]

There is a big difference between “prevent” and “reduce”. What would you tell us?

[Nicholas Robinson]

To prevent or reduce?

[Fayçal El-Khoury, Liberal, Laval—Les Îles, QC]

Yes. You mentioned both words.