Evidence of meeting #5 for Transport, Infrastructure and Communities in the 43rd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was transport.
A video is available from Parliament.
5:15 p.m.
Liberal
Churence Rogers Liberal Bonavista—Burin—Trinity, NL
Do you feel that the Canadian certification process in recent years has made advancements that have led to improved safety?
5:15 p.m.
Airworthiness Specialist, Bell Textron Canada Limited
I think the Transport Canada certification process is a very mature process, and because it's a very mature process, there are good working relationships between Transport Canada and their applicants. At the end of the day, safe products are the result.
5:15 p.m.
Liberal
Churence Rogers Liberal Bonavista—Burin—Trinity, NL
What, if anything, sets apart the Canadian certification process from other global certifying entities?
5:15 p.m.
Airworthiness Specialist, Bell Textron Canada Limited
My simple answer is that the delegation system that Transport Canada has is a trust-based relationship. You don't become a delegate in the Canadian delegation system without trust from Transport Canada. That trust requires a relationship. There is a standard that has been set where there needs to be at least a one-year working relationship with Transport Canada to become a delegate. History has shown that it takes longer than that to be able to get the level of trust that's required. I think that's one of the key elements in the Canadian system that is different from some of the other systems, the element of trust.
5:15 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey
Thank you, Mr. Deer.
Thank you, Mr. Rogers.
We'll now move over to Mr. Barsalou-Duval.
5:20 p.m.
Bloc
Xavier Barsalou-Duval Bloc Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
My first question is for Mr. Deer of Bell Textron Canada Limited, but other witnesses may answer as well.
The pilots had not been informed that MCAS, this new system, had been installed in the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. It was also not included in the manual that was provided and was not part of the training.
If you had incorporated a new system like that or a major system into helicopters built by Bell Textron Canada, would that have been in the manual? Would there have been training on this?
5:20 p.m.
Airworthiness Specialist, Bell Textron Canada Limited
I can't specifically talk about the 737 Max, but when we make changes to our products that are significant in nature, there is an assessment of the training that's required and whether there are adjustments required in our training courses.
5:20 p.m.
Bloc
Xavier Barsalou-Duval Bloc Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC
Does Viking Air, for example, do the same thing?
5:20 p.m.
President and Chief Executive Officer, Viking Air Limited, Longview Aviation Capital Corp.
I'm sorry, I didn't get the whole question.
5:20 p.m.
Bloc
Xavier Barsalou-Duval Bloc Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC
If a system such as MCAS or a system that changes the way the aircraft is flown and stabilized is installed, would Viking Air, for example, mention it in its manual? Would training be provided to pilots?
5:20 p.m.
President and Chief Executive Officer, Viking Air Limited, Longview Aviation Capital Corp.
I think it would really depend on the change to the aircraft system and whether that was considered a major or minor modification. Any time you get into changes to the control systems of the aircraft, typically they become major modifications and get a much higher level of oversight.
5:20 p.m.
Bloc
Xavier Barsalou-Duval Bloc Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC
My second question is also for Mr. Deer and the representatives of Viking Air.
If you were installing a new system, and you didn't consider it important when it would be fairly important, and wanted to avoid disclosing that fact as part of the certification process, would you be able to hide that change from Transport Canada or the Air Transport Association of Canada, ATAC? Would the Canadian certifying body detect it?
5:20 p.m.
Airworthiness Specialist, Bell Textron Canada Limited
In the Canadian certification system, I would say no. As I said before, the whole relationship that we have with Transport Canada is based on open and honest communication and trust.
5:20 p.m.
President and Chief Executive Officer, Viking Air Limited, Longview Aviation Capital Corp.
I can't imagine not relying on that trust relationship with the certifying authority.
5:20 p.m.
Bloc
Xavier Barsalou-Duval Bloc Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC
How do you explain that such a situation occurred in the United States, in the case of Boeing?
5:20 p.m.
President and Chief Executive Officer, Viking Air Limited, Longview Aviation Capital Corp.
I have no idea.
5:20 p.m.
Bloc
Xavier Barsalou-Duval Bloc Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC
All right. I have one more question for you.
Do you think a situation like this undermines public confidence in the aircraft certification process?
5:20 p.m.
President and Chief Executive Officer, Viking Air Limited, Longview Aviation Capital Corp.
I would say most certainly, and I think that's why we're here today, to support the fact that Transport Canada's certification process is robust and recognized around the world as one of the best in class.
5:20 p.m.
Bloc
Xavier Barsalou-Duval Bloc Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC
I think it's been proven by a lot of people that our protection system is solid, and I'm glad that's the case. Having said that, I'm wondering whether we should take steps to ensure that other countries' certification process is as robust as ours.
A slightly automatic acceptance system is coming. A change adopted in Europe or the United States would be automatically considered accepted here. This system could be interesting in the sense that it would simplify things, make our work faster and be profitable.
How can we be sure that we can trust the certification systems used in other countries?
5:25 p.m.
President and Chief Executive Officer, Aerospace Industries Association of Canada
I mentioned in my comments that we had done an exercise called vision 2025. We very strategically, intentionally, made recommendations around Transport Canada. We fully believe that the folks at Transport Canada are some of the best in the world. As Mike mentioned, our system is different from other systems, and I think that difference also makes it the best system in the world.
What I mentioned in my comments was that, while we have the best people, we don't have enough of them, so how would we, from a global competitiveness standpoint, move forward? We need to make sure that TCCA has the proper structure and the proper resourcing, financial and human, in order to keep up with us. I mentioned that we grow 5% a year. Their budget hasn't grown for the last seven to eight years.
5:25 p.m.
Liberal
5:25 p.m.
NDP
Taylor Bachrach NDP Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to all of our witnesses.
My first question is for Ms. Diamant.
You offered a very strong defence of Canada's certification system in your opening remarks. In the situation this committee is studying, we're seeing more and more that there were major issues in the U.S. certification of the 737 Max 8, yet Canada verified that certification. What went wrong? In your opinion, how do we fix it so that we can ensure the safety of the Canadian flying public?
5:25 p.m.
Chief Engineer, Airworthiness & Certification, Pratt & Whitney Canada, As an Individual
I can only speak to what's been published factually so far. I'm not going to speculate on anything other than that. The official investigation report hasn't been finalized.
What I can talk about, which seems obvious based on the testimony from the Transport Canada team, is that they were not aware of the changes when they validated the aircraft. In fact, it seems that the FAA may not have been aware of that. It's very difficult for a validating authority to be able to identify an area as a risk area for validation review if the certifying authority and the airframer don't do that initially. They would have been trying to find a needle in a haystack, and there's limited time to do that.
5:25 p.m.
NDP
Taylor Bachrach NDP Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC
We heard earlier about the delegation process and the role of trust. Would you say that perhaps the situation was one in which the FAA trusted Boeing to identify issues?
5:25 p.m.
Chief Engineer, Airworthiness & Certification, Pratt & Whitney Canada, As an Individual
I'll go to obligations and accountability. It's the responsibility of the organization that has the delegation or authorization to do a correct assessment and then notify the regulator when it's of a certain risk. It seems that they did not make an appropriate assessment, so it wasn't flagged to the regulator.