Evidence of meeting #6 for Transport, Infrastructure and Communities in the 43rd Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was transport.
A recording is available from Parliament.
4:25 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey
Mr. Clerk, did you want a moment to get everybody all set and sound-checked and everything?
4:25 p.m.
The Clerk
If we could take one minute or so, that would be great. Thank you.
4:30 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey
Okay, gentlemen, we are all set.
Members of the committee, ladies—we have a few of them here today—and of course gentlemen representing different areas and different sectors, welcome.
With that, we'll reconvene.
We're going to move on to a presentation.
I have here a list of the presenters. Is there an order, Mr. Clerk, that you would prefer?
I see the Air Canada Pilots Association, Mr. Giguere—I hope I'm pronouncing your name right—chief executive officer.
Mr. Clerk, I'm assuming I can start off with him.
4:30 p.m.
The Clerk
Yes, Mr. Chair.
4:30 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey
Mr. Giguere, the floors is yours. Please tell me if I messed up your name there.
4:30 p.m.
Rob Giguere Chief Executive Officer, Air Canada Pilots Association
It's correct. Thank you very much.
4:30 p.m.
Chief Executive Officer, Air Canada Pilots Association
I trust the audio is all right. We tested it earlier.
4:30 p.m.
Chief Executive Officer, Air Canada Pilots Association
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon.
I'd like to start by thanking the committee for the invitation to appear.
I'd also like to acknowledge the very important comments from the first witnesses today, Mr. Njoroge and Mr. Moore, and offer my condolences for their loss.
My name is Rob Giguere. I am the CEO of the Air Canada Pilots Association.
While I graduated as a mechanical engineer, I've been a pilot throughout my entire professional life. Additionally, I've also held senior executive positions at Air Canada and Skyservice Airlines. Over the course of my career I have been qualified on a wide range of aircraft, including the Douglas DC-8 and DC-9; the Airbus 320 series, including the 330 and the 340; and the Boeing 727 and 737.
I've been directly involved in developing, implementing and overseeing pilot training during my time at Air Canada. Additionally, I have been seconded to other airlines during my career. Today in my capacity as CEO, I am very proud to represent the Air Canada Pilots Association.
I'd like to offer a bit of context on our membership and our interest in the 737 Max.
When the committee first contemplated this study earlier this year, it was before the full impact of the pandemic was felt around the world. At that time, our association represented 4,500 active pilots of Air Canada and Air Canada Rouge. Today we have about 3,800 active members, with another 600 on furlough.
Our members operate aircraft built by Boeing, including the 737, 777, 787, as well as the Airbus 320 and 330 and the brand new, state-of-the-art Canadian-made Airbus A220.
Air Canada currently has 24 Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft in its fleet, all of which were taken out of commercial operation in March of 2019 when the transport ministry issued the flight restrictions on grounding.
Airline flight operations are extremely complex; hence, pilots are only trained and qualified to operate one equipment type at a time. Our Boeing 737 Max pilots, of whom there are about 400, have not flown passengers since March of 2019, keeping up their skills with limited periodic simulator training.
As professional pilots, our primary interest is always the safety of our passengers, our flight crew and our aircraft. Well-trained and highly skilled pilots are the first and last line of defence when it comes to the safe operation of commercial aircraft.
Overall, commercial aviation endures an extraordinarily high level of safety by managing and mitigating risk. While these broad statistics are important, they in no way lessen the tragedies in our thoughts, and our thoughts go out to everyone affected by these tragedies.
As pilots, we think particularly of those flights, as those pilots found themselves in a situation with little time and knowledge to understand the best course of action. We need to do the right thing for those lives lost.
Having been heavily involved with aviation safety for my entire career, I can tell you that every professional pilot wants to know and understand the technical details of these two accidents so we can address issues and improve aviation safety going forward, not just for the Max but for aviation more broadly.
In the nearly two years since these accidents, significant work has been done by regulators around the world, including Transport Canada, to closely examine the circumstances of the accidents. As we now know, these two tragedies exposed some deficiencies in how new models of aircraft are certified. They also exposed the critical importance of ensuring that active pilots are both considered and involved in the process.
I will first speak to the certification process. Following the accidents in early 2019, ACPA called for Transport Canada to undertake an independent review of the 737 Max to assess its airworthiness. We are happy that Minister Garneau ordered a full recertification of the 737 Max in Canada before it was to fly again.
In general, we're very concerned with the practice of delegating the certification of aircraft to manufacturers. This can amount to self-certification and relies on the behaviour of manufacturers to make responsible decisions. Canadian aviation authorities have the world-class expertise to independently certify the aircraft flying in our skies. We should not solely rely on what may be a flawed regulatory process of another jurisdiction.
Going forward, we should not outsource this critical safety task to the United States or any other country, which may in turn outsource chunks of its own regulatory oversight to the industry.
I'd like to acknowledge the work done to date by Transport Canada in re-examining the 737 Max. We're broadly satisfied with how this process has unfolded and urge the department to increase its capacity to undertake such examinations on any new aircraft introduced to the Canadian market going forward. That capacity should involve pilots who have extensive experience on the front line of the industry.
We'd also like to thank Minister Garneau for ensuring that Canada's recertification process is proceeding with great care.
Second, I want to talk about the importance of considering and involving pilots in the process, specifically as it relates to training. What we in aviation call “human factors” are a key element of the safety equation. Considering human factors ensures that humans and technology work effectively together. That is not simply about design but also includes training, policies and procedures. This is especially important, as modern aircraft have evolved to incorporate increasingly complex software systems. All these advances contribute to overall safety improvements in aviation.
We must also have a clear understanding of the pilots and their operating environment. Aside from the operational issues around the 737 Max, which appear to have been resolved to a large degree, we would point to the importance of pilot training in general and in particular with certification of new aircraft.
Pilot training is a significant cost for airlines. Pilots engage in an extraordinarily high level of training throughout their careers. This includes ongoing recurrent training and requalification, as well as extensive indoctrination training when they qualify on aircraft of different types.
The 737 Max was a variant of an aircraft already in operation for many years, and as such, an extensive training course was not required for existing 737 operators. There should be no shortcut for pilot training.
I should note that as Air Canada was not previously a 737 operator, the situation of our pilots was somewhat different, in that each Air Canada pilot underwent specific 737 Max training on dedicated 737 Max simulators. Air Canada is one of the few airlines in the world that has two simulators that it designed specifically for the 737 Max. This will be helpful and important as we move forward with the recertification of the aircraft in Canada.
As I noted earlier, Canada's professional pilots are the first and the last line of defence in aviation safety. As such, we believe it's vital for us to have a voice in the regulatory process. This is important not just on behalf of our profession but on behalf of the passengers we are charged with keeping safe on every single flight that we operate.
We should never take for granted the critical role pilots play in the very complex man-machine interface of today's commercial aircraft. It's our view that experienced front-line pilots should be an integral part of certification and of training design.
To that end, we are pleased that Transport Canada included active line pilots in the Joint Operations Evaluation Board as part of the recertification process. This ensured professional pilots, well versed in day-to-day demands of line operations, contributed to the assessment.
I'd like to specifically acknowledge Transport Canada's director general of civil aviation, Nick Robinson, and his team for maintaining regular consultation with groups like mine, groups that represent the interests of professional pilots. This is an important measure, and one we would like to see continuing on an ongoing basis.
Finally, when the 737 Max is certified in Canada, it will be important to consider the reintroduction of the process and how it's managed. Operators need to slowly and thoughtfully reintroduce the aircraft into service, ensuring that the highest standards are maintained and achieved. I'm not aware of the approach of other operators; however, my understanding from my briefings is that Air Canada has developed a very careful and thoughtful plan for the 737 Max recertification and reintroduction to service in Canada.
Thank you. I welcome any comments or questions.
4:40 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey
Thank you, Mr. Giguere.
We'll now move to the Air Line Pilots Association, International. Mr. Tim Perry is the president of the Air Line Pilots Association Canada.
4:40 p.m.
Captain Tim Perry President, Air Line Pilots Association Canada, Air Line Pilots Association, International
Thank you very much.
My name is Tim Perry. I'm the Canadian president of the Air Line Pilots Association, International and a 737 pilot at WestJet airlines. I have been a professional pilot for 18 years.
The Air Line Pilots Association, International—ALPA—on behalf of 59,000 professional pilots at 35 airlines in North America, including 16 in Canada, appreciates the opportunity to participate in the study by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities of the aircraft certification process in Canada.
Before beginning my remarks, I would like to offer our deepest condolences to the families and friends of those who perished in the Boeing 737 Max accidents, and in particular Mr. Moore and Mr. Njoroge, who took the time to relate their stories today. I found them very moving and very meaningful. I want to thank them for that.
It is in this context that I offer our recommendations for not only the Max's return to service, but also for future evaluations of new designs and modifications to existing designs.
In March, in testimony from Transport Canada's director general of aviation, Nicholas Robinson, and the director of national aircraft certification, David Turnbull, you heard their perspective on the role of airline pilots during the certification process for introduction of a new or derivative Canadian aircraft into service in Canada or the validation process for foreign manufactured and certified aircraft. They also provided information about the role of line pilots in the effort to return the Boeing 737 Max to Canadian skies.
In this brief I will emphasize the need to involve current line pilots more formally in Transport Canada's work. I will also highlight ALPA's unique qualifications to be a primary source of expertise to assist Transport Canada in its evaluation.
When an aircraft is introduced into service, whether it is new or a derivative design developed in Canada or in another country, ALPA offers its expertise to examine training and operating requirements from the perspective of pilots who are current on that type, or a similar type, to evaluate operational procedures in simulators and in flight if necessary. I will refer to them as line pilots.
ALPA line pilots operate into and out of approximately 700 airports around the globe, in all weather conditions. No organization represents such a diverse environment of operating conditions.
While Transport Canada's certification pilots certainly have a key role to play, given their background and training in flight testing to ensure that all steps in the certification process are addressed, ultimately it is line pilots who must be adequately prepared and trained to manage the handling qualities and emergencies that may occur. Therefore, systems and procedures should be evaluated by line pilots to ensure that the training is adequate. This is where ALPA can play a key role.
ALPA is uniquely qualified for two reasons. First, the ALPA Air Safety Organization is the largest non-governmental organization of its kind in the world. Unlike many other pilot organizations, we have a large number of current line pilots who specialize in various aspects of aviation and are organized by discipline within our air safety organization.
Of relevance to your study, two of these disciplines are the aircraft design and operation group and the human factors and training group. Pilot subject matter experts, or SMEs, in these two groups are supported by ALPA's full-time professional staff.
ALPA devotes substantial resources in support of the Air Safety Organization so that it can work with manufacturers and regulators to ensure that passenger and cargo aircraft meet the intent of applicable federal and international regulations and standards, that design certification and operational standards keep pace with the industry, and that newly introduced designs provide a level of safety that is at least equivalent to that of previous models. Additional information about the Air Safety Organization can be provided to this committee upon request.
A second reason that ALPA is unique compared with the government test pilots involved in the certification process is that our pilots offer a valuable perspective that can only come from those who are currently involved in the daily operations of airliners.
Mr. Turnbull said, in response to a question concerning the role pilot associations play in the certification process, that they are not typically involved until a subsequent step, which is referred to as the “operational evaluation”. He said that if there are issues when the regulator's evaluators go through the process, they may select “naive candidates, which are sometimes airline pilots”, to evaluate the proposed training requirements in a simulator.
It has been our experience that involvement of line pilots in the certification or validation process is more the exception than the rule.
I recommend that ALPA's participation in certification and validation efforts be given a higher profile.
Specific to the return to service of the Max, Mr. Robinson emphasized the importance of pilot association involvement. He is aiming for the associations to be standing by the minister when he is confident that it is ready to return to service and that a total of two representatives from the operators and pilot associations will be involved in the work of the Joint Operational Evaluation Board, the JOEB.
We are pleased—
4:45 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey
Excuse me.
Mr. Perry, can you please wrap it up? Hopefully you can get in some of the remaining comments that you might have through the questions to follow.
4:45 p.m.
Capt Tim Perry
I have five lines left.
I'll just say that we are pleased that subsequent to Mr. Robinson's appearance, two line pilots from ALPA who fly for WestJet travelled to the U.K. to participate in the JOEB's work. Air Canada pilots were also closely involved.
In the committee's development of recommendations to the government for the aircraft certification process, we urge you to consider an ongoing role for airline pilots and pilot associations in evaluating procedures as well as the handling qualities of new or modified aircraft.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions and comments.
4:45 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey
Thank you, Mr. Perry.
The toughest part of my job is having to step in when people are giving us such valuable information.
4:45 p.m.
Capt Tim Perry
I understand.
4:45 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey
We're now move on to the Canadian Union of Public Employees.
We have Jordan Bray-Stone with us. He is the chairperson, health and safety committee, airline division.
Mr. Bray-Stone, go ahead. The floor is yours.
November 24th, 2020 / 4:45 p.m.
Jordan Bray-Stone Chairperson, Health and Safety Committee, Airline Division, Canadian Union of Public Employees
Thank you, everyone.
First, on behalf of all cabin crew I represent at CUPE, I want to express our sincere condolences to those affected by the Ethiopian Airlines tragedy, most of all the victims' families.
My role is to represent the health and safety interests of the cabin crew who get on these planes day in, day out; and to work tirelessly to ensure their interests are heard. Passengers and our cabin crew get on planes and come home to their families and loved ones. They trust that the companies manufacturing them and the regulator certifying them for flight have their backs and that every safety aspect, both big and small, has been accounted for.
While the 737 Max events are obviously most concerning, similar trends of aircraft manufacturers placing profitability before safety and going either unnoticed or ignored by regulators persists at all levels. We have noted this just over the past two years as we get new aircraft.
We work in the aircraft cabin, so my focus today will be how a profit-first approach affects crucial interior safety systems and devices.
I testified before this committee a few years ago about tombstone legislation, among other things: how with aviation it often takes tragedy to bring about change and improvements.
CUPE has a history with aircraft cabin systems and tragedy. Air Ontario flight 1363 crashed on March 10, 1989, in Dryden, Ontario. One of our flight attendants perished because, at the time, cabin jump seats did not have shoulder straps.
Air Canada flight 797 landed in Cincinnati on June 2, 1983, after a horrific cabin fire, and this led to an emphasis on how important it was not to overlook the aircraft cabin when it comes to safety. It led to oxygen systems, emergency lighting, smoke detectors and smoke protection for flight attendants, and on-board firefighting equipment, among many other things.
In the past two years, a lack of consultation with our professionals, the cabin crew who work in and occupy this space, has highlighted great safety shortcomings. On the 737 Max, this led to an interior option being provided to airlines that maximizes seating to the detriment of functional lavatories, galleys and, most of all, cabin crew jump seats. The galley area is so restricted in the aft section that passengers can't access the lavatories without cabin crew either having to get out of their jump seats or the passenger having to either crawl or climb over them. Imagine the safety issues this presents in turbulence.
The narrow galley space precludes a second jump seat at the aft right, as exists in other cabin configurations. Once again, in the event of sudden turbulence, which the industry acknowledges as an emerging hazard due to climate change, where are cabin crew to go?
These are the people who will help you get off the aircraft in the event of an accident.
The lavatories on this plane are so notoriously narrow that when customers go to wash their hands, a copious amount of water lands on the floor. This is due to the tiny sinks.
Water is a known hazard on board, and training for cabin crew includes the risks of having water leaks in galleys.
It is unacceptable to have such a problem literally engineered into an aircraft to add a couple of seats. This aircraft was certified by the FAA, but it was purchased and flown by Canadian carriers. How has our regulator permitted this? Were they even aware of these problems, and if not, how? These may seem small, but they are important.
On the Airbus A220, a Canadian-designed and certified plane, option designs are offered to airlines that either omit important safety equipment or include equipment that is unacceptably difficult to use.
The aft jump seat is a pullout option, and it's prone to jamming. As well, if certain switches are accidentally depressed in the wrong order, it will not latch in place and therefore will not secure the occupant.
Most concerning, perhaps, is that the jump seat cannot be retrieved if any galley equipment is in the way, which is a common threat, as it is housed in the same frame as onboard meal carts.
The aft jump seat handset needed for emergency communication is positioned such that it is completely unreachable by most occupants unless their shoulder harness is unbuckled. As you will recall, one of our members died because of a problem with or a lack of a shoulder harness. This invites a dangerous scenario of a cabin crew member having to choose between emergency communications and their personal safety.
When asked how this could possibly have been approved by Transport Canada, officials I spoke to could not answer my question. We've never heard from them again on this issue.
Although there is ample room for additional jump seats at the back of this aircraft, it was approved to be sold to operators with only the single pullout jump seat available, what can only be assumed to be a classic cost-saving measure.
No alternate jump seats are available at the aft of the plane in the event of sudden turbulence. Furthermore, if any jump seat is to fall inoperative, someone is going to go without a seat.
CUPE is also very concerned about cabin air quality, which affects on-board crews both front and back. Canadian aviation regulations, in the airworthiness chapter of the manual at section 525.831, call for systems, even in cases of probable and expected failure, “to provide a sufficient amount of uncontaminated air” to ensure crew members can “perform their duties without undue discomfort or fatigue”. The section also states, “Crew and passenger compartment air must be free from harmful or hazardous concentrations of gases or vapours.”
Amazingly, despite the possibility of various contaminants with the potential to cause discomfort, fatigue and illness entering the cabin on commercial aircraft, only one gas is cited here, which is carbon monoxide, although “gases” and “vapours” are used in the plural form. One might be even more surprised to know that we do not have carbon monoxide detectors installed on board in our cabins, although these sections persist in our regulations.
4:50 p.m.
Chairperson, Health and Safety Committee, Airline Division, Canadian Union of Public Employees
I'm almost done.
4:50 p.m.
Chairperson, Health and Safety Committee, Airline Division, Canadian Union of Public Employees
All of this raises the question of how the manufacturing industry is being regulated as they design planes. Many of these are problems that the average flight attendant could easily flag and that our unions certainly could have likely resolved or provided guidance to manufacturers on had they been consulted, but we haven't been. If manufacturers aren't consulting the people who know the aircraft best and the regulators aren't holding them responsible, how can we have faith?
We urge the regulators and the manufacturers to involve us during [Technical difficulty—Editor]
Thank you for your time.
4:50 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey
Thank you, Mr. Bray-Stone.
I'm now going to move on to Mr. Gilles Primeau, professional engineer.
Mr. Primeau, the floor is yours for five minutes.
4:55 p.m.
Gilles Primeau Professional Engineer, As an Individual
Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members.
When I testified to this committee on March 10, I was asked if I'd table my findings at that point. I did so confidentially, with the desire and the idea to give Boeing a fair opportunity to answer the questions that were then 24 main questions over 44 pages in the document I had sent them. I can tell you today, after nearly nine months, that Boeing has not answered any of my questions and didn't even try to contact me. It's disappointing but hardly surprising, given they didn't even respond to an invitation to testify to the same committee on March 10.
After my first testimony, I reviewed the interim report on the second crash and also all of the FAA's documentation towards lifting the restrictions. Only a few of my main questions have been answered, minor ones. Furthermore, my list of questions grew from 24 to 37. On September 21, I made all my comments available as seven downloadable attachments. It's comment serial number 172 on the FAA site. Here are the highlights of my cumulative findings.
The emergency airworthiness that was issued after the first crash deprived the operators and crews of two of the four critical, logical steps that allow an MCAS command to be executed. First is the flaps. If they are deployed to any non-zero position, this disables the MCAS. The other thing that is the next MCAS command was going to come five seconds after the completion of the previous one. Had the ET302 crew been aware of these two things, their chances of recovering would have been much, much better. If you doubt any of that, please ask me during the question period.
The fleet should have been grounded after the first crash. Many arguments have been heard. The main one, in my opinion, is that the FDR data, the flight data recorder data, in the preliminary report of the first crash clearly showed not only the MCAS but also the stab trim system doing something really, really abnormal. Another thing that's less talked about is that there's a precedent, Falcon 7X by Dassault Aviation. The whole fleet was grounded at the request of the airframer, not the authorities, after an incident took place involving the pitch trim system that didn't even lead to a fatality. Also, nobody in this industry should be making any concessions for the pitch trim system since the Alaska Airlines flight 261 accident in 2000.
In my first testimony, I also made recommendations for changes to regulations. I am not going to go over them here again. We can talk about them later.
Here are the technical arguments that I want to talk about that are 100% independent of MCAS.
The pitch trim system on the 737 Max is an obsolete 1960s technology. Its main deficiency is that there's only one electric motor on the actuator for the horizontal stabilizer movement. All other comparable airplanes currently in operation have two motors. Some even have three. The WestJet flight 1245 incident on December 1, 2018—meaning between the two crashes—should be revisited for that reason. Ask me for details during the questions.
The 737 relies on the muscles of the crew as a backup for the single electric motor on its critical actuator. There used to even be a procedure called a roller-coaster manoeuver that is no longer in force, but it was trying to address the fact that this system is inadequate for lack of redundancy.
All of these arguments are difficult for the public to grasp, so let me try to offer you an analogy. Would any of you buy and drive a car today that doesn't have power steering? Obsolescence of the system also involves problems with not using the latest technology to prevent slippage, which I have seen on both flights. It also probably doesn't contain all of the contemporary safety monitor suite that we normally implement for such a system.
I show, by comparing to an existing monitor on another aircraft, that the slippage on ET302 would have been very easy to detect and passivate.
Let's talk a bit about the first crash. I saw—