Mr. Speaker, the issue being debated today concerns one of the most significant aspects of relations between Canada and the United States. It concretely involves the framework in which we have developed a system of co-operation for our common security, but it also raises questions related to peace and disarmament.
These questions of peace and disarmament are more current than ever. The world is now painfully torn between the hope for lasting peace and the horror of atrocious massacres, even in Europe, the cradle of civilization. Nevertheless, real hope has been raised by the new order which has seemed to emerge. This hope was fed mainly by the efforts and successes, albeit partial but encouraging, it must be said, in disarmament achieved by the United States and the former Soviet Union, later confirmed by Russia.
All peoples earnestly hope that this effort will intensify. It will go even better and more surely if it is done in an orderly fashion, with each gain consolidated by realistic measures that can assure everyone's security. Disarmament must go together with security, which must still be maintained with a minimum of deterrence.
There is first of all the question of the many solid long-standing ties between Canadians and Americans. Along with the United States, Canada has been a member of NATO since 1949 and of NORAD since 1958. Our mutual commitments therefore bind us both to an integrated defence of North America and of other countries in the North Atlantic region. Under these treaties, our air force, navy and army have for a long time had common modes of operation. Military equipment is often interchangeable and the officers of the various armed services have close working and even personal relations. Training, testing, exercises and manoeuvres go on all the time, and they are all done jointly, as a rule. In short, no two military organizations in the world are closer to each other, so much so that other countries often have difficulty breaking through this close embrace when it comes to selling military equipment to Canada, for example.
In this spirit, a Liberal government in 1983 concluded a 10-year agreement with the United States called CANUSTEP in their awful jargon. It allowed the United States to test weapons on Canadian territory. Each series of tests had to receive permission from the Canadian government to go ahead.
Canada's commitments to strategic deterrence are basically a part of co-operation between allies. Canada has no strategic weapons in its forces. However, in that its defence is based on the agreement among allies and it benefits from collective security, it must voluntarily co-operate in implementing this strategic deterrent force if required. This is an integral part of the national defence policy as found in the 1971 and 1987 white papers on defence and the 1992 defence policy statement.
The arms in question include cruise missiles that, in practically every year between 1983 and 1993, were tested many times in the Canadian north, more precisely inside a 2,200 kilometre corridor including parts of the Northwest Territories, British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan. These missiles, that have a 3,000 kilometre range, are launched from bombers and guided to their target by a sophisticated homing device. Because of its size and topography, Canada was and is the only place in the world where the Americans can conduct these tests.
In 1983, the reasons behind the Canadian government's acquiescence obviously had to do with the cold war between the American and Soviet superpowers. It was the era of the nuclear dissuasion strategy in a bipolar world.
The cruise missile met all the requirements of the time as it could carry either a nuclear or a conventional head, thus offering the advantage of flexibility. However, the 1983 agreement formally excluded any possibility of testing missiles equipped with nuclear heads.
As we know, the geopolitical environment went through substantial changes after 1989. The dismantling of the Warsaw pact, set up against NATO, deeply altered the strategic map.
Of the two organizations, only NATO survived. But the political thaw gave new life to the disarmament movement so that the START I and START II treaties negotiated in 1991 and 1992 imposed cuts in the number of missiles and nuclear heads deployed by the United States and Russia. Since then, the ceiling imposed on both parties rules out the production of new cruise missiles, except to compensate for attrition. They can only improve the missiles' performance by making guidance systems more precise and reliable.
That is why, in 1993, the United States asked the Canadian government to renew the 1983 agreement for another 10 years, to 2013. The Canadian government agreed to do so.
Last year, in its policy statement on security, Canada took a slightly different stand on strategic issues stating that it no longer viewed the strategic scene as bipolar. Since the new nuclear powers were considered unstable by nature, it was becoming problematic for Canada and its allies to dissociate themselves from nuclear deterrence, so nuclear deterrence was dropped from the new policy statement.
One might therefore wonder why the government has opened up the discussion today as Canada, after assessing the circumstances prevailing at the time, has made a commitment in principle which binds it until the year 2003.
What has happened is that the United States, pursuant to the recently renewed agreement, is requesting the Canadian government for authorization to proceed with the testing of an improved guidance system with which they intend to equip the cruise missiles. Now several senior members of the Liberal Party have already attacked those tests.
Is the government trying today to find allies in the House in order to support its refusal which it is already preparing in response to the American request? As a matter of fact certain remarks in the minister's aseptic speech might provoke the prognosis that it will be so.
The Bloc Quebecois for its part considers it imperative to examine closely and with objectivity setting aside all abstract theory and preconceived judgments where the real interests and responsibilities of Canada lie in this matter.
Those who are opposed to the resumption of the tests base their argument mainly upon the danger of proliferation of this type of missile, particularly at a time when the nuclear deterrent can no longer be justified. It is true that the basic technology for manufacturing these weapons could conceivably become available to many countries. The Russians have already produced their own version of this weapon, the AS-15 missile, and they do not have to ask permission from anybody when they want to perfect the system because they can carry out their tests over the vast Siberian steppes.
Professor Kosta Tsipis of MIT drew attention in 1992 in the New York Times to the risk involved in the proliferation of this weapon. He wrote:
Any country capable of manufacturing an elementary airplane can construct a cruise missile able to transport a charge of one ton over a distance of at least 300 miles and to plant it within 30 feet of its target.
In fact, the threat of proliferation does not come from American testing in Canada. It should be stressed that the tests the American government is requesting permission to conduct do not involve any new nuclear technology. These tests contravene neither the letter nor the spirit of the START treaties, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty or the missile technology control regime; thus, they do not contribute to the build up of strategic nuclear forces. In July 1993, the manufacturing of new air-launched stealth cruise missiles was restricted to 460 units, that is 1,000 fewer than initially planned. It is also important to note that, for the past few years, tests have been related to detection, interception and missile guidance. In that sense, any test that enhances the target-acquisition and interception capability of these weapons helps to limit the threat posed by the manufacturing and use of other types of cruise missiles developed in other countries. The capability to detect and destroy such weapons in flight is the only effective means of retaliation.
It should be noted in that respect that the Americans are not the only ones to benefit from any improvement in guidance technology flowing from this testing. Canada also benefits from it since our pilots take part in monitoring and detection operations.
The changes on the international scene were not all positive. For one thing, the political climate in Russia by no means guarantees stability. The recent election revealed the rapid emergence of a strong right-wing movement. Statements made by the Russian leader, Mr. Vladimir Jirinovski, do not bode well for the future of detente in the event of a return to power of the military.
This would not be the first time an opposition party formed the government following an election.
While the break-up of the U.S.S.R. may have helped to ease international tensions, it has also had a secondary, more worrisome effect. With the crumbling of the Soviet empire, new nuclear powers have emerged. The resistance of the Ukraine is telling in this regard, although it has shown some signs of co-operation.
Mr. Speaker, there have been doubts about how effectively the weapons stockpiles inherited by these republics are controlled and how they are used. As well, a number of other countries either have nuclear weapons or are doing everything they can to become nuclear powers. China, India and Pakistan already have nuclear arms. Newspapers regularly report on the efforts of several other countries, including Iraq, to develop nuclear weapons. We should not dismiss the potential threat of all of these countries deploying short-range cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads.
The best way to counter this threat is still to refine detection and interception methods and this is one of the positive aspects of the testing process we are discussing here today.
You may recall that the cruise missile can be used as a conventional load delivery vehicle. The focus should be on developing it for this purpose. The planned tests are particularly interesting since, according to the information supplied by the Americans, they will focus on a new guidance system designed to improve strike reliability and accuracy. There is hardly a need to improve the accuracy of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear arms. To the extent the new geopolitical reality demands alternatives to nuclear strikes, there is a greater need to develop more effective conventional arms.
In that field, to perform better means to be more accurate. Strategists are doing more and more to provide their armies with the means to intervene safely but firmly from a distance. This is the only way to hit a limited but strategic target while sparing the neighbouring civilian populations. The cruise missile is the perfect weapon for the job. During the gulf war, we were able to see the dramatic results obtained with the Tomahawks, those cruise missiles carrying conventional weaponry. Any test aimed at improving this very accurate weapon is therefore part of a strategy especially suited to post-cold war requirements, and I do mean post-cold war.
Moreover, there are practically no direct economic costs related to the cruise missile tests conducted within Canadian territorial boundaries. If such costs exist, they are met by the American government under existing agreements. Conversely, these tests help, at least indirectly, the Canadian Department of National Defence to have access to facilities where military technologies developed here in Canada can be tested.
What about environmental costs? Those costs are, for all intents and purposes, non-existent if one considers the very low frequency of the flights, merely a few over the course of one year, and over 3,000 kilometres of a nearly empty territory.
But we must also take into consideration of the political side of the issue. Who is asking us to conduct these tests? We must not forget that the United States is Canada's best friend, its only neighbour, its safest ally, its major trading partner, and a great nation which speaks the same language as that of most Canadians. Let us not forget that the United States is the pillar of NATO and NORAD, the two pacts which ensure our security. If there ever was a nuclear threat to Canada, something we hope will not happen and probably never will happen, though there is a risk, to whom would Canadians and Quebecers turn? I do not even have to give the answer, because that answer is so obvious. Should such a situation occur, we would be quite relieved to be able to rely on an ally equipped with cruise missiles which it would have developed at its own expense.
Moreover, abrubtly ending the long sequence of tests conducted since 1983 would adversely affect the value of our commitments. I wonder how the Prime Minister would explain this change of attitude to our old friends the next time he goes to Washington. Even if he were accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I think he would have a hard time to provide an explanation.
I can understand and share this will to distance ourselves from the Americans when it is in our interest to do so, but that is not the case in this instance. Quite the contrary, we have everything to gain by co-operating with the United States to ensure our own protection at no cost to us.
I respect the arguments put forward by those who oppose these tests on the grounds that detente is here to stay, but I do not agree with them. I hope they are right, but I would like to be sure of that. And since no one can be sure, we must consider the issue of security. In any case, I do hope that whatever decision the government makes, it is a decision based on rational and well-thought out motives. Many would be concerned if the government simply tried to say no to those tests, to please an anti-American lobby which still has some roots in certain parts of the country.
More importantly, to decide to oppose the tests would be a sudden and inconsistent move.
We are still waiting for the white book on our defence policy which the government promised to table. Where is this review of our military and international role? What will be the duties assigned to our air force? What will be the role of the navy? What will be the mandate of our army? What will be the nature and the level of our involvement with NATO and NORAD? What will be the level of our commitment in Europe? Are we going to maintain our peacekeeping operations? If so, under what conditions, with what equipment and by which criteria? What contribution are we going to ask of the United States regarding the
protection of our security? Are we going to continue to stay under its protection?
All these questions and many others are still without an answer. So, why make an isolated and hurried decision which, by breaking the continuity of our commitments and by being totally out of character, would look like a sudden impulse and would be considered as such.
Therefore, the Bloc feels that under the present circumstances, there is no need to put an end to the co-operation which characterizes our relations with our neighbours. A review of all those issues will have to be undertaken, a detailed and comprehensive exercise which, I hope, will also include a large public consultation.
