House of Commons Hansard #81 of the 35th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament's site.) The word of the day was senate.

Topics

Motions For PapersRoutine Proceedings

3:35 p.m.

The Acting Speaker (Mr. Kilger)

Shall all notices of motions stand?

Motions For PapersRoutine Proceedings

3:35 p.m.

Some hon. members

Agreed.

Motions For PapersRoutine Proceedings

3:35 p.m.

The Acting Speaker (Mr. Kilger)

I wish to inform the House that pursuant to Standing Order 33(2)(b) because of the ministerial statement, Government Orders will be extended by 19 minutes.

SupplyGovernment Orders

3:35 p.m.

The Acting Speaker (Mr. Kilger)

Since today is the final allotted day for the supply period ending June 23, 1994, the House will go through the usual procedures to consider and dispose of a supply bill.

In view of recent practices do hon. members agree that the bill be distributed now?

SupplyGovernment Orders

3:35 p.m.

Some hon. members

Agreed.

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3:35 p.m.

Hull—Aylmer Québec

Liberal

Marcel Massé Liberalfor the President of the Treasury Board

moved:

That Vote 1, in the amount of $26,952,000 under the heading Parliament-The Senate-Program expenditures, in the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1995 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.

SupplyGovernment Orders

3:35 p.m.

Liberal

Ted McWhinney Liberal Vancouver Quadra, BC

Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to support the motion of the President of the Treasury Board that vote 1 in the amount of $26,952,000 under the heading Parliament-The Senate be concurred in.

It would be appropriate for me, speaking on behalf of a government that is committed to fundamental institutional change and modernization designed to update our institutions for the economic and other problems at the end of the century and the beginning of the next, to comment on the role of the Senate as an institution in our governmental system. One of the first things to recognize is the antinomies presented by the Senate in its present operation.

On the one hand, and I quote from the beautiful wood carvings in the office of the president of the Senate from the Roman saga Seneca : ``Nothing is well ordered that is hasty and precipitate'' which of course indicates attention to the conventional role that senators talk of themselves today, a House of sober second thought.

It is balanced by the quote from the great Roman tribune Cicero which translated says: "It is the duty of the nobles to oppose the fickleness of the multitudes". Horace, who is a more popular poet, put it a little better when he said: "Odi profanum volgus et arceo!"I hate the profane mob, I keep aloof from them.

The Senate has always had this particular problem that you are exerting a power historically of correction and revision of a lower House that over the centuries had become increasingly more representative and fully democratized by the opening of the 20th century with the expansion of the franchise. Yet it is a House that over the centuries became increasingly more representative and fully democratized by the opening of the 20th century with the expansion of the franchise and yet the Senate has remained with a constitutional system that is wholly non-elective and that by the beginning of the 20th century had become anachronistic in historical terms. Indeed, the great House at Westminster, in light of which the Canadian Constitution Act in 1867 was framed and which members of this House refer to reverently and probably appropriately in that sense, abolished the powers of the House of Lords, the upper House, effectively in 1911.

The Parliament Act of 1911 reduced the powers of the House of Lords to a suspensive veto of two years. This was in 1911. It was a reform measure introduced by a dynamic Liberal premier, Mr. Asquith, and his lieutenant, Lloyd George. It was changed after World War II by the Attlee government through reduction of the suspensive veto to three months.

There was a recognition that the principle of constitutional legitimacy which is one of the hallmarks of western and western derived constitutional democracy requires that large discretionary powers be based on an electoral mandate or some species of electoral confirmation.

So there is the dilemma for the Senate today, one which we have lived with for a considerable number of years and for which we have not as yet made the steps taken by the House at Westminster, the model for the Canadian Parliament.

I had the pleasure of addressing a seminar of eastern European parliamentarians who were here last week seeking advice from the Canadian Parliament, seeking to benefit from our experience. One of the Polish members of Parliament, a thoughtful gentleman who is also a professor of law at the University of Warsaw, said to me: "You have unconstitutional constitutional provisions in your constitution". It sounds like an oxymoron and yet it is there. He said: "Look, I have read in the Constitution Act that to be a member of the Senate you have to have property worth $4,000". He said: "Is that democratic? It would not be constitutional in Poland".

My friend, who is a senator and whom I respect was with me, explained that in 1867, $4,000 was a fortune. You could buy a carriage with four horses and various other things. Today perhaps it buys several cups of coffee or more. The comparison was perhaps a little bit far-fetched but nevertheless the point was made to our Polish colleague. He said: "Nevertheless, it is not a healthy part of a constitutional charter to have this in. Why do you not get rid of it?" Then we had to get into the intricacies of how you change the Constitution of Canada since the time of the Constitution Act of 1982, which put us in a constitutional straitjacket in relation to direct constitutional amendment but which would leave, nevertheless, possibilities of change by more pragmatic and ingenious methods.

I would like to add something and I did this in conversation with a very thoughtful senator today. We were talking of unconstitutional constitutional norms which is a European concept really devised in the belief after World War II that there must be provisions on which you can challenge Nazi or communist constitutional provisions that are in denial of constitutional principles in the constitutional charter itself.

One of the points I raised with him, because he was approaching retiring age, was: "Do you think it is constitutional in Canadian terms to have mandatory retirement at the age of 75?" Of course the answer is that it is not. This would be another point to consider.

I would raise the basic point whether a non-elected House today is constitutionally legitimate and therefore constitutional in the large sense. Obviously I am not suggesting that we rush out to the Supreme Court to obtain a declaratory judgment or advisory opinion on this point, although I do think that the most recent ruling in 1979 by the Supreme Court of Canada on reform touching the Senate was somewhat wide of the mark even then.

Today, granted changing public opinion controls so much in public law and the evolution of the public conscience which affects the content of constitutional norms, I would wonder whether that 1979 decision is not worth re-examining. Nevertheless in the context of the Senate today, and granted the difficulties of amending the Constitution by the front door methods the Trudeau patriation project introduced-we do have to face this issue-is the fact that we have a non-elected second chamber, part of the widespread public disaffection with constitutional institutions and processes today. I think the answer is yes.

What can we and the Senate collectively do with this? By the way, one of the suggestions I have always considered is that the courts should be used more fully. Could a constitutional ruling be obtained and, following the example of litigants in far-reaching constitutional matters of this sort before the United States Supreme Court, could one not ask the court to delay application of any ruling for enough time to allow a corrective constitutional amendment or other change to be made?

Let me, however, return to the more practical and immediate issues that could control our approach to the Senate. The Senate can be changed without its own assent. This is one of the changes made by the Trudeau constitutional patriation act of 1982, the Constitutional Act, 1982. Only a certain time delay is involved.

There are areas in which change could be made without necessarily involving the provinces constitutionally and therefore touching the power of the federal Parliament alone, which then would require the Senate's assent or delay.

I hasten to say that I advanced some of these propositions in evidence as an invited expert witness before the Senate and the House in previous years. I have said in other committees on which I saw one of my learned colleagues opposite, a pox on expert witnesses or self-styled expert witnesses. I have to say with all humility that when I have been summoned as an expert witness by the Goldenberg committee, an excellent committee of the Senate, and by the Molgat-MacGuigan committee and others I offered these suggestions with all modesty.

One of the issues would be whether the Senate would not better assume a role, as the United States Senate has, in confirmation or review of executive power rather than in review of legislative power in which its lack of legitimacy through direct election limits it. The public appointing processes in the United States are subject to Senate confirmation, as to the Supreme Court, ambassadorial appointments and what we would here call crown corporations. This is an important and democratic role in the United States and one that ensures the better functioning of the public services.

The Senate role in foreign affairs, the two-thirds Senate majority necessary to confirm a treaty made by the United States, gives a role for a body removed at once from the executive power making the treaties and from a house often subject to too much sectional pressure.

These are the sorts of powers one proposed to the Goldenberg committee, to the Molgat-MacGuigan committee and to others under condition that the Senate be reformed and be elected.

One further role would be the election of the head of state, the Governor General. There is a case to be made for this and for providing a further constitutional legitimacy for that office. Once again this is a condition precedent. A condition precedent would be electing the Senate or in some way legitimating it by some other process.

In western Canada there is a strong body of opinion associated with a former Social Credit minister, Rafe Mair, known for broadcasting and other activities, that the Senate should be a states house, very much like the German Bundesrat. The Bundesrat is really a body for federal-provincial co-operation in the practical administration and application of legislation. It is not really a second chamber in the North American or British sense. It is an interesting model.

I raise these areas in which change in Senate powers, new powers, could be introduced and provide a worthwhile and valuable role, a necessary countervailing power granting conditions at the end of the century to an executive power that many feel has become presidential and therefore without the checks and balances however applied to presidential power in the United States and some other countries.

How would we change the Senate? Granted there are the difficulties of amending it and expecting that we are not going to have a fundamental act of constituent power that usually occurs only after revolutions or great military victories in other countries. Certainly some changes could be made by convention, by custom.

The Government of Alberta proceeded to elect somebody whom it designated as a candidate for appointment to the Senate. In one case the Prime Minister of Canada accepted that advice and appointed the person so elected. If that were followed it could create a general practice.

More interestingly, the Mulroney government, after the failure of the Meech Lake accord, proceeded to name four Quebec senators following the procedures outlined in the Meech Lake accord of consultation with the provincial attorney general and premier. Some would say that those are better Quebec senators than the usual type of nomination; interesting persons in any case.

In the meantime, though, the Senate itself can exercise self-restraint in its powers. Again to quote our Latin scholars, it probably would better to use the Fabian tactic of delay and conciliation without it trying directly to defeat measures.

I say this in welcoming the role of the Senate, a discreet role in relation to Bill C-18. I am not speaking of the confrontation with the House which I think would be unacceptable according to my constitutional thinking, but of the quiet conversations by individual senators with members of the House that seem to have produced a felicitous accord between the two Houses-maybe I am being premature-as to whether and how Bill C-18 should be adopted in its revised form.

This sort of process of interaction between two houses, a dialectical process, is very much in accord with the evolution of democratic constitutionalism. It produces a sensible and pragmatic approach to revising, updating and modernizing an institution that was honoured in its origins but has failed to keep pace with the changes in Canadian society, with the views on political representation and political constitutional legitimacy flowing from that and with the changes in other countries.

I commend to members, in voting on this measure which has my full support, that we keep in mind an agenda for constitutional change involving the upper house; that we keep in mind that the constitution is not simply an issue of the place of one or more provinces in Confederation, renewed or otherwise, but that there are larger issues involving the relationship between the citizen and the state; that we keep in mind that there are better functioning and more modern institutions that correspond more exactly to the main trends in democratic constitutionalism. This sort of change would do much to restore public confidence in our parliamentary institutions and in the people who serve them.

On this basis I am happy to support the motion as introduced.

SupplyGovernment Orders

3:50 p.m.

Bloc

Jean-Guy Chrétien Bloc Frontenac, QC

Mr. Speaker, I listened very carefully to what was said by the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra, and I would appreciate his comments on the Legislative Council of what was then known as the Legislative Assembly in Quebec City. In 1967, Premier Daniel Johnson senior abolished the Legislative Council. Well, you know how these things work. There was the usual wheeling and dealing, and finally the councillors agreed to be voted out of existence.

I would also like to recall for the benefit of the hon. member and this is another point, that I used to live in one of seven so-called protected ridings in Quebec.

SupplyGovernment Orders

3:55 p.m.

An hon. member

Protected under the Constitution.

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3:55 p.m.

Bloc

Jean-Guy Chrétien Bloc Frontenac, QC

Yes, under the Constitution. I lived in Wolfe, where there were about 6,000 voters at the time, compared with nearly 100,000 in Westmount. There were six or seven protected ridings, and to revoke their protected status required a unanimous resolution of the Quebec National Assembly. So the members for these ridings agreed to vote their ridings out of existence and themselves out of a job. Of course, a number of mutually acceptable arrangements were made.

I think that is the price we have to pay, because after going back in time several hundred years during the very interesting overview the hon. member gave us earlier, when we get back to the situation today in 1994, and soon in 2000, well, the Senate- In any case, when I mention the Senate in Frontenac, people tend to laugh. I will not repeat everything they said, but they do not take the Senate very seriously.

I would appreciate hearing the views of the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra.

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3:55 p.m.

Liberal

Ted McWhinney Liberal Vancouver Quadra, BC

Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member for his question and I will make the following comment.

I regret that it is almost impossible to change the Constitution directly with a law, as far as the Senate is concerned. If it is possible, we can consider it, but it will take the senators' consent.

But without changing the role of Parliament, of the elected House, I do not think that we can simply abolish the Senate. Legislative committees absolutely must have an increased role and the House must have a much more sophisticated system than the Constitutional checks and balances than what we now have.

As for Senate reform, in the 1980s, we considered the possibility of a sort of Constitutional counterweight, a body that would oversee executive decisions, confirm appointments, review treaties and international agreements, things like that. We are faced with this dilemma that it is almost impossible to abolish the Senate without its consent, except as far as details and particular powers of the Senate are concerned.

I agree that we must work with the Senate and try to obtain their co-operation. If not, I am quite prepared to accept an increased role for legislative committees and even to consider the possibility of an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court of Canada.

SupplyGovernment Orders

3:55 p.m.

Liberal

Don Boudria Liberal Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON

Mr. Speaker, I too listened closely and with a great deal of interest to the speech given by our colleague from Vancouver Quadra who is an expert in constitutional matters.

The Senate is, by definition, the chamber which represents the interests of the provinces. Now is not the time to debate how well it actually does this job, but the fact remains that this is one of its many duties, namely to counterbalance the representation by population in the House of Commons.

In light of these considerations, does the hon. member not consider it highly unusual, as I do, that a party which claims to have provincial interests at heart all of a sudden attempts in this federal chamber to abolish a mechanism which belongs to the provinces, without even bothering to consult them, and what is more, attempts to do so by cutting this institution's budget? Does he not find this the least bit odd? I do. The member opposite claims that Canadians do not really care all that much about the Senate.

If my colleague from Vancouver Quadra will recall the Charlottetown constitutional debate, he will remember that the Senate did indeed matter. Once the debate had begun, the people argued over whether their province should have one more senator, or one less. Would he not agree that the Senate seemed to matter then, that Canadians should at the very least be consulted before the Senate is abolished and that such a decision should not be made if that is not what the provinces or the Canadian people want?

SupplyGovernment Orders

4 p.m.

Liberal

Ted McWhinney Liberal Vancouver Quadra, BC

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the hon. member for his question. It is important to recognize the distinction made by the renowned Austro-Hungarian jurist by the name of Ehrlich between written law and the actual practice of law. I cannot consider the Senate as it is today as representing the provinces, unless major changes are made to its make-up. You cannot really say that the Senate represents the provinces.

Under these circumstances, it is very important to change the representation system applied to the Senate so that it can play the role it was originally set up for, but which does not reflect the social reality in Canada any more. That is why I would be tempted to make these changes, even though I am not very optimistic.

SupplyGovernment Orders

4 p.m.

Bloc

Gaston Leroux Bloc Richmond—Wolfe, QC

Mr. Speaker, as the member for Richmond-Wolfe and on behalf of my colleagues from the Bloc Quebecois and of all the people we represent in the House of Commons, I will speak to the notice I gave to this House objecting, on behalf of the Official Opposition, to the vote in the amount of $26,952,000 under the heading Parliament-The Senate.

The Bloc has always spoken out against the existence of a Senate, and I would like to demonstrate that this institution is, in our opinion, as archaic as it is useless. This institution is nothing more than an excuse for the government to reward its friends, be they Liberal or Tory, who will then work-in true partisan fashion-for the government or for the interests they represent. Several of my colleagues will prove it in several ways during this debate.

I listened to the speech made by the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra and I will go over the issues he dealt with. He will probably not like my arguments. I note at the outset that the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra must be feeling lonely because, first of all, he looked at the issue of maintaining the votes through the objective of revamping and improving the Senate. He must be feeling lonely because, first, his own leader does not want to address in any way the constitutional issue and, second, the Senate itself would have to scuttle its own ship.

I would like to remind you that the current distribution of the 104 Senate seats is provided for in Section 22 of the 1867 Constitution Act. As Canada is divided into four regions, these regions must be equally represented. Ontario and Quebec get 24 senators each; New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, six each; Prince Edward Island, four; the four Western provinces, six each for a total of 24; in 1948, Newfoundland got six; finally, the two territories have one each.

Senators are appointed by the Governor General who, according to tradition, acts on the initiative and advice of the Prime Minister. Everyone recognizes that they are in fact appointed by the Prime Minister.

Since senators are not elected, and the hon. member directly alluded to that fact, the Bloc Quebecois feels that the other place is an anachronism, as the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra put it so well, given the modern criteria which underly the political management of a State.

So, on behalf of my colleagues from the Bloc Quebecois, I denounce this unacceptable waste in the form of a credit of $26.9 million, plus statutory expenditures of some $15.7 million, for a total budget of $42.6 million, not including the services provided. This is an unacceptable expenditure for an archaic political institution which plays a useless role for Quebecers and Canadians at large.

Let me remind you of the origin of senates in the various political systems, and of the objectives of the Canadian Senate when it was created. This will give you a better idea of how that institution is a miserable failure in the Canadian political system.

Let us take a look at history. In ancient Greece, more than 500 years before Christ, the legislators formed a council of the 500, whose role was to control the possible excesses of democracy. The very ancient societies had the wisdom to create a political body to monitor decisions concerning society as a whole. The hon. member for Vancouver Quadra alluded to this earlier. On one of the walls of the Canadian Senate, there is a maxim by Cicero, who was a thinker in Ancient Rome, to the effect that it is the duty of the noble to oppose the instability of the people. How pretentious!

From time immemorial, when democracy was still in its infancy, people sought to give an aura of wisdom to the Senate, in order to legitimize this institution, whose mission is fundamentally a conservative one for society.

The Senate is like the British House of Lords; it is a House for very important people. True to the British tradition, the accent is on sharing legislative power among the two Houses, which represent two different social classes, that is the people and the nobility.

The first objective of the Senate, like its British model, is to review and think, thus monitoring the House of Commons. This is very close to the perception that prevailed in antiquity. Senate members are supposed to counterbalance the executive side of Parliament. Moreover, the Fathers of Confederation also wanted to follow the American model and created a Canadian Senate similar to a federal Chamber whose objective was to protect the rights of the regions and provinces, and to ensure its participation in the legislative process of the Federation.

The founders of the Canadian Upper House took their inspiration both from the British House of Lords and the American Senate, two models that were clearly incompatible and light years away from any historical affinity. The House of Lords, anchored in the medieval myth of the monarchy, and the Senate, with its modern North American dynamics firmly anchored in the twentieth century. This was a highly unsuitable marriage between a modern American Senate and a medieval British system.

We must not forget that the criteria for representation from Quebec and Ontario, at the time the Canadian Constitution was drafted, were included at the behest of Lower Canada-in other words, Quebec-in exchange for agreeing with the principle of proportional representation in the House of Commons.

In the minds of the founding fathers, the Senate was intended to provide equitable representation for the regions. However, it was never intended as a house of the regions. Today, there is no reason why the House of Commons should appropriate funds to a political institution that is ineffective and totally useless.

Considering the state of the economy, with a debt of over $550 billion and unemployment and poverty in Quebec and Canada, the total budget of $42.6 million allocated to this institution would be better spent on economic recovery and job creation.

To continue this discourse on the failure of successive federal governments to provide for responsible management of public funds, as they sank millions into an institution that is utterly useless, I would like to give two examples of a functional Senate; the U.S. Senate and the German Bundesrat referred to by the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra.

Unlike the Canadian Senate, the American model-the first federal model on this continent-is unique in its simplicity. In the House of Representatives, representation is based on numbers, while in the Senate, it is based on absolute equality among the States.

A description of the duties of U.S. senators demonstrates how ineffective and useless members of the Canadian Upper House really are. Here is why American senators have specific legislative duties that are essential to the proper functioning of the American presidential system. Thus, in conjunction with the House of Representatives, they pass bills previously approved by the President. If no compromise can be reached, the bill is not passed. They also have executive functions whose importance is

still growing, such as the approval of appointments made by the President, appointments of judges, ministers and ambassadors which are often subjected to rigorous inquiries by the U.S. Senate.

Ratification of international treaties is another major executive power held by the Senate within the American system. The American presidential system is efficient in that, among other things, the Senate produces prestigious members well known for their legislative skills, and let me remind you that they are elected by the people, which is not the case in Canada. They are elected by the people.

The U.S. Senate alone has attracted the most talented minds of the nation and constitutes an intellectual centre of indisputable superiority compared with the legislative dynamics of the Canadian Senate.

The United States Senate has really brought to the fore, through a real and constant practice of politics, the spirit of wisdom and reason which inspired people from antiquity when they set up the early senates.

Let us talk about the Bundesrat. As for the German Bundesrat, or Federal Council, it is another Senate-like democratic institution, but contrary to the Canadian Senate, it works. The Bundesrat, which was created by the Constitution of the German Empire in 1871, was a major legislative body of the Empire. It was originally an assembly of ambassadors from member states. It is the ancestor of the second German House, the Assembly of the Landers' Executive members or, if you prefer, of the federated provinces representing the various territories, either provinces or regions.

Simply to explain how the Bundesrat works, it is formed by 45 members of the government of Landers and each Land is allowed at least three votes. To illustrate the process, when a bill is introduced, for instance, it must be submitted to the approval of the Bundesrat, the equivalent to our Senate, which has a veto it can use within one week, provided there is a majority of two thirds of the votes. The head of the government of a Land automatically becomes a member of the Bundesrat. The central government designates as many ministers as the number of votes the Lands are entitled to.

I should add that the approval of the Bundesrat is required when an issue deals with administrative or financial interests of the Landers, the equivalent of the provinces and regions in Canada.

In Germany, federalism finds its true meaning. Eleven Landers are directly represented by the members of each Land's government. Therefore, Canadian federalists cannot decently talk in Quebec or elsewhere of the merits of a viable federalism that does not even respect its own components. Federalism has never existed in Canada. There is a central government that tried by all means to grab as much power as possible at the expense of provinces and regions. The Canadian Senate plays no significant role in the defence of regions and minorities, one of the reasons why it was created, which leaves the Executive of the House of Commons a maximum of powers.

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4:15 p.m.

Some hon. members

Hear, hear.

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4:15 p.m.

Bloc

Gaston Leroux Bloc Richmond—Wolfe, QC

We must admit it is not easy to deal with two legislative houses in a British type of parliamentary system. Parliamentary systems, clearly dominated by the executive, give their Upper House very limited if not meaningless powers. Given that such is the system in Canada, the Senate is reduced to an anachronism since it has no weight in the country's political balance and lacks legitimacy because its members are not elected but simply appointed by the Prime Minister. Since the executive is accountable only to the House of Commons, the Senate loses any influence it might have over the government. The parliamentary system requires that the Lower House have greater powers than the Upper House because the government comes from the former and is elected and, therefore, is accountable only to it.

That problem does not exist within a presidential system like the one in the United States since the executive is politically accountable neither to the House of Representatives nor to the Senate. The separation of powers is more strictly established in a presidential system than in a parliamentary system like ours where the Senate is useless.

In the third part of this demonstration, I would like to touch on the question of administrative responsibilities associated with the allocation of $26.9 million for the operation of an Upper House within the Canadian parliamentary system and, with your permission, I will explain how the Canadian Senate is unable to accomplish various tasks which, in theory, are part of its obligations.

For example, it is difficult to justify the existence of an Upper House based on the principle of legislative review. The idea that the Canadian Senate could reflect soberly on the legislative measures of the House of Commons flows from the conservative prejudices that existed earlier under the monarchy. The Canadian Senate is a remnant of a traditional and elitist representation opposed, in a way, to the monopolistic embodiment of a democratic legitimacy already more than 200 years old in the western world. The Canadian Upper House, the Senate, accepts its secondary role by undertaking activities that have nothing to do with its legislative role. In fact, senators are named by the

Prime Minister to play a partisan role, red or blue, or to represent pressure groups. What they do is lobby.

Here is the truth: Over the last 50 years, the Senate used its veto power only to delay, as was pointed out by my friend, the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra. Between 1943 and 1964, only two bills were rejected by the Senate and since 1964, only one, and under circumstances which were not really significant, considering that on the rejected bill, C-43 about abortion, MPs and senators were free to vote according to their conscience. Before the Constitution Act of 1982, the Senate always bowed to the desires of the government and the Commons. It did not exercise its veto power because it was continuously controlled by the party in power.

When the Canadian Senate was created, the idea was to enable the senators to distance themselves from the partisan positions taken by the members of the House of Commons. The idea was to have a House of sober second thought which would be above the bursts of passion of the people.

In Canada, the Fathers of Confederation were in favour of nominating senators to preserve the independence of the members of the Upper House. One could have expected that senators, who hold office until they turn 75-quite the job security at a time when unemployment rate is so high, both in Canada and Quebec-and are not subject to the whims of the people, would have shown their independence towards the party in office.

On the contrary, the Upper House members have been staunchly partisan, with little regard for their role as impartial law-makers. It needs to be stated again, senators are appointed on a strictly partisan basis.

For the Bloc Quebecois, which is concerned not only with Quebec's interests, but also with the democratic values dear to all Canadians, the contradiction between the myth of a House of sober second thought and the reality of a partisan Canadian Senate, is reason enough to oppose any kind of subsidy for this useless institution and to advocate its abolition.

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4:20 p.m.

Some hon. members

What a waste!

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4:20 p.m.

Bloc

Gaston Leroux Bloc Richmond—Wolfe, QC

The principle of equal regional representation has become increasingly more tenuous as the regions have evolved, as the member for Glengarry-Prescott-Russell mentioned in his question. I submit that the original regional distribution, which dates back to the negotiations surrounding the 1867 Constitution Act, is no longer representative of today's population nor of present regional borders. Fortunately, provincial assemblies quickly took over the Senate's role regarding representation of regional interests.

Finally, we must mention the dismal failure of the Canadian Senate as the protector of minorities. One of the Upper House's important roles, which is enshrined in this country's Constitution, is not only provincial or regional representation, but also the representation and protection of interests less well protected by the House of Commons.

Since linguistic duality, the notion of two founding nations, is a fundamental characteristic of Canada, such duality should normally be manifested in the Senate and be a fundamental element of its make-up. I am referring here to the double-majority mechanism, which ensures a more adequate protection for French-speaking minorities outside Quebec.

But, never ever has the Upper House stood up for these minorities' interests, and this is a proven fact. Take, for example, the problems encountered by all French-speaking communities in Canada, and that was evidenced again today. The Senate's action in all its spheres of activity fails miserably.

In fact, Canada's Upper House has a very clearly defined mandate, which is to represent partisan interests, Tories or Grits. A majority of the senators appointed by the Prime Minister have some political experience, in fact approximately half of them, and the others usually have rendered well-recognized services to the party in power. The Senate does allow a golden retirement for politicians and others who are long-time supporters of Liberal and Conservative members and who have always been close to the corridors of power in Canada.

From 1925 to 1963, the average age of senators was 69. In 1975, it was 64 years. A seat in the Senate is a true reward at carreer's end, since one does not have to fight anymore to keep one's seat until the age of 75. For the government, it is both a reward and a way to control its institution.

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4:20 p.m.

Liberal

Don Boudria Liberal Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON

Mr. Speaker, I agree with some of the hon. member's comments but certainly not with all of them. First, the hon. member claims to be the champion of regions in Canada. He said a few moments ago that his party and himself are protecting the interests-these are his exact words-the interests of Quebec and those of the other provinces.

Should he be reminded that the premier of Alberta, for example, wants the Senate not only to be maintained but to be even more powerful? How can the hon. member suggest abolishing an institution which some premiers want not only to keep but to strengthen?

Second, as for the French-speaking senators from outside Quebec, well, the hon. member does not seem to be very well informed. At this very moment, Senator Eymard Corbin is on the official languages committee, defending the interests of francophones outside Quebec. It is not the first time that Senator Corbin has defended the interests of French-speaking minori-

ties. Furthermore, he is a former chairman of the Assemblée internationale des parlementaires de langue française and he played many other roles.

The hon. member opposite may not have been here for long, but he should take a little look at the background of our French-speaking parliamentarians from outside Quebec. The late Senator Bélisle was Mayor of Sudbury and a minister in the Ontario Legislature before being called to the Senate. Did the hon. member forget the history of Senator Bélisle, one of the two francophones outside Quebec to have been in municipal, provincial and federal government? The other one is me.

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4:25 p.m.

An hon. member

At the same time?

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4:25 p.m.

Liberal

Don Boudria Liberal Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON

No. Not at the same time.

Third, he said that the senators were almost all appointed to their position as a political reward. Does he forget the work done by Senator Beaudoin, a constitutional expert who was not appointed to represent my party or his own? Senator Beaudoin speaks in defence of francophone minorities.

Surely the hon. member opposite should apologize to those three parliamentarians I just mentioned.

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4:25 p.m.

Bloc

Gaston Leroux Bloc Richmond—Wolfe, QC

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Glengarry-Prescott-Russell will certainly not succeed in making me cry.

In response to a comment that the hon. member for Glengarry-Prescott-Russell made earlier, the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra told him that provincial representation in the Senate simply does not exist. So, you can just forget about regional representation.

Second, I will tell my colleague that his party is in a catch-22 situation. The Liberals are defending the allocation of funds to a Senate which, according to the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra, must be reformed and improved. My colleague does not realize that, to do so, we have to amend the Constitution, and it so happens that his own leader has said clearly that amendments to the Constitution were absolutely out of the question. Do these people talk to each other sometimes? It seems that they do not talk to each other at all.

Does the hon. member not hear what his leader says here in the House? Each time he is asked a question about constitutional matters, the Prime Minister says that he does not want to talk about the Constitution. Yet, the argument invoked by the hon. member to defend the allocation of funds to the Senate is that we must improve the Senate, change the name of the game, and so on. Such comments cannot be serious.

We know full well that the Senate has no power. Senators are appointed by the Prime Minister and they have a particular job to do, a job that is partisan in nature. Everybody knows that. The Senate costs a fortune to administer, more than $42 million to be exact, and yet, as mentioned by the Auditor General in his last report, it sits only a little over 40 days a year, with absenteeism running at between 20 and 25 per cent. It is ridiculous to invest millions of dollars in such a useless institution when there are so many unemployed and so many people on welfare in Quebec and across Canada.

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4:25 p.m.

Liberal

Ted McWhinney Liberal Vancouver Quadra, BC

Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask a question to the hon. member for Richmond-Wolfe.

He has pointed out the constitutional contradictions in our era of transition. He has quoted two models, but they are completely divergent. The American model is not a House of sober second thought, like the one in Westminster. He admitted that. It operates equally as a House of sober second thought and as a body working as a constitutional check and balance vis-à-vis the executive power. In comparison, the German Bundesrat is certainly not a House of sober second thought. It is essentially an intergovernmental committee of high-ranking officials.

Is he then advocating one or the other as a model, for example, for a revision of the Canadian constitution?

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4:30 p.m.

Bloc

Gaston Leroux Bloc Richmond—Wolfe, QC

I thank the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra for his question. We have frequent discussions in committee. I know that he is very learned and that he has great concern for democracy and parliamentary institutions.

The hon. member noticed that I made reference to two different systems in my remarks. I meant to compare our Canadian Senate, which is completely ineffective, with two different models that do work, each in its own way. They get things done, they wield some power, and play specific roles. My colleague had mentioned a few models, and I just added a few more.

Our fundamental goal is always to increase the powers and the role of members in this House so that they can really begin to carry out their duties as soon as they are elected and do so completely.

I do not advocate any model for the Senate. What we are doing, Mr. Speaker, is examining an ineffective institution, and pointing out that this government does not want to change the rules because it refuses to reopen the Constitution. It does not want to hear a single word about the Constitution, even though some of its members would like to bring about improvements and propose amendments.

I do not advocate any specific model. All I said is that the Senate just does not work, and that it does not need that much money.

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4:30 p.m.

Reform

Allan Kerpan Reform Moose Jaw—Lake Centre, SK

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today in response to the Bloc motion. I am happy to stand before the House and say that I and the Reform Party certainly oppose the Bloc motion. We believe the intent of this motion obviously is to eliminate spending on the Senate and thereby achieve the de facto abolishment of it. The

Reform Party is and always has been an advocate of a reformed Senate, certainly not of its abolishment.

In large countries where the population is unevenly distributed there is a fundamental need to balance representation by population with representation by province. This is especially true in a parliamentary system like Canada's where regimented party caucuses engage in bloc voting under the direction of party leadership. In other big federations like the United States and Australia this balance has been achieved by establishing two levels of government and a bicameral legislature in which the provinces are effectively represented in the upper House and representation by population prevails in the lower House.

The Fathers of Confederation intended to provide this type of balance in the Canadian Parliament, but the Senate as currently constituted has failed to play this role and it simply needs to be reformed.

First, the Senate must be popularly elected. In a democratic age an appointed upper House will always lack legitimacy and hence political power. It is time to take democracy seriously.

Second, the Senate must be equal, in the sense that each province must have the same number of seats, such as in the Australian and United States models. In such a Senate the thinly populated areas, provinces of Canada, would have a majority of seats in the Senate, just as the heavily populated provinces hold the majority of seats in this House of Commons.

Reformers will not be misled into supporting a counterfeit regional version of equality according to which the west, Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic Canada will each have the same number of senators. This is approximately what Canada has now and it simply does not work.

Third, the Senate must be effective. It must have adequate power to balance the House of Commons. There is some room for fine tuning here. Reformers do not believe that the defeat of a government bill in the Senate should lead to the defeat of the government. However, the Senate must not be shorn of power so that it becomes unable to amend or veto regionally offensive legislation emanating from the House of Commons.

Reformers believe that only a triple-E Senate, elected, equal, and effective, can balance the interests of less populous provinces with those of the more populous provinces in this Canadian Parliament.

When I talk about regional fairness I like to relate it to some of the things I have been involved with, one of which is my work on the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-food. Certainly we live in a country with diverse interests and diverse problems and certainly agriculture is no exception to that.

Recently Reformers proposed at the committee level a 5 per cent reduction in the overhead costs of the Department of Agriculture. The reason we proposed this was that we believed there was a need for cuts in the department other than those which would come on the backs of farmers or the people who work in that area. I relate this to the regional fairness issue because with the diverse differences in this country only regional fairness and equality in an elected Senate would compensate for those differences.

The Reform Party made the first step toward a triple-E Senate when it pressured the Government of Alberta into holding properly constituted Senate elections in 1988. Most recently the Reform Party asked the Alberta government to pass a resolution which would request the current appointed senators in Alberta to resign so that sanctioned elections could be held in conjunction with the next Alberta provincial election. The Reform Party would herald the accomplishment of Senate election for all senators, both inside Alberta and throughout Canada as a significant leap toward the goal of a triple-E Senate.

There have been many reasons, many arguments, many pressures by politicians and people of all stripes for the abolition of the Senate. The Reform Party favours and has been advocating for many years now the abolition of those features of the Canadian Senate which render it useless and repugnant to voters and taxpayers, namely: Abolish the patronage appointments to the Senate. Elect all senators. Abolish exorbitant perks, pensions and privileges. Establish an independent commission to recommend a pay and pension package for senators and members of Parliament comparable to what is available in the private sector. Abolish inequitable representation in the Senate. Elect equal numbers of senators from each province.

If the Senate is abolished completely, Canada will immediately be governed by a one House Parliament in which the heavily populated centres would have an absolute majority of seats. In such a Parliament it would be virtually impossible to secure effective representation of the interests of the thinly populated parts of the country, namely the west, the north, Atlantic Canada, northern and rural Ontario, and northern and rural Quebec.

The members of the current House of Commons who are suddenly advocating Senate abolition have no interest in establishing any checks and balances on themselves, in particular the regional checks and balances which a reformed Senate would provide. They are simply seeking to consolidate power in their own hands.

If the Senate is completely abolished it is also highly unlikely it would be replaced in the foreseeable future. The premiers who are most loudly advocating Senate abolition simply want to maintain their own monopoly on representing their provincial

interests rather than sharing their responsibility with a reformed Senate.

If the Senate is simply abolished therefore there is very little likelihood a reformed Senate would ever be established. The Canadian federal system would fail to balance representation by population with representation by province, an essential characteristic for any federal system, particularly in a large country with an unevenly distributed population.

It is therefore the position of the Reform Party that the useless and offensive features of the current Senate should be and must be abolished and that an elected, equal and effective Senate created in its place.

In the short term, representatives of an elected body would be more responsive to the desires of the provinces of Canada and it would not require a constitutional fight to accomplish the changes we are suggesting.

In the longer term, Canadians should continue to demand an effective regional federal body to ensure that all Canadians are adequately represented in the Canadian Parliament. The long range interest of Canadian federalism, Senate reform, must be put ahead of the short term expediency of Senate abolition.

As has been mentioned by many members today, we talk a lot about drastic changes in the way this place and the entire federal system operate. Certainly we have been talking about fiscal responsibility, getting government spending under control and cutting government spending.

There are two ways to look at this. One is to cut federal spending; the other way is to prioritize federal spending. We want to take the approach of prioritizing federal spending and we talk about that in many areas and in many programs. Certainly the Senate must be one of them. We must prioritize our spending. If an elected, effective and equal Senate is a priority as we believe it is, then we must use those funds in our Senate and make cuts where there is excess in programs or non-productive programs.

I look forward to questions and comments from hon. members. I appreciate very much having had this opportunity to speak on this subject.