Debates of May 3rd, 2006

Norad

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my colleague's opening remarks congratulating me on my new responsibilities. It is an honour to stand in this place and to serve with such an honourable Minister of Defence and with this new government.

The member raised the question of where this whole negotiation might lead, where things might go in the future. With all due respect to my colleague, those are hypothetical questions that we cannot answer. The current situation is clear. We have made it clear to Canadians and to all countries that are listening that we will not participate in a missile interceptor system at this point. We will not participate in operation or development and that is the bottom line.

We have also made it clear that we are not going to initiate discussions about where this might go in the future. That is simply not part of the plan. Thankfully, the U.S. ambassador has confirmed to us that he--I cannot say never--will not ask us to participate in these sorts of projects.

For the time being, let me put the fears and concerns of my hon. colleague to rest and assure him that this is not one of the plans of this government despite the fact that we are moving very strongly on a number of other areas.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I have a couple of things I would like to clarify with the member. Much has been said tonight about the events of 9/11. One of the things that occurred to me is that at the time Norad was not the kind of command and control operation that really had any efficacy with regard to what happened to the twin towers. Indeed, one could think back to the Maginot line in terms of what our capacity is. We are dealing with a very different kind of war. That has been mentioned many times.

With regard to the fact that we now have a nation talking about pre-emptive strikes using nuclear capabilities, is my colleague not concerned in terms of the arrangements we are entering into with the United States that this could put us in some jeopardy and in fact in some danger?

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I do not think this kind of fearmongering is necessary at this time. Simply, we have made some slight adjustments to the agreement that are in our favour, that help Canada maintain its sovereignty. This increases our ability to monitor the maritime situations, which we have complete control over. I do not think the member has any reason to be concerned.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to speak on behalf of the Bloc Québécois about the Norad agreement.

I visited the Norad command centre at Cheyenne Mountain on two occasions in my years as defence critic. I was extremely impressed by what I saw there.

First, the mountain itself is very impressive. When you go into the heart of the mountain, and you see the entire detection system and the military people controlling it, it is very impressive. There are almost as many members of the Canadian military in the centre as there are American.

It is very impressive to witness a simulated attack on North America. The simulation sent shivers down our spines. No matter where on the planet a missile is launched, the Cheyenne Mountain command centre detects it in less than about 15 seconds. Not only is it capable of detecting it, but its destination is known about one minute after the launch. In terms of detection, that is very impressive.

The command centre is equipped with incredible instrumentation and programs like the Space Detection and Tracking System have also been created. The centre has a catalogue of 15,000 objects orbiting the Earth in the atmosphere. The catalogue is very important; when space shuttles are launched there must be no dangerous debris in their trajectories. It is truly impressive. I was very glad to have gone on those two visits.

The Norad treaty is an evolving treaty, like many others. It is evolving because we live in a world that is continually changing. Treaties must therefore be capable of adapting to this new environment.

I think that it is important to review the history and prehistory of Norad if we want to understand where we are today, and perhaps see where we will be in a few years. I will take a few minutes to do that.

In terms of Norad's prehistory, we can talk about the first detonation of a nuclear weapon in 1945 over Japan. That was a watershed in the history of humanity. From that moment on, people realized that this was a terrible weapon that could not just be used for anything at all. Naturally, the Americans had won that arms race—the nuclear arms race.

Soon after, Western powers, especially European, acquired nuclear weapons. Russia, among others, successfully developed nuclear weapons. So did Great Britain. And France. At that time, an exclusive club, made up of those four major powers, was equipped with nuclear weapons. Today, that club has grown substantially. This coincided with the end of the war against Germany and the division into two separate blocs, which began in 1945. There was the Warsaw Pact, associated with Russia and Eastern Europe and NATO, which at the time included only six or seven countries.

One of Western Europe's deterrents was atomic weapons. The Warsaw Pact had massed troops on Western Europe's doorstep. As a deterrent, Western Europe said that it had nuclear fire power. This marked a beginning. The Americans then decided that they had to keep an eye on Russia, since the Russians now had weapons--just as did allies of the Americans. This is how it all began.

Around 1954, the Americans decided to begin detection so that if airplanes, Russian bombers, were headed toward North America, an action plan would be implemented to send them back where they came from and even shoot them down, if necessary. At the time, it was only a question of airplanes; there was no other way to drop a nuclear weapon on the North American continent.

So the Pinetree Line was the first network situated in southern Canada. It consisted of 33 radar stations. It served to monitor approaching aircraft. However, technology was not well developed in those days. Three years later, the distant early warning line—DEW line—was created. The network was pushed further north to give them more time to react once the radar detected the planes approaching. At the time, the aim of the DEW line was to provide three hours' advance warning of a Russian attack on the American continent. This is why Canadian air bases are important now. They were just as important then. Fighter planes could take off from Winnipeg and Bagotville, as is still the case.

You will have guessed that the situation has changed and we have to deal with attacks that are much more impressive and harder to stop. There are the ICBMs, the intercontinental ballistic missiles, which are very hard to block. The Americans are just beginning to see how to block them. In my view that is a mistake. I will talk about this shortly in connection with the missile defence shield concerning which the Bloc has been very active.

So, then, an attack could be predicted three hours in advance. Now there is what is known as the North Warning System, where all the data are kept. I visited the DEW line at Hall Beach just before the latest election. I was very impressed by the whole series of radar stations where there was nobody. Just two people look after the maintenance of the 57 stations.

I note in passing that, at the time, native peoples, particularly the Inuit and the Dene wanted to be consulted on the operation of the DEW line. They had claims on the land. I believe an agreement was finally reached with them, ATCO Frontec and an Inuit organization. They created what today is known as the Nasittuq. It is the group operating and maintaining the whole North Warning System line.

It is also important to note that the aboriginal peoples also have a stake in the matter. I confess to being impressed. A team had gone to check a radar installation that was no longer working. The team had left two weeks earlier and could not return because of a storm in the area. There was concern at the time. Their fate was unknown and a reconnaissance team was going to be sent out. This is how the aboriginals came to be involved and to give their consent. Maintenance and operation of the north warning system are important. Americans fund 60% of the program and Canadians fund 40%. This is a source of significant income for the Inuit of the far north. The arrival or the new fear of intercontinental ballistic missiles was very important.

The doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) came into existence at that time. It was pure folly—as in madness—because if one country attacked another, it too would be destroyed. It was mutual destruction. Whether or not we believe it, this doctrine remains current since everyone knows that if a ballistic missile is launched at the United States, the country launching the missile will probably disappear from the face of the earth.

Aboriginals maintain and operate the north warning system.

As I stated, it is an evolving treaty. On August 5, 2004, there was an agreement. Minister Pratt wrote to his counterpart, Mr. Rumsfeld, advising him that he was ready to enter into discussions. Fortunately, huge demonstrations were held in Montreal to protest the missile defence shield. In the House, the Bloc Québécois questioned the minister almost every day. This led the Liberal government to finally state that it would not be part of the missile defence shield.

Nonetheless, through a diplomatic letter—which is the equivalent of a treaty—Minister David Pratt said he was prepared to modify the Norad agreement. Then the next step was taken. It was no longer just about detection. USNORTHCOM had Norad's information used for determining the plan of action, because at Norad there are two commanders: a U.S. commander and a Canadian deputy commander. They alternate in command of Cheyenne Mountain, which I was talking about earlier. If North America is attacked, they have to call the Canadian prime minister and the U.S. president. It is the U.S. president who will decide on the course of action.

This is new. There was no longer just Norad. Norad continues to conduct aerospace detection, but North American defence is now assured by USNORTHCOM. Naturally, USNORTHCOM said, “If Canadians do not want to take part, we will not give them a place in USNORTHCOM”. Personally, I agree with that. I do not want to repeat all the arguments that have already been made on the missile defence shield, but we think the threat was overestimated in terms of the mutually assured destruction doctrine I mentioned earlier. On whole range of issues, this was truly costing a fortune and the technology was not there. In my opinion, we did well not to join the missile defence shield. Nonetheless, this is a significant change.

I have to say that the Bloc is somewhat satisfied with this evening's debate. For years, we have been saying in this House that international treaties should be brought to the people, to the elected members of the House of Commons. This treaty was brought before us this evening, but unfortunately, we were disappointed to find out from the media that the Minister of National Defence and the American ambassador had signed some kind of agreement in principle. Later, the members attended a briefing and were told that we could not amend it. Furthermore, time is running out because according to the briefing and military personnel, the doors to Norad will close on May 12 and there will not be any more Norad. I have a problem with this situation because they are telling us to hurry up and pass it without amending it. Then we find out that the agreement is practically signed already.

I believe that the next time we sign an international treaty, more consideration should be given to members of Parliament, who should be allowed to debate the issue properly. A proper debate does not mean members of the House of Commons standing to vote on Monday. It means holding consultations. We should consult the people. This is an international treaty that will have a serious impact. It will be expensive to maintain. The DEW Line is expensive to maintain, as is the Canadian command, which I will discuss a bit later. Canadians, who are taxpayers, should find out more about this kind of international treaty.

I would now like to turn to the information process, as I see that my colleague from North Bay is here. The way this works—

[The Acting Speaker, Conservative, Royal Galipeau]

I am sorry to interrupt, but the hon. member is a man of great experience. He is seated in the first few rows and knows that hon. members must never remark on the presence or absence of another hon. member.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thought we could not mention an hon. member's absence.

[The Acting Speaker, Conservative, Royal Galipeau]

Members must not refer to the presence or absence of an hon. member.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, I have listened carefully to the presentation by my colleague from North Bay. I feel it is important to say that North Bay has an important role to play. When the North Warning System detects something, the data are sent to North Bay and probably, within the few seconds that follow, to Norad. So there is one important intermediary. In my opinion, as far as Canadian sovereignty is concerned, the people have understood that we will not send data detected in the north directly to Norad. However, there might be a problem concerning the maritime approach. I am therefore going to look a little closer at this question.

Not only is the North Warning System going to send data to North Bay and Norad, but Norad is going to send them to USNORTHCOM, which decides on the plan of action. Then the American president and the Canadian prime minister are consulted so that a decision can be made. Things are different, though, regarding a maritime approach. Since Canada refused to take part in the missile defence shield—and we supported that position—it is impossible for Canada to decide on a plan of action if missiles are sent towards North America.

Still, if rebel boats coming from rogue states deviated from their route, for example, and there was cause to intervene in Canadian waters, it is really up to the Canadian government to do so through CANADACOM. Of course, if the boat is in American waters, it is USNORTHCOM that must decide on the plan of action. So we have to ask ourselves a few more questions in this regard, since it is not indicated in the agreement, which mentions only general facts. As far as operations are concerned, this matter is far from clear. Actually, I think we should have a lot more details about this.

In my opinion, when that occurs in its waters, Canada will want to take action or counteraction against a rogue boat and it is probably Norad that will send the information. Furthermore, they have all the necessary equipment to do so.

There are many secret things. When visiting, we ask questions and are sometimes told that they cannot be answered because of secrecy concerns. The number of satellites Norad has in orbit is secret, but it is clear that they can detect ballistic missiles within 15 seconds. They obviously have what they need to detect ships. If a ship changes course, they will know right away. That is when the response plan is sent to CANADACOM—or so we hope—and to USNORTHCOM to ensure that each country responds in its respective waters.

The Norad treaty is evolving. It has evolved significantly over time, of course. Technology is also evolving. Military doctrine has evolved. Our way of seeing things has evolved. The geopolitical situation of all countries has evolved. We no longer have two major powers facing off. We have threats like North Korea and Iran. As for the Americans, we have to face the geographic reality.

On the American side, current interception counter-measures are based in Fort Grizzly, Alaska. We are told that if North Korea launches a missile, Fort Grizzly will probably intercept it. In the east, it is not so clear right now because there is no interceptor. There has been talk of placing missiles on boats to cover the east coast. All of this is evolving. We have to ensure that Canadian citizens are well-informed about the whole issue, given that they are the ones footing the bill and they are the ones who have to live with the consequences. I think we are having a good debate here tonight and I hope the voters are listening. It is likely that 99.9% of the people listening to us tonight do not know that in Cheyenne Mountain, both Canadian and American soldiers are keeping a constant watch to ensure their safety.

Therefore I thought tonight's debate was important.

In closing, the Bloc Québécois will support the treaty. We will remain vigilant in the future about its application and we want to ensure this security measure is operated in the greatest respect for the electors and taxpayers.

[Larry Bagnell, Liberal, Yukon, YT]

Mr. Speaker, the member mentioned ballistic missile defence and the DEW line and I want to talk about both of those briefly.

To go on record, a number of people and students in my riding have marched on missile defence right next door in Greely, Alaska. We have a peace coalition in the Yukon that was quite opposed to us joining missile defence, and a number of other Yukoners contacted me. These people were very happy when Canada made the decision with the last government not to join the missile defence program.

My other comment is related to the DEW line which, of course, also goes through my constituency. The Liberal government created the largest environmental program in history, the clean up of federal contaminated sites. My hope is, as the various federal departments are fighting for that, that the Department of National Defence is in there full force trying to get enough money to quickly clean up the remaining DEW line sites that have not been cleaned up. I wonder if the member would support that concept.

As there was nothing about cleaning up federal contaminated sites in either the throne speech or the budget, would the member support the government keeping that program intact and that the Department of National Defence be very aggressive in using that money to clean up northern DEW line sites?

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague from the Yukon for his question.

I want to tell him that when I visited the North Warning System at Hall Beach, the Department of National Defence was conducting a full clean-up operation. I was saying earlier that the treaty is changing, but I would say environmental thinking is too. At the time, all the equipment used was left behind.

As we know the environment in the far north and particularly the Yukon is very fragile. I think it important for us to make sure now that we do not repeat these mistakes and that we clean up the mess created at the time. Work was underway when I went before the latest election.

I hope too that the present government will continue this approach, because the environment is very fragile, and the food chain could be come contaminated very quickly. I also think that the Inuit are keeping a very close eye and want to make sure the government continues cleaning up. They understand the major issue of the possible contamination of the food chain, which would necessarily affect them.

So, I want to reassure the member for the Yukon and tell him I share his viewpoint. We have to make sure the decontamination and clean up continue for years to come.

[Bill Siksay, NDP, Burnaby—Douglas, BC]

Mr. Speaker, Ernie Regehr from Project Ploughshares, writing in a briefing note directed to parliamentarians for this debate tonight, describes the Norad agreement as a practical response to a particular political problem, that is, the negative sovereignty implications of U.S. forces acting in defence of the U.S. in Canadian air space.

He points out that Norad was originally set up to allow the United States to pursue any incoming airborne threat to the United States over Canada. I remember figuring out when I was in public school about the whole arrangement around Norad and the interception of incoming aircraft or incoming missiles, that it would happen over Canada.

It seems to me that this has not changed, only now we do not really expect incoming missiles. we are afraid of terrorists, although I am not exactly sure how Norad protects us against terrorism. It seems to me that the border agency, CSIS and our police are the main line of our defence against terrorism, not this gigantic military operation known as Norad.

It seems to me that the justification for this is to give the United States permission to come into Canada to pursue a threat to the United States and that we are giving it permission to making Canada the theatre for that counterattack. Is it in the interests of Canadians and Canadian security to give the Americans permission to do that?

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Speaker, this is a very interesting question.

I think there have been agreements between the Canadian government and the American government on interventions over Canadian territory. I will explain.

If there were an invasion by a Russian plane, probably from the east, it would most likely be the Bagotville military base that responded. If there were an invasion by air, still Russian, in the middle of Canada, Winnipeg would intervene.

We do not have enough CF-18 military bases in the west, but I think that the Canadian government asked the Americans if they would agree to intervene on the west coast, if there were a threat? I believe it was just a few years ago that a Korean plane was escorted by some American planes because the Canadian government had detected some suspicious behaviour by this plane but did not have the means to send CF-18s. So they asked the Americans to handle this intervention.

I also wish to remind the member asking the question that it is still possible for hijackings to take place. And Norad now has a primary role here. Monitoring flight plans, it can see if a plane is off course. Fighter planes can very quickly be on their way to see what suspicious things are going on.

Unfortunately, I recall the instruction given by Dick Cheney saying that, if there is a suspicious plane over Washington or over the U.S., it must now be shot down. We hope that will never happen, but we think that hijackings are still possible. I think that Norad has an essential role to play in this area. I think it will have to play this role in the future.

[Rick Casson, Conservative, Lethbridge, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I have a question for my hon. colleague across the way who is the defence critic for the Bloc.

He mentioned a couple of issues where Norad would respond to airplanes or objects going into North American airspace. I think we have seen that happen in a couple of instances. I think we had a plane that landed in Yukon that was escorted down. We saw a plane coming from Europe which was reported as suspicious and it was escorted in. This is a function that goes on every day.

Norad is watching over the entire North American continent every day and has been doing that for almost 50 years.

We may read about something happening and Norad being mentioned a few times a year at the most but the rest of the time this organization and its system is in place doing its job and, when the need arises, it will do its job.

What I do not understand is why the NDP is undecided as to whether it supports Norad. It wants to delay the agreement. The agreement will lapse on May 12 so it has to be done. The agreement has been renewed a number of times in the last 48 years and it has been changed a number of times.

We are adding the maritime aspect to it because we have been told that Norad was created to look north for incoming long range ballistic missiles. That is no longer the entire threat to this continent. We have all kinds of possibilities coming at us from all directions.

I personally believe that this expanded mandate for Norad is necessary. I would appreciate it if the hon. member opposite would relay his thoughts on what he thinks of the expanded mandate that Norad will have.

[The Acting Speaker, Conservative, Royal Galipeau]

The hon. member has one minute to answer the question.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to inform my colleague that I support the integration of the maritime approach.

I would even say, from having attended many discussions at NATO and elsewhere, that people are beginning to look at a third component. Yet we have not even begun to discuss the Northwest Passage. In the very near future, due to global warming, it is possible that more and more ships will be tempted to take this passage. However, there is also a third approach that I have heard about. Perhaps it will be the subject of future Norad amendments. I am referring to a land approach through the far north. For now, no one is capable of detecting such an approach. Discussion has already begun concerning the relevance of including this possibility in Norad.

In short, I believe that this issue must be examined comprehensively and that the safety of Canadians and Quebeckers must be ensured.

To conclude, I would like to acknowledge the people who work at Norad and who ensure our safety, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the hon. member for Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke.

I am very pleased to stand in this place today to support the renewal of the North American Air Defence Agreement, Norad. I have personally spent many years involved in the business of Norad air defence over all three coasts in the cockpit of a CF-18 and as a staff officer in Fighter Group and Air Command headquarters. Norad has been a key element of the Canada-U.S. defence relationship and a symbol of our friendship and cooperation for nearly 50 years.

Throughout the cold war, Norad provided our two countries with an effective means of defending our continent against aerospace attacks. Norad has been able to adapt to new and emerging threats over a half century of changes in the international security environment.

I would like to take this opportunity to illustrate Norad's evolution and show how this agency has always adapted to new challenges.

I will show that the new Norad agreement will allow us to be more effective in handling the threats we face today.

Renewing the Norad agreement is part of the government's primary commitment to defend Canada's sovereignty and keep Canadians safe.

Norad emerged in response to the cold war threat of Soviet intercontinental bombers carrying out nuclear attacks against North America by crossing the Arctic. Canada and the United States both responded to that threat but our efforts became joined when the Norad agreement was signed in 1958, creating a bi-national command responsible to both Canada and the United States for North American air defence.

Over the years, the original mission of Norad, aerospace control, attack warning and response, was modified to keep pace with changing weapons technologies. During the 1960s, the advent of ICBMs caused Norad to adjust its role to emphasize missile warning. In the 1980s, it was the new threat of cruise missiles that caused the mission to again change to one of intercepting Soviet aircraft before they launched their cruise missiles.

New early warning systems were deployed and forward operating locations were built in northern Canada and American airfields capable of operating U.S. and Canadian fighters. However, then, with the end of the cold war, many believed that Norad would be obsolete, that it would not be relevant in a post cold war world. They were wrong.

In 1991, Norad's mandate was expanded to include tracking and monitoring aircraft suspected of transporting illegal drugs.

Today, Norad continues to work together with police authorities in both our countries, closely monitoring aircraft that enter Canada's airspace without a flight plan until law enforcement officials can ground them to do an inspection.

Since September 11, 2001, we can see that the classic Cold War enemies have been replaced with a new type of enemy, an enemy that lies low and inflicts terror and that in a cowardly and callous way kills and injures innocent people.

That is why we must do everything we can to protect our fellow citizens from this new type of threat.

It is just as important to renew the Norad agreement as to adapt it to the current security context.

Successive Canadian governments have recognized that Norad represents the most effective way to provide for Canada's aerospace defence. The government agrees. The world has become increasingly dangerous and unstable. Along with our American partners, we must stand on guard and respond to new threats to North America together. Norad will continue to play a vital role in ensuring our security.

The new Norad agreement, which we are putting before the House today, has been adapted to meet the new security challenges that lie ahead. For one, our two countries have decided to renew Norad indefinitely, subject to periodic reviews.

Until now, the Norad agreement has been renewed for limited periods of time. It has actually been renewed nine times since 1958 and must be renewed again in May 2006.

By making the Norad agreement more permanent, both countries are making a strong binational commitment to North American defence.

We are also sending a strong message to potential hostile parties, who will see that we are serious about protecting the continent we share against any threats we may face.

Canada and the United States have also agreed to add a maritime warning function to Norad. September 11, 2001 and subsequent attacks around the world have reminded us all too well how terrorists can strike us anywhere and in many forms. The terrorist bombing of the American warship USS Cole, in October 2000, and the French tanker Limburg, in October 2002, demonstrated that terrorists can strike from the sea.

Canada and the United States are maritime nations. Canada has the longest coastline in the world. Maritime traffic in our waters is particularly heavy, and the trade that moves between our ports is important for both countries' economies.

We must act before terrorists attack our ports, our ships and our maritime trade. It is therefore essential that both countries continue to work together to improve North American maritime security.

Even though our countries' navies, coast guards and other agencies have been cooperating extensively for years now in the maritime domain, no single binational organization has ever been responsible for collecting and analyzing information related to potential maritime threats to this continent. No single organization has been responsible for providing such data to both American and Canadian authorities.

We now have an opportunity to address that gap and to provide the assistance of a very experienced binational organization to help us control this complex and dynamic environment. Norad has the necessary flexibility and experience to undertake this new mission.

Norad will contribute to the processing, assessing and disseminating of intelligence and information on maritime activities taking place off our shores and on our waterways. It will also contribute to the overall warning capability for Canadian and American authorities of maritime threats or attacks against North America.

Responding to maritime threats, however, will remain the duty of each country's national commands namely, Canada Command and United States Northern Command. By adding maritime warning to Norad's mission to deter, detect and defend against airborne threats, Canada and the United States are developing more tools to safeguard our shared continent for 21st century threats.

The uniqueness of Norad is its binational nature, and that has provided Canada with access to critical security information in a timely manner. It has also given Canada an umbrella of aerospace security that we could not afford on our own. There are no other examples of international defence agreements where personnel of two militaries work so closely in a seamless operation.

Indeed, on that awful day of September 2001, it was a friend of mine, then Major General Rick Findley, who was on duty in Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado. It was a Canadian who was responsible for managing the immediate reaction to the events as they unfolded, even though the activity was taking place in the United States. I do not think we would find that anywhere else in the world.

If we were ever to abandon Norad and if we were to remain serious about providing for our own aerospace sovereignty and security, we would have to duplicate most of what we have available through Norad. Simply put: we could not do it.

Norad remains a key element of North American security and a highly efficient defence arrangement. After almost 50 years, the Canadian and American governments still agree that it makes a lot more sense to perform the missions and functions of Norad together than to perform them apart.

While the basic objectives of Norad have endured for years, Norad has also appropriately responded to changes in the security environment. The new Norad agreement will see this trend continue. It will provide Canada with an effective and efficient means of carrying out an important and ongoing national objective: the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty and Canadian security.

[Anthony Rota, Liberal, Nipissing—Timiskaming, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to congratulate the member for Edmonton Centre on his very detailed remarks. It is not just something he picked up from reading. I know it is something he has experienced in recent years.

Not long ago, I travelled to Cold Lake, and his colleagues in the army were very proud of his being here in the House of Commons.

The question is not so much one about whether we are here to debate the importance of Norad. I think we can all agree on the importance of Norad. It has to exist to defend not only Canada but the United States and the whole of North America. The concern I have is the process in which it happened. It happened behind closed doors, it happened in secrecy and it was signed. By signing it, the Crown was bound by that agreement, but there was no real power for that signature to take place. Now the Crown is bound.

If the House should vote against Norad, would that dishonour the Crown? There is a commitment there, but no real power to enforce it.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Mr. Speaker, yes, I do have many friends in Cold Lake.

The hon. member is confusing signed and ratified. Nothing has been done in secret. In fact I believe it was my hon. colleague who mentioned that the negotiations had been started by the previous Liberal government, and I would like to congratulate that Liberal government on starting the automatic negotiations on the renewal of the Norad agreement, the secret date for which has been known for five years.

Notwithstanding that, an agreement was signed in principle. It is being ratified by this House by a vote on Monday. There is no doubt, with the support of at least three of the four parties in this House, that it will pass easily. It is a yes or no vote. It is not amendable, and we expect it to pass without fanfare.

[Randy Kamp, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans]

Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate my colleague from Edmonton Centre on his eloquent presentation in this debate. As my colleague across the way has said, I especially appreciate it when it is based on personal experience.

If we listen long enough in this place, we will hear some say that Canada's participation in Norad is somehow a threat to Canadian sovereignty. Could my colleague comment on that?

As well, specifically, because he has experience in this area, in the almost 50 years that we have been participating in this way, does he knows of any occasions when, because of our relationship in Norad, Canada was unable to respond in an independent way when it needed to do so?

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Mr. Speaker, Canada has contributed to Norad over the years. We currently contribute about 10% in terms of economic participation. There are many things we contribute to Norad, but ultimately, when we are talking about sovereignty, it is Canada first.

When we say Canada first though, it is not Canada only. People want to isolate Canada from the United States. Members of the NDP want to isolate Canada from the United States and pretend that by doing this, we are protecting Canadian sovereignty. In fact, we are jeopardizing Canadian sovereignty. The worst possible thing we could do would be to pretend that somehow Canada and the United States are physically separated. It is just not reality.

Earlier someone mentioned, I believe it was the Minister of Public Safety, that no man is an island, no woman is an island and no country is an island. Canada is certainly not an island. Some members of one of the parties in the House do live on an island. I think it is called Fantasy Island, if they think that we can isolate Canada from North America when it comes to shared responsibility, shared sovereignty and security concerns.

There have been many times, and I should not give a specific example, when American forces have bailed us out in times of need. We do contribute person per person, aircraft for aircraft, just as capably as anybody, but there are times when we just do not have enough and we have to rely on the Americans to supply the rest of the pieces that are missing in helping them support us in our Canada first objective.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is with great honour as a member of Parliament for Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, home of the warriors posted to Canadian Forces Base Petawawa, that I participate in this historic debate before Parliament, the renewal of the Norad Treaty for parliamentary approval.

It is time to foster a growing public awareness of Canada's role in the world in this age of globalization. Our role in the world, as never before, must be capable of operating under close public and parliamentary scrutiny.

Our new Conservative government is committed to greater accountability and a more meaningful role for Parliament in Canada's international relations. That is why we are submitting for debate and a vote in the House the renewal of the agreement between Canada and the United States, which underpins our participation in the North American Aerospace Defense Command, Norad.

This is another example of a promise made and a promise kept. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defence have already described for members the reasons for renewing the Norad agreement and why it is in Canada's national interest to do so.

It is my privilege to be able to elaborate on their remarks and further help the case for the full support of the House for renewing the Norad agreement.

Canada and the United States have been partners in the defence of our shared continent since 1940, when Canada signed the Ogdensburg Agreement. That agreement first enshrined the principle of mutual defence between Canada and the United States. It acknowledged the indivisibility of the national security of our respective countries and the collective security of our continent.

At that time, Canada did not want its territory to be susceptible to attack by global threats. We readily agreed to enter into such a mutual defence pact with the U.S. because of the inherent vulnerability posed by our large land mass and our small population.

Canada and the U.S. had also fought together as allies in the first world war, and the U.S. was about to join us in fighting World War II. When the second world war ended and our countries faced a new threat from the Soviet Union, Canada and the United States immediately renewed their commitment to mutual defence through cooperative air defence arrangements to protect our continent. This led within a few years to the signing of the Norad agreement in 1958, an agreement concluded under the umbrella of the NATO Treaty.

Today, the indivisibility of the security of our two countries and our continent is perhaps greater because of the economic interdependence that has grown between us. We know the figures and the volumes of cross-border trade and its value to Canada . We know that we are each other's largest single trading partner, though admittedly in our case, to a much higher order of magnitude than for the United States. Neither country is immune to disruptions in the other.

One need only recall the images of the clogged border crossings in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, or the unprecedented scene of aircraft gridlock when U.S. bound flights were diverted to the airport in Gander, Newfoundland. The economic impact of the attacks on the U.S. was acutely and instantly felt in Canada, but the indivisibility of our security goes well beyond the vital economic relationship between our nations and the prosperity we derive from it.

Our nations and our people face similar threats in today's world. As a freedom loving people, our values and interests are being opposed, not just theoretically but with overt hostility by radical extremists, rogue states and terrorists around the world. There is a community of values that we share, not only with our American neighbours but with all our other allies who are under a threat today.

Those who threaten our values rarely make distinctions on the basis of nationality, and though a large conventional threat to Canada is remote, the possibility still exists.

Canada must remain capable of dealing with the possible emergence of all threats, given the unacceptable implications of ignoring the realities of today's world. Members need only consider the debate we recently held on Canada's involvement in Afghanistan. There Canada is confronting an enemy at a safe distance from our shores, but in this day and age of globalized risk, we must also defend ourselves at home.

Traditional security paradigms have been shattered. We live in a new era, where threats present themselves internally with greater stealth and surprise than in the past when we faced a more conventional set of adversaries. These factors make our participation in Norad all the more relevant today. Norad has adapted to the new threat environment we now face.

Since the last renewal of Norad in 2001, just months before the attacks of September 11, Norad's mission has been transformed. Norad radars, communications, fighter jets and other assets have been recalibrated to address threats not only in the approaches to North America, but those emanating from within. After all, the 9/11 attacks were conducted within sovereign territory with civilian aircraft, with civilians as the targets.

Canada's national security and defence policies have evolved. Norad has adapted to this new framework by establishing direct links with a host of agencies outside the military, such as Nav Canada and its U.S. counterpart, the FAA, for civilian aviation, and with law enforcement and other security agencies in Canada and the United States.

The purpose of these growing linkages is to promote timely information sharing and a better preparedness against a wide spectrum of traditional and non-traditional threats.

In the next renewal of the Norad agreement, due before its expiry on May 12, 2006, Canada and the U.S. have not only reaffirmed Norad's aerospace defence mission, but we have negotiated a new mission to warn both nations of threats in the maritime domain.

Adding a maritime watch to Norad is a recognition that threats to our countries can reside anywhere, not just in the air domain. It is also a recognition by both countries of how well continental defence cooperation works through the vehicle of Norad.

Let me focus for a moment on the unique structure of Norad and why it has served both countries so well for so long. Norad is a binational military command where both nationalities are represented in a single chain of command. The commander is a four-star American officer and the deputy commander is a three-star equivalent Canadian officer.

In the Norad organization, whether it is in the strategic headquarters in Colorado or the Norad regional headquarters in Manitoba, Alaska and Florida, Canadian and American military members work side by side as a seamless team. Norad is based on mutually agreed protocols for the military defence of our sovereign territories.

The Norad commander reports to both governments and shares the warning threat information equally with both capitals. Norad is a venue where Canada has an equal say in the development of plans and the strategies for the defence of our shared continent. It is this unique arrangement that entails a higher degree of reciprocity and cooperation than can be found in any other alliance or coalition.

For Canada, Norad is a way of enhancing our defence capabilities through cooperation with the U.S., in effect by tapping into the economies of scale in the U.S. military. Canada's security benefits from this formula much the same way our economy benefits from its access to the U.S. market. Norad enables Canada to defend its share of the continent in ways that it could not do on its own, or not without ultimately prohibitive expenditure.

The U.S. derives benefits from assured cooperation with Canada in the defence of North America, particularly with the ability to detect threats before they reach national borders and the valued contribution of our Canadian Forces personnel and assets.

Norad has provided both nations with a flexible and adaptable framework for sharing information and warning of threats and the capacity to take action in response, either collectively or individually depending on the circumstances. It is a forum where the sovereignty of each nation is not only respected but enhanced by guarantees of mutual assistance in the event of attack. Those guarantees are backed by the necessary plans, the training and the operating procedures to render that assistance on a moment's notice.

[Bill Siksay, NDP, Burnaby—Douglas, BC]

Mr. Speaker, many Canadians are concerned about nuclear weapons. We heard from the member for Halifax on that topic this evening. Many Canadians hope that disarmament will become a reality on our planet, especially when it comes to nuclear weapons and those dramatic weapons of mass destruction.

We know that the United States, which has the largest arsenal of those weapons, has been found to be in non-compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. We also know that the United States has failed to ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty.

Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, has said that the “erosion” of non-proliferation agreements may soon be “irreversible”. I think that is something that causes very grave concern for many Canadians.

I am wondering if Canada should be entering into a military agreement with a country that is in non-compliance with an important international agreement such as the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. I do not think that is appropriate, but I wonder what the member for Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke thinks.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the role of Norad is to detect and warn our countries of incoming or variations in man-made vehicles or missiles. This agreement has nothing to do with the proliferation of nuclear arms. This is a protection method so that we can see if something is coming in, if something poses a threat to our airspace, and thus provide our countries with a warning in advance.

[Larry Bagnell, Liberal, Yukon, YT]

Mr. Speaker, I want to talk about some of the threats the member thinks we will be protected against. The preamble to the agreement states:

Recognizing that, despite arms reduction agreements, large nuclear arsenals still exist, deliverable by strategic ballistic missile, cruise missile or long range aircraft capable of striking North America;....

The member mentioned non-traditional threats and rogue states. I wonder if she could give examples.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Mr. Speaker, in my speech, I was giving examples of the types of threats there are for our continental North American airspace. The threats could come from outside the country, off the continent, but these threats could also come from within.