Debates of Dec. 9th, 2022

The House proceeded to the consideration of Bill C-9, An Act to amend the Judges Act, as reported (with amendments) from the committee.

Judges Act

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Alexandra Mendès), Liberal, Alexandra Mendes]

There being no motions at report stage, the House will now proceed, without debate, to the putting of the question on the motion to concur in the bill at report stage.

[David Lametti, Liberal, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada]

moved that the bill, as amended, be concurred in.

(Motion agreed to)

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Alexandra Mendès), Liberal, Alexandra Mendes]

When shall the bill be read the third time? By leave, now?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[David Lametti, Liberal, LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC]

moved that the bill be read the third time and passed.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise before you today to move third reading of Bill C-9. I am pleased not only because of the importance of this piece of legislation in ensuring that we maintain a robust justice system, but also because of the unanimous support it received at the end of October when we last debated this bill.

I thank my esteemed colleagues for their contributions. I am grateful to all those who shared their opinions on this bill, which made it possible to delve deeper into the issues it raises and consider them from every angle. It was really a collaborative effort, and I am proud to have played a role in it.

It is clear from our previous discussions on this bill that, regardless of our political differences, we all share the common goal of protecting the independence of the judicial system. We are supporting that fundamental goal today by implementing a rigorous, tailored process for dealing with disciplinary complaints against judges.

Given the stage Bill C-9 is at in the parliamentary process, I assume that everyone is aware of the context that gave rise to this bill. That context has been very well explained, which helped guide our recent discussions. The merits of the bill have also been debated at length in previous sittings. Nevertheless, I would like to take this opportunity to go over a few key points.

At the outset, it is important to emphasize that the modifications to the judicial conduct process proposed by this bill are substantive and far-reaching. They are not mere adjustments meant to update a process in need of updating.

I will begin with two important elements concerning judicial conduct in general before touching upon the principal areas of reform.

A robust mechanism for governing judicial conduct is critical in upholding public trust in the justice system as a whole. This is so for two closely related reasons. First, the existence of such a regime is essential even where, as in Canada, the judiciary is long established and well respected. Second, protecting judicial independence does not mean insulating judges from the consequences of misconduct. I will briefly cover each point in turn.

The impetus for amendments proposed by Bill C-9 is not a crisis of judicial ethics. It is quite the opposite. Misconduct by judges in Canada is rare. Allegations are thankfully infrequent, with findings of misconduct rarer still. We Canadians are privileged beneficiaries of a truly excellent judiciary, whose quality is widely recognized both at home and abroad. This does not mean that a strong judicial conduct regime is not necessary. It is. Maintaining the solid foundation of public confidence on which the excellence of our judiciary rests requires a robust mechanism for dealing with complaints against judges. Such a mechanism is essential to ensuring continued confidence in both the judiciary itself and the justice system overall. Canadians must be confident that instances of judicial misconduct will be addressed.

A well-functioning judicial conduct regime therefore remains critical, even when allegations of judicial misconduct are infrequent. Protecting public trust in the administration of justice demands that a mechanism be in place and be ready to respond appropriately to complaints against members of the judiciary as they are made. This is a tangible guarantee of accountability. It helps preserve confidence that allegations are taken seriously, all while respecting principles of procedural fairness.

A judicial conduct process that would serve to insulate judges from the consequences of misconduct could be just as harmful to public confidence as the complete absence of a conduct process.

That is why the provisions of Bill C‑9 propose a responsive approach seeking to ensure that allegations are addressed as fairly and effectively as possible. The proposed mechanism respects both the people filing the complaint and those who are the subject of the complaint. By providing a legitimate avenue for the careful review of allegations, we have the assurance that there is some oversight over the conduct of judges and that they will be held to account when necessary. At the same time, this promotes confidence in the administration of justice on a broader scale.

It is important to point out that the careful development of a judicial conduct process is not at all incompatible with the fundamental principle of judicial independence, guaranteed under paragraph 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the provisions on the judiciary in the Constitution Act, 1867. In fact, they go hand in hand.

That being said, we must be careful to strike a delicate balance between these two important considerations. The process we put in place to conscientiously address allegations of judicial misconduct must not contravene the constitutional guarantees that seek to ensure judicial independence.

We can be confident that this bill strikes the right balance. Canadians can trust that their judges are making independent and impartial decisions and, at the same time, they can rest assured that the judges' conduct remains subject to review. Ultimately, this will improve trust in the administration of justice, both with respect to individual judges and on a broader scale.

Let me now provide a brief overview of the legal and constitutional foundations of the judicial conduct process. At its core lies the Canadian Judicial Council, or CJC, the body responsible for receiving, reviewing and investigating complaints against members of the federally appointed judiciary. It works at arm’s length from the executive and legislative branches of government.

The Judges Act requires the CJC to submit a report to the Minister of Justice containing a recommendation on whether the judge whose conduct is at issue should be removed from office. It is for the minister to then consider whether to advise cabinet that the matter of the judge’s removal should be put to the houses of Parliament. In order for a judge to be removed from office, both the House of Commons and the Senate must vote in favour. If they do so, a request is made to the Governor General to remove the judge from office.

As I have previously noted, this process requires a counterweight in the form of constitutional protections for judicial independence. One aspect of judicial independence is security of tenure. More specifically, the requirements of security of tenure prevent a judge’s removal from office except in cases of proven incapacity or misconduct. As a further safeguard, a hearing is required, at which the judge has an opportunity to be heard and to test and adduce evidence. These imperatives lie at the heart of any judicial conduct process. They are the keys to ensuring all stages of such a process are free from undue influence from the other branches of government.

It follows that any healthy system of justice finds its roots, at least in part, in the framework established to handle allegations of misconduct by its judges. All of us would expect to be treated fairly if we were involved in a matter before the courts. The same requirement for procedural fairness applies to judges in the review of their conduct. While not in and of itself a court process, it must necessarily mirror some of the key elements of court proceedings, namely, fairness throughout while ensuring any resolution is appropriate to its context. The process must function efficiently in terms of both time and resources, producing final outcomes in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost to the taxpayer.

These elements are core to the reforms proposed by Bill C-9. While our current judicial conduct regime served us well for many years, helping to create the preconditions needed for the strong justice system we enjoy today, it is now in need of improvement. As I have already stated, this is not change for change’s sake, nor is it prompted solely by the need to update a half-century-old process. Fundamental changes in the legal landscape coupled with evolving societal norms have occurred, revealing specific shortcomings to the existing process. These could be addressed through the reforms proposed by Bill C-9.

Bill C-9’s proposed amendments target the following key areas: efficiency, accountability and procedural fairness. All three are crucial determinants of public trust and would be met by this bill. An efficient process would optimize both time and financial resources. Timely resolution of matters would help provide certainty to those involved. On a broader scale, timeliness and efficiency would foster confidence the process functions as it should, with allegations addressed promptly and effectively.

Currently it is possible for judges to initiate judicial review of CJC decisions at multiple stages. Each of these judicial reviews, begun in the Federal Court, can be appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal and, potentially, to the Supreme Court of Canada. Even if such proceedings are commenced for all of the right reasons, the lifespan of a matter can too easily become stretched out unreasonably. Efficiency is also, of course, related to cost, as timely resolution of allegations helps avoid ballooning costs.

In combination with the possibility of unduly extending proceedings over many years, public confidence in the process can suffer if its costs appear excessive. A key aspect of the new regime proposed by Bill C-9 would be its improved flexibility and responsiveness. It proposes a more refined tool for the resolution of judicial conduct matters not serious enough to warrant removal: a suite of potential sanctions that would allow for the imposition of a sanction that is more contextualized and appropriate for remedying the misconduct in question.

There is only one sanction expressly available under the current regime, and that is removal from office. It is therefore both potentially overbroad and underinclusive. Consider conduct that, while recognized as inappropriate, should warrant something less than overruling judges’ constitutionally protected security of tenure.

Even exposure to the required full-scale inquiry without actual removal can cause irreparable damage to a judge’s reputation. The CJC has told us it often struggles with the application of these stark either-or alternatives, that is, between recommending the most serious penalty or none at all. In either case the public may perceive injustice.

It is also important to highlight the idea of justice being done, as well as being seen to be done. Public trust in the judiciary relies not only on judges being held accountable, but also on judges being seen to be held accountable. By providing for options other than removal from office, such as participating in an education program or issuing a formal apology, Bill C-9 would provide a more balanced approach that reinforces accountability to Canadians at all levels. It would be an important step forward in continuing to foster the confidence of the public in our justice system.

It is essential to remember that our system of law exists to serve the public. It operates because we have confidence in its legitimacy, trusting in the capacity of its members and mechanisms to administer justice. This is no accident, but rather the result of sustained and concerted efforts over time. Here in Canada we are fortunate to have a strong foundation upon which to build. This requires ongoing attention, however, by ensuring measures are undertaken to safeguard public trust.

Bill C-9, for example, would introduce greater transparency and public participation into the judicial conduct regime. Members of the general public who are neither lawyers nor judges would participate at two crucial stages of the proposed new process.

First, they would be members of review panels charged with determining whether less serious misconduct has occurred and what sanction, short of removal, would be appropriate in the circumstances. Second, a layperson would be a member of full hearing panels that determine whether serious misconduct warrants a recommendation for removal from office.

These changes would respond to feedback received during extensive consultation across a wide range of groups, members of the public included. Along with accountability to the public, the regime would seek judicial accountability.

Critical to the process’s legitimacy is that judges would be held accountable for their behaviour in both fact and public perception. As I have mentioned, the perception that the system operates as it should is equally as important as the fact that it actually does. Expanding the options for addressing instances of inappropriate judicial behaviour would improve both. Consequences tailored to each circumstance could be deployed, meaningfully addressing a wider range of misconduct. This amended framework would also encourage creativity in approaching resolution and sanction, with a view to imposing the most suitable remedy for misconduct that warrants a response short of removal.

The final element relating to accountability is financial. As I noted earlier, the current regime can easily spiral into excessively long and expensive proceedings, undermining public trust. In addition to the reforms I have already discussed in relation to efficiency, Bill C-9 proposes a more stable funding mechanism and new controls for the use of public funds.

More specifically, funding would come from two sources. Some funding would be drawn from the consolidated revenue fund, while the rest would come from the commissioner for federal judicial affairs' budgetary appropriation, obtained through the regular budget cycle. The consolidated revenue fund would only be used to cover costs that inevitably arise from the requirement to hold public hearings when a complaint reaches a certain stage in the process. These costs are both non-discretionary and unpredictable. The more predictable day-to-day administrative expenses would be paid out of funds obtained by the commissioner for federal judicial affairs as part of the budget cycle.

Additional safeguards have been put in place with respect to disbursements from the consolidated revenue fund. There is a policy that limits the amount that can be charged by lawyers representing judges who are the subject of a complaint. Bill C‑9 also proposes that the commissioner for federal judicial affairs be more involved, both to review other procedural expenses and to work with the Canadian Judicial Council on the five-year review of costs borne by the consolidated revenue fund.

The Canadian judiciary's performance is exemplary in every regard. I am proud of our judges, both past and present, who were and are dedicated to serving their fellow Canadians to the best of their ability. However, despite the high standards to which we hold judges, and which the vast majority of them achieve, misconduct inevitably occurs. As I explained, even though such incidents are rare, having effective mechanisms in place to address them is a crucial determinant to maintaining the public trust.

Just as each individual allegation of misconduct presents an opportunity to bolster public confidence in the judiciary, so too does this bill. We have the unique privilege of taking concrete action toward strengthening the administration of justice. I was heartened by our collaboration earlier in the process, particularly at committee, that has enabled Bill C-9 to arrive at the stage where it is today. Let us continue in that spirit and send this bill on for consideration by our colleagues in the other place.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Madam Speaker, I thank the minister and I concur with his comments.

I support the bill. However, this bill is cold comfort to my constituents, Mike and Dianne Ilesic, whose son Brian was murdered by a co-worker. That co-worker shot Brian and three other co-workers point-blank in the back of the head. That killer was the first person to have a consecutive parole ineligibility period imposed on him by a trial judge.

Mike and Dianne were absolutely devastated with the Supreme Court's decision in the spring to strike down that law. They were even more disappointed with the minister's response, which was to say that he respected the decision and would not take any further steps to respond to it or fill the void left as a result of the court decision.

Respectfully, what can the minister say to Mike and Dianne?

[David Lametti, Liberal, LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank the hon. member for his support on this particular bill. It is important that we move on this bill expeditiously. I appreciate the support he has given personally, as well as the support his party has given, at all stages of this bill. I thank my critic as well, the member for Fundy Royal.

I would say to Mike and Dianne that the eligibility for parole that the Supreme Court has imposed in the Bissonnette case is not automatic. It does not mean that the person convicted in this case will be granted parole. It merely means that the consecutive life sentences stand, but there will be a possibility of parole after a fairly long period of time.

It was an unequivocal Supreme Court decision. The court clearly said, in a unanimous decision, that parole ineligibility could not stand. I have never rejected the possibility of acting. I am always open to good ideas, as the hon. member knows and has known throughout my period as the Minister of Justice. I will continue to reflect on that case.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank the minister for his speech. I always enjoy hearing him speak.

He went on at length about how Bill C‑9 will maintain the public trust, and he also talked about the separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches, which is just as important and is also maintained in Bill C‑9.

However, if there is one thing that makes us question that balance upon which the public trust relies, it is the judicial appointment process that precedes the potential removal of a judge from office, which one hopes would be a very infrequent occurrence.

I would like the minister to comment on the possibility of revising the appointment process to make it as non-partisan and transparent as possible, thereby bolstering public confidence in the judicial system.

[David Lametti, Liberal, LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for her question.

In 2016, we established a non-partisan and transparent judicial appointment process that ensures exemplary quality and greater diversity among judges across Canada, including in Quebec. I can tell this House that the Barreau du Québec and Quebec lawyers are very pleased with the quality and diversity of the individuals appointed to the Quebec Superior Court.

We have already appointed 10 judges to the Quebec Superior Court this year, and we still have nine vacancies. The process is ongoing as we continue to fill these positions. I hope to have good news very soon.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Madam Speaker, I thank the minister for his remarks on what I think is an important bill.

There is an obvious tension, always, between the independence of judges and the right of the public to have transparency about the conduct of judges. In this bill, it is very clear that we are going to make a significant improvement over the current situation, in which neither the complainants nor the judges complained about are served well. I wonder if the minister thinks that with this bill, we have finally reached the right balance between the independence of judges and the rights of those who may have complaints about judges.

[David Lametti, Liberal, LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank the hon. member for his work at committee and with respect to collaboration on justice issues generally. We have a very high degree of collaboration among all the parties in the House, and I am very proud of that fact.

I think we have reached the right balance here. I point out to the hon. member that the substance of this process was elaborated on by the Canadian Judicial Council, which is led by the Right Hon. Richard Wagner, who is the Chief Justice of Canada, and chief justices across Canada, in collaboration with superior court judges across Canada. I think there is an important developmental part of the bill that was undertaken by the judiciary.

We had a high-profile case of judicial misconduct over the past number of years in which dilatory tactics were used, and it ended up costing the taxpayer time and money. The people who suffered the most during that process were the judges. They felt that their reputation was being impugned by the actions of one of their members. Therefore, they had a very strong incentive to participate in the process and to elaborate on a process that they believed was fair.

Then the bill came here and there were good recommendations at committee. There were not many, but they were important ones. Therefore, we have taken on our role responsibly to work with justices, maintaining independence on each side and coming up with a process that will serve Canadians. That is ultimately what both the judiciary and parliamentarians do.

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley—Aldergrove, BC]

Madam Speaker, the Minister of Justice would be aware that at the justice committee, Conservative members put forward a common-sense motion. It was a proposal to amend Bill C-9 to include an automatic right of appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, not the trial court, and that was rejected by the other members of the committee. They argued that the Supreme Court of Canada is already there for appeals. However, we know that is only a faint hope, because it is unlikely that any case coming out of the CJC will ever make it to the Supreme Court of Canada. I would like his comments on that.

[David Lametti, Liberal, LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC]

Madam Speaker, indeed, this is probably one of the reasons we are here.

I mentioned the case of Justice Girouard over the past number of years, in which there were a number of judicial reviews to the Federal Court and appeals to the Federal Court of Appeal from those judicial reviews. It ended up ballooning the process in terms of cost and rendering the process much more complex, and it took years.

I know that serious discussions were undertaken by the CJC and the chief justice discussing the mechanism, and appeals to the Federal Court were considered. What the judges came up with was a transparent process to hear and provide for appeals within the system in a linear fashion with, finally, the possibility of seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

I think the hon. member is correct to say that leave to appeal to the court is not meant to be frequently obtained, but there has been a sufficient degree of attention paid within the linear system of vetting, hearing and rehearing cases so that there is a sufficient degree of protection put in the system for someone to challenge a first ruling and move from there. We have built a good balance that maintains efficiency and—

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Alexandra Mendès), Liberal, Alexandra Mendes]

There is time for one last question.

The hon. parliamentary secretary to the government House leader.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Madam Speaker, I would like to get back to the issue of public confidence in the judicial system. The minister made reference to those high-profile cases where a judge is being judged by the public, if I can put it that way, because of a particular ruling and questions of doubt are planted.

When I look at the legislation, one aspect is important to recognize: We assist in ensuring public confidence in the system when we put in the checks we are putting in today. Could the minister provide his thoughts on the—

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Alexandra Mendès), Liberal, Alexandra Mendes]

I would like a very brief answer from the hon. minister.

[David Lametti, Liberal, LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC]

Madam Speaker, at the outset, if there is a doubt about a ruling, there is an appeal process. When there is a substantive question, one can go to appeal.

What we are talking about here is when a judge perhaps makes a remark or is engaged in an activity that impugns the conduct of the judiciary. One of the main things we have done here is allow for disciplinary action to be taken in minor cases with concomitant consequences.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Madam Speaker, I rise to speak on Bill C-9, an act to amend the Judges Act. Before I do that, I would like to seek the unanimous consent of the House to split my time with the member for Langley—Aldergrove.

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Alexandra Mendès), Liberal, Alexandra Mendes]

Is it agreed?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Madam Speaker, this legislation would reform the process by which the Canadian Judicial Council undertakes reviews of complaints brought against judges for alleged misconduct. The judicial complaints review process was established more than 50 years ago, in 1971. It has a number of problems in that it can be timely, cumbersome and costly. These problems have been publicly recognized by the Canadian Judicial Council, which consists of 41 members, including all chief justices and associate chief justices of federally appointed courts. For years, there have been calls to reform the process.

The process, as it currently stands, can involve up to three layers of judicial review: the Federal Court of Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal and, upon leave being granted, the Supreme Court of Canada. That process can take years and, in some cases, even as long as a decade. This bill seeks to address that by streamlining the process, although, I would submit, it does so somewhat imperfectly from the standpoint of ensuring procedural fairness. Nonetheless, the process the government has come up with is supportable, notwithstanding some shortcomings that Conservatives raised at committee.

The bill also seeks to enhance transparency by requiring that the Canadian Judicial Council, in its annual reports, to publish the number of complaints and how those complaints were resolved.

The bill would enhance accountability. Under the current process, where a judge's misconduct is not at a level that would warrant their removal from office, such cases can be settled behind closed doors with really very little transparency. This bill would change that by providing for mandatory sanctions. Those sanctions could range from requiring the judge to issue an apology to requiring the judge to undertake counselling or professional development training with regard for the nature of the misconduct and circumstances of the case.

The bill, on the whole, would protect the independence of the judiciary, which is vital to our democracy and integral to the rule of law, which is something that, unfortunately from time to time, the current government has not respected. In addition, with some imperfections, the bill would maintain procedural fairness, both from the standpoint of the complainant as well as for a judge whose conduct is being questioned by way of a complaint.

It is good that this bill has been brought forward. It is a bill that is the product of consultations that took place in 2016, the substance of which have been incorporated into this bill, on which there is generally consensus. However, I will say that it did take the Liberals five years after those consultations ended to get around to introducing a bill. Moreover, when the government finally got around to introducing a bill in May 2021, it went nowhere because of the Prime Minister, who called a completely unnecessary and opportunistic election. Following the unnecessary election, the Liberals reintroduced the bill in the Senate last November and then suddenly decided one month later to pull the bill from the Senate.

The Liberals then reintroduced the bill, Bill C-9, last December in the House and proceeded to let it languish for months on end. For six months, they sat on their hands only to finally bring it up for debate at second reading in June, just before the House rose for the summer, and here we are at Christmas still dealing with the bill.

I highlight the process to underscore how dysfunctional the Liberal government is. Here, we have a bill around which there is general consensus, and it has taken the Liberals three bills to proceed. While the bill would enhance public confidence in the judicial system, and judges are central to that system, the same cannot be said more broadly about public confidence in our justice system, as a result of the policies of the Liberal government, policies and actions for which the government gets a failing grade.

For the Liberals, it is always about the criminals and never about the victims. This, after all, is a government that allowed the position of victims ombudsman to be left vacant for nine months. Finally, in September, the Liberals got around to filling that vacancy. It was not the first time they left that position vacant, the federal advocate for victims, the ombudsman. They left the position vacant for nearly a year in 2017 and 2018. By contrast, when it came to the prisoners ombudsman, when that position became vacant, the Liberals saw fit to fill it the very next day.

That is quite a contrast. When it comes to an ombudsman for prisoners, the vacancy was filled the next day. When it comes to the ombudsman for the rights of victims, the government has presided over leaving that critical position vacant for nearly two years out of the seven years it has been in office.

This is a government that just passed Bill C-5, the do-no-time, soft-on-crime bill, as it has come to be known, which eliminates mandatory jail time for serious firearms offences and for serious drug offences, including trafficking and production of schedule 1 drugs such as cocaine, fentanyl and crystal meth. This is at a time when we have an opioids crisis. When 21 Canadians a day are dying as a result of that, the government's priority is to let those who put that poison on our streets serve their sentence at home, instead of behind bars where they belong.

That is a government that has failed to engage in that dialogue, which is so critical between Parliament and the courts. The minister failed to respond to the Supreme Court's decision to strike down the very reasonable and just law passed by the previous Harper government to give judges the discretion to apply consecutive parole ineligibility periods for mass murderers, including the mass murderer responsible for the murder of my constituent Brian Ilesic. His parents, Mike and Dianne, are very deeply troubled by the inaction of the minister, and I am glad that today he at least acknowledged he was open to reviewing that decision. That is the first time he has said that.

In closing, I will just say that the bill is a supportable bill, but it is cold comfort for victims and their families who, time and again, have been abandoned by the government.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Madam Speaker, one cannot help but recognize, in many of the spins the Conservatives like to put, as though they are tough on crime, is that they seem to want to marginalize the true value of our judicial system, in particular, our judges. They do that by saying they do not have confidence in judges, and therefore, they need to not only support the minimum sentences of today, along with the many problems that are a part of that, but also would like to see additional minimum sentences.

Does the member not believe that judges are in a better position to be able to give a disposition, rather than instituting or putting on them minimum sentences in every situation?

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Madam Speaker, the courts have not struck down minimum sentences across the board. Mandatory jail times have always been a part of our Criminal Code, or have been for many decades, and continue to be. In fact, none of the provisions, I believe, in Bill C-5 were struck down by the courts, certainly not by the Supreme Court.

It was a choice made by the government to remove those mandatory jail times because, for the government, it is always about putting the rights of criminals ahead of those of victims. The Liberals provided little rationale on why they picked those specific provisions, which involve serious firearms offences and serious drug offences.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for his speech.

I had the opportunity to speak at second reading of this bill, and I listened to the speeches given by my other colleagues.

One point that kept coming up from the Conservative side was about protecting victims. It was pointed out that, in the review process, victims' views were perhaps not sufficiently taken into account in cases where a sanction was warranted, but not necessarily removal.

However, an amendment adopted in committee would allow for victims to at least be notified of the reasons why their complaints were not successful.

Does my colleague think this is a step in the right direction? Could Bill C-9 not have done a little more to protect victims?