Gordon O'Connor

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Chair, in the past up until about now, what the member would find if he checked the tasking in the armed forces is that about 40% of the armed forces do all the contingency operational tasks and about 60% of the armed forces do not.

We will find that many members in the armed forces have rows and rows of ribbons from going from one mission to another mission whereas other members have very few. The chief of the defence staff and the military are trying to make sure that the tasking is levelled across the armed forces so that if someone is qualified to do a task in Afghanistan or if we take on another mission somewhere else and that person happens to be in the navy or the air force and is qualified to do a job, we will employ that person in Afghanistan if needed.

The other issue the member brought up--

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

I guess you are going to get it once and for all.

Fitness, let us talk about fitness. The hon. member mentioned that somehow we are lowering fitness. We have no intention whatsoever of lowering the fitness standard.

We are potentially going to take people in who cannot immediately pass the fitness test. We are going to train them for six or eight weeks. They are going to do physical training through that period and if they pass the fitness test, they are in the armed forces. No one who cannot pass the fitness test is going to be accepted in trench training in the armed forces.

That is just an error of understanding, or whatever term one wants to use. We are not lowering the fitness standard.

With respect to re-roling, no one who is a sailor who has a sailor's trade or an air trade will be employed as infantry. What we are going to do possibly with infantry is we may ask some of the armour, or the field engineers, or the artillery who are in the combat arms to act in an infantry role if necessary. This, by the way, is historically quite traditional. Armoured regiments from time to time abandoned their vehicles and went into the line as infantry.

If we find that we need a few a more infantry to get through to 2009 without repeating the tasking of the infantry battalions, we will attempt to do that.

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Chair, before we made the extension to February 2009, we sought the advice of the military, the diplomats and the aid people to make certain that we could meet that commitment and we were advised we could.

As to the word “scrambling”, I think the member took a clip from the weekend where I used the word. I was referring to the issue that I have asked the military to try to ensure in principle that no one who was in direct combat returns to Afghanistan before February 2009. I have set a higher standard than is required, but what I am trying to do is reduce the risk on the individuals who go outside the wire and who were in combat. The military advised me that they are quite confident they will be able to achieve that. We will be able to achieve that by our existing people in the military and by our recruiting.

The point about re-roling people was also brought up. Let us not misunderstand that term. We have no intention of taking existing sailors or existing airmen and making them infantrymen. What we were talking about is making sure that the burden across the armed forces is equal. A truck driver in the navy could end up as a truck driver in Afghanistan. That is the kind of ideas we are talking about.

The advice I have is that we are fully confident that we can meet that commitment of mine.

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

I will answer two issues that you brought up. The first one is tanks. It is quite appropriate for us to have tanks there. We are putting them there to protect our infantry, to reduce the risks against our infantry. We are trying to reduce casualties.

With respect to aid, CIDA has aid. You are going to have to ask the CIDA minister about her aid program. We have a program as you mentioned. We are spending some millions of dollars. In fact we have doubled that effort in the Kandahar area. I have asked the CDS to ask the commanders on the ground if they can develop projects that the military can run that are efficient and actually get results in the Kandahar area. We are looking at that now from a military point of view.

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Chair, I think that the military tactics used in the south are appropriate to the situation. Sometimes there are only a few insurgents in the area and they are dealt with in a certain manner. When there are large numbers they have to be dealt with in a conventional manner. For instance, in the Panjwai area when they concentrated into numbers of about 500, we had to deal with them in a conventional manner. They stayed and fought in trenches and so we had to deal with it that way.

With respect to tanks, we have moved tanks into our area to protect our infantry, to make sure that when the Taliban go into areas and fight from the equivalent of pill boxes, that we do not have to send our infantry into get them, that we can use tank fire to take them out.

I think that the tactics of our allies are appropriate to the case in the south.

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Chair, I do not agree with the general's assessment of time. There are probably reasons behind his selection of six months. However, it is a critical time in the south, in Kandahar province and we have to suppress the insurgency. That is what we are doing. I believe that we are going to succeed. We have already broken the back of the insurgency in the Kandahar area in a sense that they are not prone to attacking us directly. They will have to revert to suicide bombings and IEDs.

Yes, it is a critical time, but I do not set a six month deadline to it.

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Chair, as the hon. member knows, there are 34 provinces in Afghanistan. There are 26 to 28 provinces that are relatively stable and development is going on with relatively little security effort. In about six provinces, including Kandahar province, the insurgency is quite virulent at the moment and we have had to put in extra efforts, the British, ourselves, the Americans, the Danes and the Dutch, to suppress the insurgency.

Given that, we are still succeeding in Afghanistan. We are still succeeding in Kandahar province. We are proceeding with development. There is U.S. aid development, UN development, Afghan government development, our foreign affairs development. We have development projects and CIDA has development projects and they are proceeding.

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Chair, I do not think that the goals or the tasks given the government in Afghanistan are any different under our government. It is our intention to be part of the NATO alliance and as part of that alliance to help restore proper governance in Afghanistan, to help with the development of the people so they can live a decent life, and to provide security so that insurgents do not interfere with the average lives of the citizens. It is a combination of security, development and governance.

[National Defence, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, we are committed in Afghanistan to the end of February 2009. With respect to 10 years for the army, that is only the opinion of an individual.

If the hon. member is around in 10 years he will find out that the colonel's opinion was wrong.

[National Defence, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, that it may be the British officer's opinion, it is not necessarily ours. We are dealing with the police and the army within the Kandahar region. We are providing them with great assistance to try to make them more efficient.