Gordon O'Connor

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Chair, I cannot answer this question at this time. Again, I will get the answer for the hon. member as soon as possible.

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Chair, that is like a telephone book of questions the hon. member has asked. Some of the details I do not have at hand, but I promise to get those details to him.

Our training is very important. Moose Jaw is a very important training establishment for us. It trains our pilots. From our point of view, it will go on. It has a great future. The primary purpose of Moose Jaw is to train Canadian pilots. If we can get other people to come and fly there, that helps to reduce the costs, but Moose Jaw is vital to training Canadian pilots.

With respect to the Snowbirds, they also have a great future. We are now considering a number of options. We are looking at a number of options in the department about the future of the Snowbirds.

With respect to who is there, their termination dates and some of these other questions, I will get back to the member.

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

That may be the hon. member's opinion. However, I am saying that we have not been asked.

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Chair, I think the hon. member asked two questions.

From a DND point of view and from our point of view, our projects are moving ahead. If the member wants to know about the projects from CIDA or foreign affairs or U.S. aid or the Karzai government, he can go to those sources and find the answers.

With respect to Darfur, no organization has ever asked us to contribute anything to Darfur. The member knows from reading the newspapers and staying in touch that the UN is trying to negotiate to take control of Darfur, and it has no intention of asking Canada to send troops. If it asks for any more troops, it will ask countries like Pakistan and African countries to do the job. The UN is quite content to have the African Union look after its own country.

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Chair, the Liberal government gave the military 45 minutes' warning to commit 2,000 troops to Afghanistan. The army commander did not know about it. People down the whole chain of command did not know about it. The Liberal government, centrally the prime minister and the minister of defence of the day, made the arbitrary decision without even considering the problem. At that time the military said it could only handle 500 soldiers and the Liberal government committed 2,000 soldiers. The member should not give me any spiel about warning.

With regard to warning, it was the Liberal government that committed us to the commitment in Kandahar. Most members of the Liberal government, including the hon. member, did not support our troops when the vote came.

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Chair, there may be reports from the CIA but we have 15 officers inside the Karzai government in Kabul, so we pretty well know what is going on in the government.

With respect to Afghanistan, most of the source of the Taliban comes from the Pashtun tribe. The Pashtun tribe in Afghanistan is in the south and east and numbers about 12.5 million. There are 22 million Pashtun across the border in Pakistan. It is a porous border. There is no documentation because the people in the Pashtun tribes have had rights for centuries to move back and forth to see their family members. It is quite a challenge to control who is coming and going between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

We have discussed with the Pakistan government the challenges that we face and the challenges that it faces because it also has to deal with the insurgency. What we have proposed in a modest start to gain confidence is that we have a liaison officer located with the Pakistan 12th corps which is opposite us in the Pakistan area south of Kandahar, and that Pakistan put a liaison officer with us. This would start to build up some kind of liaison with us and pass information to help our situation.

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Chair, the member had a number of questions.

With respect to the wounded, we have not hidden anything. To give numbers as of today, since the beginning of the venture, which, by the way, was started by the Liberal government, there have been 176 wounded soldiers. Of those, 126 have returned to units. We have 50 soldiers remaining who are in various states of medical care and re-evaluation. That is the state of the wounded. I will note not to mix up wounded with injured. If one happens to fall down a ladder, one could be injured. These are wounded soldiers.

With respect to the CIA, I find it incredible that the members opposite are quoting the CIA when every day in the House they talk of George Bush and criticize the Americans. I guess it is convenient to take the American information and advice when they want to, but when they do not want it, they toss it away.

The evaluation we have is not the CIA evaluation. The evaluation is that we are making a success in Afghanistan. If one looks at the entire country of Afghanistan, the 34 provinces, there are about 26 provinces that are relatively benign. There are problems in about six provinces. These six provinces include Kandahar in the south, along with Helmand province and some of the other provinces. This is where the challenge is right now. We are meeting that challenge and development is going ahead in Kandahar province.

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Chair, there is no difference between my interpretation and that of General Hillier. We are of the same mind on these issues.

The extension of the mission was not rushed. It was considered. It was evaluated by all the departments. Advice was given on our capacity to achieve these goals from a military, a development and a diplomatic point of view.

What I have said is that recently I asked the Chief of Defence Staff to try to ensure that people who are in the direct confrontation or combat roles would not go back to Afghanistan a second time. This is a principle that I am trying to achieve. In doing that, the chief has taken that on and is looking at all the ways to achieve that goal.

That was not part of the original goal, but what I am trying to do is reduce the risk on individuals. If people are put in harm's way, I am trying to make sure that they are not put in harm's way within a short period of time.

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Chair, efforts to sustain and improve the standard of health care provided to CF members at home and abroad are managed under the umbrella project called Rx 2000. It involves mental health care. It also includes a joint mental health care project. It involves both the RCMP and the veterans, along with Canadian Forces.

[Business of Supply, November 7th, 2006]

Mr. Chair, in the fiscal year 2005-06, we have achieved 106% of our strategic intake plan, effectively increasing the strength of the Canadian Forces by more than 1,000. Over the course of this fiscal year, a larger force expansion was announced. This new plan will see the Canadian Forces move to a total paid strength of approximately 75,000 regulars.

Advertising plays a huge role in the attraction process. After all, if people do not know we are hiring, they are less likely to apply. The Canadian Forces advertising budget was recently increased from $8 million to $15.6 million, which is similar to a comparable allied nation such as Australia.

With respect to retention, we continue to develop and build a retention strategy with a view to enhancing the Canadian Forces culture for retention. From quality of life initiatives to fair compensation and education and training opportunities and to family and member support initiatives, we know that all of these types of initiatives contribute to establishing a two way commitment that is essential for creating and sustaining a culture of retention.

To establish conditions for success, the military human resources group has undergone an internal reorganization consistent with the chief of defence staff's principle in which we have established a command-centric, operationally focused entity known as the military personnel command, led by the chief of military personnel.

Internally, we have reorganized the focus on specific lines of operations and to separate policy from service delivery. This new structure is more in keeping with the military personnel generation function and provides the command-centric view so necessary for providing clear direction.