Industry committee  Madam Chair, members of the committee, good afternoon. As indicated, my name is Tim Hahlweg. I'm the assistant director of requirements at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Among other things, my directorate is responsible for the analysis of intelligence that CSIS co

Industry committee  Thank you. As discussed in our recent public report, state-sponsored economic espionage activities in Canada continue to increase in breadth, depth and potential economic impact. In order to fulfill their national, economic, intelligence and military interests, some foreign stat

Industry committee  Absolutely.

Industry committee  Foreign espionage has significant economic ramifications for Canada, including job loss, intellectual property, corporate and tax revenues, and competitive advantages. With our economic prosperity and our open academic research communities, Canada offers attractive prospects to

Industry committee  Absolutely. Foreign states have engaged in espionage and foreign interference targeting Canada for years. This is not—

Industry committee  Understood. Foreign states have engaged in espionage and foreign interference, targeting Canada for years. This is not new activity. CSIS Director Vigneault has spoken publicly about the impact of these threats to Canada's economy and national interest, including—

Industry committee  Understood.

Industry committee  Thank you, Madam Chair and members of the committee. Good afternoon. I'm currently the assistant director of requirements at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Among other things, my directorate is responsible for the analysis of intelligence that CSIS collects on thre

Industry committee  As stated in the public report, and as indicated by our director in public, there are many countries of concern in this space. I specifically noted Russia and China. The NSICOP review of 2019 also reflects that those two countries are countries of concern, but there are others. F

Industry committee  Unfortunately, given the unclassified nature of this committee and this conversation today, I can't get into any specific SOE acquisitions and talk about any specific cases.

Industry committee  I would defer to my colleagues from either Public Safety or ISED to comment on that. I believe they would have those numbers from specific countries.

Industry committee  It's a very good question. I can't speak to specific operational matters and get into any specific details, but I can tell you that acquisitions by shell companies, state-owned enterprises, or ones directly linked to intelligence services or foreign governments are the ones that

Industry committee  CSIS's involvement is triggered if something comes to light that is a national security concern. As I mentioned at the outset in my opening comments, from a national security perspective, the lens keeps changing, and right now we're quite concerned with the state-owned enterprise

Industry committee  Thank you very much for the question. I can tell you that regardless of where it comes from, if there's any security threat or any suspected impact on our national security, then we will review it in that lens and bring all of our investigative efforts to bear on that. It really

Industry committee  As I mentioned, I can't get into specific operational reasons. In this secure space, I'm very glad that we have your NSICOP colleagues that we engage with to talk about these specific threat actors. I did mention China and Russia specifically as they have been noted in the public