Canada-China Relations committee  Thank you, Minister. I would like to emphasize that the work that has been done at the laboratory over the past 16 months has been born out of a long-standing history of responding to important events, be it domestically or internationally, through the outbreak support we have g

Canada-China Relations committee  We have dedicated, as part of the Government of Canada's broader variants of concern strategy, $53 million, including a great deal of resources—

Canada-China Relations committee  Yes, Mr. Chair, as part of the letter that was received from the Wuhan Institute of Virology articulating the reason for the request, it stipulated that the intended use was to develop medical countermeasures and that there would be no further transfer of pathogens. This would be

Canada-China Relations committee  The National Microbiology Lab has evolved over time from previous organizations, including most recently in 2014, I believe, when a number of other laboratories merged in.

Canada-China Relations committee  That is a broad question.

Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Chair, that question involves a fairly broad question. We collaborate through a number of networks on a number of key initiatives, which includes the WHO R&D Blueprint.

Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Chair, on the question of whether the National Microbiology Laboratory has institutional-level collaborations with institutes that are potentially associated with the People's Liberation Army, we do not have, and have not had, institutional-level collaborations.

Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Chair, that question is difficult to answer, because as I've stated before, there are a number of large-scale collaborations as it pertains to the COVID-19 response.

Canada-China Relations committee  The Government of Canada has been clear that it supports a thorough investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. There are four potential hypotheses that have been advanced, and—

Canada-China Relations committee  To be clear, the transfer of materials was for Ebola and Henipah viruses. They were not for coronaviruses.

Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Chair, I am not in a position to be able to discuss non-employees.

Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Chair, I'm not able to discuss details of non-employees.

Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Chair, I would like to be clear that we have a number of security processes, which include non-staff. However—

Canada-China Relations committee  Mr. Chair, non-employees and people who have been here as visitors or non-public servants...that would be considered personal information, and therefore, I think—

Canada-China Relations committee  With respect to the question in play, the review would have identified any potential work to be done. It would have sought, as per our HPTA and TDG, as well as virus security standards, the appropriate documentation to support the potential transfer of the viruses.