Bill C-15 (Historical)

Strengthening Military Justice in the Defence of Canada Act

An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts

This enactment amends provisions of the National Defence Act governing the military justice system. The amendments, among other things,
(a) provide for security of tenure for military judges until their retirement;
(b) permit the appointment of part-time military judges;
(c) specify the purposes, objectives and principles of the sentencing process;
(d) provide for additional sentencing options, including absolute discharges, intermittent sentences and restitution;
(e) modify the composition of a court martial panel according to the rank of the accused person; and
(f) modify the limitation period applicable to summary trials and allow an accused person to waive the limitation periods.
The enactment also sets out the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal’s duties and functions and clarifies his or her responsibilities. It also changes the name of the Canadian Forces Grievance Board to the Military Grievances External Review Committee.
Finally, it makes amendments to the delegation of the Chief of the Defence Staff’s powers as the final authority in the grievance process and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.

Strengthening Military Justice in the Defence of Canada Act

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Mr. Speaker, historically in Roman and Greek times the Spartans had terrible disciplinary measures, which I will not go into, but they were pretty grotesque. There has always been severity in the kinds of punishment meted out in our military. In many cases that was used to drive people forward in battle, to ensure that they did their duty as seen fit. However, the reality is that we are not talking about people in battle. We are talking about people who, in their everyday duties as military personnel, come into conflict with the military's rules and regulations and find themselves before a tribunal without rights that are really essential to ensuring a balance.

Later today I will be making another speech on Bill C-377 and will talk about questioning authority. That is the one thing that the military does not wish a service member to do; the military sees that as almost an offence in itself.

We have to find a way to balance a genuine, and I stress the word “genuine”, democratic and open process that is accountable within the military to those people who administer the so-called justice. The reality is that it is important that we ensure balance in this.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member for his service in the 1960s. I too served in the military, but regarding the comments made by the member from Laval, I was also a commanding officer. I served for over 33 years and I understand the military justice system. I understand that soldiers can occasionally get into trouble and have to deal with that.

Nonetheless, the summary trial system does give the service member the opportunity to choose court martial or summary trial, and that person does have recourse to assisting officers and other elements that are put in place for them. Having been part of this for well over three decades, I saw this unfold. Here I would point out that Justice Lamer in fact made his recommendations with the military and military justice in mind, because soldiers do deserve a transparent system under the charter. On this I think we all agree.

Why does the hon. member feel this legislation should not go to committee? I think it should so that witnesses could be brought forward. We could talk about this there and look at implementing the remainder of the 88 recommendations, of which 29 are now in place.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I also want to thank the member for the service he has given. I was unaware of it. We should occasionally pause and give credit to where it is due. I do not speak much about my personal service because I was only in the service in 1963-64 in a sapper apprentice program. I applied for release and went back to high school. I have never felt ingrained in it in the same fashion as someone who made a career in it.

When we discussed the matter with our critic, he recommended that we not support this legislation. However, the reality in this place is that the government has a majority and the chances are that the bill will go to committee.

I stressed earlier in my remarks that we are certainly willing to revisit the recommendations the NDP made in the past and to try to work with the government on this particular issue, because we think our amendments are of value. I do not want to appear in any way to be maligning our present system because I stressed how it has improved over the years. That was the point I was trying to make, that this is one more step along the long road of trying to ensure a balance. We have to keep improving our systems generally, including in the House and, in this case, our system of military justice to ensure that it is fair, balanced and just.

[Jonathan Genest-Jourdain, NDP, Manicouagan, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it was after listening to my colleagues' speeches on the bill to amend the National Defence Act that I thought it would be appropriate to speak as well to ensure that we explore the legal concepts associated with the matter before us.

I would invite my colleagues to go beyond the briefing notes from the House, to distance themselves from the talking points, but not from the party's position. I therefore invite them to conduct their own research and engage in an intellectual and mental exercise. I think our audience, those who watch us regularly, would like that. Sometimes the speeches we hear in this House can be redundant because people simply repeat the information they have been given, it is a rehash.

When I heard the speeches by my colleagues across the way, but particularly those of my own colleagues, some ideas seemed familiar. First of all, you must understand that I am a criminal lawyer. When I began to study law, we were told that the administration of justice in the military was different than what the common law courts applied across the country. That is why we spent very little time on the subject, or in fact none at all. I even wonder whether specialized courses were offered at the university, but I doubt it. However, we learned that people in the Canadian Forces were trained in it, that the JAGs, the ultimate decision-makers, were trained, that courses were given and that it was training that was observed first and foremost within the military.

However, there are recurring concepts in my colleagues' speeches, including the right to a lawyer, the independence and impartiality of the decision-maker and other concepts that refer to the charter. Those concepts rang a bell with me and I decided to investigate a little further. I spent several hours researching the topic last night and this morning. It was a last-minute minute decision, and we needed speakers on the topic. So I launched into my research and came up with a considerable amount of information, particularly on statutory instruments, the various acts and regulations that apply to the situation and to the bill under consideration here, but also on case law and doctrine.

The research I did was nevertheless basic, since it is impossible to grasp the ins and outs of an issue of this scope in a few hours. However, further on in my speech, you will see that several levels of legislative and regulatory authority apply to the situation, and I will go over them. I will stick very close to the statutory instruments at our disposal. That will be a change from what we have heard in this House to date. I think this is relevant and that the general public deserves to be informed about the scope of this matter.

The ins and outs of the military justice system are initially a forbidding prospect when viewed from the standpoint of legal practice in the field. By that I mean they may seem incomprehensible at first glance, reminding one that it is risky to adopt the vision and reflexes of a criminal lawyer in examining a bill that concerns, for example, summary trials in a military justice context.

When I began this study, I suspected that the principles that had been instilled in me during my years of legal training might possibly be applicable, but with certain qualifications. I was right, since some concepts that I had learned were tested when I actually looked at the authorities and at what applied in the military field. I noticed some subtleties and adaptations. So I like to think of the training given to JAGs and to people who work in the administration of military justice as additional training and that those subtleties and those transposed principles will genuinely help shed light on the specific characteristics of military life.

When I researched the statutes, I came to several major levels, which I will describe in a moment. The subtleties expressed there very much call for revisiting and exploring the material.

That is why I say it may be uncomfortable and risky at times simply to rely on notes prepared in the lobby in addressing these matters, which genuinely need to be closely examined. They are particular and specific enough that they require one to consider many elements that, incidentally, exceed the scope of a 10-minute speech.

Assuming that the officers presiding over summary trials render judicial decisions in the same way as common law courts, certain rules of procedural fairness and the principles of fundamental justice apply. Based on that assumption, I was subsequently able to conduct the statutory research necessary to examine the bill in question.

In their speeches, my colleagues invoked such principles as audi alteram partem—hear the other side. A person who is accused has the right to make his own claims. This is true in criminal law as well, whether we are talking about summary conviction or indictment. It should be understood that in the criminal courts, under common law, cases tried summarily lead to lesser sentences than cases involving indictable offences. Indictable offences can involve more serious crimes or repeat offences and are much more serious. They are treated more seriously by the courts. Those are concepts I verified to see if the same kind of reasoning applied in the military sphere.

I will refer to the laws on the books and to various tools that apply to a given situation. I will begin with the Constitution Act. It gives the federal Parliament the exclusive right to legislate in matters of military justice. That is the basis. I said there were several levels, and that is the first. It opens the door for all the other legislative tools.

Second, the National Defence Act sets out the organization of the Department of National Defence and the components and elements of the military justice system. It also addresses the concept of a criminal record. I will not discuss that aspect, because I think it deserves a study on its own, and I certainly would not be able, in 10 minutes, to describe all the ins and outs of transferring the sanctions applied in the military to criminal law. I have not grasped all the nuances that apply. That is why I will leave it for now.

Now, here is the third level, the Code of Service Discipline. This code is part of the National Defence Act and sets out the foundation of the Canadian military justice system, including disciplinary jurisdiction, service offences, punishments, powers of arrest, organization and procedures of service tribunals, appeals, and post-trial review.

That brings us to the fourth level. The procedure for summary trials and receipt of proof is set out in sections 108.20 and 108.21 of the Queen's Regulations and Orders, the QR&Os, which were made pursuant to the National Defence Act.

I said it was fairly specific and tricky, and this proves it.

I will now read the first part of section 15 of the Queen's Regulations and Orders, which applies to Canadian Forces members who insist on the right to have a lawyer:

For example, the Regulations do not expressly provide the right to counsel to the accused; however, the presiding officer has discretion to allow legal counsel to participate and, if so, to determine the level of participation to be allowed. When deciding whether to permit an accused to be represented by legal counsel at the summary trial, QR&O indicate that the presiding officer should, at the least, consider the nature and complexity of the offence, the interests of justice, the interests of the accused, and the exigencies of the service.

In closing, all of these elements accurately convey the complexity of the summary trial system within the context of the administration of military justice. In my opinion, this bill requires a review that would reveal a number of unknown factors and flaws to justify opposition at second reading.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I applaud the member for doing his homework. I know he is a lawyer and clearly an intelligent young fellow who has done the comparison and looked at the Queen's Regulations and Orders, which is quite a large document.

We have had three chief justices, Justices Dickson, Lamer and LeSage, all doing this work and concluding very similar things, which is the military justice system needs something transparent on which soldiers can rely. The independent reports of former chief justices Dickson in 1997, Lamer in 2003 and LeSage in 2012 said that the summary trial system was fair.

Could the member show me some examples in his research where he could point to the summary trial being constitutionally deficient in any way or fundamentally unfair? Did you see that in any of your research?

[The Acting Speaker, Conservative, Barry Devolin]

Before I go to the hon. member, I would remind all hon. members to address their remarks and questions directly to the Chair and not to their colleagues.

The hon. member for Manicouagan.

[Jonathan Genest-Jourdain, NDP, Manicouagan, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for the question.

I would simply remind him of my final point regarding the right to legal counsel and the tremendous amount of flexibility that is granted to the decision maker, the arbitrator in summary trials. I have my doubts about this; some unanswered questions remain.

There is a tremendous amount of flexibility, and that alone is enough to justify revisiting and reviewing the procedures that apply to the summary process in the military justice system.

[Jean-François Larose, NDP, Repentigny, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for his speech. He is himself a lawyer, and we are very impressed by the depth of his knowledge.

I wonder if he has any comments to make about the amendments proposed in March 2011 in the context of Bill C-41, which was similar to this one. We want to increase the number of minor offences from five to 27. As a former member of the military myself, I am curious to know why it was decided that only five minor offences are important, and not 27, considering the impact the army can have on us.

[Jonathan Genest-Jourdain, NDP, Manicouagan, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for the question.

I did not go over every offence that was suggested. At the time, I simply looked at the general documents. However, there are things like drunkenness that could lead to charges and a summary trial in the military justice system.

What I still have serious doubts about is the fact that these offences could ultimately lead to a criminal record. I did not address this issue and I would rather not go into it, because there are so many ins and outs and I have not been able to identify them all.

In any case, I have never seen that in my practice. It would be rather unfortunate and rather strange to see these offences and charges on someone's record, when doing a search with their name and date of birth, for instance. Personally, I have never seen that, and it would be somewhat questionable, especially considering how expensive it is to apply for a pardon, not to mention how long it takes, with the RCMP taking fingerprints and so on. I have taken on a few such cases, so I know what a difficult process it is.

How can people get rid of this liability, once they have been convicted?

I submit this respectfully.

[Alain Giguère, NDP, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Mr. Speaker, we are going to talk about military justice, which is a very special area within the justice system.

Military justice differs from traditional justice in that the goal of the former is to ensure respect for the military hierarchy, while the principle underlying the latter is to ensure harmonious relationships between equals.

In military justice, a general is not equal to a private, and vice versa. This is a major problem because capital punishment still exists in military justice. Quite simply, in military law, the use of lethal force can be authorized against an unarmed individual. The individual can even be taken by surprise. A classic example of this is a pilot who attacks a supply convoy identified as belonging to the enemy. The death penalty exists in military law; it is a rule of engagement. Soldiers are authorized to use force against a group of people identified as enemies. That is serious.

Because the use of force and violence is legal, it must be strictly controlled and disciplined. We can all agree on that. The problem is that these elements of control and discipline must not strip soldiers of their basic rights. I have some examples of trivial offences.

This is an example of insubordination. A soldier returns to the base on Monday. He did not sleep all night because his children were sick, he is a little irritable and he swears at a superior. Under current military law, with a summary trial he could be given a punishment that results in a criminal record. The soldier, who has sworn at a superior, will have a criminal record.

Under civilian law, and under labour law, when a person is punished for the first time, they are given a verbal warning. A note is made in their file and after one year it is removed. That is the difference: one individual is subject to military justice; the other is subject to the standard rules of labour law.

If the operator of a tank has an accident and injures someone, he may face a summary trial and be given a harsh punishment, which can result in a criminal record.

In my province, Quebec, unless the person is found to be criminally negligent, there will be no punishment. Under insurance law, the injured person will be compensated by insurance, and it stops there. There are no penalties, not even a report, if the person who caused the accident did not do so intentionally. There is no punishment.

It is different in military law. Military personnel may find themselves with a criminal record. In Quebec, an explosives expert who sets off a dynamite charge but has miscalculated its size will face charges under administrative law. He will be prosecuted for a professional error. He may be sentenced to take courses or private tutoring. In the military, a criminal record may be the result, and that is serious. A person is thus branded because of the simple fact he or she was in the military and committed an error that any civilian might have committed, with a completely different punishment, if any.

That is where this becomes unacceptable. It is important and essential to maintain respect for hierarchy and discipline in the Canadian Forces. Still, these people, who are giving their best efforts for their country, should not be branded for life. It is not easy to leave military life and find work with a criminal record, especially for offences that would not even lead to a court appearance in civilian life.

The Supreme Court considered the issue and found some things that needed correction. Bill C-15 does offer some corrections. Are they enough? Unfortunately not. Several elements are missing. Amendments have been made, but only 28 of the 88 recommendations in Justice Lamer's report have been retained. That is not many. All 88 recommendations were worthwhile. They were essential to give all our military personnel the same protection the rest of us have in our everyday lives.

One of these essential amendments concerned the fact that 60% of the members of the grievance board should be civilians, so that the person handling the grievance is not directly involved and has some independence from the officer corps. We are not rejecting the officer corps, whose expertise and knowledge are substantial, but civilians should be in the majority on the grievance board. That is not unreasonable. In addition, more authority should be granted to the Chief of Defence Staff in the grievance process. If he is looking into a grievance, he must have some authority to be able to collect pertinent information.

At present, a summary trial leads to a criminal record. That is a fundamental issue on which we absolutely do not agree. In order to warrant a criminal record, a person would have to be court-martialled, in a court where he would have legal assistance and be able to present a defence. If the offence is serious enough to warrant a criminal record, a summary trial is not appropriate; the matter should go straight to the Supreme Court. Out of more than 1,800 cases that were prosecuted, only 67 went to a court martial.

If the offence is deemed to be serious enough to appear on a criminal record, offenders should be tried through a court martial, where they will have the opportunity to present a defence and justify their actions before an independent judge rather than before their immediate supervisor.

We have heard some important quotations about this, including one from retired Colonel Michel Drapeau, who was the secretary to the Canadian Forces Chief of the Defence Staff for a number of years. He was responsible for writing the rules of engagement, which is a big responsibility. He said:

...until you, the legislators, address this issue, it is almost impossible for the court to address any challenge, since no appeal of a summary trial verdict or sentence is permitted. As well, it is almost impossible for any other form of legal challenge to take place, since there are no trial transcripts and no right to counsel at summary trial.

That is exactly what must be corrected, and we must do so.

The House resumed from December 7 consideration of the motion that Bill C-15, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, be read the second time and referred to a committee, and of the motion that the question be now put.

[Craig Scott, NDP, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am honoured to rise after many of my colleagues have spoken in the last few months to Bill C-15 on military justice.

In 2003, the Right Hon. Antonio Lamer, who was the former Chief Justice of our Supreme Court, presented his report containing an independent review of the National Defence Act. That report contained 88 recommendations pertaining to military justice, the Military Police Complaints Commission, grievance procedures, the Provost Marshal and so on.

The bill is the legislative response to these recommendations. Thus far, however, only 28 recommendations have been implemented in legislation, regulation or by a change in practice.

In 2010, Bill C-41 was introduced to respond to the Lamer report, and in essence this bill is similar to Bill C-41 that came out of committee in the previous Parliament. The amendments carried over include court martial composition and military judge security of tenure.

However, other important amendments—and it is really important that we all be aware of this—that passed committee stage at the end of the last parliamentary session did not end up in the bill. These include the following three NDP amendments that I will mention.

First, the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff in the grievance process: This was amended clause 6 in Bill C-41, responding directly to Chief Justice Lamer's recommendation. That is not here.

Second, changes to the composition of the grievance committee to include a 60% civilian membership: This was an amended clause in Bill C-41. Again, this is not in Bill C-15.

Third and finally, a provision ensuring that a person who is convicted of an offence during a summary trial is not unfairly subjected to a criminal record: This is amended clause 75 in Bill C-41. This last amendment from Bill C-41 that did not reappear in the bill will be the main focus of my own remarks.

The NDP will be opposing the bill at second reading. However, we do hope that some of these shortcomings that I will be emphasizing, and have been emphasized by some 50 or 60 of my colleagues in the House, will be looked at seriously. The practice of committees of the House will vary somewhat in this case, I hope, and some amendments will come back at third reading.

I want to clarify that the amendments to Bill C-15 do not adequately address the injustice of summary trials. Summary trials are by far the most used military tribunal within the military justice system. The purpose of a summary trial is to deal with minor military-related offences. The objective is to quickly deal with alleged offences within the unit, so members can be returned to active service as quickly as possible, which helps promote and maintain discipline within the unit.

In his brief, Colonel Michel Drapeau stated that the summary trial was the most frequently used disciplinary method to deal with offences committed by Canada's military personnel. In 2008-09, 1,865 cases in total—96%—were resolved through summary trial, while only 67 cases—4%—were heard through court martial.

The amendments in Bill C-15 do not adequately address the unfairness of summary trials. Currently a conviction of a service offence from a summary trial in the forces can result in a criminal record. Summary trials are held without the ability of the accused to consult counsel. There are no appeals, there are no transcripts of the trial and the judge is the accused person's commanding officer.

This reflects an undue harshness when certain members of the forces who are convicted of various minor service offences end up with a criminal record, leave the service at some point and enter into society, with a criminal record and everything we know that can imply for their prospects, whether it is looking for jobs or advancing in the educational sphere. The fact that people have criminal records can sometimes be looked at when they want to upgrade their education.

Some of the minor service offences include insubordination, quarrels, disturbances, absences without leave, drunkenness and disobeying a lawful command. These, by definition, could be extremely important matters to military discipline, as we can imagine, every one that I have just listed. Discipline and efficient functioning of a military unit has to be at the very core of how the military functions, and we can see how these could be of great instrumental concern to the military. However, they are not worthy of a criminal record, I suggest.

Bill C-15 makes exemptions for a select number of offences if they carry a minor punishment, which is defined in the act, or a fine less than $500. These would no longer result in a criminal record. This is to be welcomed, but my point is that the recommendations in Chief Justice Lamer's report and the NDP amendments in Bill C-41 have to be taken seriously. We have to go further.

What we propose, by increasing from 5 to 27 the number of offences that would be exempt from a criminal record after summary conviction, responds to a very serious need in the military to hear that society, outside the military, understands the incredibly tough job people expect of members of the military and the pressures they are under that can often lead to summary conviction trials. People also want to welcome them back into society without the burden that is the worst kind of send-off for their service to our country—namely, a criminal record.

A criminal record can make life after the military very difficult, to put it mildly. It can make getting a job, renting an apartment and travelling very difficult. Imagine having a criminal record and trying to travel to the United States these days. A lot of Canadians would be shocked to learn, frankly, that people who bravely serve our country can get a criminal record from a system that lacks the due process usually required in civilian criminal courts.

I have spoken to my colleague from Repentigny, who has had some experience in the military. He spoke in the House, not by way of a speech but by way of several interventions, and I want to put the interventions on record as part of my speech so they can be integrated into a broader theme.

First, the member for Repentigny stated:

My experience has shown me that soldiers are subjected to conditions that are extremely different from what is experienced in the civilian world.

People are encouraged to join the Canadian Forces in order to gain experience and come out with some incredible tools. I made mistakes, minor ones. It happens to everyone. For example, you go before a superior officer and get charged, fined, patted on the back and told not to do it again. That is part of life's lessons. We are talking about young people who enlist at the age of 18, 19 or 20 and who need guidance. I do not think that providing guidance for minor offences involves encouraging young people to join the Canadian Forces, exposing them to extreme conditions and handing them a criminal record on their way out. That does not work.

In another intervention, my colleague from Repentigny had the following to say:

For the last 10, 15 or 20 years, professionals, members of the military and experts have been requesting changes that should be made.

These amendments were brought forward and agreed to during the previous Parliament. Everyone agreed. Now the Conservatives are proposing half measures by saying that they are going to send the bill to committee for review, but they are not giving any guarantees.

I presume he means any guarantees that they actually will modify in light of common sense.

Finally, the member for Repentigny said something that I think is indeed disturbing, if what he says is true, and I believe it to be true. I spoke to him yesterday to confirm that Hansard is correct. He stated:

Mr. Speaker, being an ex-member myself, I have seen trials that colleagues and friends have gone through and the impact they can have to ruin careers and leave people looking at the military in a certain way but not necessarily understanding the system. I have seen summary trials put onto military personnel in such a way that they were used as a training tool. I think there is a serious problem with this.

That is the understatement of the century.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, what is in fact evident is the need for change. We have seen this over the last number of years with members of the forces and different stakeholders coming to the House and suggesting that we need to modernize the military justice system. It is somewhat disappointing that the government is not taking a larger step to move forward on the issue.

Having said that, the principle of the bill ultimately does merit our support of the bill going to committee, where hopefully it can be amended to make it a stronger bill. If we do not support its going to committee, does the member not think that would send the wrong message to members of the forces and others, that we do not support the principle of making needed changes they want implemented?

[Craig Scott, NDP, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I completely understand the dilemma any party has faced in deciding whether to support bill in principle or oppose it and hope that things can be pushed through at committee.

My experience so far in the House is that at the moment, the way committees are working, very little that opposition members propose in going to the heart of problems with bills ends up being addressed. We have to look at that in advance. We cannot simply say there is a general principle that we support and that there are also serious flaws that we hope to work out at committee. We will work at committee, but these serious flaws undermine the very purpose of the bill.

[Anne Minh-Thu Quach, NDP, Beauharnois—Salaberry, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his very informative speech.

It is rather outrageous to learn that the Conservatives are once again disregarding every recommendation made by the opposition parties and every one of their proposed amendments.

Could the hon. member say more about the fact that 96% of cases are handled with summary trials, which result in criminal records, and that the members are not entitled to a lawyer or an appeal? This creates an even greater injustice and makes it even more difficult for those members to make their case.