Afghanistan Committee on May 28th, 2008

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

First of all, colleagues, let me welcome you and those Canadians watching this meeting on television to the fifth meeting of the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan. Tonight we're honoured to have Dr. Graham Fuller with us.

Dr. Fuller is an independent writer, analyst, lecturer, and consultant on Muslim and world affairs. Dr. Fuller worked for 20 years as a CIA operations officer, 17 of them overseas, mostly in the Middle East, including time as a CIA station chief in Afghanistan from 1975 to 1978.

Once again, thank you very much for being with us, Dr. Fuller. I will now turn the microphone over to you for your opening statement.

[Professor Graham E. Fuller, Simon Fraser University]

Thank you very much, sir.

I noticed the unfailing courtesy of everyone insisting that I am Dr. Fuller. Actually, it's Mr. Fuller, but if you insist, I will accept in other senses.

It's an immense pleasure for me to be here to talk to this group on what is a matter very close to my heart. I know it is of immense importance to Canada at this point in the development of its foreign policy.

First of all, I would like to very strongly commend the courage, devotion, and self-sacrifice of Canadian men and women in Afghanistan who are working hard, spending treasure, and, of more importance, giving lives in Afghanistan for this cause to work.

There is no question in my mind that the goals in Afghanistan are extremely worthy: to weaken radicalism; to improve the position of women, human rights, education—again especially for women—and the rule of law; to root out corruption; and to establish democracy and justice. I think these are unexceptional goals that everyone could aspire to. The problem is, in my view, that these goals are not being implemented in Afghanistan in any significant way. In my view, the situation is actually worsening.

I defer to you and to others who perhaps have been there very recently in terms of the most recent statistics and figures you have. I know there are many figures quoted by many different sources in support of their particular position, and I don't want to be here in a game of my statistics trying to outweigh yours. I'm simply presenting what I consider to be my view of the overall situation.

I think the situation is worsening, in that the number of attacks in general is growing across the country each year. More foreign fighters are becoming involved. The IEDs, or improvised explosive devices, which were devices really quite unknown in Afghanistan some years ago, are now being widely used as a result of the experience that fighters have had in Iraq.

It's similar for suicide bombings. For all the years of fighting in Afghanistan against foreigners, suicide bombing was unknown until just a few years ago. In Afghanistan today it's commonplace.

Unfortunately, the area of conflict is spreading outside of the worst of the areas, namely the Pashtun-dominated south, and it is moving into areas that are not known for Pashtun control. Sadly, Kabul is not in control of the country itself. Karzai is—rather cruelly sometimes—referred to as the President of Kabul rather than of Afghanistan.

The issues relating to poppy growth are very serious. Afghanistan probably supplies the bulk of poppies that are consumed by the west in one form or another. When I was chief of station in Afghanistan in the seventies, I can remember being briefed by people who told me they had been fighting poppies starting thirty years before that point. I used to go out with my children and wife in the summertime, counting poppies just in the vicinity of Kabul, to see if there had been any change despite all the efforts of the American and other embassies in the area to try to diminish this problem. So I don't see that there is any major change in that. And worse today is the insistence of some policies to destroy the poppy fields. That is destroying the livelihood of Afghan farmers and turning them in the direction of the Taliban.

In short, I just do not believe that the goals that have been established by Washington, NATO, or the participants in those operations are being achieved, and they are not really going to be achieved in any medium timeframe. Perhaps over a generation one might possibly have some hope of fulfilling some of these goals.

When I speak in such negative terms, I have to point out that I'm not alone in this. Certainly most of my colleagues in the intelligence business, or indeed in the State Department but now no longer involved in this, broadly share these views, as have many external independent assessments of the situation.

Let me just offer a few quick thoughts about the nature of the problem. I know many of you know a lot of the facts, but I'd like to just put them in a framework.

The power of the Taliban overall seems to me to be growing, but what is vital to understand about the Taliban is that this is not essentially an ideological movement. Rather, it's a national or nationalist movement of the Pashtun population, which is the biggest single ethnic group in the country, perhaps making up half of the population. If you were a Pashtun, you'd see the Taliban as the major vehicle for the fulfillment of Pashtun power in Afghanistan. Pashtuns perceive that they have lost that since the fall of the Taliban government and going on to earlier periods. Even if most Pashtuns do not love the Taliban, or even if they do not fully sympathize with many of their extreme interpretations of Islam, they often offer them support in the name of restoration of Pashtun power in the country.

If any of you have read the fascinating history of the area, I don't need to remind you that invaders of the country over hundreds and hundreds of years have never done very well in this country. I do not see any reason why today's forces, which are perceived as occupation forces by many, should expect feelings to be broadly different.

Unfortunately, although I think Hamid Karzai is a very honourable man, a very decent and likeable individual, he has not been terribly competent. Worse, he is perceived as an instrument of the United States and something of an Uncle Tom by most Pashtuns. Even though Karzai himself is Pashtun, he is seen as an effort to placate Pashtun feelings, but not as fully representative of them. New coalitions are therefore rising in the country that are either pro-Taliban, ex-communists, warlords, or others who oppose Karzai's power.

Another quick reality about the country that it is imperative to understand is that if the Pashtuns are the biggest single ethnic group in Afghanistan, there are twice as many Pashtuns in Pakistan. The whole border with Afghanistan is populated by Pashtuns on the other side who are integrally linked linguistically, culturally, tribally, in clan terms, and in other perspectives; so to speak of a border there is highly artificial. It's a porous border. People come and go across it mostly outside of any legal framework. So the Pashtuns in Pakistan will be deeply involved in Pashtun politics in Afghanistan whether we like it or not.

This affects Pakistan's position viscerally. Pakistan is a very insecure country in many respects, living next door to this colossus of India. Therefore, Pakistan cannot afford to have another enemy or threat on its western borders. Therefore, I would argue that any Pakistani government and any security officials or military officials in Pakistan will be determined to maintain control and voice over Pashtun politics in Afghanistan, and indeed would like to have some major degree of control over what Kabul's policies are. I do not think this is going to change. It has nothing to do with Islam or ideology; it has to do with Pakistani geopolitical interests and fears in the region.

Let me jump on now, because my time is very limited and I look forward to an exchange with you all here.

I wish I could say Canada was appreciated in Afghanistan and the region as a totally independent power with a long and distinguished culture of peacekeeping and working within the context of the UN. Sadly, most Afghans see the Canadian participation as essentially part of an American project. I fear that this association with that American project is a very fatal one, because it is a source of anguish and anger to most Muslims, not just in Afghanistan or Pakistan but across most of the Middle East today. Unfortunately, although we might see it as an international umbrella for Canadian participation, NATO also is essentially seen as an instrument of western power.

Today, Muslims across the Middle East perceive the American war against terrorism and its allies as a war against Islam. Whatever the facts are, this is the perception. They perceive Muslims as being killed in the many tens of thousands across the area, especially by U.S. forces. They are fearful and distrustful of American—and indeed even NATO—goals there. I wish that were not the case, and I wish that Canada could be there in its own right and appreciated in its own right as an independent force with a distinguished history.

Let me just suggest a couple of things that I think are vital. I do not wish to argue on Pakistan with many experts within the Canadian government. I understand that your distinguished ambassador to Afghanistan is coming this evening, and I don't wish to cross swords with him in any respect. But I'd like to say that if the likelihood of failure by NATO and others in the next few years is likely, as I wish were not the case, then we need to think about exit strategies. That's Colin Powell's old maxim for American involvement: exit strategies.

I believe there will be no lasting solution until the Pashtuns are brought fully into the system, and that will have to mean forms and elements of the Taliban itself, however distasteful this may be. It is not realistic to think of transforming Afghanistan into a democratic, cohesive, united, peace-loving, clean country in any near term.

Furthermore, apart from involving the Pashtuns heavily, which means Pashtun power, even if the most radical of the Taliban are excluded, there are regional powers that have immense interests in the area, and these are very important for future settlement. These powers are Iran, which has huge influence over western Afghanistan; Pakistan, which I've already talked about; but also Russia, which, as you know, is still licking its wounds from its involvement, with many sad parallels to the NATO participation today. Russia, China, and India—all of these countries have deep, permanent interests in ways that even the United States does not have them. The United States has not lived next door to Afghanistan, and once the fear of al-Qaeda is eliminated, most in the region feel the U.S. will lose interest and that NATO will lose interest.

There must be ways to engage these countries even if Washington does not want to talk to or deal with Iran and does not wish to bring China or Russia more closely into the picture. Indeed, I would have to say that although Americans on the ground are very realistic, the leadership in Washington still perceives Afghanistan as a future base for American power projection across Asia, to block China and to block Russia. Therefore, I feel this goal in itself, even though unspoken, is a reality and creates a reaction from China and Russia, whose assistance, without mentioning Iran, is vital.

Therefore, in conclusion, I would say that I think Canada will have a distinguished future role in the world as a peacekeeping force and as an independent country. However, to be associated with the seriously flawed and dangerously failed policies of the United States government under the present administration is to simply make nearly impossible the Canadian mission there. I wish that were not the case, but having long been associated with American foreign policy, it pains me to say that this is the reality.

So, hopefully, as the world grows more multi-polar now, even against Washington's wishes, I think Canada will find increasing room to work among emerging great powers of the world rather than having a simple, “Are you for America or against America?” I think the world is a bigger place than being pro-American or anti-American. There should be room for countries like Canada to work broadly amongst a great range of powers.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

Thank you very much, Mr. Fuller.

Each of the parties will now have seven minutes to enter into dialogue, to ask questions, and for you to answer. I'll start with the Liberal Party, and the Honourable Bob Rae.

[Bob Rae, Liberal, Toronto Centre, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Fuller. It's great to have you with us. I'm sorry you're not going to cross swords with Mr. Lalani, because I think it would be helpful for us to hear such a discussion. I'm serious. I don't think we should be shy about having a healthy debate.

Mr. Fuller, we do have to develop an exit strategy, at least militarily as a country, because we've only committed our troops until 2011. Nothing that you've said shocks me, but if you had to restructure the mission leading up to 2011 and if you had to restructure the mission after 2011, how would you do it?

[Prof. Graham E. Fuller]

That, of course, is the $64,000 question, and I wish I could give you an easy response to that.

It's not just a tactical question, it's a question of gradually attempting to engage regional powers in this process, as I said earlier. One of the future scenarios for Afghanistan—just one of them—would be an Afghanistan dominated by Pakistan. I'm not proposing or supporting this, but I think it is one logical possibility for the future.

As the west grows tired of this nearly impossible task, Pakistan itself will seek to strengthen its voice there in ways that will empower the Taliban but which will lead to the crushing of al-Qaeda and international jihadi forces. To me, that's what this is all about in the end. If there's one critically vital task, it's eliminating these international jihadi forces, and especially al-Qaeda. I think Pakistan—and the Taliban themselves, by the way—is quite capable of doing this once the Pakistanis feel their local goals have been taken care of.

[Bob Rae, Liberal, Toronto Centre, ON]

Let me just take you up on that. Let's go back to the recent origin of the conflict. I'm not going back too far over time, but to the attack on the twin towers. The fact is that al-Qaeda was clearly sustained by the Taliban—not just tolerated by them, but sustained by them. What evidence would you have that suggests that the Taliban would now be ready to turn on al-Qaeda and turn on other jihadi forces that are now located in Afghanistan, as well as in northwestern Pakistan?

[Prof. Graham E. Fuller]

That's a very good question.

First of all, there is no Taliban as such. This is a very broad spectrum of people. Most Taliban are interested in Islam as it relates to Afghanistan, society in Afghanistan, and defence of traditional Afghan values, whatever we may think of them. I would argue that if they think that some minimal attention is being given to these goals and that western military forces are out of there, we would find large numbers of Taliban who are quite ready to simply operate within their own country rather than join some kind of international jihad.

Yes, it did happen—you're absolutely right—with al-Qaeda before, but I think this is an exception to the rule. Afghans have not been, by and large, joining al-Qaeda around the world or fighting elsewhere. So I think it is not entirely a dream to think that the Taliban can be split, as long as they feel that western armies and occupying forces, in their view, have left the country.

[Bob Rae, Liberal, Toronto Centre, ON]

I'm going to give my last question to Mr. Ignatieff, Mr. Chairman, because we're such good friends.

[Michael Ignatieff, Liberal, Etobicoke—Lakeshore, ON]

We're such good friends—all true. It's a truly amazing spectacle.

Thank you, Mr. Fuller.

Let me get to the question, sir. If the Taliban are a nationalist movement—and those are your words—and not primarily terrorist, although they did harbour terrorists, and if they are serving Pashtun nationalism, which is transborder, is one implication of what you're saying that any attempt to create a national state out of Kabul with Pashtun support is destined to fail?

As I understand the Canadian strategy in Afghanistan, it is to create a national government in Kabul with the support of the Pashtuns. You appear to be saying this is a delusionary dream—that is, that Pashtun nationalism will always resist the creation of a central state—and that therefore Canada is supporting a political goal that can't be achieved.

Is that the sense of your testimony?

[Prof. Graham E. Fuller]

No, sir, absolutely it is not. I'm concerned, if I left that impression with anybody.

The Pashtun have dominated Afghanistan for some 300 years in a multi-ethnic society, and it has worked fairly well. At this point, the Pashtuns feel that with the overthrow of the Taliban, which was essentially a Pashtun government, they have lost everything in Afghanistan.

Therefore, no, I'm not saying they would resist a united country dominated by Kabul; the question is whether the Pashtuns will have the major voice within Kabul itself. No, I do not think they would in any way resist a united Afghanistan; they would prefer that. But they simply want to be part of that project.

Yes, it's nationalist, but it's also very religious, and to them there's virtually no difference. If you're Pashtun, you support this kind of religious, rather primitive, mountain type of religion—mountain Islam. If you're religious, that's what you support. It's very hard to distinguish between an ethnic movement and the kind of fundamentalist religious ideals that the Taliban have.

By the way, they're not alone in this. Other elements in Afghanistan also share some of those religious, social values.

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

Thank you very much.

Now, it is Mrs. Barbot's turn, for the Bloc Québécois.

[Vivian Barbot, Bloc, Papineau, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I am going to share my time with Mr. Bachand. I will ask my question and then Mr. Bachand will ask his.

Thank you for coming here, Mr. Fuller. You paint quite a dark picture of the situation in Afghanistan, particularly about Canada's contribution.

Accepting the fact that you are saying that, in general, things are not going well and that we are heading for failure, is Canada's work with NGOs bearing fruit? Are we working consistently enough to be reasonably well accepted by the Afghan people?

[Prof. Graham E. Fuller]

I think the views among the Pashtun and Muslims in general in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the rest of the Muslim world are very similar. They feel threatened by the global war against terrorism as conducted by Washington. They see it as a war against Islam, against Islamic values. They see Muslims being killed by the tens of thousands or more in country after country, as a result of policies that I frankly would describe as very misguided by Washington: in Palestine relating to Israel, relating to Lebanon, relating to Somalia, relating to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Therefore, most Muslims don't think only in terms of the local situation, but think of this as a global defence against imperialism. I'm not calling Washington's policy imperialism, although there are some elements of a global hegemonic vision there, but it is perceived widely in the Muslim world in this respect, and that is what complicates the problems so much. Most Muslims everywhere sympathize with the struggle even if they don't fully approve of Osama bin Laden.

I hope that answers your question as I understood it.

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

Let us wait for thirty seconds to get the interpretation working.

I want to make sure you hear the question in English.

Mr. Bachand, go ahead, please.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Fuller, I read your CV this afternoon and I was impressed by your credentials. But what most got my attention was that you worked for the CIA for a long time. So you are an intelligence and information man. That tells me that you surely still have your old contacts who gave you the reports that you used for your evidence to the committee.

I will not be telling you anything you did not know when I say that the Vietnam war was not lost in Vietnam, but in America when the American people took a stand and decided that it was over. At least, that is what I think.

Is it your impression that, since the Vietnam War—and this still applies today—military doctrine has changed when it comes to information and propaganda as tools? It is refreshing to listen to you today because we have been discussing our involvement in Afghanistan, probably for years, and each time that a general, or a senior government official, or public servants come here, they tell us that extraordinary things are happening in Afghanistan and that we are heading down the road to democracy at top speed.

I would also like you to tell us if you think that a committee like ours can be on the right track if we are not given real information and if we do not have access to classified documents. In other words, we listen to people and trust in their good faith. So the senior people who appear before us are involved in a campaign of propaganda and manipulation, in my view, and I would like your view on it too.

[Prof. Graham E. Fuller]

Thank you, sir. That's a very important question.

Any government attempts to put the best face on its policies and its accomplishments.

Secondly, if I were asked to be in charge of the Afghan effort today, I would have to think positively about what I can do today to change this thing. It is, perhaps, a luxury of being an intelligence officer or intelligence analyst to have the freedom to look down the road regardless of the political implications of the analysis. This is why there is very frequently tension between intelligence organizations and policy-makers.

Yes, I think there has been a great effort by Washington to put a positive spin not only on Afghanistan but also on Iraq and many other situations in the area. This is always true, but I think it has been especially true in the last eight years.

But, sir, you wondered how you can be informed of the situation without classified documents. I have worked for 25 years with classified documents, and let me say that I do not think that classified documents contain necessary secrets for your understanding or my understanding of this particular problem. The secret information may sometimes be important as to where bin Laden may be hiding or where some military force is standing today for a military attack, in tactical terms. But in terms of understanding the broad trends, there is no intelligence that gives an answer to this question. All we can give is informed judgment, informed opinion. And informed people can disagree even about the way to interpret the facts.

My understanding of what is going on in Afghanistan today, or in Iraq or elsewhere, is based not at all on classified information. I see no classified information. I haven't seen classified information for 15 years.

But if we learn to think intelligently and look at a variety of sources.... On the Internet today, by the way, there is a remarkable variety of sources and good information about alternative views of the situation. If you look at the views of other countries—the English press, the Indian press in English, or things such as the Asia Times, which is published in east Asia in English and has an Indian-Chinese perspective that is markedly different and very well informed—they will give you some alternative perspectives.

I don't think you need any classified information to appreciate the grander problems that are involved in understanding this situation.

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

Thank you very much, Mr. Fuller.

I now move over to Mr. MacKenzie.

[Dave MacKenzie, Conservative, Oxford, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

I may end up sharing some time with my colleague, sir.

Mr. Fuller, I listened closely to what you said, and I have some problems with your concept. You seemed to indicate that we should leave the country and that the Pashtun population and the Taliban would then fill the void. But isn't that the reason we're there?

We have heard from Afghanis about what went on in their country when the Taliban was in control. How do we square that circle--that we leave the country and allow that body of people to then take over, to burn the schools, to do all of the things they did for a good number of years? Does that make sense?

[Prof. Graham E. Fuller]

Sir, that is also a very important and difficult question. If there were an easy answer to it, I would not be here and you would not be here.

But let me say that I think there is a difference. I think the presence of western troops “in occupation”—and that is the term that is used by most Muslims—of their country creates a radicalizing element that encourages other radical forces. It encourages jihadis to come in from all over the world to fight, especially against the American presence there, which is being fought in country after country on a military basis.

I am arguing first that the Taliban, to the extent that we can generalize about them, because there are different trends among them—they're all Pashtun, they're all nationalists, they're all believers in Islam to one degree or another—have learned a few things in a generation as well, watching this terrible debacle. Even the old Taliban were uncomfortable with bin Laden, when he first arrived there, but found themselves gradually trapped in a situation in which they came to depend on him. I don't think the situation could be replicated in quite the same sense.

So I would argue that the Taliban have learned something, the Pashtun have learned something, and I think the Pakistanis themselves have learned about the dangers of losing control of even elements that they supported, as they did earlier.

If it is known that the west is leaving and mechanisms are put into place with regional power support—from Russia, Iran, China, India, others, the UN—to essentially try to re-establish a government in which Taliban may win an important voice, it is the kind of Taliban and the kinds of policies they will pursue that will matter most.

I don't think we would go back to school burnings, but a conservative country, a conservative social policy, a conservative policy towards women that I do not approve of? Yes, I think we would see some return, but I don't think it would be a return to the rather horrific and sometimes exaggerated examples of the worst of the Taliban and their methods now, which are seen as part of their anti-American struggle.

[Dave MacKenzie, Conservative, Oxford, ON]

It seems to me you're suggesting we try an experiment: that we leave the country now and see what happens.

One of the countries you talk about is Russia. They've already had their conflicts with Russia. I just don't comprehend how we leave the country to the Taliban, to their past and perhaps their future, and then expect that Russia will be one of the countries that will keep them as an honest broker. It somehow defies common sense to me.

[Prof. Graham E. Fuller]

First of all....

I'm sorry, the thought has left me, but the other important thought is there and it will come back to me.

First of all, we're not talking about turning the country over to the Taliban, but opening up a new political and essentially non-military process, and a very quick one, whereby a new government can be established and a new balance of forces be established. I can't give you the perfect formula for how this is going to be conducted, but the alternative is equally important.

You say leave and give it up. I'm not persuaded that if we stay two, three, five, or even ten years we are going to achieve the goal we hope to achieve there. I think twenty years would be lucky, and there is no guarantee that you're not going to continue to inflame nationalist and religious and fundamentalist passions, in Afghanistan and in Pakistan and in the region, to come and fight against this present NATO project.

So it's not a crazy choice versus a sober choice. It's a sober choice at the present, which I argue is not working and is probably not going to work. And it's a new way of approaching the use of regional powers to stop the worst of the past elements. That is the participation of elements like al-Qaeda. Pakistan doesn't want it, Iran doesn't want it, Russia doesn't want it, and China doesn't want it. These countries have great power within those countries.

Another scenario is that Afghanistan will basically be divided into spheres of influence for some time to come, with those countries involved. It's quite thinkable, even though regrettable.

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Black.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, Mr. Fuller, for coming here from the west of Canada. I know it's a long trip, because I do it every week, as does my colleague Mr. Dosanjh. We appreciate it that you came. You've given us a different insight and some provocative things to think about.

I'm particularly interested in what you said about the area and the countries surrounding Afghanistan--Pakistan and Iran. I wonder if you believe it's possible to find a peaceful solution to the war in Afghanistan without the involvement in the buy-in by those neighbouring countries. I quite doubt it myself.

The other thing I wanted to ask you about it is the issue of the marines who have now come down to the south, an additional 3,000 troops, to do some kind of a surge similar to what they did in Iraq. I'm wondering what you think about that kind of a surge that is happening right now, and whether you think this kind of effort will work in the long term, because I think we do have to look at the long term there, as you said.

I'm also curious about whether you have any information to share with us about the ISAF mission and the Operation Enduring Freedom mission, which is going on at the same time. I understand there are 8,000 to 10,000 American troops in Afghanistan now that are not part of the ISAF mission. I'm wondering if you have anything you could share with us about how those two quite separate missions interact, whether you know of any problems and communications between the two, or any other information you could share with us.

[Prof. Graham E. Fuller]

I hope very much that the presence of a new marine contingent will assist in the pacification of the south. But as we all know, this is a guerrilla war and guerrillas generally do not choose to stand and fight and lose, as they inevitably will. They will vanish into the hillsides and attempt to wait out the United States.

This is a waiting game in many respects. Nobody expects Washington to have the stomach—much less other countries—to stay for two, three, four, five, six or more years in this kind of an effort. People are therefore waiting until the moment is more propitious for their own power.

Frankly, I don't think there's a military solution in that sense. It has to be essentially a political solution, and I think there is a contradiction somewhat between the two, frankly. Ideally, you weaken the military strength of your opponents so that they will then negotiate. I don't think they are going to negotiate. They will simply retreat and wait.

Between ISAF and the U.S. military forces, I cannot give you any in-depth assessment because I'm not deeply engaged in these details. I would have to say there has been some contradiction in American policy from very early on, and that is between State Department nation-building and aid nation-building, if you will, or institution-building. On the other hand, there are the CIA and the military that are essentially looking to find al-Qaeda and kill them, and to kill Taliban forces in the area.

There has unfortunately been a high degree of civilian deaths. Let's not call them collateral damage; they're civilian deaths. This has been a major factor in alienating the population. Even President Karzai has been very bluntly critical of Washington in saying that these civilian casualties are intolerable, yet they are essentially a part of the process, and I don't see any serious diminution of that process. But while the CIA and the military are working with warlords, supporting them and giving them money, and supporting private militias to attempt to fight the Taliban to locate al-Qaeda and other foreign elements, they are supporting the very elements within the government that are weakening the civilian nation-building side.

So there has been a contradiction between these two elements. I don't think they're totally incompatible, but I think they're weakening. Each one complicates the other's mission.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

You mentioned in your comments to us that the Taliban were not ideological.