Finance Committee on May 2nd, 2023

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

I don't know if Graham is still here, but I know his mom and dad are probably watching. His father was a fine candidate for us in the 2019 election in Toronto. I have to tell you that Graham has done yeoman's work in this new role, as a young man taking over from the excellent work that I thought would be really difficult to replace in Matthew Clark.

By the way, Matthew didn't leave me for another MP. I know that's what you're all thinking. Good people get poached; not to overuse that word, but people get poached. I guess Matthew did get poached. He now works for the Ambassador of the United States. He joined that illustrious office one week before President Biden visited Canada, so he was pretty much put under the gun.

[Eric Duncan, Conservative, Stormont—Dundas—South Glengarry, ON]

They're good researchers.

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

They are good researchers.

[Eric Duncan, Conservative, Stormont—Dundas—South Glengarry, ON]

[Inaudible—Editor]

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

They know it well.

I'm sure this would be enlightening to the Minister of Finance if she could spare the two hours to listen. In our effort of finding Freeland, we could actually probably send her the blues. Maybe she could find the time between panels at the Liberal convention to take a look.

The second paragraph here, on page 3.... How many pages is this? It is only 55 pages. It reads:

Therefore, the first few sections of the report describe the current accountability regime. Section 1 provides an overview of accountability in responsible government, explains the purpose of an accountability regime, and outlines the doctrine of ministerial responsibility and its practice in Parliament and in government.

I know that my colleague MP Findlay knows this well, because she was an exceptionally well-briefed and a knowledgeable minister of the Crown who always respects Parliament.

Section 2 [of this report] deals with the role of Parliament (particularly the House of Commons)—

That's where we are today as members of Parliament and as a standing committee of the House of Commons.

—considers in some depth the role of the key mechanisms that Parliament uses to hold government to account, and explores the accountabilities of ministers and senior officials in this context. Section 3 examines the essential aspects of accountability in the ministry, touching on the role of the prime minister and the Privy Council Office, and addresses how ministers and deputy ministers manage the political-bureaucratic interface. Section 4—

I'm looking forward to that.

—outlines the central role played by...Treasury Board and its Secretariat in relation to managerial accountability, particularly as it concerns the responsibilities of deputy ministers for financial management.

The last section of the report—

It is the ultimate section one might say.

—describes a framework for reform. In this context it is important to note the principal lessons learned from past efforts at reform. Knowing where we have come from will help guide where we should go.

Isn't that a truism that is absolutely correct all the time? You need to know where you have been to guide where you should go.

The government operates in a challenging environment and reforms, both in Parliament and in the government, can carry a high cost if not carefully planned and executed. Reforms must take us forward, not backward. Section 5 outlines each element of the framework and identifies the following for each of the core accountability mechanisms in Parliament, the ministry, and...Treasury Board.

The three that are listed here after this paragraph say, “the specific challenges noted by the distinguished participants in the consultation phase of the report; the measures that the government has already undertaken to address these challenges; and the core values and objectives that will guide the government in developing its action plan.”

Isn't that what governments like to do—develop action plans? Executing on them...sometimes not so much, but developing one, oh boy, that is fun.

The specific measures the government will be taking to strengthen accountability are outlined in—

This is in italics.

—Management in the Government of Canada: A Commitment to Continuous Improvement.

I'm glad we're committed to continuous improvement. One of the ways we get continuous improvement, just as an aside, is through elections. Through an election, we get continuous improvement. That's the beauty of our democracy because we can elect a new and better government.

Section 1.2 at the bottom of page 3 is called “Overview of accountability in responsible government”.

Any discussion of accountability in our constitutional system—the Westminster system of parliamentary democracy—must be informed by an understanding of how that system functions and why. Although the Westminster system developed incrementally, rooted in evolving democratic values, rather than abstract or static concepts, it has deep integrity, and the roles of different players complement each other in a fine balance.

It's sort of like a fine wine.

It is thus both an evolving system that has adapted to changing circumstances and an organic structure in which changes in one area inevitably have repercussions in another. This section provides an overview of the accountability regime. Each of the constituent elements is explored in greater depth in the sections that follow.

The Westminster system is defined by its distinctive accountability features: the twin tenets of parliamentary sovereignty and responsible government. Under this constitutional system, Parliament can make any law it wishes within the limits of the constitution—for example, the division of jurisdictional authority under the Constitution Act, 1867 and the rights set out in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The executive is responsible to the legislature—that is, the government of the day remains in power only so long as it commands the confidence of the elected House of Commons.

Of course, as an aside, we know the only way that's possible right now is through the costly coalition agreement between the NDP and Liberals. This has caused, in essence, a working majority for the Liberals, which is obviously not something the people vote for.

I will go on with this report. On page 4, it says:

The executive is therefore accountable to the legislature for the exercise of its authority, and together they are accountable to the electorate.

Now, I would like to welcome the new guests who have arrived. I guess we're drawing a crowd with this insightful discussion about parliamentary accountability of ministers of the Crown.

I welcome you to the room.

[A voice]

Have any of you seen Minister Freeland?

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

I could ask that, as well.

Have any of you found Freeland? We are searching for her.

[Voices]

Oh, oh!

[A voice]

It's a negative, no.

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

Apparently, those who arrived did not see her wandering the halls of Parliament. She must be preparing for her discussion with Hillary Clinton.

Because of this, I will go on to page 4 of this Treasury Board document, which I'm sure is going to be exceptionally insightful for members of the government:

Because in this system the members of the executive sit in the legislature and require its confidence, their accountability is anything but a remote theoretical construct—it is a living, daily reality in the House.

Ministers, who together as the ministry form the government of the day, exercise executive authority in this system. These ministers, who act largely through the work of a non-partisan public service, are accountable to Parliament both individually and collectively.

Again, isn't that the essence of why we are here? We're trying to get parliamentary accountability from the Minister of Finance in our search for Freeland.

All accountabilities in Canadian government flow from ministers’ individual and collective accountability to Parliament.

I think that's an important point to pause on. I will come back to this, depending on things.

At this stage, Mr. Chair, I would like to move to adjourn.

[The Chair, Liberal, Peter Fonseca]

Please repeat that, MP Perkins.

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

I'm sorry. I had hoped the microphone could pick me up.

At this stage of my presentation, which I may or may not have to continue, I put a motion forward, again, to move to adjourn. I will assure everyone that, unlike the last time, I will vote for my own motion.

[The Chair, Liberal, Peter Fonseca]

Go ahead, Mr. Clerk.

[Philip Lawrence, Conservative, Northumberland—Peterborough South, ON]

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Beech does not have an authorized headset on and therefore a vote can't count, according to the Standing Orders.

[The Chair, Liberal, Peter Fonseca]

He can vote thumbs up or thumbs down. Yes, he can.

(Motion negatived: nays 6; yeas 5)

MP Perkins, that's a vote in favour of your continuing. We are in mile seven or eight now in this marathon.

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

Mr. Chair, I thank you for your kind words and the kind endorsement by the government.

I am somewhat disappointed in my colleagues who clearly have had enough of me. Maybe that's because we had a caucus meeting this week and they heard me then.

I will continue since the government wants me to—

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

I have a quick point of order if I may, Mr. Chair.

I am sorry to interrupt.

I just wondered if Mr. Perkins might be willing to entertain a question off of a point of order, because I know he referred earlier to the requirement of the government to have the confidence of the House of Commons. This is a subject that's of some particular fascination to me.

I think it's quite important. He's talked a lot about the fundamental principles of Westminster parliamentary democracies. Of course, this is a very important part of the Westminister system. He's talked a little bit about ministerial responsibility and, I'm pretty sure at one point, some of the extraordinary powers of the Prime Minister. Of course, one of the most extraordinary powers of the Prime Minister is the power to determine willy-nilly, if you will, whether the Prime Minister enjoys the confidence of the House or not, even without a vote in the House of Commons.

This is something that I think has been problematic. He talked about the U.K. being the kind of mother of the Westminster parliamentary system that we still look to for precedents, and they determined some time ago, several years ago now, that a Prime Minister should no longer have that power. In fact, if a Prime Minister does not observe a fixed election date, that Prime Minister would have to go to the House of Commons and get a vote of a two-thirds majority in order to be able to part ways, as it were, with a fixed election date as prescribed in law.

I just wondered if, in the course of his comments, he might be willing to talk a little bit about the confidence convention, some of the ways that this extraordinary power of the Prime Minister has been abused and whether he thinks that's something that the House of Commons should look to curtail.

[The Chair, Liberal, Peter Fonseca]

Thank you, MP Blaikie.

The floor is yours, MP Perkins.

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

In the spirit of collegiality and the earnestness with which that question was posed by MP Blaikie, I probably will get to most of the answer on that one once I'm through the 55 pages here. We're on page 4 for the information of those watching.

Let me just quickly say that I think perhaps if the government had followed through on the—

[Philip Lawrence, Conservative, Northumberland—Peterborough South, ON]

I just have a brief point of order.

We are a bilingual country, so will you read that in French as well, I hope?

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

I will not torture people. I have been taking French for a year, and I have done several French immersion courses. I'm getting better—un petit peu—but I will save you that pain right now.

[Some hon. members]

Oh, oh!

[The Chair, Liberal, Peter Fonseca]

I see that MP Ste-Marie has perked up, and we'll be grading that French.

Go ahead, MP Perkins.

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

I have the privilege of sharing a seat in the House of Commons with our Bloc colleagues. Dr. Garon is my seatmate. Sometimes we practise French, but I will stick with his advice right now, which is not to do it too much in public.

With regard to MP Blaikie's question, I think it's a great question. Perhaps the discussion of the fixed election dates and the Prime Minister's power...because it was former prime minister Stephen Harper who brought in fixed election dates and removed that power in a majority government for the Prime Minister to pick a time that best suits them. We have that.

Obviously, the fixed election date, as I understand it, still applies in a minority government as well, unless the Prime Minister loses the confidence of the House. We know that the supply agreement between MP Blaikie's party, the NDP, and the government prohibits the fall of this government before the fixed election date. Perhaps he could pursue that with his leader to see if he thinks we should have an earlier date. They can challenge that.

In addition to that, I think you could add a fixed election date. I know this is off-topic, but the chair allowed a question a little off Mr. Blaikie's motion. I think it was the PROC committee—I'm not sure which committee of the House it was—that was supposed to look at, or started to look at the government's promise that the 2015 campaign would be the last election with first past the post.

There are a lot of different views on that. Probably within each of the caucuses, there are different views about the best way to do that. I think that process started.

My own interpretation of it was when the government discovered, when they ran the numbers on the various scenarios and their thoughts for the day, that somehow it would not be advantageous to them. Somehow, they thought they would lose the thought that they were the national governing party and could naturally win every election under the current system. Strangely, and shockingly, they abandoned that promise, too.

I'm sure MP Blaikie was disappointed, as many Canadians were, that we didn't even see through the process to look at the options and have a good public discourse. This discourse would also have been in Parliament about that fundamental issue of how we elect parliamentarians and how we elect our government out of that system.

It is an area still worthy of discussion and review, without a doubt, as we are talking about the issue of ministerial accountability. I think it's fundamental, and I appreciate that MP Blaikie agrees with me, that ministerial accountability is fundamental to the successful functioning in our system.

In this report from the Treasury Board Secretariat entitled “Meeting the Expectation of Canadians: Review of the Responsibilities and Accountabilities of Ministers and Senior Officials”, on page 4 in the fourth paragraph, where I left off, the report reads:

Although Parliament does not exercise executive authority, it is the principal guarantor of the government’s accountability, scrutinizing the government’s policies and actions and holding it to account. Parliament has a spectrum of tools for doing this, ranging from its role in the passage of legislation to the review and approval of public expenditure to the interrogations of Question Period

These are important elements.

But while the specific tool may vary, the environment remains constant—that of partisan politics. Parliament and its processes are inherently political.

I would say as an aside, we sometimes hear people saying, “That's partisan” or “That's political.” Some people think that's a bad thing, but actually, it's a key element of democracy. All of us on this committee and all of us in this House join political parties because we believe there are certain solutions to the challenges the country faces.

We have different viewpoints. There's a reason why MP Blaikie is a member of the New Democratic Party, and there's a reason why Bloc members are part of that party. There's a reason why you choose to join the Liberal Party or our party. We all have different solutions and maybe, sometimes, different ideas about what the challenges are that face the country.

None of them are less legitimate than the others.

[The Chair, Liberal, Peter Fonseca]

MP Perkins, I'm sorry to interrupt.

We're going to suspend at this time. I think that's on a positive note.

I know that you're going to work on the French.

We're going to focus on the amendment and we're going to suspend until next week. We'll see everybody next week.

Thank you.

[The meeting was suspended at 8:38 p.m., Thursday, May 4]

[The meeting resumed at 11:05 a.m., Tuesday, May 9]