Procedure and House Affairs Committee on May 16th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

I call the meeting to order.

Good evening. Welcome to meeting number 74 of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. The committee is meeting today to study the question of privilege related to the member for Wellington—Halton Hills and other members.

We have with us today Michael Chong, MP for Wellington—Halton Hills.

Mr. Chong, you will have up to 10 minutes for an opening statement, after which we will proceed to questions from the committee members. I want to thank you for taking the time to be with us tonight. Welcome to PROC.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for inviting me to appear tonight.

The last several weeks have been a trying time for me and my family, but it is important to note that my case is only one of many cases of Canadians who have been threatened on Canadian soil by authoritarian governments and have suffered in silence. It is my hope that real change will result from what has happened, change that will strengthen our national security and intelligence to better protect all Canadians and Canadian institutions.

Here is a brief outline of the facts concerning my case.

I first became aware that Mr. Wei Zhao, a PRC consular official, was collecting information on my family in the PRC from his post in Toronto in a Globe and Mail report of May 1, 2023. The report indicated that Mr. Zhao was collecting this information for further potential sanctions to put pressure on me and other MPs with respect to debates going on in the House of Commons. According to a Globe and Mail report of February 13, 2023, a national security source had previously described Mr. Zhao as a suspected intelligence actor.

Two years prior, on June 24, 2021, I was briefed by CSIS on foreign interference threat activities. This briefing was general in nature and did not contain any information about Mr. Zhao. Between that first briefing I received from CSIS on June 24, 2021, and May 1, 2023, no one ever informed me that Mr. Zhao was collecting information on my family from his posting here in Canada.

I recommend, Madam Chair, that Mr. Wei Zhao be censured by the House for his foreign interference threat activities targeting a Canadian member of Parliament. This would send a clear message to any person in Canada who would engage in these activities that Parliament will take action to defend its members.

Clearly, Mr. Zhao and representatives of the PRC in Canada have been coercively and corruptly targeting MPs on both sides of the aisle to put pressure on MPs with respect to foreign policy. In order to identify where the systemic problems are, I recommend that the committee obtain the documents and tracking records related to the July 20, 2021, CSIS intelligence assessment entitled “People's Republic of China Foreign Interference in Canada: A Critical National Security Threat”.

Madam Chair, I understand from earlier testimony that an MOU has been entered into whereby CSIS notifies the House of Commons if a member might be under threat by a foreign government. In light of this MOU, I recommend that CSIS inform an individual MP directly about specific, detailed foreign interference threat activities targeting them and their family, including the identity of the persons involved in those threat activities.

I also recommend that CSIS inform the Speaker of the identity of any persons in Canada involved in foreign interference threat activities targeting MPs and their families so that the Speaker can inform all members of the House of Commons of the identities of these persons.

CSIS has consistently advised that sunlight and transparency are tools that Canada can use to combat foreign interference threat activities so that the details of these threat activities are made public. That way, MPs, citizens, parties and candidates can make informed decisions about what is going on.

A similar protocol is in place in the U.K. House of Commons and appears to have been used at least twice in the last couple of years. Last year, MI5 informed the U.K. Speaker of Ms. Christine Lee, an agent of the PRC who was engaged in foreign interference threat activities. The Speaker subsequently notified all MPs via email about this individual. In another example, all British MPs were alerted by the Speaker via email two years ago about two individuals acting as agents of the Russian Federation.

Madam Chair, I want to say something about the unauthorized releases of intelligence.

These releases are injurious to national security and diminish the confidence that Five Eyes allies have in the security of Canada's intelligence. These releases would not be happening in a system that is functioning properly, and that is the responsibility of the head of government, who alone is responsible for the machinery of government.

These releases are a result of a government that does not release information in a controlled and timely manner to Parliament or its committees. These releases are a symptom of a national security and intelligence system that is not working, a system that is not conveying information to Parliament, to its committees, to its members, to political parties or to other individuals and institutions in a controlled and timely manner.

In this day and age, information is ubiquitous and voluminous. Information is going to get out. The question is whether information is released in a timely and controlled manner by the government or whether it is released as it has been over the last several months. It is the job of the government to provide Parliament with information about national security and intelligence issues in a controlled and timely manner, whether on the issue in front of this committee tonight or on issues like the national security breaches at the government's Winnipeg lab.

The matter in front of the committee would likely not have happened if the government had followed the example of peer jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the United States, which have a long history of briefing legislators on highly sensitive national security and intelligence issues. This is common practice in both countries and has been for decades. History shows that legislators are responsible and effective in how such information is shared and used. Canada needs to catch up and emulate the best practices of peer jurisdictions to ensure critical national security and intelligence issues do not become bottlenecked within the bureaucracy and executive. This can be done effectively and efficiently. Based on the U.K. and U.S. models, there need not be a trade-off between national security and empowering legislators in this way.

The Prime Minister's NSICOP is not a long-term solution. It has no standing in Parliament. It is effectively a government committee, appointed by the Prime Minister, on which MPs happen to sit.

The change that is needed is institutional. I recommend that NSICOP be brought within Parliament. Canada needs an independent parliamentary national security and intelligence committee based on the model of the U.K. and the U.S.

I also recommend that the government expeditiously introduce legislation for a foreign agents registry and commit to a public inquiry focused on PRC foreign interference threat activities.

In closing, Madam Chair, western democracies will continue to come under increased threat from foreign interference by authoritarian states. Foreign governments like the PRC and the Russian Federation will not stop trying to coercively influence our institutions in order to bend our actions to their interests. To think otherwise is naive. An urgent, whole-of-government approach is needed for this serious long-term threat.

A national security review is long overdue, and I recommend that the government undertake one as soon as possible. The review must go beyond the Prime Minister and our intelligence agencies. It must involve, as an equal partner, Parliament—the institution that is the beating heart of our democracy.

The government needs to act. To not act is to make our democracy needlessly more vulnerable to the threat of foreign interference. I am confident MPs can rise to the challenge. Let's learn from our democratic allies. Let's act now to deter future foreign interference in our democracy.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you for those remarks, Mr. Chong.

I want to remind everyone that comments must be addressed through the chair.

We will now begin the first round of questions. Members will have six minutes.

Starting things off is Mr. Cooper, who will be followed by Ms. Sahota, Ms. Gaudreau and Ms. Blaney.

Go ahead, Mr. Cooper. You have six minutes.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chong, for appearing.

We know, based upon what the Prime Minister's national security adviser informed you about, that CSIS provided the July 20, 2021, intelligence assessment that revealed that you and your family in Hong Kong were a target of an accredited diplomat at Beijing's Toronto consulate. That memo was sent to the Prime Minister's own department and other relevant departments, including Global Affairs Canada. The Prime Minister claims he first learned about this when it was reported in The Globe and Mail on May 1.

Do you believe that is credible? If the Prime Minister, in fact, is being truthful that he only learned of it on May 1, what does that say about his fitness for office, as the Prime Minister responsible for the machinery of government?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

I think it's important to clarify that the July 20, 2021, intelligence assessment of CSIS was sent by CSIS to various points within the Government of Canada, including the Privy Council Office. That is my understanding of what happened. What exact points other than the Privy Council Office it went to is not clear.

I think it's also important to note that if one is to take the Prime Minister at his word, then clearly there was a breakdown in the machinery of government. In the government's “Open and accountable government” document, it's clear that the sole responsibility for the machinery of government is the Prime Minister's. It's also clear in that same foundational document that the Prime Minister is the lead on national security and has a special responsibility for national security.

Combining those two facts—that the Prime Minister has a special responsibility for national security and is alone responsible for the machinery of government—I think it's clear that the Prime Minister failed to structure the machinery of government in a way that would ensure information flowed to MPs and to the House of Commons when those MPs and the House were targets of foreign interference threat activities.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

There is no question that this was a significant failure, a major breakdown, in a best-case scenario. It may be worse than that; it may be that the Prime Ministerknew about this and sat on it, but taking the Prime Minister at his word, who ultimately bears responsibility for this failure?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Well, I think the machinery of government is the Prime Minister's responsibility alone. That's not just my opinion. That's a fact. “Open and accountable government” makes it clear that the Prime Minister alone is responsible for the machinery of government—in other words, responsible for the architecture of the government, the organizational structure of the government—and it is astounding that the structure would be established in a way that would prevent MPs who were being targeted from being made aware of those specific threat activities.

I would add that the best practice of Five Eyes alliance allies makes it clear that other allies in the Five Eyes alliance have long had those procedures in place. I referenced in my opening comments a procedure, a protocol, that's in place between MI5 and the U.K. House of Commons. I referenced two examples of how that protocol was used in the last several years to protect the integrity of the U.K. Parliament from threats emanating from either an agent of the PRC or two individuals acting as agents of the Russian Federation.

Clearly, that type of protocol should have been put in place years ago when these threats were first raised by our intelligence community.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

On May 3, regarding the information about the threat to your family, the Prime Minister told reporters, making a categorical statement, that “CSIS made the determination that it wasn't something that needed to be raised to a higher level because it wasn't a significant enough concern.”

It wasn't just that the Prime Minister said that he didn't know; he made the categorical statement that CSIS made a determination not to pass the information on. The very next day, the Prime Minister's own national security adviser contradicted the Prime Minister. In other words, what the Prime Minister said was not true.

Did that give you any further confidence in the ability of this Prime Minister to do his job and to keep Canadians safe from Beijing's interference?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Well, I think there was clearly a systemic breakdown in the machinery of government, and that's why I think it's really important for the committee to understand where this information went.

My understanding is that CSIS does not produce intelligence products for itself. It produces intelligence products, such as the intelligence assessment in question here, for one of the points outside of CSIS within the Government of Canada. I believe there are 17 national security points within the Government of Canada. I think it's important that the committee find out, through tracking records, exactly where this information about me and other targeted MPs went within the Government of Canada and where the information about Mr. Wei Zhao went within the Government of Canada so that the committee can produce a report with recommendations about how to address these systemic failures.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Do I have any time, Madam Chair?

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

You have five seconds.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Okay. I'll pick it up in the next round.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Mr. Chong, I can share that I do believe the intentions of the committee are to respond to the House on the question of privilege before the House rises, so it's something that we also take seriously.

Ms. Sahota, you have six minutes.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Chong, for being here today. I definitely think we'll get more insight as to how we can improve our system through this forum. I think we have similar goals.

I appreciated your recommendations. Some of those recommendations are ones that have already been undertaken. However, I know that there are nuances, such as NSICOP becoming a standing committee. The foreign agent registry is well under way. I wish this hadn't happened to you, but in a way, perhaps it will prompt us to do even better in the years to come.

However, we have had CSIS agents come before this committee and testify that this is not a new thing. Even from the time of Mulroney, CSIS and many agencies have had a difficult time trying to get government to act and move on ways to protect our democracy and our members of Parliament from interference. There have been many steps taken, and I think we can continue to improve on them.

You mentioned that you were briefed on June 24, 2021. I believe La Presse stated that you were also briefed on August 1, 2021, on February 5, 2022, and on July 18, 2022.

Do any of these ring a bell? Is that true or untrue?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

The only briefing I received on foreign interference threat activities was in June of 2021. That's the only briefing I received on foreign interference threat activities. That briefing, as I mentioned in my opening comments, was general in nature.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Okay. Well, that's interesting—

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

The other meetings weren't specifically about.... They weren't briefings on foreign interference threat activities.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

But they were meetings with CSIS.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Yes. I had met with CSIS outside of.... Yes. That's correct.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

But they did not have anything to do with any threat level to you or to your family.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

None of those meetings I had with CSIS indicated any information about Mr. Wei Zhao, the PRC diplomat in Toronto.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

You know, that's telling as well, because I know from all of the media reporting that we've seen that there are some inaccuracies or there's a tendency to elaborate sometimes and make something of a situation that may not be true, so I'm glad we were able to clear that up.

There was a big question on everyone's mind, obviously, when we read about the threats faced by you and your family in The Globe and Mail article. It was difficult to read. However, it did leave a lot of us with questions, because many members face these types of situations. We had witnesses here from Alliance Canada Hong Kong who gave us examples of the intimidation and threat tactics used by Beijing in order to intimidate organizations, activists and members of Parliament.

What were the exact threats that you felt or that you now perhaps know that your family faced?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

I don't want to get into specific details about threats, but let me just say this, which may explain some of the meetings I had with CSIS outside of my June 24, 2021, meeting: I have received threats that I believe may be related to the PRC. I'll just leave it at that. That explains the meetings I had with CSIS outside of that June 24, 2021, meeting.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Without getting into details of what the threat was, is there a way for you to give us a general idea of what type of threat it is so that we have a better understanding of what to be looking out for?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Sure. It was more than one threat. One involved something that happened in the last federal election campaign. The others were outside of the federal election campaign and involved threats sent to me regarding the PRC and my travel outside the country.