Procedure and House Affairs Committee on Oct. 17th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

With that, I want to thank you for your time and attention today.

I think what was quite fruitful was actually understanding the mandate of what you do compared with perhaps what we might want you to do. You can only do what you're mandated to do. I think that was quite eye-opening for me. Even though we've had so many meetings, being able to actually understand what your role is, where information is obtained and then how it's acted upon and who can and who can't, is quite interesting.

With that, I want to thank you for your time and attention.

If members have other comments, we might send them to you, so please stay tuned. If there is anything that comes to mind that you'd like our committee to know, such as feedback that we should be considering, please don't hesitate to send that to the clerk. We'll have it translated in both official languages and shared around.

We're going to suspend, committee members, for a quick three minutes to get ready for our next panel.

Thank you to you and your team. Have a great day.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

We're going to continue with our meeting.

I just want to say that Mr. Cooper has asked for the floor really quickly. I'll offer him the same courtesy, and then we will continue with our panel with a guest who committee members have all agreed we would like to have here, so we're excited to get to that promptly.

Go ahead, Mr. Cooper.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I'm just following up on the point made by Ms. Blaney during the first panel that we do have an hour on Thursday to deal with future committee business. I think Ms. Blaney was alluding in part to the need to get to the bottom of the incident that brought shame on Parliament when a former SS officer was introduced during the address of President Zelenskyy.

I have a motion on notice that I would submit. I would hope that there would be consensus that there would be agreement that this be done openly and transparently, and that we have the second hour on Thursday in public, not in camera, not behind closed doors, and deal with that issue, which is pressing.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you for putting your position on the record.

I do hear that this is the matter that we would like to deal with next. I think there are details in what you're suggesting, and I think committee members need to determine what the best approach is. I think members are hearing what members are saying. I encourage those conversations to continue.

With that, I will be continuing with the work of the day. I would like to welcome, from the Treasury Board Secretariat, Mike MacDonald, senior assistant deputy minister, office of the chief information officer. He is here in his former capacity as the former acting national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister.

Mr. MacDonald, we appreciate your responding to our request to appear again so quickly. It means a lot to us. I know that it adds a lot onto your schedule, but you bring us insights and information that are important to the work that this committee is doing.

With that, we welcome you to PROC. You will have up to five minutes for your opening statement. Then we will proceed to questions.

[Mike MacDonald, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Office of the Chief Information Officer, Treasury Board Secretariat]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I'll be very quick. I have an opening statement that I'd like to make.

First off, I'd like to say good afternoon to the members of the committee. As mentioned, my name is Mike MacDonald. I'm currently the senior assistant deputy minister, and I work in the office of the chief information officer of Canada, which is housed at the Treasury Board Secretariat.

I was the former assistant secretary of the security intelligence secretariat, which is at the Privy Council Office. I held that job from 2020 to 2023, a three-year period. At one point, I acted as the national security and intelligence adviser in 2021 for a period of two and a half weeks.

The Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada advises and supports the national security and intelligence adviser, or NSIA, including coordinating operational and policy initiatives. It also provides management functions for interdepartmental security and intelligence committees.

The secretariat also supports the NSIA and, more recently, the deputy NSIA in their briefings of the Prime Minister and cabinet on key national security issues, policies, operations and crises, as necessary. It also has a coordination role whenever national security or intelligence issues are going to cabinet.

You've already heard from many senior officials who have underscored the seriousness of the threat of foreign interference. You have also heard that, yes, there have been issues with the sharing of intelligence internally, including the mechanisms that are meant to flag important issues. The NSIA, Ms. Thomas, has spoken about changes that are being introduced or that have been introduced to the intelligence-sharing system to strengthen information sharing.

There should be no illusions about the threat posed by foreign interference against our institutions. I would reiterate what witnesses before me have said—there is confidence that Canada's 2019 and 2021 federal elections were free and fair.

As you have already heard, we have robust tools in place, such as the critical election incident public protocol, which established both the panel of five and the SITE task force. This view has also been reinforced and thoroughly examined in both protocol reports—the Jim Judd report and the Rosenberg report—as well as by the independent special rapporteur. Both NSIRA and NSICOP have studies on foreign interference under way, providing further assurance that our system is robust, and we are co-operating with the review agencies.

We continue to build on this foundation to address a serious threat to our democracy.

I welcome any further questions from the committee.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you, Mr. MacDonald.

We're going to enter into six-minute rounds. We'll be starting with Mr. Cooper, followed by Ms. Sahota, Madame Gaudreau and then Ms. Blaney.

Mr. Cooper, you have six minutes.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Mr. MacDonald.

Mr. MacDonald, on what date did you first read the July 20, 2021, CSIS memo that indicated that an MP—whom we now know was MP Chong—and his family were being targeted by the Beijing regime and that Beijing's intelligence service, the Ministry of State Security, had taken specific actions to target other Canadian MPs, as we now know—MPs Kwan and O'Toole? When did you first read that memo?

[Mike MacDonald]

Madam Chair, I don't have an exact date of when I first read that memo, but it was in the spring or early summer of this year.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

You were the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister on July 20, 2021. Is that right?

[Mike MacDonald]

Yes. That is correct, Madam Chair.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

That is the date of that memo. We know it was sent to the PCO. According to the testimony of Jody Thomas, it was sent on July 20, 2021.

I will correct that. She said that in July 2021, it was received by the PCO.

Where did it go in the PCO? Why did you not see that memo at that time?

[Mike MacDonald]

I have a few things for some context. Thank you for the question, by the way.

As it has been explained previously—and certainly based on my experience working in the national security community—intelligence is sent out and shared through various means. For example, I was provided intelligence when I was in my role through the electronic system or the top secret classified system. I could be provided intelligence by some of the analysts. Sometimes, people prepared briefing packages for me. In the cases when, for example, I was interested in certain issues at play, I would ask the client relations officer at CSE, based on my requirements at the time, to create intelligence and information.

The point I'm trying to make here, sir, is that there are a variety of ways in which intelligence moves into the system.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you for that.

It went, though, to the PCO in July 2021. It eventually made its way into the reading package of Mr. Morrison, who returned to his role after you completed filling it on an interim basis.

Do you have any details on who it went to at the PCO in July 2021? Who would have been involved, and how would it have eventually made its way into the reading package for Mr. Morrison, I believe, on August 17, 2021?

[Mike MacDonald]

Thank you for the question.

Chair, I can confirm that the document—the intelligence assessment—did not come directly to me. I checked my personal holdings back when I was still working for the Privy Council Office.

Where it went in the Privy Council Office, when it was sent out and to what other offices, I don't know. I don't track.... I do not have knowledge of where it went.

If you refer to Ms. Thomas's testimony, it went to several other departments and deputy ministers. I can only surmise that it went to places in the PCO where most intelligence is sent for forward distribution and/or printing in packages and so on.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Where would that be at the PCO?

[Mike MacDonald]

One of the places, as was mentioned in previous testimony, would have been the office of the NSIA. There are, perhaps, other places. I'm not familiar with the distribution of intelligence in the PCO.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

It's concerning that it was not brought to your attention and that it only made its way into the reading package of Mr. Morrison. He has testified he doesn't recall reading at the time what was, as he characterized it, a nine-page memo—as if that is prohibitive to seeing it.

This was the second memo, it should be noted, that went to the PCO and, eventually, to the Prime Minister's national security adviser. The first was the IMU in May 2021. Mr. Rigby said he did not receive that IMU, but we now learn that it was, in fact, sent to Mr. Rigby in May 2021.

It seems to me that what we have is a breakdown of communication of information that is about as serious as it gets. It involves the targeting of multiple MPs—including the family of one, in Hong Kong—in the immediate lead-up to an election. It was information that ultimately resulted in the expulsion of a Beijing diplomat.

Would you at least concede that the information should have been brought to your attention?

[Mike MacDonald]

Thank you for the question. There was a lot there.

I think I'll address your last point and your last question.

I rely on, stand by and agree with the testimony of several previous witnesses. If I look at one of the comments that was made, there was a breakdown in the process—it was not only a breakdown in the process but, I think, it was an insufficient process, so we have rectified those problems. What's important here is the recognition that information was not shared when it should have been shared. Systems are in place now and changes have been effected extremely quickly to ensure that doesn't happen again.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Mrs. Romanado.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Through you, I would like to thank the witness for being with us today.

The goal of this committee is not to lay blame. It really is to identify what happened and to make recommendations, as you said, with the goal of improving the system.

Further to what my colleague Mr. Cooper was just referring to, I started to create a timeline because, as you know, we had a lot of turnover in the NSIA position in the last couple of years. We want to make sure that we have a better understanding of what happened, who was where and so on. Again, this is not with the purpose of laying blame, but so that in the event we have a situation again whereby people are leaving a position and/or are absent and so on, we make sure that there's adequate coverage.

In the Right Honourable David Johnston's report, he mentions that you were briefly the interim NSIA when Mr. Morrison went on personal leave. I understand that Mr. Rigby announced he was stepping down on June 30, 2021, and Mr. Morrison was going to take over on an interim basis. However, I understand that you served as acting NSIA from July 16 to August 3, 2021, when Mr. Morrison was on personal leave. Is that correct? Was it roughly those dates?

Do you have the exact dates that you served as NSIA?

[Mike MacDonald]

Chair, I can confirm the exact dates that I acted. I believe it was a Friday. It was July 15 to...I believe it was a Tuesday, because of the long weekend of August 3, which is two and half weeks.

Yes, you are correct.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you so much.

During that time, as Mr. Cooper mentioned, there was a deep-dive memo—an intelligence assessment—drafted by CSIS outlining the threat to Mr. Michael Chong. That was dated July 20. You left the position on August 30. Mr. Morrison came back from his leave on that day and continued until the order in council dated January 4, 2022, naming the current NSIA Jody Thomas.

Is that correct?

[Mike MacDonald]

Your timeline is correct.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Perfect.

One of the things we heard from Mr. Vigneault, who is the director of CSIS, when he testified before this committee on June 13, 2023.... I'm going to quote what he said, because it was something that was really important to us. He said that “intelligence must be shared to have an impact.”

You mentioned that a lot has changed since that time. I know Ms. Thomas has testified that they've put processes in place to make sure that there are no gaps in the event there's a change in position and so on.

Can you provide us with any recommendations, in your opinion, for how we can continue to strengthen that to make sure that, in the event there is some turnover, or if there is turnover in the future, the hand-off is done well?

[Mike MacDonald]

Thanks for the question, Madam Chair.

There are a few things that I would like to take a moment to briefly go over.

One is that I actually appreciate your comments about not laying blame. When public service officials appear before committee, we try—certainly, that's my mantra—to help the committee understand. You will make your decisions, and recommendations come up, which is super helpful.

Continuity is key, and continuity I think in any senior executive position—positions in the public service—is key, because as senior executives we move around a lot. It's a leadership dynamic and a skill that you have to work through. There are ways to have continuity, often referred to as “briefing binders”. People show up to new jobs and have very comprehensive binders, but I think—and what I've experienced—is that reaching out to staff and sitting down and talking with staff is one of the best ways to ensure continuity, because they're the experts. They can help you understand.

If I look back at my time in the Privy Council Office, there are three things that I have taken away that I would share with the committee in the spirit of recommendations around changes.

One is that you, as a consumer of intelligence, need to challenge the intelligence. Ms. Thomas was very helpful in helping me think about the way in which I challenge the conclusions, because intelligence is often not a complete picture. It is simply a moment in time, and that is key to understand.

I think the other thing that senior officials have shown me is that you need to seek clarity and to try to build a bigger picture of what the intelligence is showing you—or not—which kind of goes to the comment about sharing intelligence. It has to be assessed and contextualized, and you need to challenge that function and get that clarity.

The other one, which is extremely important, is that you need to inform and you need to give advice on what it means and what the options are for senior decision-makers.