Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on April 13th, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

I call the meeting to order.

Welcome everyone to meeting number 15 of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the subcommittee on Monday, January 26, 2026, the subcommittee is meeting to examine the current situation for democracy and human rights defenders around the world.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of the witnesses and members.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your microphone and please mute yourself when you are not speaking. For those on Zoom, at the bottom of your screen you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation: floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.

I will remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.

Welcome to the witnesses.

As individuals, we have Ms. Gabrielle Bardall, assistant professor of political science and chairholder of the Canada research chair in women, democracy and power in the Francophonie, from the Université Sainte-Anne; Mr. Leslie Campbell, analyst and consultant, international democracy assistance, by video conference; Professor Miriam Cohen, associate professor and chairholder of Canada research chair in human rights and international reparative justice; Mr. Kevin Deveaux, lawyer, by video conference; and Ms. Monika Le Roy, fellow, Montreal Institute for Global Security.

From the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, we have the Honourable Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, head and president-elect of Belarus, by video conference.

Welcome everyone.

You will each have five minutes for opening remarks.

We'll start with Gabrielle Bardall.

[Gabrielle Bardall, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Chairholder of Canada Research Chair in Women, Democracy, and Power in the Francophonie, Université Sainte-Anne, As an Individual]

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to be here today.

My name is Gabrielle Bardall. I am the Canada research chair on women, democracy and power in the francophonie at Université Sainte‑Anne. I bring over 20 years of experience in democracy assistance across more than 60 countries, including with the United Nations, international civil society organizations and Global Affairs Canada.

My central message is this: Supporting resilient democracy internationally through Canada's foreign policy tools is urgent, but it requires a shift—from technical support to protecting people, power and participation. Canada is uniquely positioned to lead that shift, by setting the normative agenda, establishing a special representative and mobilizing Canadian expertise.

We are living through a rupture in the international order. The rules-based system is under strain. In this context, support for democracy is not only a values issue; it's really a preventative security and economic policy—the essence of national strategic interests.

Canada has strong assets to respond. We have a respected track record, recognized expertise and global credibility. To remain effective, however, we must update how we understand democratic threats.

The nature of democratic erosion has fundamentally changed. We are no longer seeing only the dismantling of institutions. We are also seeing the manipulation of institutions and the shrinking of participation, including in untraditional ways such as through violence against women in politics.

The indicators and targets have also changed. The indicators of democratic decline are appearing in new places. Attacks on women’s rights organizations are among the clearest early warning signs.

The strategies used to undermine democracy have also become more sophisticated. We are seeing hybrid approaches that combine restrictive legislation, digital manipulation and narrative warfare. Gendered disinformation and identity-based attacks are increasingly used to polarize societies and weaken democratic cohesion.

Taken together, the central challenge to democracy today is the systematic shrinking and distortion of democratic space.

Canada’s work in supporting parliaments, electoral systems and governance remains essential, but it is no longer sufficient on its own. Canada must build on these strengths with approaches that protect participation, respond to hybrid threats and engage directly with power dynamics. This includes recognizing that democratic contestation now takes place in information spaces and public narratives, and that trust-based, long-term partnerships are critical to sustaining democratic resilience.

Canada also has a comparative advantage in how it works. Some of Canada’s most effective leadership has been demonstrated through our engagement on the women, peace and security agenda, which emphasized relationships, networks, and sustained engagement across government, civil society and international partners. This model prioritizes trust, convening power and political insight, allowing Canada to operate with flexibility in complex environments.

To operationalize this shift, Canada should take three key steps.

First, it should ground its approach in a clear normative framework for democracy, drawing on international commitments and Canadian constitutional principles, and consider developing a more integrated national action framework.

Second, Canada should establish an office of a special representative for democracy to facilitate coherent cross-government responses, provide visible leadership, convene partners, align Canada’s tools and enable rapid responses.

Third, this role should be embedded within a broader, more formal network of Canadian expertise, ensuring real-time insight, adaptive policy and rapid response through a model inspired by the Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada or options suggested by colleagues here.

Finally, this work must be grounded in multipartisan commitment and gender-based analysis plus, or GBA+. Democracy is not a partisan issue—it is a foundational Canadian value. Likewise, GBA+ enhances our collective national security and economic interests.

In closing, to defend resilient democracy today, we must move beyond technical fixes and engage directly with the realities of power—who holds it, how it is contested and who is excluded. Canada has the experience, the credibility and the tools to lead. What is needed now is the strategic focus and institutional anchor to act on that leadership.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Ms. Bardall. You did a good job of staying within your allotted time. I hope the others will do the same.

We will now hear Leslie Campbell's opening remarks for five minutes.

[Leslie Campbell, Analyst and Consultant, International Democracy Assistance, As an Individual]

Thank you, Chair.

Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the subcommittee. Thanks very much for inviting us all to participate today.

I'm going to give a little history here but come around to very much a similar point to [Technical difficulty—Editor] created Department of Government Efficiency in the United States, or DOGE, ordered officials at the State Department and USAID to immediately suspend [Technical difficulty—Editor]. While a true review never took place, several weeks later, a termination list was circulated that cancelled—

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Chair, I have to raise a point of order. I think there's a connection problem, and it could affect the health and safety of the interpreters. Can you check whether the problem can be fixed?

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Yes, we'll check that right away.

I would like to continue with you, Mr. Campbell. If the problem persists, we'll come back to you and you won't lose any time.

Please go ahead. You can start from the top.

[Leslie Campbell]

In late January 2025, the newly created Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, ordered officials at the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development to suspend [Technical difficulty—Editor] a review. While a true review never took place, several weeks later, a termination list was circulated that cancelled—

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

I'm sorry to cut you off, Mr. Campbell. We would like to come back to you. We'll try to correct this situation.

I invite Professor Miriam Cohen to take the floor for five minutes.

The floor is yours.

[Professor Miriam Cohen, Associate Professor and Chairholder of Canada Research Chair in Human Rights and International Reparative Justice, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, my name is Miriam Cohen, and I am the Canada research chair in human rights and international reparative justice at Université de Montréal.

Thank you very much for inviting me to be here today and for considering the situation of democracy and human rights defenders around the world. It's an honour to contribute to the committee's work on an issue that directly concerns the rule of law, democratic governance and the protection of fundamental freedoms.

My remarks will focus on three areas. First, I'll provide an overview of the current situation of human rights defenders internationally. Then, I'll discuss legal frameworks and institutional mechanisms for protection, and I'll end with some best practices and recommendations.

Human rights defenders play an essential role in any democracy. They help to ensure that human rights are protected and respected, and that democratic principles are upheld. Human rights defenders come from a wide variety of backgrounds. They are youth, adults, members of indigenous communities, recognized professionals and civil society actors. Active in both urban and remote areas, detention settings, and conflict and post-conflict zones, they work alongside refugees, migrants and asylum seekers. They are also present in new arenas such as climate change, AI and emerging technology.

Despite the crucial role they play, human rights defenders are routine targets for intimidation, attack, abduction, false accusations and serious rights violations, by both state and non-state actors. They are unfairly tried, wrongfully convicted and sometimes murdered or forced into hiding.

These trends fit into a broader context of democratic backsliding. Global indicators show that civil and political liberties have been consistently deteriorating for over a decade. When democratic institutions are weakened, human rights defenders often become targets, precisely because they serve as a counterbalance.

Today, various legal mechanisms and instruments help to protect human rights defenders.

In 1999, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, recognizing their role and their right to promote and protect human rights. Although not legally binding internationally, the declaration is based on the Charter of the United Nations and the major international treaties on human rights. In addition, the UN Human Rights Council examines matters related to the protection of human rights defenders through its universal periodic review and special procedures. The special rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders plays an essential role, analyzing information on violations and developing recommendations.

A number of regional initiatives complement these frameworks.

In Europe, the Council of Europe adopted a declaration to improve the protection of human rights defenders and has a general rapporteur responsible for monitoring the situation of human rights defenders.

In Africa, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights created a special rapporteur on human rights defenders mandated to pay particular attention to certain types of vulnerable people, including women's rights defenders and environmental advocates.

It is also important to point out that states can neither delegate their responsibility to protect human rights defenders nor use exceptional circumstances to shirk their responsibility. The protection of human rights defenders stems from a fundamental obligation under the rule of law. Human rights defenders are vital to the workings of a democratic society. Their work helps to prevent rights abuses, strengthen public trust and support the rule of law. For that reason, their protection is imperative to democracy.

With that in mind, it is especially important for the international community to prioritize three things.

The first is to fight against impunity for perpetrators of violence against human rights defenders.

The second is to guarantee freedom of association and access to funding for civil society.

The third is to ensure clear and consistent political support for democracy and human rights defenders at risk.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Ms. Cohen. I'm very glad you stayed within your allotted time.

We will now hear opening remarks from lawyer Kevin Deveaux for five minutes.

[Kevin Deveaux, Lawyer, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

Thank you to the committee for this opportunity to present.

I'll just briefly give you my background. I've been a lawyer based in Halifax for 35 years. I was elected four times to the Nova Scotia House of Assembly. Twenty years ago I left politics and started working internationally, first with the United Nations and more recently as a consultant, focused on political governance and, particularly, support to parliaments and political parties. I've had the pleasure of working directly with more than 80 parliaments around the world.

My focus today is probably more broadly to talk about Canada's role in building systems that can ensure democratic resilience and support the democratic advocates around the world. In particular, I think we can all agree that in the last year or so the world order has shifted. It's no longer good enough for Canada to follow others. It's time for us to lead. I would hope that the speech from January in Davos by the Prime Minister was a starting point for that, but if it's going to be more than words on a page, then we really do need concrete ideas about how Canada is going to build those coalitions of middle powers. It's no longer about us being in the back seat. It's about finding our added value and being prepared to lead in securing democratic states and values.

I understand that Canadian foreign policy has shifted away from perhaps other priorities to now focusing on Canada's security and on building stable trading partnerships for our economic prosperity. I don't disagree with that pivot, but I would say that we don't have security as a country and we don't have stable trading and economic prosperity without partners who are following democratic standards. For example, there's the rule of law. Without an independent, robust judiciary, the enforcement of trade agreements and supply chain contracts isn't going to happen. Without robust civil society and free media, holding the government to account becomes much more challenging. We need to ensure that those democratic standards and values, and countries based on those, are the basis of our partnerships.

If we're talking about a new world order, I would also argue that it's time for a new approach. The old way of overseas development assistance, or ODA, and project-based modalities where the global north imposed its needs on the global south will no longer be viable. Canada needs to lead not through the prescriptive requirements that it imposes through project cycles but through collaboration amongst like-minded democratic countries and nascent movements in more autocratic settings, as I think we will hear from our fellow presenter from Belarus.

Canada does have unique value, whether that's our two languages, our two legal systems, our cadre of experts in many fields of democratic governance or our history of gender-based analysis as a priority. These are things that I think allow Canada to provide and have the gravitas to lead. We want to facilitate dialogue and solutions between the north and south. Again, this isn't about imposing from the north to the south. It's about how we begin to talk to each other as equals. Let's not create a new institution that will be looking to solve problems that may or may not exist. Let's invest in bespoke and tailor-made analysis and use Canada's convening power to create solutions where democracy is challenged or threatened.

I have one very concrete recommendation with regard to that. I think the Government of Canada needs to invest in a rapid deployment system of democratic governance and security experts who can provide timely, high-quality political analysis that can inform the government as it makes decisions with regard to global events. I suspect—in fact, I'm pretty confident—that this is lacking at the moment.

Such a system should be external from the government so that we can have more frank advice and analysis. It should be based on a roster of Canadian experts from which a small group can be drawn. They can conduct political and security analysis in hot spots. Think of Bangladesh after the 2024 uprising, or think of Lebanon, perhaps, in a month or two, if possible, when this conflict ends. It would be able to draw upon Canadian academics and think tanks for background and analytical research. It would be able to provide Global Affairs Canada and the broader government with concrete political analysis and recommendations within weeks of a global crisis to inform our actions and policies. It would give Canada a seat at the table through a rapid, evidence-based analysis that can be shared with potential partners.

Canada's offering to its partners is a commitment to facilitate and create space for an informed dialogue that can create solutions and support tailored interventions to a given country or region in a given circumstance. By building a rapid deployment system for political analysis, Canada is building a reputation as a broker and an incubator of bespoke solutions for a given country or region in crisis. This is soft power, and soft power is a type of political capital Canada needs as we seek new trading and security partners.

Finally, I would just say that I think some of the other recommendations I've heard already, particularly from Madame Bardall around a special representative or an office of democracy, fit very well within this rapid deployment as ways of enhancing Canada's capacity to speak and act quickly.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, sir.

I would now like to invite the Honourable Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya to take the floor for five minutes.

Welcome, Madame. The floor is yours.

[Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Head and President-elect of Belarus, United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First of all, I want to thank the Canadian Parliament and government for your commitment to freedom, democracy and human rights.

Canada was always one of the staunchest supporters of the Belarusian democratic movement. I want to thank you for that, but first of all for supporting Ukraine, because the fates of Belarus and Ukraine are intertwined.

My name is Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. In 2020, I was an ordinary housewife, and I decided to run against the dictator Lukashenko, who ruled the country for 30 years. I did it out of love for my husband, who was a blogger and was imprisoned after his decision to challenge the dictator. By all independent counts, we, the Belarusian people, won that election by a landslide, but predictably, the dictator refused to step down, and he unleashed real terror in Belarus. Thousands of people were imprisoned and many more were forced into exile, including me.

In exile, we continue to fight. We have formed the government in exile and democratic institutions as an alternative to the pro-Russian regime in Minsk. Many western countries recognize us as legitimate representatives of the Belarusian people and call me president-elect. I'm glad that Canada, since 2020, no matter who is in power, has recognized our movement and in 2024 launched formal strategic consultations with Belarusian democratic forces.

Belarus is a perfect example of what happens when you neglect democracy. It shows how security and democracy are intertwined. Authorities that don't respect their own people also don't respect their neighbours. The regime in Minsk made Belarus a launch pad for Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Belarus is used for hybrid attacks against Europe. Russia deploys nuclear weapons and strategic missiles to blackmail our neighbours—Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. The dictator is selling our independence to Putin in exchange for his political support.

All of that happens against the will of the Belarusian people. Most Belarusians are against the dictatorship, support Ukraine and lean toward a European future.

Any dissent, any form of resistance, is cracked down on by the regime. Since 2020, 65,000 people have passed through detention. On average, every single day, 10 people are being detained on trumped-up charges. People are arrested for everything—for comments, for likes on Instagram, for donations to Belarusian volunteers fighting in Ukraine or for helping the opposition. As we speak, more than 950 political prisoners remain behind bars, including 120 women.

Last year, thanks to U.S. diplomacy and European pressure, more than 500 people were released. Unfortunately, it didn't stop the repression, and new hostages have since been taken.

Belarusian prisons remind us of the Stalin times. People are regularly beaten, tortured, punished by isolation and cold, and kept incommunicado. Many have died behind bars already. Even those released cannot enjoy full freedom. They remain under surveillance and restricted in rights. Those abroad face transnational repression. The regime has denied them passports, documents and consular services, making them de facto stateless.

The regime abuses international mechanisms, such as Interpol, to chase political opponents. Those who are active in exile, including here in Canada, are blackmailed with their relatives' prosecution in Belarus. Even abroad, our people cannot feel safe. Those who return to Belarus to renew documents, for example, or visit elderly parents are often arrested right on the border.

The regime in Belarus wages war not only against its own people but also against Belarusian culture and identity, our language and our history, just as Russia is doing in occupied territories in Ukraine. Their goal is to make us another Russia and destroy our pro-European aspirations.

Today, I came here to ask Canada to be a leading voice for freedom and democracy worldwide and to put the Belarusian situation in focus.

I have some practical suggestions for Canada.

First, keep pressure on the regime. Keep sanctions strong. Demand the release of all political prisoners and a full stop to repression. Canada has leverage and you have power.

Second, continue and increase assistance for our civil society, for democratic forces, for cultural initiatives and, of course, for independent media.

Programs such as Journalists for Human Rights, funded by Canada, help empower our connection with the people on the ground and provide them with truth, not propaganda. Canada can also support the International Humanitarian Fund to help victims of repression, which we launched with Norway and which 12 other countries have already joined.

Third, support our accountability efforts. Canada can support the case in the International Criminal Court against Lukashenko's regime for crimes against humanity. We must bring perpetrators to justice, not only for repression but also for complicity in Russia's war and the deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus.

Fourth, help Belarusians in Canada so that they can feel safe. We have small but very active communities in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver. Establish simplified legalization mechanisms and provide Belarusians with the necessary documents and asylum. Recognize Belarus as an unsafe country to return to and prohibit extradition to Belarus.

Fifth, help us raise the issue of transnational repression in the UN and OSCE. I know Global Affairs puts a lot of focus on it. We must prevent dictators from misusing international mechanisms for political prosecution.

Finally, strengthen the relationship with Belarusian democratic forces and the United Transitional Cabinet, because changes in Belarus are inevitable. As history shows, dictatorships collapse when no one expects it. We must prepare for a post-Lukashenko Belarus now, so that when the moment comes, we can put the country on the right track.

In the end, I ask you to form a group for a democratic Belarus in the Canadian Parliament and organize joint events together to highlight Belarus, Ukraine and our struggle for freedom. Our fight is not isolated. It's part of a global fight for freedom, democracy and human rights. Of course, change in Belarus is our task—the Belarusian people's—but no fight for freedom can be won when you're alone. We need allies on our path, and we count on Canada and your leadership.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you.

Due to the situation, I gave you more than two minutes extra. I feel sorry for the other witnesses. I have to respect the time, but you got special consideration.

Now I would like to invite Ms. Monika Le Roy to take the floor for five minutes.

The floor is yours.

[Monika Le Roy, Fellow, Montreal Institute for Global Security, As an Individual]

Thank you, Chair and members of the subcommittee.

Canada has a genuine and distinguished record in supporting democratic governance abroad. During the Pinochet and Argentine dictatorships, Canadian funding sustained independent researchers who later helped design the democratic institutions that replaced those regimes.

Canada led the Commonwealth efforts to impose sanctions against apartheid in South Africa when larger allies resisted. At the 2001 Summit of the Americas, hosted in Quebec City, Canada anchored the declaration that became the Inter-American Democratic Charter, embedding democratic conditionality into the institutional architecture of an entire hemisphere.

The question before this committee is not whether Canada believes in democracy support. It is why we have not built the doctrine, sustained funding or institutional coherence to do this work systematically. Canadian engagement has been episodic, shaped by program cycles and political wins. That has constrained our credibility and reduced the strategic return on our own interventions.

I offer 20 years of practitioner experience at the OAS, navigating democratic crises in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Haiti, serving as senior policy adviser to two Canadian foreign ministers and providing field leadership supporting targeted democratic interventions across five continents.

Today I want to offer three propositions.

First, democracy support is of Canadian national interest. Democratic partners make better trade and security partners. They offer rule of law, contract enforcement and regulatory predictability, the very conditions Canada's trade diversification agenda depends on. Investments in legislative oversight or judicial independence are not charitable acts. These are investments in the durability of the economic and security partnerships our country relies on.

The counterfactual also matters. Authoritarian actors are actively undermining the rules-based system Canada depends on, displacing multilateral norms and destabilizing the environment in which Canada trades, invests and operates. This is not values divorced from interest. It is national interest policy and it should be treated, structured and funded as such.

Second, political institutions are a necessary investment. Civil society support matters, and Canada has capable organizations doing it, but civil society without functional political institutions produces advocacy without governance. In open societies, democracy requires legislatures that work, parties that compete responsibly and elected officials who can govern. In closed environments, it requires protecting the political and civic space that keeps democratic possibility alive.

The numbers are stark. Of Canada's roughly $12.3 billion in official development assistance, about $165 million goes to democratic development. Of that, just $4.75 million reaches legislatures and political parties. When Canadian parliamentarians engage directly with peers through mechanisms like ParlAmericas and the Parliamentary Centre, they build institutional trust and political relationships that open doors and anchor security partnerships.

Third, credibility depends on consistency. Canada's multilateral positions, political statements and global affairs programming must reinforce one another. Belarus illustrates the challenge. Magnitsky sanctions are in place, and they matter, but designation without proportionate support for political institutions and without sustained engagement with democratic forces in exile, reveals a gap between what Canada says and what it deploys.

This subcommittee has heard from the president-elect from Belarus. A legitimate question is whether Canada's material support is proportional to the leadership position it claims to hold. It's time to meet the moment. Global official development assistance dropped by nearly one-quarter in 2025. Democracy and governance programming experienced some of the steepest cuts in decades, where the largest funder, the United States, has halted roughly 90% of a $3-billion annual budget. This is a vacuum that will not remain empty. The only question is what and who is going to fill it.

My recommendations do not require new money. They require rebalancing and doctrine.

First, the committee should ask the government to develop a public Canadian democracy support strategy, one that links Canada's political and multilateral positions to programming and explicitly treats democracy support as an investment in Canadian economic and security interests.

Second, direct Global Affairs Canada to fund political actors—legislators, parties and elected officials—with the same intent applied to civil society. Supporting political institutions is not interference. It is the most direct investment Canada can make in democratic durability.

Third, recommend predictable multi-year partnerships with key democratic institutions that carry Canada's credibility into the field. The model here is partnership, not episodic grants. Sustained support allows planning, expertise retention and the long-term relationships this work requires. Canada has the tools, the credibility and the strategic interest to play a serious role in supporting democracy abroad. What we have lacked is the doctrine that connects these tools and the consistency that convinces our partners we mean what we say.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Ms. Le Roy. You finished right on time.

Now I would like to move to questions and answers, but before that, we have to go back to Mr. Leslie Campbell. I will just let you know that we are probably going to continue to have the same problem. If the problem persists, we will have to say sorry to Mr. Campbell.

Mr. Campbell, we will give you another chance. The floor is yours.

It appears Mr. Campbell is no longer with us, so we will go to the next step, which is questions and answers.

I would like to start by inviting Mr. Majumdar to take the floor for seven minutes.

The floor is yours.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you for all of your testimonies today. We really appreciate hearing your perspectives on how democracy and international affairs serve the national interest. It's been very insightful.

Sviatlana, it's really good to see you healthy and thriving again. You've been a great friend to Canada, and hopefully Canada has been a good friend to you and your cause. Maybe I could start with you very briefly.

A case against Lukashenko has now been brought to the ICC for crimes against humanity, but Canada has not joined. Should Canada support this effort, and what outcomes would you expect from the ICC?

[Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya]

First of all, I have to say that Lithuania's referral was an important breakthrough. The ICC has now opened an investigation into alleged crimes against humanity linked to Belarus. It's focused, in particular, on the deportation and persecution of political opponents. Of course, it's not just a symbolic case. It means that, for us, the doors to justice are open. There is still a long road ahead, but the road exists. We started work on this case three years ago, so some even lost hope.

What I expect from the ICC, first of all, is a serious, professional investigation that preserves evidence and identifies those most responsible for the crimes. Second, we await arrest warrants when the legal threshold is met. Third, it's a message to every official in the Belarusian system that impunity is not forever.

I do not expect miracles tomorrow, but for the victims, even this opening of the case really matters. I think that Canada, of course, can support the accountability process more effectively. At a minimum, Canada should or could publicly support this investigation, share the evidence with the prosecutors where possible and fund, for example, documentation work, and protect witnesses and survivors on its territory but also support universal jurisdiction cases.

We call on more countries to join Lithuania's referral, so Canada can join this case in the frame of the International Criminal Court.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

In Poland, I had an opportunity to meet many of your colleagues, who are very sophisticated actors in how they represent Belarusian activists and civilians down to the village district. Systemically, what kind of support could be provided to you and your colleagues in these challenging times?

[Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya]

We are really people and a nation without a state. First of all, of course, we need support for our people. While putting pressure on the regime, we are asking for support for our civil society, because it's the backbone of any uprising. We ask you to provide assistance to Belarusian civil society activists, young initiatives and independent media and journalism, including human rights reporting.

Also, cultural and educational programs are extremely important, because the regime is trying to erase everything Belarusian. For example, we can propose to increase support for media through the Journalists for Human Rights program that is chaired by Marcus Kolga.

Also, contributions to the International Humanitarian Fund are essential, because we are expecting more political prisoners to be released, hopefully soon, and all of them will need psychological and physical rehabilitation.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you very much. I really appreciate that. That's a good survey of events. I'm sorry to cut you off. I have just a brief couple of minutes left.

Ms. Le Roy, it's nice to see you. You have incredible experiences across Asia and the Americas, both on a policy and a practitioner level. Your testimony suggested ways in which doctrine and support could be provided to actors across these areas of your expertise.

What do these areas in Asia and the Americas tell you about Beijing's approach in undermining these democracies around the world?

[Monika Le Roy]

I just returned from spending two years in the South Pacific, building democracy programs that were literally designed to confront China's incursion into the South Pacific sea. They've moved into a region where western governments were, for the most part, absent. They immediately moved in to start building deep-sea ports to support their naval blockades if they wanted to move into new territories. They are interfering and building partnerships with security apparatus across the Pacific Islands region. They're using money to destabilize and corrupt governance institutions and natural resources.

Simple partnership programs that work with political parties, that work with governance structures and that work with legislators to build transparency capacity provide a very safe and low-effort alternative to the Chinese government for partnership with the rest of the world.

In regard to Venezuela, I think we've all seen what has happened in the country over the past year in particular, but that was 15 years of erosion by a government that was getting substantial funding from the Chinese government to do erosion of democratic structures and eliminate their human rights systems in order to ensure that the Chinese government had access to long-term oil resources.

Canada did play a role in supporting International Criminal Court prosecutions or investigations into the situation in Venezuela, but it fell short of taking additional action to support the opposition. Supporting local actors—political parties, civil society groups—is essential to providing a counterpart for foreign interference that's intent on weakening structures that would support our allies.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Okay. Thank you.

Chair, I understand that I'm probably at the last five seconds of my time, so I return the floor.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you.

Now I would like to invite Ms. Anita Vandenbeld.

Anita, welcome back. We missed you. I hope all is well. You have the floor for seven minutes, please.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you very much. It's wonderful to be back, especially with this incredible panel. I think we could spend many hours with these witnesses.

I have a question for each witness. If we don't get to you in this round, maybe we can follow up.

I'm going to start with you, Mr. Deveaux. You and some of the previous witnesses spoke quite a bit about the ODA model of project X, where there are four to five years of funding for a particular country to do a particular project with pre-set activities, outcomes and outputs, but the model doesn't work when it comes to this urgent global threat of democratic backsliding.

You talked about rapid response. You talked about going into areas where there's high risk that perhaps mobilizing an arm's-length institution or some form of expertise would be better than having projects that can sometimes require months or years for a contract to be signed.

Can you tell us a little bit more about what that might look like?