Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I would like to apologize, but I do not speak French very well.
Each time I went on a course, I was sent on another UN operation, and got away from Ottawa, which wasn't a bad thing.
As this is your last day before returning to your ridings, I actually thank you for being here. It wasn't like that when I went to school. During my time in uniform, I was sent here with government talking points, so it's nice to be able to express my personal opinion this morning without fearing a call from the CDS or the minister tomorrow morning.
Let me start by saying I think you have the cart before the horse. That is to say, what's the foreign policy that will dictate the employment of our military post-Afghanistan? Unfortunately, it's my observation that this is not unique to this committee. It's the usual way the defence policy is made in this country. If you research the subject, you will see that defence policy reviews have historically been done before foreign policy reviews, which is quite bizarre.
Presumably, the questions I was given about peace operations suggest those will be a priority for the Canadian Forces following Afghanistan. If the polls and the letters to the editors and the talk shows are to be believed, that would be in tune with the majority of public opinion. Mind you, that opinion ignores the fact that our self-proclaimed reputation as a peacekeeping nation is one of the great Canadian myths. To qualify as such, surely peacekeeping must have been a top foreign policy priority, and it never was. It was parked well behind sovereignty, defence of North America, and coalition or alliance obligations, with NATO being the alliance that demanded the most personnel and cash. During the Cold War, we had only modest numbers of troops deployed on peacekeeping operations, compared to our large, permanently stationed land and air forces on the central front in Europe. It seemed to me that successive governments endorsed a peacekeeping myth because it was cheap, and they could cut defence budgets while still maintaining some international profile.
We had massive deployments to peace operations only during the early 1990s, after the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. We had large missions in Bosnia, Croatia, Cyprus, the Golan, Cambodia, and Somalia. Three of them--Bosnia, Croatia, and Somalia, as well as a small mission in Rwanda--represented the end of peacekeeping missions as we knew them, all 13 of them from 1956 to 1990.
The difference, not noticed by the majority of the public, is that post-Cold War peacekeeping missions involve peace broken by factions, not countries. Factions don't have flags flying in front of the UN building in downtown Manhattan. They don't have delegations there. They don't give a damn for the UN, because the UN peacekeeping force operating under UN rules of engagement can't hurt them.
I say this as someone who others have described as the most experienced peacekeeper in the world, not because of the nine missions I served with, but because I served on UN duty in every rank from lieutenant to major-general, except for full colonel, and commanded a UN mission, not just the military component, in Central America, and established and commanded a subordinate mission in Sarajevo, where I reported directly to the United Nations, at least when they would answer the phone.
That brings up the capacity or lack thereof of the UN to direct and resource UN operations in which the use of deadly force is authorized. Eighteen years ago some of us said the UN was incapable of directing post-Cold War missions. While we were chastised--or in my case reprimanded--for saying so, we were heartened to hear the Under-Secretary-General for UN Peacekeeping say exactly the same thing just a few years ago.
Subcontracting to a nation to run a mission on behalf of the UN can work, as it did with the U.S. in the lead in Somalia and under Australian leadership in East Timor.
I saw the grimaces and winces when I mentioned Somalia as a success story for the U.S. The U.S.-led assault in December 1992 was the most successful intervention in the history of the United Nations. The force, including Canadians, went to a knife fight with a gun and established security conditions that permitted the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. It was only when the UN took over six months later--and I was there observing the handover for CTV--that the leadership of the mission self-destructed, and the entire mission left with its tail between its legs. By the way, and for the record, the U.S. commander of that intervention force, General Johnston, was standing by to appear before the Somalia inquiry to state that the Canadian Airborne Regiment was the best unit he had in his 36,000-man force. Too bad it was shut down before he had a chance to appear.
Assuming that our future foreign policy will continue to offer up Canadian military contributions to coalition alliance operations, some with UN blessings, some without, we have to maintain a flexible, combat-capable military. We must never again subordinate our military to ridiculous UN rules of engagement dreamed up in downtown Manhattan.
No matter how benign the mission, we should be prepared for the worst-case scenario, not the best case, which always dictates UN thinking as it is the least expensive. Let me give you a few examples.
While commanding a mission in Sarajevo, it was important for me to defend the airport from heavy tanks that were within about 400 or 500 metres. I asked permission from the United Nations to bring the TOW Under Armour, tube-launched, optically controlled, wire-guided missile systems that we had introduced and placed on top of armoured personnel carriers from our Canadians who were serving in Croatia. The UN came back and told me I could bring the missile launchers down but not the missiles. I obviously ignored the order, disobeyed the order, and brought them anyway.
I asked for mortars. They said I could bring the mortars down from the Canadian contingent, but not high-explosive ammunition, only illumination, so, presumably, I could see the people who were attacking us at night. And I ignored that order.
The Danes, when they came in and said they were bringing Leopard tanks, the UN said no. The Dutch brought them anyway and fired a few rounds at people who were shooting at them and they never got shot at again in their six-month tour. And in the case of the Dutch going into Srebrenica with nothing but small arms, we all know what happened there.
I conclude with something I have championed for the past 50 years unsuccessfully. Of all the countries in the world that should maintain an amphibious expeditionary capability, it's Canada. We keep bragging about our three oceans.
A thousand soldiers on board a purpose-built ship, one on each coast, capable of deploying on short notice, unlike today... Such ships cost less than a destroyer or a frigate and require smaller crews. Don't be fooled; the joint support ship project currently in suspension does not address this requirement. There is no space on board the JSS for combat troops and their equipment.
Such a capability would be invaluable not just for intervention operations but—equally important—for humanitarian missions, like those experienced recently following natural disasters in Haiti and the Indian Ocean, not to forget the one we're standing by for on the west coast of our own country.
The U.S., U.K., Spain, Italy, Holland, Australia, France, and Russia can't all be wrong as they currently expand their amphibious forces. Unfortunately, we don't have that capability, period.
I would be happy to discuss this during the Q and A, and I encourage you to consider this valuable addition to our military capabilities during your deliberations.
Thank you very much.
