National Defence Committee on Oct. 28th, 2010

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

I would like to welcome everyone to the Standing Committee on National Defence. This is our 30th meeting. Today, pursuant to the agenda and Standing Order 108(2), we are continuing our study of the next generation of fighter aircraft.

Our witnesses today are from the Department of National Defence. We will have the honour of hearing from Lieutenant-General Deschamps, Chief of the Air Staff, and Colonel Dave Burt, Acting Project Manager, Next Generation Fighter Capability.

Thank you and welcome.

So, monsieur, you have about ten minutes to do your presentation, and after that all members will have the floor. It's up to you. Thank you very much.

[LGen J.P.A. Deschamps, Chief of the Air Staff, Department of National Defence]

Merci, monsieur le président. Committee members, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the high-level mandatory capabilities for Canada's next-generation fighter aircraft.

You recently had the opportunity to hear from Mr. Dan Ross, our Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel), concerning the process being used to procure the F-35 as the best price, best capability and, thus, best-value fighter for Canadians under the MOU signed by the Joint Strike Fighter Program partners. I will therefore focus specifically on Canada's requirements—and the extensive analysis of options—for the fighter we will use for the next 30 to 40 years.

As I noted previously before this committee, manned fighters are essential to our ability to maintain control and sovereignty over our airspace, whether in Canada or during operations abroad. Neither unmanned aerial vehicles nor any other air platform can carry out this demanding and complex task, whether they are operating in air-to-air or air-to-ground roles. This is the same conclusion reached by many of Canada's allies.

Following the announcement of the government's intent to acquire a next-generation fighter in the Canada First defence strategy, we examined our requirements very closely and finalized them in early 2010. We looked at future and current roles and missions that our next-generation fighter would be responsible for and the environment—both physical and threat—in which it would be operating.

We need a capability that helps us carry out our core missions of defending the sovereignty of Canadian and North American air space through NORAD, providing Canada with an effective and modern capability for international operations, and effectively conducting joint operations with our allies through NATO or a coalition.

We need robust aircraft, capable of operating across Canada's vast geography and under harsh and varying weather conditions and deterring challenges to Canadian sovereignty.

Because we cannot afford to acquire and operate multiple, specialized fighter fleets, tomorrow's fighter aircraft must be capable of undertaking a variety of air-to-air and air-to-surface combat roles. In a more generic sense, the fighter must be capable of undertaking whatever defence role we demand of it, whether that is a northern sovereignty patrol, an intercept role, war-fighting, surveillance, or anything else.

Furthermore, to be prepared for the future, the aircraft must be flexible enough to deal with threats and missions that were unexpected at the time of its conception. We know that some of the threats faced by the CF-18 in the late 20th century have faded, some have continued, and new ones have emerged. There is no reason for us to doubt that we will continue to see similar fluidity and evolution in threats as this century unfolds. We assume that technology will continue to evolve on various fronts, such as data processing, threat detection, weapons systems, self-defence suites, and interoperability, to give just a few examples.

Specifically, our short list of high-level mandatory capabilities, which are qualitative and not quantitative in nature, comprise the following characteristics.

Range: the aircraft must have the range to be capable of deploying in NORAD and NATO alert configurations, in accordance with instrument flying rules without air-to-air refuelling support, whether the aircraft is flying non-stop from a main operating base to a deployed operating base or from a main operating base to a forward operating location with one stop en route if required.

Endurance:

The aircraft must have the endurance to be capable of operating from a main operating base, a deployed operating base or a forward operating location in accordance with instrument flying rules and maintain a combat air patrol in accordance with Canadian Forces, NORAD and NATO requirements.

Speed: our next fighter must have the speed to be capable of successfully conducting an intercept of air-breathing threats—that is to say, non-ballistic threats such as fighters or bombers—to Canadian airspace or to airspace assigned to the Canadian Forces in accordance with NORAD and NATO standards.

Air-to-air refueling: The fighter must be capable of receiving fuel in flight to extend its range and endurance.

Deployability: our next fighter must be capable of deploying to and operating from forward operating locations domestically and worldwide in a full range of geographic, environmental, climatic, and threat conditions.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance: the fighter must be capable of providing non-traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data before, during, and following the deployment of weapons. This capability will assist targeting, intelligence, and command entities in a variety of decision-making processes.

Weapons: the aircraft must precisely deliver a range of air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons in all weather conditions, day and night, and in permissive and non-permissive environments to provide a spectrum of tailored weapons effects.

Survivability:

The aircraft must be capable of defending itself by employing a range of self-defence technologies and minimizing the risk of detection, engagement and damage in predicted threat environments.

Growth potential: the aircraft must be capable of continuous upgrade to its level of interoperability, survivability, and operational capabilities for the duration of its lifetime.

Fleet size: the fleet must be large enough to conduct assigned missions and roles while simultaneously maintaining combat-ready force generation capability—that is, training new crews and maintenance of aircraft.

Certification:

The aircraft must be capable of certification and sustainment in accordance with Canadian standards.

Delivery: the delivery times must give us the capability of achieving an initial operating capability of the new aircraft, coordinated with the CF-18 Hornet's end of lifetime. In other words, the new fighter must begin delivery in 2016 to allow overlap with the Hornet's projected retirement in 2020, and thus avoid a gap in our defence capabilities by ensuring that such needs as trained crews are ready to go. In procurement terms, that is almost tomorrow.

The analysis of the quantitative mandatory requirements associated with these high-level mandatory capabilities for Canada's next fighter made it clear that only a fifth generation fighter could satisfy our mission needs in the increasingly complex future security environment.

The F-35 Lightning II is the only aircraft that meets our mandatory requirements and the only fifth-generation aircraft available to Canada. The fifth-generation F-22 Raptor is an excellent air superiority fighter that is being upgraded through the addition of selected capabilities that have found their origins in the F-35. However, the United States government does not permit foreign sales. Russia has a fifth generation under development, and China is expected to do the same.

Three key capabilities distinguish a fifth-generation fighter from a fourth-generation fighter.

First, interoperability—a unique combination of stealth, long-range high-resolution sensors and security high-capacity networks that allow aircraft to communicate with one another and share data in a secure environment.

Secondly, sensors and data fusion: a system that consolidates tactical information from the sensors and off-board sources to provide pilots with a clear understanding of the tactical situation at a glance.

Thirdly, survivability: that is very low observable stealth, advanced sensors, a comprehensive self-defence suite, and secure data link that mean a fifth-generation aircraft can accomplish more in a mission with fewer supporting assets.

It is important to be clear that a fourth-generation aircraft cannot be upgraded to a fifth-generation aircraft. You cannot turn a fourth-generation CF-18, even a modernized version such as ours, into a fifth-generation stealth aircraft.

The F-35 Lightning II represents the revolutionary difference from previous generations of fighters in terms of capabilities, and it brings unique advantages. It brings stealth technology. Low observability will significantly reduce the aircraft's electromagnetic signature and therefore reduce detection by enemy sensor systems. It provides lower risk and improves survivability for the pilot, as well as enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, all of which have significant relevance across the Government of Canada's defence priorities of national, continental, and international operations. It possesses advanced sensor and data fusion technology that will gather, synthesize, and display information to help pilots understand the tactical situation at a glance, make complex tactical decisions quickly, and take decisive action. The aircraft takes care of much of the data gathering and synthesis that pilots now have to do themselves and that has become almost overwhelming in its quantity and speed. In effect, the aircraft is the co-pilot.

We will have interoperability with our partners and allies that will be seamless, safe and effective within NORAD and NATO and on coalition operations.

The F-35 allows us to share its entire situational awareness with partner aircraft. When we go into operations abroad with like-minded coalition nations with the same platform, the aircraft are the same. Therefore, we can share resources and quickly go into an operation without weeks of training, because we have the same kit and software as our partners. It makes a big difference in how we're going to do business as a coalition.

Furthermore, the aircraft is sustainable. We will be able to replace lost aircraft, or acquire additional aircraft if the future global situation demands it, because the production line will operate until at least 2035. Software will be upgraded on an ongoing basis, and we will not have to contract individually for upgrades, bringing huge savings and keeping the aircraft up to date as technology evolves.

In conclusion, given the increasingly complex and uncertain future security environment, the F-35 Lightning II will provide Canada with the greatest probability of mission success and the greatest probability that our men and women will survive and return safely from their missions.

We are acquiring the F-35 Lightning II to protect Canadian interests and to counter tomorrow's threats. Procured and sustained through the JSF program, the F-35 is the best value for our taxpayer dollar and will keep Canada at the forefront of fighter operations, enabling our fleet to remain relevant, flexible, viable, and sustainable well into the middle of this century.

The F-35 Lightning II is not an unnecessary luxury. It is the right tool, at the best value, to properly do the job that Canada and Canadians want their air force to carry out on their behalf.

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. I would be happy to address any questions you have about the high level mandatory capabilities for our fighter.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much, Lieutenant-General Deschamps.

I will now turn the floor over to Mr. LeBlanc.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would also like to thank General Deschamps and Colonel Burt for being here today.

General, thank you for your overview of the technical needs, which the parliamentary secretary presented in committee a month ago.

I know my colleagues also have questions to ask and there will be other rounds.

General, we were very concerned about the Auditor General's recent report with respect to the Chinook helicopters. I know you share that concern. I think the minister certainly expressed his concern clearly on seeing the Auditor General's report, as well as his acceptance of her analysis and his commitment to ensuring that the air force does better in subsequent procurements.

In the Chinook helicopter procurement, one of her criticisms, as you know, was the escalation of costs because of modifications and changes that were made after the initial decision to proceed. She identified a number of steps at which the costs ended up almost doubling and she identified a lot of the responsibility for that around changes that were made during the process. She also commented that the ongoing support costs weren't properly calculated, and she identified perhaps a billion dollars that the defence department may have to reassign for having underestimated the cost of operating the Chinooks.

The Chinooks were an operating aircraft. The F-35 certainly is not as familiar as the Chinook helicopters might be. What reassurances can you give us, General, that with respect to the F-35 purchase--which is much more expensive than the Chinook purchase--some of those mistakes won't be repeated?

[LGen J.P.A. Deschamps]

I'll ask my colleague, Colonel Burt, to address the cost controls within the JSF program with our coalition partners. He can probably provide some of those answers for you.

[Col Dave Burt, Acting Project Manager, Next Generation Fighter Capability, Department of National Defence]

Thank you very much for the question.

There are cost controls within our participation in the MOU. Perhaps I should go back to some basics, because I'm not sure that's clearly understood.

This committee has been told that we will be procuring the aircraft through the MOU, and all our needs will be put forth to the JSF program office, together with those of all the other partners. Each year all of those needs are collectively negotiated with Lockheed Martin and the other prime contractors. Similarly, our sustainment costs will be actioned in a collective way. So we will not be acting unilaterally; we will be acting collectively through the JSF program.

Through our participation in the JSF program we have visibility on all of the costs. The team from the JSF program office negotiates with the prime contractors led by Lockheed Martin. We have Canadians participating in that team as members of the JSF program office, and we also have observers.

Finally, before any of these contracts with Lockheed Martin are finalized for procurement or sustainment, the details of them are put back to the executive steering board on which we have a member who has an equal vote with all of the other partners, and a veto vote, in that the JSF executive steering board seeks unanimous agreement on all of these types of arrangements. Through that process we will be able to monitor and control the costs to Canada for the procurement and sustainment of the aircraft.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Colonel, then there are some of the problems she identified. For example, your review boards would have met to look at the escalating costs with respect to the Chinook, but that wouldn't apply in the case of the JSF acquisition because it would be sort of multinational, with the different partners working together. So some of the cost control mechanisms that were allegedly in place for the Chinooks and failed aren't even applicable to this purchase. We're participating with a larger group of people. I'm surprised that all of these measures are in place to control the costs, yet you're proposing to acquire something without even knowing the costs.

[Col Dave Burt]

There are a couple of issues that you've raised. First of all, there are mechanisms within the department, the senior review boards, that will still be applicable to the next-generation fighter capability project, but they will be applicable in a different context, as you have alluded to. To be frank, we have not yet determined how our participation in the JSF program will interact with the senior review boards and the other boards within the department. We are working on that process now. We set up the project management office two weeks ago. I'm making a big effort to try to expand my team to address all issues of that nature.

One of the other issues that we need to address is getting a clearer understanding of the costs as we advance to government for expenditure authority on the various elements of the project. We will be taking a team to the JSF program three weeks from now to seek further information, and we will be advancing our understanding of the sustainment costs through that process.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

I don't have anywhere near the experience of you gentlemen in these issues, but I'm surprised that “advancing our understanding of the costs”, as you said, would come after the minister decides to acquire the aircraft. Does that normally follow the acquisition decision ?

[Col Dave Burt]

You raise a good point. We have initial estimates to show that the costs of sustainment will be in the same range of what we currently pay for our current fighter aircraft. Based on that, and understanding the huge cost advantage of procuring through the JSF program and the MOU, and understanding our timeline to reach an initial operational capability prior to the end of our CF-18 capability, we need to start now. When we put all of those factors together, we advanced a recommendation that we start now.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Sir, I have another very quick question.

Have the requirements you outlined and the minister tabled a couple of weeks ago been made public before? Would other companies that make fighter jets have seen any of this information or heard of it before you read it into the record today?

[LGen J.P.A. Deschamps]

Thank you for the question.

As we were gaining insight into the program, the companies were exposed, through Colonel Burt's group, to some of those high-level requirements we were looking at as we developed the final requirements for the government. They were engaged at the exploratory stage, but not in the formal process, as we would for a request for proposal, which is a competitive process. We made sure we had a good understanding of what we saw as the high levels, and therefore shared that with those interested parties in the industry.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Bachand, you have seven minutes.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Welcome, Lieutenant-General Deschamps, Colonel Burt.

The last time you appeared before this committee, I asked you a number of questions, and I'd like to go back to the one about internal simulations. I will repeat what I said last time. It has to do with Eurofighter, of course. They talk of simulations in which combat air patrols made up of four Typhoon aircraft, supported by an airborne warning and control system, the AWACS system, defeated JSF formations of eight aircraft 85% of the time.

I would like to know whether we have really bought the best aircraft. Further on, I note that other simulation series pitting the JSF in one-on-one scenarios against such similar modern aircraft such as the Su-35 or the J-10 "do not always end in a JSF victory". In answer to my question about access to the simulations, general, you said the content of the documents could not be disclosed because it was classified. I asked whether you meant they were censored, and you answered: "Of course. Since Canada does not own the information...".

I would like to know who owns the information. Is it Lockheed Martin?

[LGen J.P.A. Deschamps]

The three owners are part of the U.S. government, since it purchased or subsidized the aircraft.

As for your question on simulations, I am not going to comment on what a rival company claims to have done in a simulation. I cannot understand how they got access to it. In terms of the simulation the company used, I'm not sure what it used to build its simulation model, since that is not shared. They can announce whatever they like, I cannot contradict them. I don't have access to whatever their claims of success are based on.

All I can say to you is that we and our partners have been analyzing everything there is out there for a number of years. We compare that to the aircraft's capability in a very detailed way. That's why it's modified for adaptability to future conditions.

I cannot tell you whether their claims are true or false because I don't really have access to what they have done, but I can tell you that, on our side, we have been studying that for almost 10 years in great detail and with the help of many experts. This fighter is still the most competitive in a dangerous and integrated environment, as you mentioned.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

The last time you were here, I also asked you whether you had done one-on-one or group combat simulations of that kind. You answered: "Absolutely. We have done a lot of simulation activities, both as part of the JSF program with other partner nations and unilaterally."

Were those one-on-one or group combat simulations? And, in either case, could you tell us if you won?

[LGen J.P.A. Deschamps]

Do you want to speak to simulation?

Colonel Burt is one of my experts. He has used the simulator many times. He can give a more detailed answer.

[Col Dave Burt]

Thank you for the question.

As I described to the committee when I last met with you, we have had a number of opportunities over the past years to do simulation exercises as a partner in the JSF program. We have also done some unilateral simulation, all at a very highly classified level.

In those simulations we have looked at a range of different adversaries and different combinations of those adversaries. One thing that has been made very clear to Canadians and the Canadians involved in this process is that the types of capabilities that are available with the F-35 are needed to meet the requirements that have been spelled out by the director of air requirements and approved by the process within the department. Those capabilities are needed explicitly for the defence of Canada and the cooperative defence of North America.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Right. If I understand correctly, we are trying to determine whether this is the best purchase. You know that the Bloc Québécois not opposed to the purchase of this aircraft; rather, we are interested in the resulting defence contracts. It would be more reassuring to us if we could be sure that the aircraft can come out on top in the theatre of operations.

If I understand correctly, you are simply asking us to make a leap of faith. If I have no access to the simulations, I cannot draw any comparisons.

What would you be prepared to do to challenge the simulation system that a competitor might come out with?

[Col Dave Burt]

I would do what I did in reaction to the article to which you are referring. In reaction to that, we consulted through the classified processes that we have at hand, and we confirmed that our understanding of the nature of dominance of the F-35 was indeed correct in the context of the details that were provided in that article.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

So, legally, you consulted the classification process to see to what extent you could provide details. So, can we have the legal opinion to which you seem to be referring?

[LGen J.P.A. Deschamps]

Certainly.

I don't know where that question is leading us.

Simulation is an extremely technical aspect of our job. You asked how you can know that we know what we are doing. That is more or less insinuating that we don't know what we are doing.

We have proven in combat that we know what we are doing. So I am offended that you are implying that a job requiring technical experts has to be given to people who don't really know the business, so that they can conduct an assessment to make sure that we do know the business.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

I do not know the business, but we are the ones—

[LGen J.P.A. Deschamps]

Mr. Bachand, I don't know what you want.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

—who authorize the expenditures.