National Defence Committee on Nov. 3rd, 2011

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Mr. Brahmi.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

General Natynczyk, there's a lot of talk these days about abolishing positions on military bases, especially in my riding, Saint-Jean. I'm sure you can't reveal any secrets to us, but I'd like to know what the consequences of abolishing these positions would be on operational readiness and how this could throw our operational readiness off balance.

[Gen Walter Natynczyk]

Mr. Chair, as I've already mentioned, we have put a lot into transforming the Canadian Forces, in terms not only of efficiency and investments pertaining to members of the Canadian Forces, but also readiness and capital for the future. We are now doing studies on the structure of the regular force, the reserve force and even civil National Defence teams.

The primary goal of this work is to determine the indirect costs and efficiency of the organizational structure, ensure that we maintain the readiness level of all our battalions, units, ships and squadrons, in the case of our air force and also our training bases. As far as readiness is concerned, it is essential to ensure that our training centres, both individual and collective, are protected, and ensure that our members are properly trained in preparation for present and future operations. I don't know what the situation is in your riding, but I think priority is given to the efficiency of the organizational structure.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Right.

You've just talked about the reserve; this is an important aspect. Canadians realize that headquarters optimizes the resources you're given by the government. Still, if we talk about the reserve, there has to be a back and forth flow of dedicated resources between the reserve force and the regular force. That means, if we look at the past 10 years, that our engagement in Afghanistan must have had an impact on management of the reserve force, since the regular forces were out of the country.

How did our engagement affect our reserve force?

[Gen Walter Natynczyk]

When operations began in Kandahar, the number of full-time reservists was about 4,500. Last year, the number of full-time reservists was over 10,000. During this period of high-paced operations, we replaced a lot of members in the Canadian Forces who were at Wainwright for training, or in Afghanistan to take part in operations, or on a break after taking part in operations. We had to use all full-time reservists and even civilians, on all the bases and all our instruction centres.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Would you say, in the last 10 years, the reserve has been amputated because of deployments? Was that consistent?

[Gen Walter Natynczyk]

No, not at all. In the Canada First strategy, the goal was to promote the growth of the reserve forces. In the beginning the reserve force had about 22,000 or 23,000 members. I remember, I was vice chief at that time. The goal of the Canada First strategy is to have a reserve force of 30,000 soldiers. But it's a matter of balance between the part-time reserve and the full-time reserve. The aim for full-time reservists is training. However, during the high operations period, we used a lot of full-time reservists at headquarters and other centres, because the members of the regular force were deployed. Now the goal is to have the right balance between part-time reservists and full-time reservists.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Right. Thank you, General.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Madam Gallant.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This question I ask will be through you to our witnesses.

There's been quite a discussion with reference to the tempo, not only of our humanitarian and domestic missions but also of our deployments to Afghanistan and Libya.

As costs and funding certainly apply to readiness, I wonder if the Canadian forces are totally reimbursed for the additional costs of a mission, which may be over and above the normal operating costs for the military. For example, in Haiti, for the additional cost of having our troops go there and do what they did, were the Canadian forces fully reimbursed? And for the long-term mission in Afghanistan, from year to year, has the Canadian forces been reimbursed, or have you had to dig into your budget to take care of the shortfalls?

[Gen Walter Natynczyk]

Thanks very much for the question.

Again, the operational tempo has been high and has been sustained. As I said before, our ability to do that is based upon the long-term investments that we've made.

With regard to the finance piece, I would ask the vice chief. He'll be coming here in the next little while. From my knowledge of the Haiti mission, when we went forward to the minister with a plan on January 13, 2010, we scoped out up using up to 2,000 folks. We thought the emergency phase would be up to two months, which would give sufficient time to the non-governmental organizations, the international organizations, and so on, to stand up. We thought it'd be up to about two months. We costed that out—and again, the department can probably provide that to you. My understanding is that the amount was fully reimbursed.

As for the Afghan mission, there are others who know the details of this. What I understand is that over time, a significant portion of the overall cost came as incremental funding. A portion of the funding was from within, and our department worked with the central agencies to negotiate that.

Again, I would defer to those who know more about this than I do.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Therefore, from the standpoint of readiness, that has not interfered with it.

[Gen Walter Natynczyk]

Indeed, for the Afghanistan mission we received significant funding to assist in bringing the forces up to the higher level of operational training required to go into theatre. So we received incremental money for the kinds of high-level, brigade-level training that people have witnessed at Wainwright, Alberta.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

One of the new programs implemented by the Canadian Forces is the MP familiarization program, and so this summer I had the opportunity to visit Trenton. One of the observations made was that with the C-17s were in such high demand, the pilots were really firing on all cylinders for a very long time, not only with the deployments and the humanitarian missions but also the training required to keep up their certifications.

My question comes back home to the base at Petawawa. We see those hangers going up, getting ready for the Chinooks. How do we know, in terms of readiness, that the pilots, the engineers, the technicians, and maintenance people will all be in place upon the arrival of the Chinooks?

[Gen Walter Natynczyk]

I think in both areas, both in Trenton and up in Petawawa, the best guy to ask is the commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force, André Deschamps, who has the details on this.

I just tip my hat to the air force for how they were able to manage the introduction of the C-17 and C-130J, and I anticipate the same kind of work with the CH-47 Foxtrot, the Chinook Foxtrots that are coming in. When you look to the success stories of the last little while, from the decision on the C-17 to when we were able to deliver it on mission, to my mind it was done in record time. From when we took delivery of the C-17, two weeks later the first C-17 was delivering humanitarian supplies to Jamaica in the aftermath of the successive hurricanes that hit Jamaica. From the introduction of that system to actually deploying it into an operation took two weeks. That was because we had worked very closely with the U.S. Air Force. We had taken a lot of our people and put them into the U.S. Air Force, having them fly C-17s for quite some time. When we received our C-17s, the U.S. Air Force provided back to us some of their pilots who had the right balance of experience.

Similarly, with the C-130J, it was literally within months that we had the first C-130J introduced and flying into Afghanistan, doing operational missions there.

Similarly, when the government decided to procure CH-47 Deltas—the Chinook helicopters that we had in Afghanistan, which are an older version of what we'll be seeing here in the next few years—the minister and I were able to fly on Boxing Day of that same year following the decision to purchase them in April. So it was literally within months, because we had made the investments in training pilots, putting them into U.S. Army installations and bringing them up to that operational capability in record time.

The Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force is working very closely with the U.S., but also with the U.K. and Australia, so that we can get the pilots into their training systems--and here I would add that the ground crew, the maintainers, are also on the various courses--so that when the aircraft arrive, we can quickly bring these aircraft up to what we refer to as an initial operational capability and then to a full operational capability.

I'll just say that the investments this past while into the air force have been tremendous. As the commander of the RCAF reminds me, historically we've generally introduced only two new aircraft into the air force every decade. This decade he's receiving seven new aircraft types. So his transition into those seven new aircraft types, while concurrently maintaining a high operational tempo, is a challenge.

I am really proud of those men and women because they're doing a great job.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Mr. Alexander.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you so much, General, and your chief, for your leadership on the issue of readiness and for being here today.

You referred to the missions of the past decade. Let's take it even back to Bosnia and how each one was unanticipated. We all understand that. It has always been the case since time immemorial.

General, if I may add, I think there's been another trend in the last decade. Not only are we going to places we hadn't necessarily anticipated going to, but we're being asked to perform even greater feats of leadership. If you compare, of course, Bosnia with the leadership we showed in Afghanistan because our allies were busy in other places, and the leadership that culminated this year with General Bouchard—an unprecedented level of leadership—I think these speak to the demand for a new kind of readiness, which you're obviously grasping but which is challenging.

One of the observations we all make, having been to Wainwright and having heard witnesses from your team testifying here, is that there is a tremendous versatility on the part of our forces. Even though they don't know where they're going, they want to go. They are ready for the unexpected, and that's very precious.

My first question is really about this. Knowing what capabilities you have, knowing what missions we're now performing, how do you manage the risks with regard to unexpected missions? How do you as the CDS and your command team try to be ready for what you almost certainly know you won't have planned for 100%? And how does that relate to ability to be ready in different parts of the world?

We've talked about basing requirements. We've had some of these in some countries that weren't entirely satisfactory in the end. We know we're innovating in that field and we know that we don't just have to take soldiers, but we also capabilities like ISR and in the cyber field. General Vance was very clear that these emerging capabilities are going to be critical in the missions of the future.

Tell us about managing the balance of risks in being ready for missions that aren't going to be served up to us five years in advance on a silver platter.

[Gen Walter Natynczyk]

I was just in Hawaii with the chief. We were meeting with 26 other chiefs of defence staff of the Asia-Pacific Rim countries, together with our colleagues from Australia and New Zealand. The message I received there--the same message I received in Brussels--was that everyone wants more of Canada. No matter where we put our men and women, people know the quality, the professionalism, the values, and the morals of those individuals. I'd say our secret weapon is a Canadian soldier, sailor, airman or airwoman, or special forces trooper with an open hand and a smile. They represent our culture, and they do an extraordinary job of it.

In respect of our versatility, the very character of Canada's forces us to be an expeditionary, highly professional force. If you can have a C-17 land in Alert or Resolute Bay, literally thousands of kilometres away from us; if you can have a C-130 land in Cape Dorset or Cambridge Bay, in small communities across the Arctic that are expeditionary distances away, with gravel runways that are very isolated, then let me tell you that landing at Jacmel Airport in Haiti on a 3,000-foot asphalt runway is easy.

We are challenged more by operating in our own domain than we are operating around the world. It is harder to sustain operations in our high Arctic than it is to sustain operations in Kandahar or Kabul. In the Arctic, it's what you bring. It creates an immediate self-sufficient culture. Seeing HMCS Montreal up in the high Arctic, and HMCS Toronto before that, and seeing our submarine, the Corner Brook, up in Iqaluit just a year ago, we know that being able to complete missions in the high Arctic enables us culturally and operationally and gives us a sense of versatility and agility.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

I think that is the answer.

General, tell us about the contribution of leadership to readiness. We know from General Leslie's report that one of the options would be to consolidate some of the employer commands you have. Tell us what the impact would be on readiness.

[Gen Walter Natynczyk]

Again, I would reserve those kinds of things. We're still working inside the Canadian Forces and the department to go to the minister, and I would not want to share things here that I've not shared within the Canadian Forces, within the department, and with the minister.

As we look towards efficiencies, we will ensure that we are able to project leadership abroad. The fact is we have made investments. Charlie Bouchard, before been part of the Joint Force Command Naples, was deputy commander of NORAD. Before that he was our operational commander of all Canadian Air Forces back in Winnipeg. So we've made investments with him, as we've done with General Milner and General Vance, and so on.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Everyone realizes we are being called by bells to vote. Standing Order 115(5) reads:Notwithstanding Standing Orders 108(1)(a) and 113(5), the Chair of a standing, special, legislative or joint committee shall suspend the meeting when the bells are sounded to call in the Members to recorded division, unless there is unanimous consent of the members of the committee to continue to sit.

Is there unanimous consent to sit?

I'm not seeing unanimous consent, so I am moved to suspend the meeting. But because of the time--it's a thirty-minute bell--and because this room will be occupied by the time we get back, I'm going to adjourn the meeting rather than suspend it. All members did have a chance to put a question to the Chief of the Defence Staff.

Walter Natynczyk, and Chief Robert Cléroux, it was great having you here today. We are going into Veterans Week, where we are going to honour and remember all of the sacrifices made by our brave men and women who have served us so well through the years as part of our proud military tradition that so many of us align ourselves with as Canadians. That is being continued today under your leadership and by the great people who serve us across this country and around the world in the Royal Canadian Navy, the Royal Canadian Air Force, and the Canadian army.

Thanks so much for your testimony and providing your input for our study on readiness. I hope that when we're done, you'll find value in the recommendations of the report that we table in the House.

The meeting is adjourned.