Natural Resources Committee on June 18th, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Good afternoon, everyone. We're here today to continue our study of Atomic Energy Canada, the facility at Chalk River, and the status of the production of medical isotopes.

We have today four witnesses. Two are here with us, and two are by video conference. From the École polytechnique Montréal we have Professor Jean Koclas, from the nuclear engineering institute, engineering physics department. From the University of Waterloo we have Professor Jatin Nathwani, Ontario research chair in public policy for sustainable energy management, and executive director of the Waterloo Institute for Sustainable Energy. Welcome.

We have by video conference from Atlanta a gentleman from the University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Dr. Daniel Meneley, acting dean, faculty of energy systems and nuclear science. Welcome.

As an individual we have Dr. Harold Smith.

We will hear the witnesses in the order they are listed on the agenda. We'll start with presentations of roughly ten minutes each.

Professor Jean Koclas, please go ahead with your presentation.

[Dr. Jean Koclas, Professor, Nuclear Engineering Institute, Engineering Physics Department, École polytechnique Montréal]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I do not know if it's preferable to go in French or in English. I can do both and switch from one to the other.

If there are people who would like to hear me in French, I can begin the presentation in French. I may lapse into English sometimes, depending on my train of thought.

First, we were invited to come before this committee on very short notice. We therefore prepared the document you have before you very quickly, and I will refer to it throughout my presentation.

Currently, as everyone knows, we are faced with a worldwide shortage of technetium 99m, a large portion of which is produced by the NRU reactor of the nuclear laboratories in Chalk River, or rather the Chalk River laboratories. I worked for a long time for Atomic Energy Canada Limited in Chalk River. At the time, it was called Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories, and sometimes I forget and use the former name.

I would remind you that this Technetium 99 is not produced directly in the Chalk River nuclear reactor; it is produced essentially by Uranium-235 fission in special enriched uranium targets. The NRU reactor uses uranium that is enriched to just over 90% in Uranium-235, which produces a type of uranium that is not normally used for civilian activities. For the purposes of radio-isotope production, the system works very well, and the quality and efficiency of uranium production are very high given these highly enriched targets.

This highly enriched uranium, once it is placed in the reactor, undergoes fission, like the rest of the uranium around it. After a few days, this uranium is removed and chemically treated so as to extract one of the products of the fission of Uranium-235, that is, Molybdenum 99. This Molybdenum 99 is very useful, because although it is radioactive with a half life of almost 3 days, that is, 66 hours, it can be transported relatively easily throughout the world, given the means of very rapid transport that we currently have at our disposal.

The disintegration of this Molybdenum 99 gives rise to another isotope, Technetium 99, this time in metastable form. This Technetium 99 will disintegrate and have a half life of six hours. This metastable form is simply the form of the core of Technetium 99, an excited state on a layer of quantum energy. To reach its ground or unexcited state, it emits a gamma ray. Therefore, Technetium 99 is a pure gamma ray emitter. These rays are emitted at an energy at which the nuclear medicine detection systems are very sensitive, which means that this Technetium 99 technology has given rise to a vast array of nuclear medicine instruments.

Technetium 99 has the immense advantage of being a non-invasive technique, and is thus very popular in nuclear medicine. We have seen a steady rise in the demand for Technetium 99 the world-over, simply because from a demographic point of view, the population in North America and that of Europe especially are aging. Therefore, the number of treatments required to keep these people in good health is increasing steadily, on the one hand, and on the other, more and more inhabitants of emerging countries require Technetium 99-based treatments as well.

Furthermore, nuclear medicine technology has developed considerably in recent years, and therefore, more and more Technetium 99m procedures are becoming accessible to the public. This means that not only do more people need this treatment, but there is also an ever-increasing number of applications for this isotope, which means that the demand for Technetium 99 will only continue to rise.

This unique isotope is very difficult to produce in massive quantities outside nuclear reactors. Although a certain amount can be produced using cyclotrons, this method produces only Technetium 99m and not Molybdenum, and since Technetium has a half life of only 6 hours, the time available is very short.

This concludes our overview of technetium 99m. However, I would also like to point out that even the technique known as PET scan would not be able to meet all medical imaging needs, even if we were only talking about Canada.

To vary things a bit, I will now speak in English.

I will give you my point of view on the MAPLE 1 and 2 reactors at Chalk River.

I must say, first of all, that I have very little technical information or precise information about these reactors.

If I can go back to a long time ago, in 1992 the Chalk River Laboratories decided to shut down the NRX reactor because its useful lifetime had been essentially reached and this reactor was no longer reliable. NRU, which was a nuclear reactor right next to NRX, became de facto the only nuclear reactor in Canada able to produce these radioisotopes on a very large scale.

At the time this situation arose, it was clear that the NRU reactor would reach the end of its useful life quite soon. Twenty years before, in the early seventies, the calandria of this NRU reactor had been changed, and, if I am not mistaken, the design lifetime of this calandria was only 20 years. So the calandria of NRU should have been replaced in 1995, or around there. But the MAPLE reactors were put forward as an alternative to NRU, and each of these two reactors was to be able to produce more than 100% of world demand in radioisotopes.

Of course, these two nuclear reactors, as we know, have given rise to a variety of technical problems, technical issues. Many of them were solved. One could question the quality of construction, so I think AECL spent some time going through quality assurance to make sure that the reactor was built according to design. Most of the technical problems were solved.

If you don't know how the nuclear industry works, usually when you modify something in a nuclear reactor, when you bring forth a new type of reactor, most of the time you have unforeseen difficulties. You can think of the Darlington reactor, which was just an increment in size of a standard design, and engineering problems arose that took more than a year to solve. So I think the MAPLE reactors, MAPLE 1 and MAPLE 2, do not escape these sorts of engineering constants.

However, there is a larger MAPLE reactor operating in South Korea, the HANARO reactor. So as far as we know, the MAPLE reactors were stopped last year mostly because one technical issue has not been solved, namely the positive reactivity coefficient. This reactivity coefficient was predicted to be negative, as it is also predicted to be negative in larger CANDU reactors. Similar calculations to those done on the MAPLE project were performed by other laboratories in the United States, all of them reaching the conclusion: this positive power coefficient should have been negative.

It was, however, measured as positive. Although some efforts were made by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited to explain this positive power coefficient, the full explanation was not found.

When you find yourself in a situation where you cannot predict as simple a coefficient as the power coefficient, then can you be sure that the nuclear safety analyses, which are based on calculations, are correct?

We hope that the MAPLE reactors were simply put in a mothballed state rather than truly dismantled. It is our opinion, however, that the MAPLE reactor project should be reinstated and that sole technical difficulty be tackled by a group of people involving not only AECL but also those from outside this company, maybe some other organizations, including universities, where we have, over the last few years, made very powerful modifications to transport theory, nuclear reactor calculations, fluid flow, and heat transfer.

I think we should put together the resources to analyze the situation and predict correctly the positive power coefficient so that this technical issue can be solved and the molybdenum–99 and technetium-99m problem can be solved once and for all. It is my opinion that this country should put some of its resources into solving this problem.

We are not raising anything new when mentioning the advanced age of the NRU reactor. This reactor, which was designed in the 1960s following successful operation of the NRX reactor, had an exemplary career in its capacity as a nuclear reactor. Not only did it produce radio-isotopes, but it also supported research activities that were important to the Canadian nuclear industry as well basic research, for example, in the area of neutron spectroscopy.

We should be fully aware that the NRU reactor was not originally designed to produce radio-isotopes, but solely to support research. It was not until later, around 1975, that radio-isotope technology really began developing for use in nuclear medicine. Gradually, the NRU and NRX reactors were tailored to this situation in order to supply a considerable portion of the radio-isotopes used throughout the world.

In 1995, the calandria reached the end of its 20-year useful life. With the announcement of the MAPLE project, it was simply decided that the useful life of the NRU reactor would have to be extended until the two MAPLE reactors came on line. But given that the MAPLE project went on longer than expected, the useful life of the NRU reactor was extended to support the production of radio-isotopes during this transitional period.

The NRU reactor is now the only one in Canada that can produce significant quantities of radio-isotopes. Last year, authorities at Atomic Energy of Canada Limited decided to put an end to the development of the MAPLE reactors, but the calandria of the NRU reactor, which should have been replaced in 1995, was not. So it is no surprise to us that the calandria is now leaking. It has gone well beyond its useful life of 20 years: in fact, it is now up to 35 years, that is, over 50% longer than its projected maximum life. We believe that the NRU reactor will experience recurring problems of this kind.

Some of you may be disappointed to learn that, in my opinion, the useful life of the NRU reactor should be extended for a longer period than currently planned. We are currently told that the NRU reactor's useful life will end in 2016, whereas its operating licence expires in 2011. So my conclusion is that the next operating licence will be good for five years, which is standard for the licences issued by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. This five-year period is merely an administrative decision, not one based on the actual condition of the reactor.

Appropriate repairs could be made to the NRU reactor, especially given the current shutdown and the fact that the southern pump has been emptied. This would allow not only the most urgent repairs to be done, but also those required to prevent further corrosion. In these conditions, I believe that the useful life of this reactor could extend beyond 2016.

Moreover, I would like to point out that it is very difficult to build nuclear reactors quickly, regardless of the country. The announcement concerning the MAPLE reactors probably meant that other countries in the world shelved any plans they may have had to build reactors that could produce these radio-isotopes, given that the two MAPLE reactors were to supply 100% of world production.

Therefore, I believe that our country has the very great responsibility of keeping the NRU reactor operational, given that not only does it continue to produce radio-isotopes, but it also supports basic and applied research for the CANDU reactors.

This concludes my presentation.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Thank you, Professor.

We'll now go to our second witness. From the University of Waterloo we have Professor Jatin Nathwani, Ontario research chair in public policy for sustainable energy management, and executive director of the Waterloo Institute for Sustainable Energy.

Go ahead, Professor, for around ten minutes.

[Dr. Jatin Nathwani, Ontario Research Chair in Public Policy for Sustainable Energy Management, Executive Director, Waterloo Institute for Sustainable Energy, University of Waterloo]

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you for your invitation. It's my pleasure to be here, and I will stick to my ten minutes.

I will confine my remarks, in essence, to three aspects: the need for a reliable supply of isotopes, the technology choices and the future options, and suggestions on governance aspects and the public dialogue for acceptance.

In terms of the need for a reliable supply of isotopes, the shutdown of the NRU reactor at Chalk River has again brought into sharp focus the critical need for a reliable supply of isotopes to our hospitals. The most compelling and difficult issue, however, is the reliability and safe operation of a single aging reactor on which depends the well-being of so many, both Canadians and globally. To an outside observer and to those not associated with the isotope business, the realization of such extreme dependency and vulnerability on a single source is a matter of profound shock and incredulity. How did we get into this corner, and what's next for the path forward?.

Anything short of a revolutionary transition away from current practices in nuclear medicine that rely on the use of isotopes would suggest to me that a robust and a dependable supply will remain a critical need. The government's recent indication to exit from the supply side of isotope production by 2016 would make us dependent on sources outside Canada. For a resource this critical to the overall health and well-being of Canadians, the exit strategy does not appear to be prudent. The provision of a reliable supply of medical isotopes is far too important for the terms and conditions of supply and price to be determined by others.

If frustration with current costs is the primary driver for determining exit, what of the higher costs later, when we have conceded all control of any assurance of our own supply? Upon exit, we simply become a minor player with no influence. After a reasonable degree of success in the global markets, what is the compelling case for jeopardizing our own security of supply? As well, if we take the long view, could the exit strategy not compromise our ability to control health care costs if, over time, the use of isotopes continues to become more widespread in medical practice?

The fact that Canada has played a leadership role in the development and application of innovations in nuclear medicine and nuclear technology over the last 50 years is worth noting. That this has resulted in a significant positive contribution to quality of life and to health is again not to be dismissed lightly. That our global share of the business is respectable attests to some degree of success, and it has allowed us to enjoy relative stability for our own use. Why would we simply walk away? Is there not a case for nurturing our own strengths and for putting in place the solutions for realizing the benefits of this technology into the future?

Let me now turn to the question of technology choices and some suggestions for the way forward. One option is a combination of best-effort short-term fixes for the NRU reactor. That would allow us to muddle along until 2016 or so. Given the age of the reactor, this is the best that can be done in the short term, but this is not a credible or sustainable long-term solution. If we accept that the need for medical isotopes is not about to disappear, then a more robust solution is necessary. In light of our current difficulties, it makes sense to revisit the decision to cancel the MAPLE reactors.

I understand there are technical issues that need to be resolved, and there's a regulatory dimension to this as well. A strong recommendation by this committee to revisit the decision on the cancellation of the already built and partly commissioned MAPLE reactors is an option. If accepted by the government, this recommendation could pave the path for subsequent resolution of the technical issues.

Such a recommendation, coupled with a requirement on the agencies--whether AECL, industry, CNSC, or others--to develop an action plan with a formal quarterly progress report to this parliamentary committee, would provide a sufficient degree of focus, public accountability, and a high level of attention.

Whatever the business model--whether it is a public-private partnership, sole government ownership, or some other--the goal is to ensure that the national interest is taken into account, so we have to frame this problem as an important national problem, bring a sense of urgency to its resolution, and enlist the vast expertise within our regulatory bodies, industry, and the academy. However, in my view this will require an enormous amount of goodwill, a step-by-step problem-solving attitude, and vigorous measurement of progress against goals.

I believe this is the best path, and I remain confident that the technical aspects can be resolved.

Repairs to the NRU reactor, when completed, can only be viewed as short-term relief. It's an old reactor, and relying on it for too long would not be appropriate. A parallel path, followed with urgency, can bring the already-built MAPLE reactors to an operating state over perhaps the next six to 18 months, and such a strategy offers the best prospect for putting Canada on a firm footing for assurance of supply.

I will turn now to the problem that I characterized as that of governance and public acceptance.

How we set up the governance of institutions responsible for nuclear matters does have an impact on the quality of day-to-day decisions. In my appearance before this committee, I had indicated the need for an amendment to the Nuclear Safety and Control Act that includes a test of net benefit to Canada. If such a test were to be embedded in legislation, it would provide a stronger framework and guidance to the regulatory function, clarity of direction to industry, and broad public support for a coherent decision rationale in the public interest.

Again we are at a juncture that does not foster a meaningful discussion on how to do the balancing of trade-offs between real benefit now and what to make of low risks far into the future. We cannot allow ourselves to be stymied by perceived risks of reactor operation that place undue weight on hypothetical fears and end up denying patients the healing benefits of the reactor technology that yields large benefits for therapeutic and diagnostic use as part of medical treatment.

The costs are real, but not astronomical. The risk is not zero, but low, and the benefits are large and positive. The trade-off to serve the public interest is, to my mind, clear and simple.

Beyond specific aspects of governance and regulatory policies, there is a deeper and a more fundamental problem of public acceptance. Only you in the political arena can help with this problem.

In simple terms, there is a small but strong anti-nuclear sentiment that dominates public discourse on matters nuclear. Even though the safety risks are generally very low, social amplification of risk through the media gives rise to a political and cultural climate that makes it difficult for policy-makers to take a strictly rational approach. It reduces their comfort space of operation and forces the easier way out; witness the exit strategy proposed by the government.

Rather than taking the long view that emphasizes a balanced perspective, we run up against the problem of what I call the ugly duckling, the unpalatable pushed aside for yet another time. May I be so bold as to suggest that the time has come to shift the terms of debate around nuclear issues and help reduce the social friction, and that all parties will have to begin to articulate clearly the benefits of nuclear technologies? Over time, this would create sufficient space in the public sphere for a more informed dialogue.

The current crisis is but the simplest and clearest example of how we effectively ignore the enormous benefit of nuclear technology because the political comfort space is too narrow to allow for a more balanced and nuanced response. We create a cultural straitjacket that leads us directly to an exit strategy and an easier and quicker response to a problem; what it does not do is take into account the full consequences of the long term. For Canada, it would be truly unfortunate to walk away from having built and led a successful enterprise around the production of isotopes without a determined effort to fix the short-term problem.

I will now end with four simple recommendations to you.

First, confirm the need for a robust and dependable supply of medical isotopes for use in medical practice, and confirm whether the trend toward increased use is expected to continue.

Second, make a strong recommendation to revisit the decision on the cancellation of the MAPLE reactors. If accepted by government, a requirement to put in place an action plan for the agencies to establish clear timelines and implementation schedules to bring them to an operating state would be necessary. I think this is a credible path for a robust base for supply assurance long into the future.

Third, amend legislation to include a test of net benefit to Canada in the Nuclear Safety and Control Act. This would provide a strong foundation for balancing difficult trade-offs in regulatory decision-making.

Fourth and last, make a social and political commitment to frame a useful public dialogue on matters nuclear to help create a positive environment for policy-makers to make rational decisions.

Thank you for your time. I'll be happy to answer questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Thank you, Professor Nathwani.

We go now to video conference from Atlanta. From the University of Ontario Institute of Technology, we have Dr. Daniel Meneley, acting dean, faculty of energy systems and nuclear science.

Go ahead, please, for about ten minutes.

[Dr. Daniel Meneley, Acting Dean, Faculty of Energy Systems and Nuclear Science, University of Ontario Institute of Technology]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First I must say that what I say today are my own opinions, my own attitudes, my own convictions, and not those of the university at which I am employed.

The previous speakers have in fact eloquently described many of the situations I had intended to cover, so I will expect my brief to be even more brief than it is as written.

There is one point. The NRU reactor was and continues to be a vital part of the successful CANDU electric power system. As that power system has now reached maturity, the primary role of NRU is testing of design features aimed at upgrading plant performance and diagnosis of unexpected performance characteristics of various components and systems. Major plant developments, such as the current ACR-1000, also require extensive testing of novel design features, especially in the areas of fuels and materials.

But how about its age? How about its leaks and unplanned shutdowns? Of course, these are expected events in any similar facility. They are made critically important only by the lack of a backup system, as has been mentioned by previous speakers. AECL, to their credit, fully recognized this lack and planned early to install a large multi-purpose reactor as a replacement for NRU as soon as the imminent final shutdown of NRX became apparent. However, funding was not provided for this project.

Then, as a second-best approach to the problem of isotope production, the MAPLE project was initiated, with very tight funding and very tight schedule allowances. The results of this fundamental decision to proceed with MAPLE are well known.

However, in spite of the obvious weaknesses associated with the MAPLE facilities, I consider that start-up and operation of these facilities may well be the preferred route, as has been mentioned by both other speakers. It may well be the preferred route to solving the immediate shortage of radioisotopes. Yes, there will be problems; yes, this may not be possible until well after completion of the present repair processes at NRU; however, at the end of that sequence of events--that is, the repair of NRU--there still will be no backup supply of radioisotopes for a very long time to come. At the very least, MAPLE might help to fill this time gap.

I'm aware, from discussions here in Atlanta and in Vienna some time ago, that other countries are gearing up now to replace and augment the supply of molybdenum-99 from their own countries, so the gap-filling by MAPLE may well be the best thing we can do for both Canada and the world.

I come to the fundamental question to be answered, and I believe the committee is to be commended for investigating this question: if not MAPLE, then why not MAPLE?

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Thank you, Dr. Meneley.

We go now to our last witness, who is here as an individual. He is Dr. Harold Smith, and he appears by teleconference from Toronto.

Go ahead, Dr. Smith.

[Dr. Harold J. Smith, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen of the committee.

I provided a brief biography to the committee. I would like to expand on that just a little, and I'd like to touch on two points: aspects of the production of moly-99 and the positive power coefficient of reactivity.

The positive power coefficient of reactivity is not a mystery. It is not an unsolvable engineering problem. It is a small thermal mechanical effect in a prototype design that requires a simple engineering fix. The power coefficient can be restored to a value of close to zero, and a safety case can be made for these conditions.

I'll come back to my biography. I started working at AECL in 1975. In 1981 I became section head of physics at the Whiteshell nuclear research establishment. In 1982, at the request of my branch head, I started to design the core for a new research reactor concept for the purpose of developing a new product. At that time, it had no name. The design concept was that it would be a multi-purpose research reactor, be based on low-enriched uranium, have competitively high thermal neutron flux levels, and not require development of any new technologies.

“Multi-purpose” meant at that time that it should be able to provide neutrons for fundamental nuclear materials research as well as produce a wide range of both medical and industrial isotopes.

During the next six years I led the development of the reactor concept, assembled and developed the computer codes, developed the various initial models required to simulate the reactor, and built an analysis group to support the effort.

By 1984 we felt that we had the basis for this new product. The group was asked to come up with a name and to make it Canadian in some way. In the next week or two, I coined the acronym “MAPLE” reactor. It stands for “Multipurpose Applied Physics Lattice Experiment” reactor.

In 1985 we hosted a team of ten Korean physicists and thermal hydraulics specialists to start the design of a MAPLE for Korea, which became known as the HANARO reactor. The HANARO reactor went critical in the early 1990s and functioned successfully at up to 30 megawatts, carrying out all of the described functions. It is mainly devoted to research, and production of moly-99 is not a priority. You cannot just throw out research programs that take years of implementation.

I left AECL at the end of 1988 to advance my career and experience by working for the CEA at Cadarache in France. I returned two years later to work in the nuclear safety group of Ontario Hydro. Three or four years later, I was offered the opportunity to work in Moscow on contract to AECL, consulting as an expert on western safety analysis methodology.

In 1997 I returned from Moscow to work as the head of the physics group on the newly revived MAPLE project. I led the physics effort in the preliminary and final safety reports, became a commissioning supervisor for MAPLE, and then became a nuclear commissioning manager.

I and my team took both MAPLE 1 and MAPLE 2 to criticality. We measured the positive PCR and we participated in the subsequent efforts on the positive power coefficient of reactivity.

I understand from the newspapers that there has been a team of experts who claim that MAPLE would never be functional. I now ask the rhetorical question: who are these people? If anybody qualifies as an expert on MAPLE, I think I'm it. Nobody has asked me or anybody else involved in the project what we think.

Let me talk briefly about the production of moly-99.

From the project's inception, we had focused attention on how to make sufficient quantities of fission product moly-99. If it were easy to do, everybody would be doing it. Working from the known demand at the time in the mid-1980s and using the estimated demand growth for a 30-year reactor lifetime, we built in the capacity to deliver double the world requirement at any time. This is achieved by high thermal flux levels, flexible target removal schedules, and the capability of the reactor to be shut down and started up every 24 hours. This is not an easy task.

I emphasize the word “deliver” since the reactor must produce at least twice the amount that has to be delivered, because you're going to essentially lose half of what you've produced by the time you've extracted it, purified it, and delivered it to where it's going. As was pointed out by Dr. Koclas, the half-life of moly is only 2.7 days. You have to work very quickly. Processing is almost a military-style operation. That is why you cannot store it.

But to make sufficient quantities to meet these demands, the reactor needs to have high flux levels. Without delivering a nuclear theory course, please accept that it is the nature of the production and decay processes.

You cannot make more in a low power reactor by operating for longer periods, because what you have made will be destroyed by neutron absorption and decay. You cannot arbitrarily raise the maximum power level of an existing reactor to increase flux levels to produce more moly-99. You could produce more in this manner, but reactors are designed for a certain maximum power level. Raising that maximum value involves redesign to provide additional cooling and compensate for whatever safety margins have been eroded, and possibly fuel redesign.

These changes would be increments of 5%, 10%, and 15% on their current capability, as you've already heard in the press. When people talk about how they're going to work on their reactors, they're talking about 5%, 10%, and 15%.

It's the compactness of the MAPLE core that permits the required flux levels at a relatively low power of 10 megawatts. Having said that, I note that MAPLE 1 operated at 80% full power and is capable of making the world requirement for moly-99 at that power level. MAPLE 1 was producing moly-99. We did not extract it because we're still commissioning the reactor and we did not want to destruct the continuity of the process.

Let me just speak briefly, then, about the power coefficient of reactivity. When the positive PCR was measured during commissioning, further tests were put on hold until it could be investigated. We reviewed our calculations. We've re-performed the calculations using the latest tools and data libraries. The design tools that we had used were in the original tool kit developed in the eighties. We contracted external expert groups to review our test analyses and calculations, and another group, as was pointed out, to recalculate the PCR.

Nobody came up with a result that was significantly different from the original results. From this, we concluded that there must be an unmodelled effect taking place. The regulator required that we understand it.

We executed a PIRT study for a phenomenon, importance, and ranking table, in which every component of the reactor is examined by a group of specialists on each system against a list of physical phenomena to decide if a particular phenomenon can contribute to the observed effect. This systematic approach led to the identification of 20 possible candidates, but only three stood out: bowing at the targets, bowing of the fuel elements, and possible heat-up of water between the reflector wall and the flow tubes, because there was some recirculation.

A test program was planned for the execution of these tests that focused on each candidate to the maximum extent possible. However, in each case it was not possible to completely isolate the factors in each test; i.e., there was some interdependence of each of the three different effects. So the end result needed the answers from all three tests to determine each individual contribution uniquely.

By taking out the targets and replacing them with fuel bundles, test one showed a reduction of a positive PCR by about one-third. Test two straightened out the recirculating water, but did not change the value of the PCR. That's been called failure. That was a measurement of what we intended to measure.

That left the third test, on the fuel bundles, to be executed, which was to use the simple engineering fix, which is to restrain the bowing of the elements--and it's a very tiny amount--when the project was suddenly terminated. The contribution from the targets and the contribution from the fuel both depend upon the same physical effect.

This same effect will happen to any material that expands when heated. If one side is hot and the other side is cool, there's a temperature asymmetry from side to side.

The fuel assemblies in MAPLE and HANARO reactors are very similar. HANARO is a larger MAPLE. I personally worked on the transfer of the technology. The fuel assemblies are made by the same people. HANARO has a negative PCR of a value we calculate for MAPLE. It is mostly a property of the fuel constituents.

The temperature asymmetry results from a high-flux gradient across the outer elements of a fuel bundle making one side hotter and the other side cooler. The fuel element will bow as one side tries to expand more than the other due to the temperature difference. This bowing movement moves the fissile material in the fuel element up the flux gradient in such a manner. This makes it more important to the core. This is the source of the positive reactivity coefficient.

This last statement could be labelled as speculation, since we did not have the opportunity to perform that test. In fact, the project was terminated in May, and the test was scheduled for October.

While the PCR would be negative for a core fuelled without moly-99 targets, we see that they do make a positive contribution, so putting the same number of targets back in the core would bring the net effect to approximately zero PCR--perhaps slightly positive, perhaps slightly negative--unless the targets were also modified to resist bowing. So you cut off the effect in both types of assemblies.

In conclusion, I'd like to repeat that if making moly-99 was easy to do everybody would be doing it. Other reactors may be upgraded, but will only be able to contribute small fractions of the demand. Other proposed methodologies are still in the experimental stage, and there are two MAPLE reactors, each with the capacity to deliver more than the current world requirement. Positive PCR requires a relatively simple engineering fix to restrain the bowing of the elements and reduce the PCR to approximately zero.

I thank you for your attention, and I hope this doesn't turn into another Avro Arrow.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Thank you, Dr. Smith.

We'll now go to questions, starting with the official opposition.

Mr. Regan, go ahead.

[Geoff Regan, Liberal, Halifax West, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It's unfortunate we weren't able to secure a room to have a televised meeting today, particularly in view of what we've heard from these four witnesses. They are witnesses who were proposed by all the parties--in fact two of them were proposed by the minister's parliamentary secretary--and they're all agreeing. They're all saying that the government has made a mistake and should reconsider its decision to cancel the MAPLE project. It's a remarkable confluence of expert opinion we're hearing today, and it's very disappointing that the public is not able to see this.

I really appreciate the witnesses appearing today. It has been very interesting and raises lots of questions. Unfortunately, we only have limited time.

Dr. Smith, did I hear you say that the reactor produced moly-99, that it produced the isotopes, but they were not extracted? Is that right?

[Dr. Harold J. Smith]

That is correct. We operated first at one megawatt, then at two megawatts, five megawatts, and eight megawatts, as we did tests at different power levels. The targets were in the core, and moly-99 was being generated in those targets.

[Geoff Regan, Liberal, Halifax West, NS]

Was the testing of the MAPLE reactors complete last year when the government abandoned the project?

[Dr. Harold J. Smith]

No. We terminated at 80% because we were required to explain the positive PCR before we could carry on. Then the project was terminated before we got to that point. We were probably four months away from putting the final test in. That test would have contained the engineering fix.

[Geoff Regan, Liberal, Halifax West, NS]

Have you heard anything that gives you an opinion on why that decision was taken by the government?

[Dr. Harold J. Smith]

No, and it's an area that I don't care to step into, because it becomes political and I don't want to deal with that.

[Geoff Regan, Liberal, Halifax West, NS]

Okay. In your view--

[Dr. Harold J. Smith]

I will say there's no technical basis.

[Geoff Regan, Liberal, Halifax West, NS]

I think what we've heard today from witnesses is basically that we should get the NRU back up and operating, which of course is what AECL is attempting to do as quickly as possible, no doubt.

We've also heard that the government should go back to the MAPLEs so we have a secure supply of medical isotopes for Canada for the future and so we can supply them to other countries. But let me ask you this: how long, Dr. Smith, do you think it would take to get it going?

[Dr. Harold J. Smith]

The last time I saw MAPLE was a year ago. It had the fuel removed at that point. It was sitting in pristine condition. I do not know what has happened to it in the last year, because I have not been working for AECL. But if you decided to do it and the machine had not been otherwise dismantled, you still have to recover the teams. In particular, the operators will take about one year to re-certify; they have not run the machine. We could be putting it together and they could be re-certifying, but you're still going to have a year's delay getting on track.

[Geoff Regan, Liberal, Halifax West, NS]

The minister and I believe the Prime Minister both said that MAPLE never produced isotopes. Is that the truth?

[Dr. Harold J. Smith]

No, absolutely not. Of course it was there. You can't avoid it if the targets are in the core.

[Geoff Regan, Liberal, Halifax West, NS]

Explain to us why it is that you feel that the MAPLEs could use the same fuel type as HANARO in South Korea--without getting too technical about it.

[Dr. Harold J. Smith]

It is essentially the same fuel. Yes, it's the same fuel made by the same people at AECL.

[Geoff Regan, Liberal, Halifax West, NS]

But the type--

[Dr. Harold J. Smith]

There are subtle differences in the design, and I may get into trouble by specifying those details.