Debates of Oct. 3rd, 2025

The House resumed from September 26 consideration of the motion that Bill C‑8, An Act respecting cyber security, amending the Telecommunications Act and making consequential amendments to other Acts, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

An Act Respecting Cyber Security

[Jacques Ramsay, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Speaker, first, I will be sharing my time with the member for Saint‑Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton.

I am honoured today to have an opportunity to speak in support of the bill on cybersecurity. Now more than ever, it is crucial that we take action to protect our most important pieces of infrastructure against ever-changing security threats and cyber-threats. This is without a doubt a key piece of legislation, perhaps even a life-saving one for Canada.

As we all know, this bill is the result of extensive consultations carried out by the government with numerous stakeholders. We consulted with the provinces, territories, municipalities, critical infrastructure owners and operators, cybersecurity experts, civil liberties groups and the academic community. We listened closely to the concerns t#hey raised about the bill, as well as those raised by stakeholders in committee. One of the stakeholders' key concerns is the need to increase oversight and transparency while strengthening privacy protections.

I want to assure all parliamentarians that the government has taken these concerns into account and has made significant changes to the bill to address them. Although a number of legislative and constitutional instruments already protect Canadians' privacy, Bill C‑8 provides greater certainty when it comes to protecting their privacy and personal information.

In addition, “for greater certainty” clauses have been added to reassure Canadians that orders and directions cannot and will not be used to conduct surveillance activities or intercept private communications. Rather, these powers are intended to be used in rare and serious circumstances where there is an urgent need to respond to a known threat or vulnerability. These amendments are a direct response to concerns expressed by civil liberties organizations.

Bill C‑8 also clarifies that confidential information must continue to be treated as such by anyone who receives it and must only be shared if it is absolutely necessary to do so.

Other amendments also seek to improve government transparency and accountability. When the previous bill was examined in committee, stakeholders expressed concerns about the lack of public reporting requirements for the orders set out in part 1 of the bill. As a result, an amendment was passed to balance respect for confidentiality with the public's need for transparency.

Another amendment now sets out the information that must be included in annual reports to Parliament, such as the number of orders and directions issued and the number of service providers affected. What is more, in response to stakeholders' concerns regarding accountability, the bill was amended to require the government to notify the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians within 90 days after an order or confidential direction is issued.

During review in committee, civil liberty groups and industry experts expressed concerns regarding the scope of the new powers granted to the government under this legislation. Some stakeholders pointed out that there was a risk that the government could issue orders or directions without consulting or considering relevant factors, such as the existence of reasonable alternatives.

Although the Governor in Council already has a mechanism in place to control its powers, Bill C‑8 addresses these concerns by introducing a reasonableness standard and a non-exhaustive list of factors that the Governor in Council must first consider before issuing an order or direction. When issuing, amending or revoking an order or direction, the Governor in Council may consult with governments and industry, recognizing the need to do so in an expedient manner given the urgency of the situation.

These amendments will ensure that any new powers granted to the government are accompanied by appropriate controls to prevent abuse and strengthen accountability.

They will provide the Governor in Council with greater clarity and fairness in the exercise of these new powers. In particular, the Governor in Council will have to take into account factors such as the operational and financial impacts on public safety before issuing any given order or direction.

Thanks to all these changes, Bill C‑8 has been strengthened and will provide greater transparency and accountability to Canadians. It also provides additional safeguards for Canadians with respect to the protection of their privacy and personal information.

Security threats and cyber-threats are becoming more frequent, complex, sophisticated, and politically motivated. The government is committed to defending Canada and its critical infrastructure. Cyber-threat programs sponsored or supported by states such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea represent the greatest strategic threats to Canada today. They are part of global campaigns of espionage, sabotage, and subversion carried out by these states. These malicious cyber-threat activities can seriously compromise Canada's national security, public safety, and economy.

This bill is therefore essential to protect Canadians. It will enable the government to act quickly to promote the security of Canada's telecommunications system by minimizing risks to users.

When we hear stakeholders express their concerns, we take them seriously. We work diligently in committee, guided by a spirit of collaboration and our commitment to the national interest. As several other hon. members have already pointed out, this bill is long overdue. Passing Bill C‑8 will mark an important stage in the government's ongoing efforts to counter security threats and cyber-threats. It will protect the safety of Canadians and Canadian businesses. I urge my hon. colleagues to support it without delay.

[Michael Guglielmin, Conservative, Vaughan—Woodbridge, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the Privacy Commissioner highlighted several amendments that did not make it into the bill. We all know that cybersecurity threats are a very serious issue that we need to work diligently on, but privacy is paramount. Would the member agree that improvements should be made to the bill in the committee process?

[Jacques Ramsay, Liberal, La Prairie—Atateken, QC]

Mr. Speaker, let me remind members that this bill was brought before the House in the last Parliament. Obviously, we would be more than willing to consider amendments on anything that has changed since that time. I think it would be rather tedious to have the parliamentary committee repeat the same work done during the previous Parliament.

In my view, the amendments we proposed are significant. They guarantee privacy. We are convinced that Canadians will view that as entirely reasonable.

[Alexis Deschênes, Bloc, Gaspésie—Les Îles-de-la-Madeleine—Listuguj, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague for his speech. I have a question for him. Although we agree on the general objective of securing our infrastructure, we have concerns related to individual freedoms and the right to privacy.

What guarantees can my colleague give us that information collected by the federal government will not be used for purposes other than the purpose it was collected for?

[Jacques Ramsay, Liberal, La Prairie—Atateken, QC]

Mr. Speaker, we had the same concerns as my colleague. We made sure to strengthen those safeguards in the bill. There is now a reasonableness standard that the Governor in Council will be required to consider before issuing a direction or order. I think those safeguards are entirely satisfactory at this stage.

[Guillaume Deschênes-Thériault, Liberal, Madawaska—Restigouche, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety, for his excellent speech.

I am proud of our government, which has proven that it takes public safety seriously with Bill C‑2, the strong borders act, Bill C‑9, the combatting hate act, and our upcoming bail reform.

I would like to hear my colleague's thoughts on why it is so important, in the current context, to have a strong legislative framework for cybersecurity.

[Jacques Ramsay, Liberal, La Prairie—Atateken, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the consequences of any breach in our telecommunications and cybersecurity would be catastrophic. It could paralyze the country. That is why we are taking action. We have a legislative model that will be the envy of all G7 and G20 countries. We are confident that we are fulfilling our obligations while respecting the privacy of all Canadians.

[Gord Johns, NDP, Courtenay—Alberni, BC]

Mr. Speaker, in the NDP, we have highlighted that there would be risks to privacy and civil liberties, and the bill would allow for mandatory information sharing between telecom regulators and federal agencies, as well as possibly onward to foreign governments.

One of our questions is this: What is the standard for this disclosure? Simply having the minister's judgment on what is necessary as a standard is vague, subjective and wide open to abuse, so maybe my colleague can answer this: Why are there no requirements for privacy impact assessments in the bill?

[Jacques Ramsay, Liberal, La Prairie—Atateken, QC]

Mr. Speaker, we already have a number of constitutional and legislative instruments guaranteeing privacy. Bill C‑8 is very clear on this. It simply allows information collection when faced with a risk that is serious and known. There will be no fishing expeditions. We have established the parameters that will guarantee Canadians' civil rights and liberties.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House today to speak to this issue. In fact, I spoke to the previous version of the bill, Bill C‑26, in the last Parliament. It is easy to get lost in all these “C” bills.

Since the elements of Bill C‑8 are absolutely identical to those in the previous version, our hopes and fears are exactly the same as well. I could copy and paste what I said last time. Having said that, I am still going to make an attempt at originality today.

I think there is consensus in the House that the goal is so fundamental and that this issue of cybersecurity is so important that it goes without saying we need to give Bill C‑8 a chance at second reading.

The bill will then be studied in committee, where we will have the opportunity to examine it in greater depth. We all agree that this bill is filled with good intentions. However, the road to hell is paved with good intentions, so who knows what else we might find in there. That is often the case with this type of bill. There are issues, and the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has raised some concerns, as have we, while still agreeing with the bill's objective.

I want to start by talking about the objective of the bill. Everyone agrees that cybersecurity is a major issue, including for everyone here in Parliament. In a few days, on October 21, it will be six years since I became a member of Parliament here in the House. I have lost count of the number of emails I have received warning of cyber-attacks. We already know that cyberspace is at the heart of economic and geopolitical warfare in this increasingly dangerous world. Some would say that cyber-attacks are better than military attacks, but unfortunately, they are not mutually exclusive.

Let us look at several examples to show that this issue is not just theoretical. Let us remember that, in 2020, Parliament adopted a motion to force the government to make a decision regarding Huawei and Chinese interference in general. The federal government recently banned Huawei from the 5G network after years of dithering and warnings from intelligence services.

Let us briefly review what the 5G network is to help us understand why there is a clear need for legislation in this area. The 5G network is a new telecommunications technology with bandwidth that is 10 to 100 times greater than that of the current LTE networks. The technology stands out for more than just its speed. It stands out for its extremely low latency, which is the time it takes for one computer to communicate with another and receive a response. This opens the door to many possibilities in different areas, but to achieve such performance, 5G uses a multitude of pathways. To simplify, let us say that something that is sent from Montreal to a computer in Paris could have a portion pass through New York, another through London, another through Barcelona, and so forth. That is the interconnected world we live in today. This makes the technology particularly vulnerable because it becomes difficult to track the path that the data takes.

Huawei has already been implicated in a scandal involving China spying on the African Union headquarters. I do not know if anyone remembers that, but it is extremely worrying. In 2012, China gave the African Union a fully equipped ultramodern building. China told the African Union that it could get set up, that the networks, computers and telecommunications systems would be provided by Beijing. In 2017, after a few years of operation, African computer scientists realized that the servers were sending out huge amounts of data at night, when nobody was working in the building. It was odd. They wondered why that was happening.

They discovered that the data was going to servers in China that were being used to spy on political leaders and staff. As it turned out, Huawei was the main supplier of the network infrastructure. Microphones were discovered in the walls and tables.

In 2017, China adopted a new national intelligence law where all Chinese companies are obligated to contribute to Chinese intelligence work, be it military or civilian intelligence. A company could be told to spy on behalf of another Chinese company to give China an advantage on the world stage.

China has always denied that its companies had to engage in espionage in foreign countries. Western intelligence agencies, however, say otherwise, and also agree that Chinese laws apply abroad. In any case, we know that China's large companies have close ties to the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese military and the Chinese government, and that all four have an extremely incestuous relationship with Beijing.

In any case, any company that shows the slightest defiance toward the Chinese Communist Party has no chance of prospering. China, of course, is not a market economy. It is a highly controlled and centralized economy even though, on paper, private companies have officially existed in areas known as special economic zones since the death of Mao Zedong, undergoing constant expansion ever since. For a while, it was thought that China would evolve into a market economy, but that has obviously not turned out to be the case.

For all of these reasons, experts are leery of using Chinese equipment in critical infrastructure such as telecommunications infrastructure. Digital technology played a key role in the so-called new silk roads strategy, launched by the Chinese regime in Beijing.

Once again, the British felt that the risk could be mitigated by not using Chinese equipment in certain specific areas, such as the military and embassies. These are such strategic areas that the British excluded them. However, they have since reconsidered their position and banned the company altogether in 2023.

The U.S. intelligence agency, the CIA, and the Canadian criminal intelligence agency, CSIS, believe that the threat is too great and that the company should be banned, just as the Canadian government recently banned Huawei's 5G technology. The United States has banned Huawei from developing 5G technology in the United States and is pushing for its NATO allies to follow suit, which Australia, New Zealand and now Britain have done.

It is important to note that Huawei was way ahead of the game in terms of developing 5G technology, which prompted many companies, including Canadian companies, to consider using Huawei equipment. Since then, many other companies, such as Nokia, Ericsson and Samsung, have caught up. This means there are more options on the market today, and the Canadian telecommunications industry has shifted away from Huawei services to develop 5G technology. Therefore, it is entirely possible. We are not that dependent on what China has to offer.

In addition, countries such as Australia and New Zealand have denied Chinese companies access to 5G technology development, even though these countries are much more dependent on China than Canada is. Justin Trudeau's government could not make up its mind for the longest time, but it finally woke up. Things started to move. The same is true when it comes to concerns about TikTok. The government is concerned that China could be using certain apps to steal information, and rightly so. As we have seen, China is the queen of data collection.

This bill obviously seeks to address a very real problem, to ward off these potential cyber-attacks, but we are concerned about interference from Ottawa. The Privacy Commissioner asked whether there was any evidence that this bill, which does not clearly rule out the possibility of tracking old emails or searches, would not infringe on the most fundamental aspects of people's privacy. The answer is in the question, in that we should likely clarify things and include more specifics to reassure people who may be concerned about their privacy. Right now, there is no evidence to show that the bill will not infringe on privacy, and we certainly do not have any guarantees that it will not.

That is why it is imperative that the committee conduct a thorough study, that we do the study right, that we hear from witnesses and experts. In any case, some of the work was done during the study of the previous version of the bill, Bill C‑26. Unfortunately, that study was not very reassuring. We need to amend the current bill to ensure that Ottawa is not able to infringe on people's privacy.

[Madeleine Chenette, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Canadian Identity and Culture and Minister responsible for Official Languages and to the Secretary of State (Sport)]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for his presentation, which summed up the geopolitical issues and all the challenges posed by certain governments that are more autocratic than democratic.

This bill contains all the necessary parameters to protect people and data. I would also like my colleague to tell us what he thinks are the strengths of the institutions protecting us in Canada. There is no need for fearmongering. Canada does have robust institutions.

Is my colleague familiar enough with these concepts to explain them to Canadians?

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Mr. Speaker, there are a number of positive elements in the bill. One example is that it enacts the new critical cyber systems protection act. Another is the impact that amending the Telecommunications Act to add promotion of security could have.

However, what is being proposed may also have an impact on provincial infrastructure, such as Hydro-Québec, and we are worried about that encroachment.

As I said, I have no problem with the objective of what is being put in place. However, we must keep an eye on areas of overreach, which should be limited and more strictly controlled. I am confident that our colleagues on the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security will be able to do a good job on this.

[Gord Johns, NDP, Courtenay—Alberni, BC]

Mr. Speaker, one concern New Democrats have raised is the one-size-fits-all approach. This bill would lump together banks, telecoms, nuclear facilities and energy co-operatives under a single compliance framework. All of them would face the same 90-day timeline to stand up cybersecurity programs, no matter their size or capacity. For large corporations, perhaps this is feasible. For small operators or co-ops, it could be impossible.

Should compliance obligations not be tailored to the realities of different sectors?

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I do not disagree with my colleague on that. I think this will likely come up in committee. As soon as we start hearing from witnesses, some will say that they agree with the idea, but that they need more time and a transition plan.

Needless to say, no one can argue against virtue and common sense. That is why it is hard to disagree with what my colleague said.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, protecting the critical systems we have in place is ultimately protecting the Canadian economy, among many other things. Yes, we need to be concerned about the whole issue of privacy and so forth, but not moving legislation of this nature forward would have a very negative impact on cybersecurity and our economy.

I wonder if the member could provide his thoughts on how important it is for the Canadian economy as a whole that we have legislation of this nature.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it is important for the economy as a whole, especially in today's world. That said, there are some important privacy considerations at stake. That about sums up my remarks. Yes, doing this is essential, but not at any cost. I think that is my speech in a nutshell.

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Parkland, AB]

Mr. Speaker, there has been some concern about some provisions of the bill that talk about when the minister has a reasonable belief that there is a threat to the telecommunications system. One, the word “system” might be an overly broad way of categorizing the telecommunications infrastructure and, two, when dealing with individuals, there could be some room for potential abuses.

I was hoping the member could talk to us about his perspective on ways we could perhaps strengthen this legislation to ensure that individual Canadians with concerns are not being in any way targeted by this legislation.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Mr. Speaker, that is why I was saying that it is important for the committee to do a thorough job. It must ensure that the bill's objective, which is commendable, is not pursued without regard for the consequences, which could be devastating.

Our remarks are summed up nicely in the testimony of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. He said that he supported the idea but urged caution. Are there safeguards in place, given that it would be possible to use the data, to discover people's personal online search history and to look at their old emails? Does the bill not go a bit too far? Should we not make it clear that these things should not be done at all costs? They are already happening in the context of criminal investigations, but that is not the case here.

[Leslyn Lewis, Conservative, Haldimand—Norfolk, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today with heavy concerns about Bill C-8, a proposed law presented as a measure to secure Canada's telecommunications and critical infrastructure.

I think we can all agree that cybersecurity is very important. Our information networks are the lifeblood of our economy, education, health systems and daily lives. Protecting this critical infrastructure is essential, but without liberty, there can be no security. As such, my speech today will focus on how Bill C-8 would impact the individual liberties of average Canadians.

Bill C-8 would grant the federal government sweeping powers. It would allow the Minister of Industry, with direction from cabinet, to order telecommunications service providers like Rogers, Telus and Bell to act, refrain from action, remove equipment, prohibit certain services and, in extreme cases, suspend or terminate services to individual users. While Bill C-8's intention is to focus on service providers, it indirectly encroaches on the fundamental freedoms of Canadians by failing to carve out an exemption for individual Canadians who rely on the Internet and telecommunications to work, travel, communicate, engage in commerce and banking and connect in their virtual communities.

Consider what that means in practical terms. In today's world, losing access to telecommunications or the Internet is not just a minor inconvenience; it is a form of isolation. It can prevent someone from working, learning, paying bills, accessing health care and participating in civic life. It is, in essence, a digital prison.

The gravest concern about Bill C-8 is that it contains provisions of secrecy and non-disclosure. A person whose Internet is cut off may not know why their service was terminated. They may not know the evidence against them. They may not have a meaningful opportunity to defend themselves. A Canadian could be trapped in a digital prison with no way to challenge it. Bill C-8 therefore breaches fundamental guarantees under the Charter of Rights. This strikes at the heart of our Constitution.

Section 7 of the charter guarantees the following:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

Fundamental justice includes someone knowing the case against them and having a fair opportunity to defend themselves. Bill C-8, as it stands, would allow the government to deprive individuals of essential services without ever seeing the evidence, which is a profound breach of these principles.

Section 8 of the charter, which protects against unreasonable search and seizure, would also be engaged. The bill would allow the government to collect private information without consent and with minimal safeguards. This combination of secret orders and the lack of disclosure creates a scenario where Canadians' privacy and liberty are deeply at risk. Even if national security is invoked, section 1 of the charter requires that limitations on rights be proportionate, necessary and minimally impairing.

Secret orders, broad powers and no avenues for defence fail this test. Canadians should not have to surrender their rights to remain secure. Security and freedom can coexist. The government can both defend our telecommunications networks and protect the rights and freedoms of all Canadians.

Bill C-8 might secure networks, but as it stands, it risks imprisoning citizens digitally and denying them fundamental justice. In so doing, it would undermine the very freedoms we seek to protect. Let us not mistake security for liberty. Let us not trade the rights of Canadians for a false sense of protection.

Let me give a concrete example of how Bill C-8 could affect an ordinary Canadian. Imagine Sarah, a citizen frustrated with a government program she believes was mismanaged and corrupt. In her frustration, she posts online, threatening to expose government corruption. She threatens to reveal secret information she has collected about the program. The government views her post as a threat to the telecommunications system, so it quietly issues an order under Bill C-8. Her Internet provider receives direction to shut down her Internet and phone services, all without a court warrant or court order. The same provider is legally forbidden from disclosing the reason why Sarah's Internet was suspended. If the provider were to explain, it could face penalties and even jail. The next morning, Sarah is shocked to find that she cannot access her email, bank account or work portal. Her social media accounts are frozen. She cannot contact her friends, family or colleagues. She has been cut off entirely from the digital world and she has no idea why.

This is a system of double secrecy. The government order is hidden and the provider is prohibited from telling her anything. Sarah cannot see the evidence against her or ask questions, and she has no way of defending herself. She is effectively trapped in a digital prison. She is isolated, powerless and silenced.

Over the following days, the impact deepens. Sarah cannot pay her bills, participate in remote work, access health care portals or communicate with anyone. Eventually, she finds out the government is behind this, so she attempts to challenge the order, only to hear that any judicial review may involve secret evidence that she cannot see. The provider has the information but, under Bill C-8, is not allowed to share it. Every attempt to assert her rights is blocked. She is not merely inconvenienced; she is entirely cut off with no meaningful recourse.

This scenario is conceivable and would be legal under Bill C-8 as it stands. It illustrates why Bill C-8's secrecy and non-disclosure provisions are so dangerous to individuals. People may say this would never happen. The government will, no doubt, insist that the intent of the bill is clear, but why should Canadians trust it?

We must take the bill at face value. We must rely on what the text explicitly sets out in the law; otherwise, the law intended to protect telecommunications infrastructure could easily be weaponized by any government against ordinary citizens. Citizens most at risk are people like me. They are those who publicly and loudly express dissent, challenge orthodoxy or raise uncomfortable truths. These citizens most active in civil society are most at risk of being cut off, penalized and isolated without ever knowing why.

For these reasons, Bill C-8 undermines the principles of fundamental justice in the charter as it stands. Security in this context can be a pretext for control while transparency and liberty are sacrificed.

Sarah's story is not just a hypothetical; it is a warning. Bill C-8 risks turning ordinary Canadians into prisoners of secrecy, silenced without cause and stripped of their most basic rights. We can secure a network without the risk of trapping innocent citizens in a digital prison and without stripping them of the ability to defend themselves. This can be done. We can provide clear exemptions in the legislation for individual users, which should be part of what we discuss in committee. These are practical, reasonable measures that governments could adopt.

We owe it to all Canadians to do everything in our power to elect leaders who will not be silenced, who will protect their security and who will guard their freedoms, because freedom without security is a cage.

I am splitting my time with the hon. member for Kitchener South—Hespeler.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I am not too sure if the member supports the legislation. It comes across that she has some concerns for individuals like Sarah.

I think the minister has been fairly clear as we have gone through this legislation that Bill C-8 is important for many different reasons. I recently highlighted that we need to protect the consumers of our economy through cybersecurity. It is not optional for the government to do it; it has to be done.

Would the member not, at the very least, agree that having cybersecurity to protect the Canadian economy is absolutely critical and that we need to have legislation? Maybe it is just a question of having some amendments to address some of the concerns the member has put forward.

[Leslyn Lewis, Conservative, Haldimand—Norfolk, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I want all Canadians to know that cybersecurity is an extremely important thing in this digital era. It is very important for the government to take this seriously.

This bill is a very important bill, but that does not mean there are not elements it that, as a legislator and a trained lawyer, I must bring to the public's attention. There are some concerns about how individual users are not properly treated in this bill, and they need to be corrected.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague is highlighting an important issue. We hear a lot of concerns from Canadians about Bill C-8. She included some of them in her speech. If she could shed light again on those concerns, it would be great.

[Leslyn Lewis, Conservative, Haldimand—Norfolk, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we recognize that there are times when our telecommunication infrastructure is threatened. In those instances, the government must act expeditiously to minimize and curtail that threat. However, these provisions can seep over into the realm of ordinary citizens. In the example I gave of Sarah, her entire life was unravelled because of this legislation.

I do not believe this should be the intent of this legislation. We really need to look at the impact of this legislation on ordinary individuals, because the average Canadian needs their telecommunications to facilitate every aspect of their life.

[Madeleine Chenette, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Canadian Identity and Culture and Minister responsible for Official Languages and to the Secretary of State (Sport)]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my hon. colleague for her speech.

I would like some reassurance. You said that this cybersecurity bill is important. You focused a lot on Sarah's story, and we certainly agree that it is important to protect people's privacy.

To reassure the public, could you tell us what benefits you see in passing this bill? Will you work with us at committee to get it passed?