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Crucial Fact

  • His favourite word was transportation.

Last in Parliament November 2006, as Liberal MP for London North Centre (Ontario)

Won his last election, in 2006, with 40% of the vote.

Statements in the House

Pearson International Airport Agreements Act April 26th, 1994

Mr. Speaker, the statements made by the hon. member are, to say the least, absolutely unfounded. To accuse this party, that did what it said it was going to do and cancelled the deal, and call us puppets, is absolutely ridiculous.

We are not the party that is trying to abrogate its responsibilities to the Canadian public. We are, by this legislation, doing what we promised before the election and what we promised since we have been elected: cancel the deal because we knew it was not in the public interest. Even the Bloc admits that the process is bad and that the substance of the agreement is not good.

I wish the member would be a little more generous with his terms. It was his leader who was party to that gang of hoodlums, as we knew the previous government, for a good many years. I am getting sick and tired of listening to your hypocrisy, pointing fingers here-

Pearson International Airport Agreements Act April 26th, 1994

Madam Speaker, I appreciate the comment and question by my colleague the transport critic for the Bloc.

The minister and the government have indicated that Transport Canada and our government want to look at commercialization opportunities. Commercialization does not necessarily mean the same as turning over or privatizing so that the private interest is protected and the public interest is not.

The member will know we have already announced some measures such as the air navigation system. We will be consulting all the stakeholders to find out if there is a better way of controlling our air navigation system to make sure that safety is paramount, that all the stakeholders have input into the system, and at the same time save the taxpayers some money.

I do not have to tell the member why we need to look at opportunities for saving money. We have a deficit and a debt to deal with. The taxpayers also demand that this government look at every opportunity to make sure we are as efficient and as effective as possible, but not to give up the public interest.

We are not in any position to make an announcement as to how we will deal with Pearson. That announcement will come as the minister indicated and as I indicated in my speech. By the end of the year we will put forward our plan of action for Pearson, not only the administrative structure but also the plans we have for its future. We are consulting.

It is not inconsistent nor is it talking out of both sides of the mouth to say that the deal structured by the former government was a bad deal. It was badly structured. It was a bad process, repugnant to taxpayers. The detail and substance of the deal were bad and not in good public interest.

We do not intend to make the same mistakes. We have learned from other people's mistakes, hopefully. We will put together a plan for Pearson, other airports, other modes of transportation, be it the seaway, be it rail, be it marine, be it highways, to work in co-operation with all the stakeholders, the provinces, municipalities, communities, anyone we have to, to make sure that Canada has the most effective, efficient, integrated transportation system to serve Canadians.

At the end of the day Canadians have to compete with the Americans, with the Mexicans, with the global community. Unless we can move goods and people as efficiently as we possibly can and at the best costs we cannot compete. If we cannot compete we do not have jobs and if we do not have jobs we have economic and social problems.

I would hope that commercialization is not a bad word. It is an opportunity that the government wants to look at to see how much more efficient and effective we can be in all modes of transportation.

Pearson International Airport Agreements Act April 26th, 1994

Madam Speaker, I appreciate the comments made by my colleague from Winnipeg St. James. He has touched on a number of important issues with regard to local airport authorities. He is absolutely right that we want to get it right, that we want to do it right.

The government has learned from mistakes made by others. The Minister of Transport and Transport Canada are looking at ways of fixing those flaws the member talked about with regard to local airport authorities. There are tremendous opportunities.

The minister sees it that way. Transport Canada sees it that way. Local communities can play a positive, constructive and proactive role in running airports to be the economic instruments they can be, but not to the detriment of public interest. We are defining what that public interest is in terms of safety and other matters.

The member is right on. We intend to make sure the local airport authority provisions are enhanced to make them much more accountable, much more transparent. We intend to ensure there is broad representation on those boards, to ensure the bottom line is that the interests of the community are always at the top of the heap so to speak.

I thank the hon. member for his constructive suggestions. We hope to have those revisions in place as soon as possible. As the member has indicated a number of communities are looking at opportunities.

As the Reform Party keeps reminding us, the government wants to be as effective and as efficient as it possibly can to save taxpayers money. If the local airport authorities can do the job well and protect the public interests as well as further their own local objectives, why not? The government is prepared to look at that.

Pearson International Airport Agreements Act April 26th, 1994

Madam Speaker, before I get into the text of my speech I wonder if I could make a couple of observations that are rather striking and troublesome.

We have heard from both the Bloc Quebecois and the Reform Party. They have questioned the way the Pearson deal came about and the substance of the deal. We all agree that the process and the substance were seriously flawed in many ways because the Canadian public interest was not protected. Yet both opposition parties are voting against the bill.

That is rather curious. I must admit I was rather surprised that the leader of the Bloc Quebecois would take the time to address this issue. He talked about a number of things, from lobbyists to other circumstances. He went on ad nauseam about the fact he had left the government before he had anything to do with it. I believe that perhaps he has a guilty conscience.

He is right. He left the government in May 1990, but he was part of that gang, part of his colleagues, part of the cabinet, part of the so-called friends he now wants to deny he ever had anything to do with who put this darned bad deal together. It is rather curious that the Bloc leader would go on at length trying to divorce himself from a bad gang, as Canadians would know it, as he knew it. Yet he participated maybe not in the Pearson deal, but right from the beginning he knew exactly what was going on.

He went on and on. He must have a guilty conscience about the fact that he had anything to do with the gang that operated in Ottawa for nine years.

He then starts talking about the bill being a smoke screen and in fact talks about Pearson being a very important economic instrument and transportation mechanism. What does he ask for? A public inquiry that would probably cost millions and millions of taxpayers' dollars and waste a lot more time. We need to get on with the planning of Pearson. The bill needs to be put in place to effect the cancellation because the former government did not put a cancellation clause in the agreement.

I find it rather curious that the Bloc talks about integrity. It is really talking about wasting a heck of a lot more time so that we cannot get on with the business of deciding what we need to do in the public interest with regard to Pearson.

The comments of the Reform Party were equally absurd. They talked about the flawed process, about the flawed contract. Yet what is it talking about? It is talking about delaying.

The member for Simcoe Centre said that Pearson was an important employment generator. We can put people back to work. Yet he said Reformers could not support the bill until certain other things happen. That is not being fiscally responsible, like the Reform Party likes to pretend it is, at least in the minds of Canadians. I do not really understand where the Reform Party is coming from in terms of delay and timing. We want to do exactly what I thought the member said, and that is get on with planning the future of Pearson and national transportation.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to participate in the debate on this important legislation, Bill C-22. I want to add my support to the Minister of Transport who has brought this legislation forward to cancel the agreements entered into by a previous government for the operations of terminal 1 and terminal 2 at Pearson International. This is a necessary step not only to ensure the future of Pearson but also to restore the faith of Canadians in their democratic institutions.

We are not cancelling this deal because it was fashioned by a previous government. To do so simply for partisan reasons would be unjustifiably frivolous. Rather the government has said that we will build on some of the previous government's initiatives when, and I emphasize when, such works serve the interests of the people of Canada. Pearson airport did not serve those interests.

The people of Canada voted in the last election for open and transparent government. The process that led to this deal was neither open nor transparent, nor did it stand up to scrutiny byan impartial observer, Mr. Robert Nixon. As we all remember,Mr. Nixon, the former Ontario treasurer, advised the government to reject the deal saying: "To leave in place an inadequate

contract, arrived at with such flawed process and under the shadow of possible political manipulation, is unacceptable".

I want to digress perhaps a little for a moment, although it is related. One of our important commitments as a government is to renewing Canada's infrastructure and that includes our transportation system.

As my hon. colleague, the Minister of Transport, said in his speech in February, we intend to help Canadians build a stronger economy. One way to do this is through policies that bring immediate gains in transportation efficiencies. This kind of forward thinking will contribute to long term economic growth by enabling Canadians to do business and move goods quickly and efficiently at competitive costs. Yes, we need to improve our transportation infrastructure but not at the expense of the long term interests of the people of Canada.

To get back to this particular deal, perhaps it would be useful to look at some history, to get some perspective on where things started to come apart. I know that other speakers have already indicated that. On April 8, 1987 the then Government of Canada issued its policy framework for the management of airports in Canada. On June 22, 1987 the government selected the Airport Development Corporation to construct and operate Pearson's terminal 3. I should point out at the same time that the Leader of the Opposition was in the Conservative cabinet.

The Falcon Star Group which included the Matthews Group of companies was an unsuccessful bidder in this competition back on June 22, 1987. In September 1989 the Matthews Group submitted an unsolicited proposal to privatize terminals 1 and 2 but this proposal was not accepted by the then government in September of 1989.

In October 1990 the then Minister of Transport announced the government would privatize terminal 1 and terminal 2 at Pearson. A year and a half later on March 11, 1992 the government issued an RFP for the privatization and redevelopment of terminals 1 and 2. The original RFP provided only 90 days for response, although that was extended, if we can call it that, by an additional 30 days.

It is not as though the construction industry was booming in southern Ontario in those days. Yet no other firms were given reasonable time to participate, so the process was flawed right from the beginning.

On December 7, 1992 the government announced Paxport's proposal was the best overall, but Paxport still had to demonstrate that its proposal was financially viable. When it could not do this it turned to Claridge, its rival for financial support. By February 1, 1993 Paxport had joined forces with the other original bidder in a joint venture partnership which became T1 T2 Limited Partnership.

By May 1993 when most outstanding issues had been dealt with sufficiently for formal negotiations to start, we now find that Claridge, the second place finisher, in effective control of the joint venture.

On August 30, 1993 the then Minister of Transport announced that a general agreement had been reached to redevelop and operate the two terminals. Then just nine short or long days later, depending on your perspective, on September 8, 1993 the government called the long awaited election. We all remember that campaign well and we all remember the concerns raised by the public and media about the Pearson deal.

The soon to be Prime Minister warned the parties to the deal not to sign it, that a new government would not hesitate to cancel it if it was not found to be in the public interest.

It should perhaps be noted that the circumstances were such that the government's chief negotiator asked for written instructions about whether to complete the transaction. That chief negotiator got those instructions on October 7, 1993 despite the concerns expressed by many Canadians, the soon to be former Prime Minister issued explicit instructions to conclude the deal. We now know where the push came from. It seems that the Canadian people had some doubts as well and we know how they expressed themselves at the ballot boxes.

What would the Government of Canada have gained by the agreement? Remember the terms of the lease was 37 years with an option for an additional 20 years. This means the government could well have been signing away control of a major national asset for almost three generations.

The agreement also included a constraint on alternative airport development within a 75-kilometre radius of Pearson. How did the previous government suppose this government would serve the people of London and the rest of southern Ontario by this kind of provision in the agreement?

Extensive reviews have shown that the airport facilities in the area of south central Ontario must be co-ordinated. Southern Ontario airports must, for planning purposes, be considered part of a single integrated system. This clause alone would have severely constrained future governments, eliminating many sound planning options. Under the agreement the government could have done nothing to alleviate the pressures of growth at other airports until Pearson topped 33 million passengers a year.

As Mr. Nixon said in what I take to be restrained understatement, the agreement did not serve the public interests.

I know my allotted time is running out, but I cannot leave the matter without some mention of the appearance of cronyism conveyed by this deal. It is this appearance that is so corrosive to public confidence in the government and its institutions. While we are not suggesting that anything illegal was done by any of

the parties, some of their actions conveyed the impression that they had something to hide.

Everyone knows how much concern was expressed about lobbyists and political staff seeming to have an inordinate influence on decisions that should have been made on the basis of public interest, influencing them so much that senior public servants felt pressured.

We have a long tradition that requires openness and transparency in any undertaking that involves the public purse. Canadians are entitled to disclosure when it comes to a deal affecting their assets.

I am afraid there is much more, but time does not permit me to examine the rest of it. What is also important now is that it is time to move forward. The government understands that the people of Ontario, in fact all Canadians affected by Pearson's operations, would like a prompt decision on how we are going to manage Pearson. That is one good reason for proceeding with the bill, to cancel the agreement as we must formally through this legislation as quickly as possible. Pearson is too important a national asset to languish while we debate. The Minister of Industry said when he introduced the bill: "We need to get the cancellation over with so we can get on with the job of planning for its future operations".

However, as has been clearly stated by the Minister of Transport, we will not be put in the untenable position of cobbling together a solution. Pearson is too important and we are too much aware of our responsibility to Canadians to rush simply for the sake of doing something, anything, as some members opposite seem to want us to do without proper care for the long term effects of our decision.

The fact of the matter is that the decisions we take at Pearson do not just affect that single airport. That is why we are consulting with a great many people. Yes, we are consulting with our Toronto members of Parliament. They were elected and are the rightful voice of their constituents in Parliament, in our caucus and in our government. We will consult with provincial, municipal and regional governments and local community leaders. We are doing that and the minister is doing that. We intend to do it right, not like the previous government has done.

In fact, as some of our other counterparts have indicated in the debate this morning, Pearson is not a local airport. It is a national airport and we are seeking national consultation.

The fact that our party is a national party with representatives from all parts of this country is a positive for us, not a negative. I cannot say that about the Bloc which only has members in one province nor the Reform Party which has members in only two or three provinces. We are a national party with national representation. We will consult with our national caucuses as to what to do about our national airport.

The government intends to make a final decision on Pearson's administrative structure before the end of this year. It is now time to close the book on this sorry chapter and move forward with planning for the future of Canada's transportation hub. Passing the legislation will allow us to plan the future of Pearson unencumbered by these flawed agreements.

No one should be surprised by anything in the legislation. It is nothing more than what we said we would do before the election, after the election, and when we introduced the legislation.

We will negotiate only for out of pocket expenses. We will not negotiate for lost profits and we will not negotiate for lobbyist fees. We are doing what the Bloc has indicated we should not; we are doing what the Reform has indicated we should not, which is to negotiate lobbyist fees. We will not pay for lobbyist fees. We will not pay for lost profit. We will pay for out of pocket expenses.

The legislation does not limit the amount of any potential payment nor does it preclude any continued negotiations because negotiations must continue. It does make clear to all the parties what the government is and is not prepared to consider. It makes it clear that these negotiations cannot go on indefinitely.

We are not saying that lobbyists should not be paid. We are saying these parties should take up the matter with the people who employed them, the developers, and not the taxpayers of the country.

I would like to close with this reminder. The most important asset a government can have is the confidence of its citizens. During the nine years of the previous government-and I was happy to hear the history lesson from the leader of the Bloc Quebecois because he participated in part of those nine years in that government-we saw a steady erosion of confidence in the public sector.

This erosion had many causes, from the behaviour of certain elected politicians to an arrogant style of political leadership. One of the key causes of this erosion was the practice of conducting public business behind closed doors giving the idea of favouritism.

Canadians deserve better. The government intends to do better by delivering to Canadians the leadership and the innovation demanded by today's changes backed by integrity and supported by principles that will never be sacrificed to expediency.

We look forward to working with both parties at committee to improve the legislation, if we can. We need to get on with the business of planning Pearson's future. We cannot unless we pass the legislation. I look forward to the comments of members from both sides.

Interparliamentary Delegations April 20th, 1994

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Standing Order 34(1), I have the honour to present, in both official languages, the report of the Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association of the 21st annual meeting between the Canadian and European Parliaments held in Vancouver, British Columbia, from February 15 to 18, 1994.

Might I add that this is one of many examples of a parliamentary association doing positive work on behalf of Canadians on an issue that could potentially have been very damaging to the Canadian economy and thousands of jobs, namely the forestry industry.

I want to thank everyone who participated in this great forum because I think we did good work for Canada.

Transport Canada April 20th, 1994

Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for giving me this opportunity of advising the House that Transport Canada has been advised by Cape Canaveral that there is a possibility that some space debris may re-enter the atmosphere and crash into the ocean off Nova Scotia and Newfoundland on Thursday, April 21, 1994, between 1200 and 1500 hours, eastern daylight time.

This is a serious and important issue and Transport Canada is working with the departments of National Defence, Foreign Affairs and our respective American counterparts to monitor the path of this debris. As the member mentioned, notice has already gone out to the marine and aviation industries.

I also advise the House that it is intended that the departmental satellite re-entry contingency plan, which provides for Transport Canada emergency staff, will give the authority to take whatever action within its sphere of competence to-

St. Lawrence Seaway April 20th, 1994

Mr. Speaker, first let me congratulate the member for Thunder Bay-Nipigon on becoming chairman of the subcommittee that is reviewing and will bring forward recommendations on the seaway.

I want to thank the people from the mid-Canada port survival task force that I met with yesterday. The National Transportation Agency did make a ruling last year, for the most part exonerating the railways but that decision has been appealed and will be reviewed by the government.

At the same time, my hon. friend will know that the whole question of western grain transportation reform is undergoing an intensive review.

The Minister of Transport and the government are determined to build a national, integrated, efficient transportation system, one that is affordable to the user and to the taxpayer of the country.

High Speed Train April 13th, 1994

Mr. Speaker, I want to take this opportunity to thank the member for Joliette for his very informed speech on high speed trains.

I have no quarrel whatsoever with his enthusiasm for a technology that we are obviously considering. He alluded to the fact a report and a study on which $6 million is being spent by Ontario, Quebec and the federal government is to be released in June. Surely he wants to be true and honest with Canadian taxpayers by at least waiting for the report and until such time as government and Parliament can make a decision on it.

As I said, the governments of Quebec, Ontario and Canada have embarked on a major study to determine the viability of a high speed rail system in the Quebec City to Windsor corridor.

The present study covers a broad range of subjects that have been identified in previous works and is so designed to provide the most comprehensive evaluation of the potential of high speed rail in the corridor.

The three governments hired a consortium of consultants as managers of the project. The consortium is responsible to produce the benefits and the costs and the financial analysis for the overall project.

In addition the consortium is supervising and co-ordinating the following component studies, all very important to the decision making: data gathering, passenger and revenue forecasting, technology assessment, including the operating and strategy and costing.

The member alluded to one technology but he also should know that two technologies were under consideration. New technologies are being developed even as we speak.

The member talked about $7.5 billion. I do not know where he got those figures. The study has not been finished yet and some of his figures, unfortunately, are from previous reports or previous studies that have been done.

Also included are the industrial strategy and the economic benefits, institutional options and the legislative and labour issues, trends in intercity passenger transportation and government support, environmental aspects, impacts of the urban system and settlement patterns and the light freight and station concessions. This study builds on the findings and recommendations of the Ontario-Quebec task force report which identified several shortcomings in its work and the work of previous studies.

One of the main concerns in the task force report work was the inadequacy of the data that formed the basis for the passenger and revenue forecasts. To address this concern one-third of the total allocated budget of $6 million for the current study has been devoted to the gathering of data concerning travel patterns

and attitudes of the travelling public and to the forecasting of future usage.

This is the most critical aspect of the high speed proposal. Will people use it if in fact it is built? Previous studies of passenger travel in the corridor were conducted in a short timeframe and did not address the seasonal variances that may exist.

The quality and reliability of the base data have also been greatly improved over previous works. We have obtained 60,000 survey responses, three times more than had been obtained in the previous studies. This level of response was possible through the full co-operation of all the carriers in the corridor. Complete access to their passenger facilities and equipment was obtained to facilitate the conduct of the surveys. This is the first time researchers have been able to gain this unconditional co-operation. The survey results were also provided to the individual carriers to validate accuracy and reliability.

We have exerted a great deal of effort to improve the quality of the data to be used as the base for the study. This information is presently being incorporated by many of the consultants who are still in the midst of their work. It would be inappropriate and naturally premature to presume the outcome of their work.

In October 1989 the federal government established a royal commission on national passenger transportation with the objective of reporting on a national integrated, intercity passenger transportation system to meet the needs of Canadians in the 21st century. The commission reported its findings in 1992 and recommended with respect to high speed rail that governments only invest in high speed rail if the overall benefits exceed the costs and taxpayers do not have to pay an operating subsidy.

Furthermore, the commission recommended that there be public consultation on the implications of the government's decision and that the government establish a regulation under which high speed rail would operate, including safety and environmental regulations.

Clearly the royal commission has indicated through its recommendations that a hasty decision should not be promoted and that the full impacts of high speed rail are known prior to making a decision.

The Canadian debate on high speed rail has been ongoing for a long time and has intensified over the last few years with the release of several independent reports. These reports indicated that the governments will have to play a major role in any high speed project in Canada. The scope and the nature of the federal government's participation are yet to be determined or defined.

The House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport addressed the question of the role of the federal government in high speed rail and reported its findings in March 1992. The Member should know that the theme of that whole report was a leap of faith.

The standing committee's recommendations are to a large extent addressed in the many component studies underway within the scope of the present study. Once again, these results will not be known for some time and the government should have all the information at hand prior to deciding on the future of high speed rail.

Canada's national rail passenger service has undergone many changes over the past few years. VIA Rail operations have been downsized in order to reduce subsidies. High speed rail is an option to improve the quality of service that is presently provided by VIA Rail.

A decision on the role of the federal government on high speed rail should not be made in isolation but would have to be addressed in the light of the broader context of the overall transportation needs in Canada. Canada's freight railways, CN and CP, have incurred substantial financial losses over the past 10 years. The railways are preparing proposals for the consolidation of their networks in Canada and some rail rationalization may be inevitable. This does not mean that valuable right of way which can be redeveloped for future purposes will be forgone. However, it would be beneficial to include this aspect in the decision on any high speed rail system.

As I stated earlier, the creation of jobs is a priority mandate of the federal government. A high speed rail project during the construction period will create significant employment. We do not argue with that. The economic impact study which has yet to be completed will quantify the levels that would be generated by a high speed rail project.

The choice of technology is another area that must be identified. As I have indicated, we are looking at more than one technology. A high speed rail project will not see the light of day without significant contributions from the private sector. The motion should not be moved forward without the benefits of the study.

We are prepared to further discuss this matter once the $6 million study, paid for by the Canadian taxpayers, is brought forward and presented to Parliament.

Via Rail April 12th, 1994

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the question from the member for Perth-Wellington-Waterloo.

I should point out that these rumours are simply that, rumours, and are based on unfounded speculation. This government has not made any decisions on service levels to VIA but members in this House should understand that the levels of budget for VIA have been established by way of the budget that was tabled in February.

VIA is presently undertaking negotiations with its labour unions. We are hopeful that it in fact can gain the efficiencies that it needs, that labour will co-operate in those deliberations and that in fact the public will also participate because the solution to a viable passenger rail system in this country is that all stakeholders can in fact make it possible.

No decisions have been made by this government, nor will they until such time as those negotiations have been completed.

Rail Transport April 12th, 1994

Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for his question.

As he knows, this question has been asked of the Minister of Transport a number of times in this House. Also, he should know that the critic for his party and the Standing Committee on Transport are looking at rail rationalization.

I should point out to the members there is a regime in place called the National Transportation Agency that is to look at rail abandonment and rail rationalization. That is the vehicle by which rationalization is considered. No, we have no plans to declare a moratorium. There is a system in place for that to occur.