Stephen Owen

[An act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals and firearms) and the Firearms Act, December 6th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I agree with the member opposite that this is an extremely important issue to all Canadians. The cruelty which is visited upon animals, in a vicious, neglectful or willful way, is unacceptable to Canadians and the legislation deals with that demand.

The effect of Motion No. 1, as the member opposite said, would be to do away with the bill altogether. That is simply unacceptable.

After consulting with the public in 1998 on the current cruelty provisions in the criminal code and by virtue of receiving petitions with over 10,000 signatures and about 100 letters a week being sent to the Minister of Justice, it is absolutely clear to the government that the vast majority of Canadians want the anti-cruelty laws to be modernized and strengthened. That was the evidence before us in committee right across the board, whether it was people representing the agricultural industry, hunting and fishing interests, medical research or the general public.

This is extremely important legislation. People want to see people who act viciously toward animals dealt with strongly. I must say that some of the strongest testimony came from members of the agricultural industry, an industry that is one of the backbones of our economy, our culture and our society. They are the people who are closest to animals in many ways in our society and they know best that the humane treatment of animals is immensely important.

The bill is an important matter of public policy. It is a strong part of government policy and it will go forward as far as the government is concerned.

Looking at Motion No. 4, the effect of the motion would be to substitute the word “experience” for “feel” in the sense of experiencing pain rather than feeling pain, talking within the definition of animal. The word “experience” when used as a verb, as is proposed in the motion, is capable of several meanings. The Oxford dictionary defines experience as: meet with, feel, undergo, learn or find. That could lead to confusion in the interpretation of the legislation. Of course, many of those meanings have no relation to what we are talking about or focusing on in the legislation.

The word “feel”, however, is defined in terms of being conscious of a sensation, that is, the ability to feel pain. It establishes that the animal must have the capacity to sense pain. Mere physical reflex in the absence of a developed nervous system of course is not enough. I would urge the House not to approve that motion.

Motion No. 5 presents a major problem for the government. It would result in fewer protections being offered to animals than is currently the case. The reference to contravention of industry standards introduces a notion into criminal law which is unprecedented, that is, that standards set by industry would determine whether or not a person was liable for cruelty offences under the criminal law.

The Supreme Court of Canada in the Jorgensen case made it very clear that approval by a provincial body as a matter of law cannot preclude the prosecution of a charge under the criminal code.

There is also a very good chance that such an amendment would ultimately be ruled to violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the basis that the law was so lacking in precision that it did not provide sufficient guidance for legal debate as to the scope of prohibited conduct. The law must be sufficiently clear so that Canadians know that they are at risk of being prosecuted if they commit a particular act.

The reference to industry standards is important. It raises a number of questions. Would those standards have to be passed by a provincial legislature? If not, would voluntary codes of conduct be an industry standard? Would industry standards that were not well publicized still be relevant under the section? Who would determine what was a relevant industry standard?

Reference to industry standards in the heading of the offence relating to intentional cruelty offences would suggest that industry standards, which condone certain activity, would excuse that activity.

In that regard, it is interesting to note that the activities listed in paragraphs (e), (f), (g) and (h) are prohibited outright. The wording of the motion suggests that what is intended is to have industry rather than the criminal courts determine what is legal and not legal in the country.

In that sense, simply the reference to “industry standards” would not have any true relevance to many of the offences listed.

That being said, an amendment in committee does, specifically for the purposes of greater clarity, refer to the applicability of section 8(3) of the criminal code, which applies all of the common law defences to offences under the code and under this section by specific reference.

In terms of the common law defences that are available currently under the law, the bill when passed will not remove any defences that are now available.

Further, the use of the word “negligent” in section 8 makes it clear, in the sense of the criminal meaning of negligence, that the activity to be criminalized under this section would have to significantly depart from the ordinary standards.

That is a high standard to meet for a criminal charge. It makes it clear that things that are lawful now as ordinary parts of business practice, agricultural practice, hunting and fishing, and medical research, will continue to be protected as they are now.

Motion No. 6 is an important recognition of the value of police dogs to the police services generally. The new offence created by the motion would extend application of the offence provisions to law enforcement animals, whether or not they are actively engaged in law enforcement at the time the offence is committed. This is important. It could be a horse or a dog but that great expense, time and care has been put into the training of this animal. Of course, that would be an immensely valuable tool, as well as a very expensive one to replicate.

The offence provision, as redrafted, makes it clear that the law enforcement animals are being protected because of the risk they face on a daily basis in the course of assisting peace officers and public officers. This small amendment to this section that was amended in committee makes it clear that there is a discretion in the sentencing judge as to whether the costs of replacing the animal should be part of the sentence. It may be that the person has no ability to meet that provision and therefore it should not be a mandatory requirement.

When I look at Motion No. 7, the government recognizes the extremely valuable services provided by animals that assist persons with disabilities. However, the motion should be resisted because it undermines the general policy of the animal cruelty provisions: that all animals deserve the same protections under law.

The law enforcement animal provision is a clear exception to this general rule but it is rationalized on the basis that these animals are at risk on a daily basis because of the nature of their work in assisting those involved in law enforcement. The amendment could create uncertainty in the law, the one reflecting animals assisting persons with disabilities, because the disability is not defined.

If distinctions between animals are made on the basis of their utility to humans, it can be argued that there is no policy basis for not creating specific offences for each type of animal that is a working animal of some sort.

I will briefly mention Motion No. 8. I urge all members to resist the motion. It would create specific provisions relating to the conduct of trials in animal cruelty cases. It is not clear, in the face of provisions in the Canada Evidence Act relating to the receipt of evidence by experts, as well as well developed case law in this area, why it is necessary to create a specific provision for judges in animal cruelty cases.

It should be noted as a general principle that it is crown counsel, rather than the judge, who calls evidence in support of the prosecution and the defence. It is the defence, rather than the judge, who calls evidence in support of the defence.

The motion would potentially create uncertainty in the law. It is unclear whether it would replace existing statutory provisions and powers of common law for the court to oversee the conduct of trials and the reception of expert and other evidence.

An amendment of this nature would have cost implications for the provinces and territories.

It would be irresponsible to agree to a motion of this nature without consultation and without an examination of the larger implications of such a provision.

[Criminal Code, December 6th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, the two amendments passed by the other place would maintain the essential strong elements of Bill C-24. I will summarize these. First, the bill would provide an enhanced definition of criminal organization and create a new offence to target involvement with criminal organizations.

Second, it would improve measures to protect people from intimidation who play a role in the justice system. This would include members of the news media investigating organized crime.

Third, it would create an accountable process to protect law enforcement officers from criminal liability for certain otherwise illegal acts committed in the course of an investigation. This element of the bill is the subject of the two amendments from the other place.

Fourth, the bill would broaden powers to forfeit and seize proceeds of crime and property used in a crime.

The two amendments which I urge members of the House to support wholeheartedly deal with greater accountability in the lawful justification sections of the bill.

First, they would provide that when the minister designates officers to be under this protection he does so on an individual rather than a group basis as had been provided for in the bill passed by the House.

Second, they urge that the designation only take place in a jurisdiction of Canada where there is civilian oversight of police activities and a body to investigate public complaints concerning them.

The two amendments are immensely important. They would maintain and enhance the elements of the bill as passed in the House. I urge all members of the House to vote in favour of them.

[Criminal Code, December 6th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, as members will recall, Bill C-24 was introduced on April 5 and received approval at third reading on June 13. The bill has now been passed at third reading with amendments by the other place.

The amendments made in the other place do not change the essential nature of Bill C-24. As members will recall, Bill C-24 is intended to strengthen Canada's ability to deal with organized crime and to make a number of related changes to improve our law enforcement capability.

As passed by the House in June, the bill included four main elements, all of which are attained in the bill as amended by the other place. Very briefly, the four elements are: first, a new enhanced definition of “criminal organization” and the creation of a number of new offences targeting involvement with criminal organizations; second, measures to improve the protection from intimidation of people who play a role in the justice system; third, the creation of an accountable process to protect law enforcement officers from criminal liability for certain otherwise illegal acts committed in the course of an investigation; fourth, the broadening of powers to forfeit and seize proceeds of crime and property that has been used in a crime.

As I have indicated, these elements in all of their essential nature remain in the bill as amended. Rather than change the essential nature of the bill, the amendments made by the other place make enhancements to the bill. In particular, the amendments provide enhancements to control and accountability under the law enforcement justification for certain otherwise illegal acts committed in the course of an investigation. These amendments were made by way of two motions which were carried in the other chamber.

Members of the House will recall that an essential condition of the law enforcement justification is that it can only apply to designated public officers. Both motions to amend Bill C-24 that were made and carried in the other place relate to this designation requirement.

The designation requirement is a key aspect of control and accountability under the scheme. Under the requirement the responsible minister has a “competent authority” and must turn his or her mind to the need for and qualifications of the particular officers who are proposed to have this special jurisdiction and justification under the criminal code. The minister will be accountable for these decisions with respect to designation.

As originally passed by the House, Bill C-24 allowed the responsible minister to designate individual public officers or groups of public officers. In the other place it was pointed out that allowing for group designation instead of just for the designation of individual officers may undermine to some degree the key ministerial control and accountability function. It was suggested that greater control and accountability would be achieved if ministers were required to exercise this function with respect to each officer. This would directly require the minister to turn his or her mind to the essential characteristics of each officer in respect of the appropriateness of and eligibility for designation.

Members in the other chamber evidently agreed that allowing only for individual designations would be preferable. A motion was carried that eliminated authority for group designations in the number of places where it appeared.

Upon full consideration of this change, I believe the House should fully support it. The change enhances the control and accountability mechanisms under the scheme. Although these mechanisms already were strong, it is appropriate that they be made stronger by requiring individual consideration of each officer for whom designation is proposed.

Further, the change will not undermine the effectiveness of the scheme. While there may be some additional administrative burden in requiring that designation be done on an individual basis, this is a small and acceptable price to pay for enhanced control and accountability.

The additional motion to amend which was carried in the other place relates to the function of civilian oversight for police officers. It has been pointed out previously that the control and accountability mechanisms directly incorporated in the law enforcement justification scheme are in addition to, not a replacement for, existing control and accountability over law enforcement officers in Canada. Among the ways that this currently takes place in Canada is through the work of the bodies established for the civilian oversight of police. Such bodies are widely employed in this country.

The exact manner in which they are constituted and function can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Nevertheless effective methods of civilian review of police conduct, most notably through jurisdiction to receive and consider public complaints, is well established in Canada.

Nothing in Bill C-24 removes or undermines the role of civilian oversight. It is fully expected that civilian oversight bodies established in the various Canadian jurisdictions can and will play a role in reviewing the conduct of police officers under the law enforcement justification in the same manner as they currently play a role in reviewing law enforcement conduct.

Some have argued however, that because of the nature of the law enforcement justification and the absolute need to guard against abuse, we should make it a condition that civilian oversight bodies must be in place with respect to any enforcement officers sought to be designated under the scheme. As it has been suggested that civilian oversight bodies have an important role to play in relation to the law enforcement justification scheme, it has in turn been argued that we must ensure prior to designation that this role can be carried out. In situations where this civilian oversight capacity does not exist or where it may conceivably not exist in the future, although it is certainly not a trend to eliminate civilian oversight in Canada, perhaps the special authority granted by the law enforcement justification should also not exist.

Members of the other place evidently accepted these arguments. A motion to amend Bill C-24 was carried. It adds two subsections to proposed section 25.1 of the criminal code.

The first new subsection, subsection 3.1, provides that a competent authority may not designate a member of a police force unless there exists a public authority composed of persons who are not peace officers who have the power to review the conduct of the officers proposed to be designated. This achieves the condition on the scheme that I have discussed, that a civilian oversight authority must be in place to allow designation.

The second new subsection, subsection 3.2, allows the governor in council or a lieutenant governor in council as the case may be, to designate a person or body as a public authority for the purpose of the other added subsection and provides that this designation is conclusive evidence that this person or body is such a public authority. This will avoid any uncertainty of the existence of civilian oversight and avoids collateral attacks on the competence of the oversight bodies.

These are changes that the House can and should support. It is vital that the law enforcement justification scheme be subject to review and we can rightfully anticipate civilian oversight bodies will play an important part in this review. In order to assure the House and the Canadian public that this civilian oversight review capacity is in place in relation to the law enforcement justification, it is appropriate to make it a condition of the scheme.

[Human Rights, November 30th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, this Sunday, December 2 is the International Day for the Abolition of Slavery. Article four of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude and that slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms, yet there are places in the world where this article is not respected.

Slavery comes in many forms: the sexual exploitation of children; child labour; migrant labour; domestic labour; forced labour; slavery for ritual or religious purposes; and trafficking. We must meet the difficult challenges perpetuated by these injustices and eradicate slavery in all of its manifestations.

Slavery is an affront to the values and ideals that Canadians and freedom loving people around the world hold dear. Indeed it is an affront to all of humanity. I invite all hon. members of the House and all Canadians to join in commemorating December 2, the International Day for the Abolition of Slavery.

[Anti-Terrorism Act, November 28th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak at third reading of Bill C-36, known in short form as the anti-terrorism act. Bill C-36 was introduced in the House to provide needed enhancements to Canada's ability to address terrorism under the criminal code, to make related changes to other laws and to amend Canadian law to improve our ability to respond to discrimination and hatred.

The bill responds to the events of September 11 and the new face of terrorism that was revealed that day. While more than two months have passed since the events of that day, I am sure that none of us can forget the horror of the mass murder that took place.

Since that time this government and other governments around the world have taken significant and immediate steps to improve security. Also, through military and other efforts we have taken very significant steps toward dismantling the base of Osama bin Laden, a terrorist network in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless it would be very wrong to conclude that the threat of terrorism has disappeared, whether from al-Qaeda or from other potential terrorist organizations. We must remain vigilant as a country. Further, we must act in concert with other countries in the global effort against terrorism. It is recognized throughout the world that we need a long term approach to the problem.

The measures in Bill C-36 are a key part of Canada's long term plan to address terrorism. While as I have said the bill is responsive to the events of September 11, it would fill gaps in Canadian law that need to be filled regardless of the events of that day. September 11 has given us a great impetus to act without delay. It is important to emphasize, as the Minister of Justice has done, that these are not emergency measures but rather measures that would allow us to remain vigilant to an ongoing threat.

I will take a few moments to go over the major elements of Bill C-36. I then intend to review the changes accepted by the standing committee which have been reported back to the House.

I now turn to the major elements of the bill. Bill C-36 would implement the international convention on the suppression of financing of terrorism and the international convention on the suppression of terrorist bombings, the two remaining international conventions on terrorism that Canada has not yet implemented. The term terrorist activity is defined under this bill. The definition makes reference to offences that are set out in international conventions relevant to terrorism.

In addition, a general definition is provided referring to acts or omissions undertaken for political, religious or ideological purposes intended to intimidate the public or compel government to act and cause death, serious bodily harm or a number of other serious harms specifically set out in the definition.

The bill would provide for a list of terrorist groups and persons to be made by order of the federal cabinet on the recommendation of the Solicitor General of Canada. Under Bill C-36 comprehensive new terrorism offences under the criminal code would be created.

These include offences relating to participating in, facilitating or instructing terrorist activity and harbouring others who carry out terrorist activity. These offences would criminalize a full range of activities related to terrorism.

The bill would provide for limited and strictly safeguarded preventive arrest as a means of assisting law enforcement officers to disrupt the planning of terrorist attacks.

The bill would also provide for investigative hearings under the criminal code. These hearings, permitted under limited conditions, would be judicially supervised and would require the individual to give evidence to assist the investigations of terrorist offences. Such evidence could not be used against that individual and so protects a person's right to remain silent in his or her own criminal proceeding.

The bill would implement an aggressive sentencing and parole regime for terrorist offences including a maximum of life imprisonment for many offences as well as restricted parole eligibility.

Under Bill C-36 measures would be added to the criminal code on the financing of terrorism. Included within these measures are provisions on the seizure, restraint and forfeiture of terrorist property.

In addition, the bill would amend the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act. The mandate of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, Fintrac, under this act would be expanded to gather, analyze and disclose information on terrorist money laundering.

Also, as a way to assist in drying up the source of funds for terrorist groups and to prevent abuse of Canada's laws on charities, Bill C-36 would enact the charities registration security information act. This act would allow for the removal or denial of charitable status from organizations where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the organizations make their resources available to terrorists.

The focus of these measures is the prevention of terrorism. While our current laws allow us to charge and convict terrorists after they engage in terrorist acts we clearly must be able to do more. The measures in Bill C-36 would significantly enhance our ability to charge and convict those who are in the planning stages of terrorist attacks, to go after those who direct terrorist activity even before the activity occurs, to arrest and impose conditions on the release of persons where this is necessary to prevent terrorist activity, to dismantle the financial networks that support further terrorist activity and to incarcerate for a long period of time those found guilty of terrorism.

There are a number of other significant provisions in the bill. The bill would update and refine the Official Secrets Act to better address national security concerns. The bill would also amend the Canada Evidence Act to allow for enhanced protection of sensitive information during legal proceedings. I also highlight measures under Bill C-36 that are relevant to targeting discrimination and hatred within Canada.

Under the bill a new criminal code offence of damage committed against religious groups and their places of worship would be created. This new provision would send a strong signal that behaviour such as destroying or damaging a church, mosque or temple or interfering with religious activities is completely unacceptable in Canada.

As well the bill would provide a new power to order the deletion of hate propaganda made available to the public through computer systems such as the Internet. The Canadian Humans Rights Act would be amended under the bill to clarify that communication of hate messages using new technologies such as the Internet is a discriminatory practice.

It is now my intention to explain some of the amendments that were accepted by the standing committee and that have been reported back to the House. Under these amendments the major elements of the bill would remain. However the amendments would make a number of improvements and refinements to these elements.

Certain of the amendments would help to clarify aspects of the bill for which misunderstandings might otherwise have arisen. The changes would reflect the government's intent in the bill but would help to ensure that this intent is clearly understood and would be appropriately implemented. Other changes would help to provide additional oversight and control of certain of the provisions of the bill.

In addition to these amendments a number of technical corrections and refinements were made to Bill C-36. I do not intend to review these in detail.

In making these major and minor changes the standing committee listened to the concerns of parliamentarians as reflected in the report of the special Senate committee on Bill C-36, as reflected by comments made by members of the standing committee and as reflected by the debates in the House. The changes would also take into account comments made by numerous other Canadians whether in submissions before the parliamentary committees or elsewhere.

Of course not all the suggestions that were received were accepted by the standing committee. We are grateful nevertheless for the close attention that has been paid to the bill and the thought provoking and useful ideas that have been provided.

Let me begin with the definition of terrorist activity, which has received considerable attention during the examination of the bill. One of the provisions of the definition as originally put before the House excluded “lawful advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work” from the scope of the definition. Some have questioned whether because of the use of the word lawful activities of this type which include unlawful conduct such as assault, trespass and minor property damage might be interpreted as being terrorism.

This was never the government's intent. The fact that an activity is otherwise unlawful does not by itself mean that it amounts to terrorism. Quite the contrary. Therefore the committee has accepted an amendment removing the word lawful.

This would not have the effect of making protests lawful that are otherwise unlawful due to violations of other criminal laws. It would, however, clarify that this specific exclusion from the scope of the definition of terrorist activity applies whether or not the advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work is lawful.

While discussing the definition of terrorist activity I also wish to observe that certain words in the definition that have provoked some discussion were not amended by the committee. These are the words “political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause” that refer to the motivations for terrorist activity under the definition.

These words have been retained in the definition as they are absolutely necessary to appropriately define and limit the scope of Bill C-36. It is important to emphasize that nothing in these words would target any particular cultural, religious or ethnic group or political or ideological cause. Rather, the words would help to distinguish terrorist activity from other forms of criminality that are intended to intimidate or compel people by the use of serious violence.

The committee nevertheless recognized that it was advisable to clarify the definition to provide with further certainty that the enforcement provisions in the bill are not to be interpreted or applied in a discriminatory manner or in a manner that could suppress democratic rights.

The committee considered and accepted an amendment that stipulates in this regard that the definition of terrorist activity would not apply to the expression of political, religious or ideological ideas that are not intended to cause the various forms of perverse and extreme harm set out in the definition.

Proper review and oversight of the powers provided under Bill C-36 would also help ensure that the powers are applied appropriately. Many such review and oversight mechanisms were already part of the bill when introduced. The government is committed to ensuring that the enhanced enforcement powers under the bill contribute to the safety and security of Canadians but do not undermine fundamental rights.

The standing committee listened to submissions that additional monitoring was necessary. However, further to these submissions, it accepted an amendment requiring an annual public report by the Attorney General of Canada, the Solicitor General of Canada and their counterparts in the provinces and territories.

This report would concern the powers of investigative hearings and of preventive arrest under Bill C-36. This information would provide an annual check on the use of these provisions and inform the parliamentary review which is to occur within three years.

Let me assure the House that a substantial amount of information is required to be reported. This information is analogous to information required to be reported on the interception of communications under the requirements currently established under the criminal code and analogous to information required to be reported with respect to the law enforcement justification under requirements that would be established by Bill C-24 regarding organized crime which the House approved.

I emphasize with respect to the investigative hearings and the preventive arrest that the provisions for an annual report are supplementary to the considerable checks and balances already provided with respect to each power. We have all seen reports and commentary to the effect that these provisions would allow uncontrolled and unprecedented powers that jeopardize the rights and freedoms of Canadians.

In response to these suggestions it is important to emphasize that both the investigative hearing and the preventive arrest in fact build upon powers already found in Canadian law. Both build upon these powers only for the special purpose of helping preserve Canada's safety and security against terrorist activity. Both are subject to very significant limits and controls and both are subject to direct judicial supervision. Further, both powers have been extensively reviewed to provide confidence that they comply with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Additional review and monitoring of the powers of investigative hearing and preventive arrest would be provided by making these provisions subject to a sunset clause. The standing committee has accepted an amendment under which each of these measures would be subject to the expiry provided for after five years. Parliament would be authorized to extend this expiry period on resolutions adopted by a majority of each chamber but no extension may exceed five years.

The best sunset clause would be the circumstances that occur where it is never necessary to use these provisions. It is important to note the committee did not accept a sunset clause for the whole of the bill. Such a clause would negate our ability to fulfill international obligations to address terrorism. Further, it would fail to recognize that the need to maintain vigilance against terrorism is a continuous one and that the measures in the bill are balanced, reasonable and subject to significant safeguards.

The power to issue certificates by the attorney general under the Canada Evidence Act, the Access to Information Act, the Privacy Act and other acts prohibit disclosure of sensitive information relating to national defence or security or received in confidence from a foreign entity.

The power to issue such certificates would be a vital addition to our ability to prevent the disclosure of information injurious to international relations, national defence or national security.

At the same time the standing committee agreed that the provisions could be better circumscribed and should be subject to review. For these reasons it accepted amendments under which the certificates would have a maximum lifespan of 15 years unless reissued. The certificates would be reviewable by a judge of the federal court. The certificates may only be issued after an order or decision for disclosure in a proceeding. The certificates would be published in The Canada Gazette .

These changes would substantially enhance the controls on certificates. I observe that the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Mr. George Radwanski, sent a letter to the Minister of Justice stating that these amendments fully and effectively address the concerns he previously raised about this aspect of Bill C-36.

I want to speak briefly to a matter which was raised at committee hearings and which, it has been said, might relate to the privilege of the House and the Senate to send for persons, papers and records. As the House knows, the subpoena power of parliamentary houses has existed for over 300 years and is essential to their functions.

There are provisions in Bill C-36 which refer to “a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of information” and related procedures in clauses 43 and 70 which would protect sensitive security information from public disclosure. It would not be the intention of the bill to alter the current status of parliament's subpoena powers and privileges. In fact similar provisions already exist in sections 37 and 39 of the Canada Evidence Act.

Having stated this for our parliamentary record so that the intention of the House is clear, an amendment was made to the bill under Motion No. 7 yesterday for the same purpose of clarifying our intention that parliament's privilege to send persons, papers and records not be affected by this legislation.

Canadians can be assured that the government is taking timely action against the threat of terrorism while at the same time ensuring that rights and freedoms are preserved.

[Justice, November 28th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, the legislation established in this country affects the appropriate balance between section 1 rights and other sections against search and seizure in our country. The fact is that in section 1 of the charter of rights and freedoms it is necessary for limitations on those rights of search and seizure to be bounded by rationality, minimum intrusion and proportionality. That is what this legislation achieves.

[Justice, November 28th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, the DNA bank that was set up through government legislation and in consultation with the provinces is effective at taking samples and banking them from people convicted of serious crimes.

The Minister of Justice and the Solicitor General of Canada are today meeting with their counterparts from the provinces and territories to discuss this and other issues related to the security of Canadians.

[Anti-terrorism Act, November 26th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, the amendment put forward by the member for Lanark--Carleton deals with two key issues: persons permanently bound to secrecy and to special operational information. It is important for us to understand that we are talking about a very restricted intersection of those two definitions. A person may become a person permanently bound to secrecy if the person is a current or a former member or employee of a scheduled entity or if designated by a deputy head and personally served with a notice to that effect.

The criteria are important. On the criteria for designating a person to be a person permanently bound to secrecy, in quoting from the Globe and Mail article, the member for Lanark--Carleton spoke of people who take their secrets to the grave. This is an immensely important and inaccurate distinction that the writer is making. They are not their secrets. They are secrets, special operational information that must be kept secure. They are not their secrets to take to the grave and they certainly are not their secrets to disclose. However the criteria for designating such a person are twofold: the person has, has had or will have authorized access to special operational information; and it is in the interests of national security to designate the person. We are talking of national security.

New offences create a special regime for those persons who have a privileged access to the most vital information, such as special operational information and criminalizes on their part the unauthorized disclosure or a purported disclosure of this narrow band of information going to the essence of Canadian national interests.

The security and intelligence community has certain operational requirements that need to be fostered. These operational requirements include an ability to ensure secrecy and project to others that they have the ability to protect the information entrusted to them.

While it is true that the person may be designated for life, the character of the information may change. The definition of special operational information makes it clear that it is information the Government of Canada is taking special measures to safeguard from disclosure in the national interest.

Very briefly, with respect to the sunset clauses which the hon. member has referred to, and perhaps I may use the opportunity at a later time to respond to them, it is important to understand that these sunset clauses are cumulative to a number of other accountability mechanisms and review mechanisms in the bill. We have ministerial responsibility. These are not police officers, prosecutors, people in distant parts of the country making decisions. These decisions are under the certificate of an attorney general. As well, they are under judicial review, judicial accountability, some ministerial responsibility and judicial oversight on most if not all of the aspects in some way or another of this bill.

We have annual reports of attorneys general and solicitors general, federally and provincially. The federal ones will be put before this House on an annual basis. This will build cumulatively a database on which to base further reviews including the three year parliamentary review. I would suggest in this forum of public accountability, that it is the solemn duty of every minister of the House not to let this three year review go anywhere. Members of the justice and human rights committee will be examining it. People in the House will be examining it. We will have data building over time to base that review on.

The sunset clauses after five years only come after that ministerial responsibility, judicial oversight, cumulative annual reports, parliamentary review, including review by committees. On an annual basis I think we should fully expect in the justice and human rights committee that the relevant ministers will be brought before the committee to answer questions on their annual reports on an annual basis.

The vigilance required of all of us in the House as with the news media, as with the general public is going to be critical to ensure that this very important legislation is put to the intended use and only to that use.

With respect to sunset, yes, parliament will have to in both houses by special resolution extend it, if the circumstances demand that because of the continuing threat of terrorism those tools are found to be necessary and are appropriately used for the protection of the public. I would suggest that the best sunset clause will be when these powers are never used because they are not necessary because the threat has dissipated.

[Anti-terrorism Act, November 26th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, to my hon. colleague, I do take issue with the suggestion that section one of the charter of rights and freedoms is relevant in any way in this discussion. There simply is no infringement of other charter rights and freedoms that would invoke a consideration under section one.

These words regarding religious, political or ideological purposes are words of limitation. They are not designed to criminalize or single out people on the basis of their religion, political beliefs or ideologies. Rather, they must be read against the rest of the clause which speaks in terms of an intention to intimidate the public or a segment of the public.

My hon. colleague mentioned that these words do not seem to appear elsewhere. In fact they appear in the anti-terrorist legislation of the United Kingdom. These words must be read in conjunction with the intended consequences that must be present before exposure to criminal liability can exist, for example, causing death or serious bodily injury, endangering life, causing serious risk to the health or safety of the public, causing serious interference or disruption of an essential service, facility or system.

These words therefore should not be viewed as singling out any group on the basis of its beliefs. It is in fact this motivation by a system of thought, whether it is religious, ideological or political, that is perverted when combined with the elements of the offence that are described and provide a dangerous and extra potency beyond the normal range of crimes which the hon. member has mentioned.

For instance the hon. member mentioned biker gangs. He will recall that Bill C-24 which is now before the other place for consideration has similar provisions for facilitating, participating in or financing criminal organizations. This goes beyond that, beyond the venal or ordinary criminal behaviour, even if done in an organized fashion.

Subsection 1.1 was added to section 83.01 for greater certainty. This was done by government amendment at committee stage to make it clear that an expression of a political, religious or ideological thought, belief or opinion does not constitute a terrorist activity unless the other portions of the definition are satisfied. The effect of removing the words “political, religious or ideological purpose” is to transform a position that is designed to counter terrorism into one that is nearly indistinguishable from a general law enforcement provision. This sends the wrong message.

It is terrorists and not ordinary criminals, however venal, that we are targeting here. It weakens the constitutional justification for a measure that we regard as necessary to respond to an extraordinary threat.

[Computer Hackers, November 26th, 2001]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the hon. member for Saskatoon—Humboldt for raising an issue of such national and international importance. I would also like to thank the hon. member for Elk Island for sharing with us his views on this important issue.

Issues relating to cyber crime, such as hacking and malicious virus dissemination, have been widely recorded over recent months and have caused governments, industry and public much concern. Criminal conduct on the Internet has increased as we have seen the use of the Internet increase. Therefore, it is important that this and related issues receive the proper attention of parliament and the government in general.

That being said, I would like to restate this government's commitment to ensuring that our laws keep pace with technology. We would like to continue to foster the relationships the government has created with law enforcement and industry to ensure that the laws and tools used to combat cyber crime fulfill the needs of law enforcement without hampering our industry's competitive advantage.

I would also like to commend the member for Elk Island for his comments about education in the schools regarding the appropriate, responsible use of this technology. Canada continues to be a world leader in the area of battling cyber crime, crimes that in many instances do not respect orders.

We have forged many international partnerships and will continue our involvement at the G-8, the Council of Europe and the UN, to name but a few, to effectively deal with these issues.

The hon. member's motion, although well intentioned, is nonetheless redundant. He has characterized it as a provision that will fill a void in Canadian criminal law. My answer to that assertion is: no it will not. Sections 342.1 and subsection 430(1.1) of the criminal code were designed with the dissemination of malicious computer viruses in mind. They are also worded in a manner which could make them applicable to some future still unknown form of mischief.

One of Canada's legal traditions is to draft legislation in a general manner so that it does not target a particular thing. In other words, in Canada a fraud is a fraud whether committed in person or via computer. We do not need a separate offence to cover computer fraud.

In that same line of reasoning, a section which was created to deal with any form of mischief to data, including computer dissemination, should not be overwritten simply because it does not include those words explicitly.

During the first hour of debate, the hon. member for Fundy--Royal said it best when he stated that “the current criminal code is adequate to deal with computer hackers”. He also pointed out that these offences were serious offences that carried a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. In fact, where the mischief in question endangers life, the penalty can be life imprisonment.

It is clear that the criminal code already deals with these types of crimes in a very serious manner. These provisions have been on the books for over 15 years and in 1997 were amended for fine tuning. This is demonstrative of this government's commitments to update our laws when needed and it will continue to do so.

Although the Minister of Justice agrees with the motion in principle, she cannot support it because the conduct is already contemplated by the code.

Justice officials have been working to establish and foster partnerships with private industry, law enforcement and other governments. It is our understanding from these sources that the criminal code adequately deals with the conduct described in the motion before us. Law enforcement has and will continue to use these provisions successfully. Again, we are all aware of the recent mafiaboy case, where the accused was charged with 64 counts of hacking and mischief.

Internationally, we have also been recognized as a world leader. In a recent independent international study on the readiness of national laws to deal with cyber crime, McConnell International found that Canada's cyber crime laws were among the world's strongest.

Although Canada is a world leader in this regard, the government is committed to ensuring that our laws speak to our changing technological environment while having due regard for fundamental human rights. Canada continues its role as a world leader and is an active participant in many international fora on cyber crime. These include, among others, the G-8, the Council of Europe, the United Nations, the Commonwealth Secretariat, OECD and the Organization of American States.

As observers to the Council of Europe, Canadian delegates have been integral in negotiating a draft convention on cyber crime, which will be adopted later this year, and will stand as the benchmark for international instruments in this area.

At the G-8, Canada continues its leadership role on cyber crime issues and is looking forward to its presidency in 2002.

Because cyber crime challenges our notions of sovereignty, our participation in these international fora will require that we constantly review our legislation to not only make sure it keeps pace with technology, but also that it is in step with the laws of international partners.

In summary, the Minister of Justice is satisfied that the criminal code already covers the malicious dissemination of computer viruses and that no further action is required with respect to this motion.