Richard Marceau

[Civil Marriage Act, February 21st, 2005]

Madam Speaker, I am asking for rigour in this debate. We cannot, on one hand, ask why so much time is being spent on this subject and complain about it, as the Conservatives are doing, and on the other, ensure that 99 members will not speak just once but rather twice, by using, as they are, a dilatory tactic.

People cannot talk out of both sides of their mouths. In my experience, the Conservative Party, all too often in cases concerning the rights of same sex couples or homosexuals, resorts to such rhetoric.

I want to take this opportunity to recognize the work of my colleague from Hochelaga on this entire debate on same sex marriage. This is not the first debate on the rights of homosexuals. I am convinced that, when this fight to grant homosexuals full equality in our society goes down in history and whenever the debates since the 1990s to present are mentioned, the name of my colleague from Hochelaga will be quite prominent.

In fact, he has been fighting tooth and nail. He has faced not only political obstacles, but personal ones to ensure that gays and lesbians in Montreal, Quebec, Canada have access to full equality. Whether he is fighting for same sex marriage, against hate propaganda, for the recognition of the right to pension benefits and other rights, my colleague from Hochelaga deserves the support and thanks, not only of women and men in the gay community, but also, I believe, of society as a whole.

[Civil Marriage Act, February 21st, 2005]

Madam Speaker, I too have appreciated spending time with the hon. member for London—Fanshawe on the Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness; while his opinion has differed greatly from mine, we have enjoyed the exchange of ideas on this topic and many others.

Indeed, I am familiar with section 33 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I am speaking personally now, and I would be open to a discussion regarding whether or not it is necessary to have such a section in the charter. I am open to a discussion, absolutely, on that point. There is one case we are interested in, in terms of freedom of religion, and if someone asked me whether the Government of Quebec should once again resort to section 33 of the charter in the case of religious instruction in Quebec—it has to make its decision by June—I would advise Quebec not to do it, so that all minorities and all religious groups will be on the same wavelength and on an equal footing.

The hon. member's second question concerned human rights, and the judgments various courts have made in various cases. One of the cases that was frequently brought up in the committee's work was that of a man who had paid for an advertisement which included a passage from the Bible and two men holding hands, two little stick figures, with a big X over top. This was often used as an example to say that freedom of religion was endangered because a Biblical quotation had been declared hate literature. But that is not true. It was the combination of the Bible passage with the big red circle over top that could lead to the idea that gays were not wanted, and even that they could be killed.

We must be very careful when we select our examples. We have to explain them well because shortcuts can be dangerous, not only in this debate, but it also may weaken the position that those who oppose same sex marriage want to defend.

[Civil Marriage Act, February 21st, 2005]

Madam Speaker, I am extremely pleased to speak in the House on Bill C-38. This may not be the beginning of the end, but it is surely the end of the beginning. I travelled around Canada with the Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to examine this issue. I am pleased to finally see the finish line.

During this journey, which will, I hope, lead to full equality for our fellow citizens who are homosexual, I would like the debates both inside and outside the House to be respectful of all sides, because the subject at hand is one that affects us deeply. This subject involves us as humans and concerns the most fundamental human and personal values we each hold. Great care must be taken not to hurt those whose opinion we do not necessarily share.

However, I must say that, at the same time, we have to be honest. I will start by saying that I am a bit disappointed by the attitude of the Conservative Party to this debate. Right from the start, they had decided to resort to delaying tactics to unnecessarily prolong the debate, in my opinion. When I hear, as I did earlier, Conservative Party members say, “My constituents want us to move on to something else and to talk about other issues”, this seems to contradict the fact that, first, they used delaying tactics and, second, that approximately 99% of their 99 members will speak in this debate.

That said, I believe it is essential to put this debate into context and establish the law at issue. The first, obviously, concerns the division of powers. We live in a federation. Although I do not want to be part of it, as long as we are, I will ensure that the division of powers is respected, specifically areas under Quebec's jurisdiction, and that the federal government does not intrude.

In the matter before us, the matter of marriage, or rather family law, the rule is as follows: family law is, as a general rule, under provincial jurisdiction. There are two exceptions to this: marriage—the status required in order to marry, and not the solemnization of marriage—and divorce.

As a result, Parliament, or we as parliamentarians, cannot address anything other than marriage and divorce. This means that we cannot, as parliamentarians, in any way create another form of conjugal union, whether termed civil union, registered partnership, or whatever, because we do not have the power to do so. As federal legislators, we cannot create or legislate on anything other than marriage, parts of marriage and divorce.

Hon. members will understand that we, as sovereignist MPs and members of the Bloc Québécois, cannot logically call upon Parliament to even try to legislate in something that comes under Quebec's jurisdiction. As a result, this is the first conclusion to be reached in order to properly situate this debate: we cannot legislate on anything except marriage and divorce, since the rest does not come under our jurisdiction.

As for the second point, in the constitutional document by which we are governed, there has been a Canadian charter of rights and freedoms since 1982. We have moved from a parliamentary democracy to a constitutional democracy, that is to say the power of the legislators, our powers, are restricted by a charter of rights.

Having decided as a society to equip ourselves with instruments that are constitutional, as far as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is concerned, or supra-constitutional, as far as the Quebec charter of rights and freedoms is concerned, we cannot therefore legislate against these documents and the principles they contain.

I am rather surprised to hear the speeches by the Conservatives referring only to the Supreme Court's decisions, particularly in a reference. A number of courts have, in fact, studied the issue before us today. Except for one lower court whose decision was overthrown by an appeal court, all the courts have declared the so-called traditional definition of marriage, the one which denies spouses of the same sex the right to marry, to be unconstitutional, because it does not respect the right to equality enshrined in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I will read this section, because it is of interest:

Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

I draw the House's attention to the phrase “in particular”, which indicates that this is not an exclusive list. As the law evolves, other bases of discrimination can be included, and that is what has happened since the decision in the Egan case. The Supreme Court ruled that sexual orientation was an unacceptable ground of discrimination under the constitutional law of the land. Thus, discrimination based on sexual orientation is not permitted.

Here I will offer an aside. The opposition leader cited the same ruling, the Egan case, supporting his argument that the Supreme Court had ruled on marriage only once, and wanted to keep the so-called traditional definition of marriage. I would like to send the opposition leader back to do his homework, because the judge who said that was in a minority; it was an obiter dictum to use a Latin phrase current in legal circles, which means that no court is bound by that little aside, if I could call it that, made by a justice of the Supreme Court.

The appeal courts of Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia, the supreme courts of Yukon, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador, as well as the Court of Queen's Bench of Manitoba and Saskatchewan have all said, unanimously, that the equality right in section 15 requires that same sex spouses have the right to marry. Thus the legal situation in Canada is very clear: the law says that, today, same sex spouses have the right to marry.

What should we remember in all that? First, as I indicated earlier, we can only legislate on marriage. Second, according to the courts, the only way to legislate in compliance with the charter is by allowing same sex partners to get married.

What can we do about this? We could go for the notwithstanding clause, which means that we, as parliamentarians, would be saying that we have decided to suspend the rights and freedoms of some of our fellow citizens. That should be of concern to each of us personally. Are we, all of us, prepared to suspend rights that have been recognized by the courts? Personally, I am not in politics to suspend the rights and freedoms of my neighbours, friends and fellow citizens.

Those who think and say that we can legislate and restore the so-called traditional definition of marriage without using the notwithstanding clause are either in bad faith or ignorant of the law. Let me refer at this time to a letter to the leader of the opposition signed collectively by law professors, from which I would like to quote excerpts.

The letter states:

You must explain to Canadians how your plan to entrench the traditional definition of marriage will pass constitutional muster. The truth is, there is only one way to accomplish your goal: invoke the notwithstanding clause.—

The fact that you want Parliament to enact clearly unconstitutional legislation and adopt the traditional definition of marriage without using the notwithstanding clause leads us to suspect that you are playing politics with the Supreme Court and the Charter.—

It states further:

In short... [you] should either invoke the use of the notwithstanding clause, and justify this decision to Canadians, or concede that same-sex marriage is now part of Canada's legal landscape. If you intend to override Canadians' constitutional rights, you at least owe it to them to say this openly and directly. Canadians deserve better.

For 134 of Canada's top legal experts to take this extraordinary step of expressing their views not only for the leader of the opposition, but for all those against same sex marriage, means that these opponents have to be very clear. Are they prepared to suspend the rights and freedoms of their fellow citizens? Given that we are always a minority in relation to someone else, I am not in politics to suspend the rights and freedoms of anyone.

Let us talk about religion. We have heard many religion-based arguments from religious groups to uphold the so-called traditional definition of marriage. They should have the honesty to recognize that Bill C-38 applies only to civil marriage. From the beginning of this debate, from the very moment this topic appeared on the order of the day, my colleagues and I have tried to protect and balance two equally fundamental rights. The first is the total and unequivocal respect for the right to equality. I am a strong believer in the right to equality for anyone living in our society. I am also a strong believer in defending the right to freedom of religion. I do not believe that one of these rights is more important than the other. To me, the freedom of religion includes the right of any religious group to refuse to marry same sex partners if that is their wish.

There are numerous examples where this is already the case. A divorced Catholic wanting to remarry cannot get remarried in the Catholic Church, even though this is discriminatory. Why? Refusing to allow divorce is part of the Catholic Church dogma and deserves to be protected. A Catholic woman cannot become a priest. This is discriminatory on the face of it, but it is protected by the freedom of religion, which I will defend with as much vigour as I defend the right to same sex marriage.

For those who still say—in somewhat bad faith, in my opinion—that freedom of religion is threatened by Bill C-38, allow me to quote a few passages from various court rulings on this matter. I will begin by citing paragraphs 59 to 60 of the Supreme Court ruling.

It therefore seems clear that state compulsion on religious officials to perform same-sex marriages contrary to their religious beliefs would violate the guarantee of freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter. It also seems apparent that, absent exceptional circumstances which we cannot at present foresee, such a violation could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

Paragraph 59 reads as follows:

The question we are asked to answer is confined to the performance of same-sex marriages by religious officials. However, concerns were raised about the compulsory use of sacred places for the celebration of such marriages and about being compelled to otherwise assist in the celebration of same-sex marriages.

The reasoning that leads us to conclude that the guarantee of freedom of religion protects against the compulsory celebration of same-sex marriages, suggests that the same would hold for these concerns.

Returning to the question before us, the Court is of the opinion that, absent unique circumstances with respect to which we will not speculate, the guarantee of religious freedom in s. 2(a) of the Charter is broad enough to protect religious officials from being compelled by the state to perform civil or religious same-sex marriages that are contrary to their religious beliefs.

In my view, this is extremely clear. It is also the opinion of other courts. I can refer to the British Columbia Court of Appeal, which quotes the decision of Justice LaForme in the Halpern case in Ontario, which I will quote in English:

Further, I find that there is no merit to the argument that the rights and interests of heterosexuals would be affected by granting same-sex couples the freedom to marry. Contrary to the assertion of Interfaith Coalition--I cannot conclude that freedom of religion would be threatened or jeopardized by legally sanctioning same-sex marriage. No religious body would be compelled to solemnize a same-sex marriage against its wishes and all religious people--of any faith--would continue to enjoy the freedom to hold and espouse their beliefs. Thus, there is no need for any infringement of the equality rights of lesbians and gays that arises because of the restrictions against same-sex marriage.

I could continue to quote from the British Columbia appeal court decision, which is quite clear on the next page. Moreover, the Ontario appeal court is more direct in its argument on freedom of religion. For those who are following the debate, I am quoting paragraphs 52 and 53.

MCCT framed its argument this way in its factum: There is no obligation on the law to recognize religious marriage as a legal institution. However, once it decides to do so (as it has done), it cannot withhold recognition to any religious marriage except in a constitutionally lawful manner.[53] In our view, this case does not engage religious rights and freedoms. Marriage is a legal institution, as well as a religious and a social institution. This case is solely about the legal institution of marriage. It is not about the religious validity or invalidity of various forms of marriage. We do not view this case as, in any way, dealing or interfering with the religious institution of marriage.

It seems to be fairly clear that religious freedom is well protected at this time and no group could be forced to marry two persons of the same sex against its will.

It would, moreover, be worthwhile reasoning in the reverse, if I may make this aside. Today some groups, including the United Church, the Unitarians and the Reformed branch of Judaism, would like to be able to marry same sex couples, but cannot and still could not in certain jurisdictions, even if Bill C-38 were not passed. Why should these groups have the Catholic or Baptist definition of marriage imposed upon them? This is an infringement on their freedom of religion also.

I would also like to say a few words about clause 3 of Bill C-38. It raises a few questions in my mind, including whether it is not ultra vires as far as the powers of Parliament are concerned. I will go into that further in committee.

In closing, I will point out that a society is judged by the way it treats minorities. We have the responsibility to ensure that all minorities feel comfortable in our societies. I dream of the day when my children, who are seven today, will be able to live in a society where difference is not merely tolerated but welcomed and embraced. By giving and acknowledging rights to minorities, in this instance the rights of gays and lesbians, society as a whole will benefit, not just those minorities.

[Civil Marriage Act, February 21st, 2005]

Mr. Speaker, I have two questions for my hon. colleague from Edmonton—Spruce Grove.

First, she seems to be glossing over the decisions handed down by the various appeal courts that ruled on this issue, focussing only on Supreme Court decisions, or rather the reference to the Supreme Court. The fact of the matter is that decisions having the force of law have been made by the Quebec, Ontario and B.C. appeal courts, among others.

To be very clear, I will read an excerpt from the decision of the Court of Appeal of Ontario, in the language in which it was originally written:

--it is our view that the dignity of persons in same-sex relationships is violated by the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage. Accordingly, we conclude that the common-law definition of marriage as “the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others” violates s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The court decision goes on to state that this violation of section 15 is unjustifiable under section 1 of the Constitution.

My first question is the following. What of the law in those provinces where the courts have already ruled very clearly, absolutely unequivocally, that the so-called traditional definition of marriage is contrary to charter equality rights?

Second, reference is commonly made to the so-called traditional definition of marriage. Obviously, marriage has evolved. Once again, the hon. member seems to be glossing over that. Marriage has evolved especially during the 20th century: we have gone from a time when, in many jurisdictions, upon marrying, women lost their status as adult persons and fell under the responsibility of the man they married to a time when women have become fully equal partners with men. So, within the institution of marriage, women have gone from second fiddle to equal partner.

In the light of this, how can the hon. member say that the institution of marriage has not evolved and could not evolve in a direction that would allow it to include same sex partners?

[Civil Marriage Act, February 16th, 2005]

Mr. Speaker, I want to ask my colleague and leader of the Bloc the following question.

One of the arguments presented by opponents of same sex marriage, as formulated by the leader of the opposition, is that of freedom of religion and the fear that adopting Bill C-38 would interfere with that freedom.

Is the opposite not true? In other words, is it not true that today, if the bill does not pass, and same sex marriage remains illegal, religious groups—I am thinking of the United Church, the Unitarian Church, the reformed branch of Judaism—who want to marry same sex couples, will not be able to do so because same sex marriage is illegal. If Bill C-38 does pass, it would permit these people—meaning these groups—who want to marry same sex couples to do so, while also protecting the right of the Catholic Church, the Baptist Church and other religious groups not to marry same sex couples if they so choose. In other words, will we not achieve the appropriate balance by protecting the right of some to perform marriages if they so choose and the right of others to not perform such marriages, if that is their choice?

[Criminal Code, February 14th, 2005]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak on Bill C-215 to amend the Criminal Code in order to impose consecutive sentences for the use of a firearm in committing an offence. This bill was introduced by the member for Prince Edward—Hastings.

As you know, the bill was introduced by my colleague from the Conservative Party of Canada and was put on the priority list on November 15, 2004. The purpose of our colleague's bill is to require that a sentence for the commission of certain offences be supplemented if a firearm is used. The additional sentence is to be served consecutively and is to be a further minimum punishment of five years imprisonment if the firearm is not discharged, ten years if it is discharged, and fifteen years if it is discharged and as a result a person, other than an accomplice, is caused bodily harm.

I can understand our Conservative colleague's intent. He has told me that he was a military police officer for many years. It is understandable that he would want more severe punishments for certain types of criminals who too often victimize people in Quebec and in Canada.

We feel, however, that minimum sentencing must be used sparingly, because it ties the judge's hands. If memory serves, it is used at the present time for 29 Criminal Code offences. Some feel that minimum sentences have harmful effects on the work of judges, because they are the people best placed to determine the appropriate sentence.

I would, however, like to add a cautionary note. We do not share the aversion to the very idea of minimum sentencing some, too often on the government side, suffer from. The Bloc Québécois has introduced Bill C-303 setting minimum sentences for sex crimes involving minors.

We feel that children are the most fragile members of our society and those who are dearest to us, and when minors are preyed on by a sexual predator there must, in our opinion, be a minimum sentence in order to ensure that children are protected and that the perpetrator receives a mandatory prison sentence.

As the parliamentary secretary is well aware, the debate on the protection of vulnerable persons legislation will afford us an opportunity to bring in the essence of my bill, C-303, and integrate it with that bill.

Thus, we are not opposed in principle to the establishment of minimum sentences. Nevertheless, they must be used sparingly. We believe that, in the case of the clause in Bill C-215, the sentences the hon. member proposes are disproportionate, all the more so because they are added to the sentence already stipulated for the crime. In establishing minimal sentences, the use of a firearm has already been considered and increases the length of a prison sentence.

The sentences proposed in Bill C-215 are even more problematic when there are accomplices. As the House knows, the Criminal Code states that an accomplice may be given the same sentence as the perpetrator of the crime. Let us imagine, in the example already given by my hon. colleague, an 18-year-old, easily influenced, whose friends get him involved in a robbery. This young man, being reticent, agrees to stand lookout at the door of the store. His friends have not told him they intend to use a gun in their crime. During the crime, a shot is fired and a clerk is slightly injured. In such a situation, the young man would automatically be sentenced to 15 years in prison, in addition to the minimum sentence for robbery, which is four years.

A judge will be forced to sentence this young man to a minimum of 19 years of prison for what is certainly a reprehensible act, but one that is certainly not serious enough to deserve such a sentence.

Sentences that are too harsh can also have a negative effect. Rather than handing down a sentence that is too severe, judges might simply try to acquit the accused, in order to avoid imposing a sentence they think too harsh.

In short, this means the Bloc Québécois will vote against Bill C-215. We admire the desire of the hon. member for Prince Edward—Hastings to fight crime more effectively. We believe that the proposed sentences are disproportionate and that minimum sentences must be used specifically and selectively. We also believe they must be used in certain cases, including, as I mentioned, sex offences against children, a subject we will be examining again, either in committee or in this House, when Bill C-303 comes before us.

[World Police and Fire Games, February 7th, 2005]

Mr. Speaker, for a long time now the federal government has needed to meet its financial commitment for the World Police and Fire Games to be held in Quebec City this summer.

During his recent visit to Quebec City, the Minister of Transport and minister responsible for the region promised to contact several federal departments for the $700,000 needed to ensure the success of this major international event.

Can the minister tell us what responses he got from his colleagues?

[Criminal Code, February 7th, 2005]

Mr. Speaker, I am extremely pleased today to speak on Bill C-10, currently before the House. Like many bills considered by the Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, this is an extremely important bill because it concerns, on the one hand, the rights and freedoms of numerous individuals, in this case those with psychiatric disorders and, on the other, public safety.

It is, therefore, our duty as parliamentarians, particularly the ones who sit on the Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, to find the necessary balance between these two fundamental positions in our society: respect for individual rights and freedoms and for public safety, which obviously includes security of the person.

The Bloc Québécois is always cognizant of the need to maintain this extremely fragile balance, in our societies, often more fragile than we know. This balance was, in our opinion, destroyed by Bill C-36 and the anti-terrorism legislation introduced by this government in the last Parliament. So, we are carefully watching these areas because they are of great concern to us, even more so since, in the past, the government has destroyed this balance with other bills and legislation it has passed in this House. This makes us twice as careful about similar issues.

I will echo my Conservative predecessor. I took part in this process based on a desire to cooperate. I have personally tested how this minority government works since it was elected on June 28. At that time, as we know, 54 Bloc members were elected. This is a shining victory for our party, due, among other things, to the quite exceptional performance of our leader, the member for Laurier—Sainte-Marie, during the election campaign. As a result, it is the duty and obligation of the government to work in cooperation with all the parties. It has no choice.

I have to admit this was not the case in the past. The Liberal Party of Canada, with its too frequent tendency to feel proprietorial about the seat of government, has tended to be far too arrogant and disagreeable, not just toward Canadians in general, but toward MPs of all parties in this House. It has had an all too frequent tendency to make decisions with little consultation and very little cooperation with the parties in opposition, saying that it would simply ensure that this or that bill got passed because of its majority position. Too often, in my opinion, this House as well as the entire legislative process suffered in the process. As a result, Quebec, and all of Canada, were deprived of the positive input that could have come from their representatives, the opposition MPs in particular.

It is important to point out that question period, which will start in another hour and a half or so, is very much a confrontational situation, despite its very important parliamentary role. The opposition calls for an accounting from the government, and it has to provide answers in the House. This is very much a confrontational exercise. In a parliament based on the British tradition, moreover, the members are placed in such a way as to encourage confrontation across the floor.

What the general public is less aware of is that the committee context offers an opportunity to work together, if the will is there of course, without partisan politics, in order to achieve objectives that are, when it comes down to it, quite similar for all parties, with the obvious exception of the Bloc Québécois objective of making Quebec a sovereign country.

I have tested the government's declared willingness to cooperate. I have found both the Minister of Justice and his parliamentary secretary willing to sit down with us, willing to consult us and willing to explain their point of view. In addition, for the first time in a very long time—I have been a member of Parliament since 1997—I found them demonstrating a willingness to listen to what opposition members had to say regarding the various bills, including Bill C-10.

I can tell the parliamentary secretary and the Minister of Justice that I am prepared to continue working with them in this spirit of collaboration which they exhibited concerning Bill C-10. I hope that this willingness to cooperate will continue for the good of the entire population. This willingness to cooperate has been demonstrated with respect to the amendments to Bill C-10 proposed by the Bloc Québécois, which were of course based on research and detailed legal analysis of that bill, as well as on the considerable amount of testimony heard by the committee.

The quality of the witnesses appearing before the justice committee is exceptional. We benefit from listening to them and retaining their suggestions, because the men and women who come to give us their viewpoint do so admirably and they are thoroughly familiar with the issue. Often, just among ourselves, they know the issue much better than the members of Parliament do, at least as the legislative process begins. Thus they can shed light on certain questions which in our first analysis, we might have ignored, or to which we might not have given the attention they deserved.

Two questions have been studied by the committee, particularly by the Bloc members. I would like to say something about each of them. First, there is the question of who will conduct the psychiatric assessment of these people. We know that many of us here in this House come from regions where psychiatrists are scarce. It was important to ensure that people who must be assessed could be assessed not only by psychiatrists, but also by other, perhaps differently qualified individuals, selected by the government of each province.

This would allow people with mental disorders to be assessed in their own regions without having to go to big cities and would prevent the provincial governments from having to spend a fortune on sending a psychiatrist to a region without one.

This amendment, which was suggested by many witnesses, was presented in the committee by the Bloc. Although the wording has been changed, the government and I did manage to agree on it. This amendment was presented and adopted in the committee.

We worked on another amendment, which has to do with the victims. We know that victims are far too often forgotten in the cumbersome legal process. They are the ones who have been hurt by a certain action. They might be hurt physically, psychologically or often both. It is very important for me to make this a basic issue in any discussion I have on this matter as Bloc Québécois justice critic. It is a basic and unwaivering concern of mine to ensure that these men and women who are victims of violence do not feel lost in the justice system, which is very complex, even to lawyers.

One of the amendments we proposed, which was also changed in cooperation with the government, would ensure that victims' rights are taken into consideration.

There are a few other amendments that I proposed in the committee. For those who have followed the work of the committee, I tabled amendment BQ-1, which I withdrew following a commitment made by the government.

As I was saying earlier to the parliamentary secretary, just before my speech, after I withdrew my amendment to redefine unfit to stand trial or not criminally responsible, the government promised that this issue would be raised during a meeting of the federal, provincial and territorial justice ministers. By the end of this session, before the summer adjournment, the government will come back before the committee to give a progress report on its work on this part of the bill. The government repeated this commitment earlier.

Besides amendment BQ-1 and all subsequent amendments, another very important amendment was withdrawn, namely amendment BQ-10. I am sorry to be so technical. The government promised to revisit the matter. This is an amendment to paragraph 672.5(8), which stood in my name. The government had asked me to withdraw my amendment because it believed that it was placing a rather heavy obligation on the provinces and on the legal aid system in particular.

The government made a commitment to come back before the committee after raising this issue once more at a federal-provincial conference. I am very anxious to hear what the government will have to say on the matter. As I said at the beginning of my speech, any legislation dealing with the balance between the rights and freedoms of individuals and those of society deserves our full attention, and there is always room for improvement.

Depending on the government's response following its discussions with the provinces, I may have to come back with a bill or go back to committee to try and amend this bill again.

Finally, amendment BQ-19 was the last one to be withdrawn following discussions with the government. I cannot go through all the amendments. It was withdrawn following a very productive meeting I had at my office with the various Justice officials before attending a committee meeting.

All that to say that, at this stage, we support Bill C-10, which was improved on through the consensual effort of the different parties in the House of Commons. I hope this atmosphere of cooperation and collaboration will continue.

On behalf of the Bloc Québécois, I pledge to continue working along those lines, because the interests of Quebeckers and Canadians are much better served when parliamentarians and the different parties work together to provide the people who send us here with the very best legislation.

[Auschwitz, January 31st, 2005]

Mr. Speaker, last week, the whole world commemorated the Shoah, one of the darkest episodes in the history of humankind. For the first time, at last, after 60 years, the UN held an extraordinary session to remind the world of the horror and barbarism that man is capable of, and what hatred and intolerance can lead to.

On January 27, 1945, the Red Army liberated the prisoners of the Auschwitz extermination camp, where the Nazis and their collaborators had implemented the “final solution” to what they referred to as the “Jewish Problem”.

Today, can we claim that the lessons of the past have been learned? Unfortunately, no. The world idly stood by during the massacres in Cambodia, the genocide in Rwanda and, today, in Darfur. Moreover, anti-Semitism is very much on the rise again worldwide.

Canada too should look in the mirror. At one time, under the government of Mackenzie King, it closed its doors to thousands of Jewish refugees seeking asylum here. This is a period of which Canada has no reason to be proud.

In light of these disturbing facts, there are two duties that should be fulfilled, namely to remember and to act.

[Hanukkah, December 8th, 2004]

Mr. Speaker, the Jewish festival of Hanukkah began yesterday at sundown. In Quebec, across Canada and around the world, Jews will be celebrating the victory of the Maccabees in the first national war of liberation, which is an integral part of the liturgy of Hanukkah.

On this occasion, the first candle of the chanukiyah is lit using the shamash candle. The chanukiyah candelabrum has nine branches, including the shamash, unlike the traditional menorah, which has seven. An additional candle is lit every day for eight days.

According to Jewish tradition, the light dissipates the darkness by introducing clarity. It represents the triumph of enlightenment over obscurity and victory over oppression and assimilation. This light is the symbolic representation of a living Judaism.

Beshem ahmitai ba Bloc Québecois, anee mihvahkesh

Le shloah shefa brahote le hag Hanukkah sameah le kol

Haverenu haezraheem ha youhudeem.

On behalf of my colleagues in the Bloc Québécois, I want to extend our most sincere best wishes to our Jewish compatriots for a happy Hanukkah.