Madam Speaker, the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food has presented a thorough and, on the whole, balanced appraisal of the need to learn the lessons of the avian influenza outbreak.
As the report acknowledges, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency recognizes that there is room to improve. It goes on to say that all stakeholders could have been better prepared. The report states, “No matter how careful the preparation there are always uncontrollable events”.
That is the nature of emergency planning. We can and we must prepare for emergencies. Many steps can be taken to improve an emergency management system but with every emergency comes new developments not foreseen in the contingency plans.
Perhaps the true test of an excellent emergency response system is: first, how well it follows the recognized procedures for controlling the situation; second, how effectively it responds for the unexpected; and third, how effectively it incorporates the lessons learned so that we may be better prepared the next time.
On each of these tests I believe Canada has demonstrated that we have an excellent system. Canada's system of following the acknowledged procedures was attested to by an international panel of experts. Following the eradication of the outbreak, the government asked the panel to give its opinion of the response. The panel found that the disease control actions were consistent with internationally accepted principles. It found that the surveillance system and the surveillance protocols were appropriate. It found that the movement restrictions, procedures for destruction of infected birds and disposal of infected birds and products were all appropriate. It found that pre-emptive depopulation, the process for considering exemptions and the cleaning and disinfection procedures were appropriate.
An independent panel of international experts said that the CFIA did the right things. In fact, the panellists complimented the CFIA on its response. One panellist highlighted such features as the very good level of cooperation between the CFIA, its provincial counterparts and other provincial and municipal authorities.
Another expert wrote:
The logistics of this whole operation was huge, and improvisation of machinery available to deal with this problem was a credit to those concerned.
Another panellist wrote:
Canada was adequately prepared to deal with the outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza and had in place the appropriate regulations, veterinary infrastructure, and resources to facilitate the successful eradication of the disease.
Therefore, on the first test of an effective emergency system, Canada has received the acclaim of our international colleagues.
However we recognize that some of our linkages with our partners in the provinces and the industry could have been stronger and we are working on that through the recommendations of the lessons learned report.
What about the second test, the ability to respond to unforeseen circumstances? When the mission from the European commission made its final report it praised the innovative measures and the improvements to the procedures that emerged in light of new developments.
Let me give the House one example where decisive action on the part of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency moved beyond the standard procedures and made a significant impact.
When the first case of avian influenza was detected there were two possible strains: one, a low pathogenic variety; the other, highly pathogenic, or HP. The response to HP avian influenza calls for a much more dramatic response in restricting movement within a control zone. The tests to determine whether the disease is high or low pathogenicity require about a week for the results. In that amount of time a highly pathogenic strain could spread far.
Even though the standard procedures recommended that decisions be based on scientific evidence and even though there were many voices that recommended against imposing control restriction for HP avian influenza, the CFIA acted decisively. It determined that it would not risk the possibility that this strain was highly pathogenic.
I would recommend to the House that this was not a popular decision at the time, but as it turned out, it was the right decision and the CFIA is to be highly commended for making a decision that, in the end, was instrumental in controlling and eradicating the disease so quickly.
Canada did well in the first two tests in effective emergency response system. It followed the accepted procedures, but where new developments arose, it responded quickly and decisively.
The third test is whether we learn how to improve the system so that we are better prepared the next time. Here again, the committee's report acknowledges that considerable effort is being made to draw upon our experiences to apply the lessons.
In addition to the standing committee's own hearings, there was a Canadian poultry industry forum in Abbotsford last October. The CFIA has conducted a process entitled “Lessons Learned Review” that forms the basis of building a better emergency response system.
There are places where the recommendations from the report before us augment the action plan developed by the CFIA but, unfortunately, there is one recommendation that would sidetrack some of the excellent work that is already under way. I do not believe that we need another commission to study the events of last year, not when the committee itself has been so thorough, open and transparent in obtaining the input from witnesses.
As a former mayor and a former president of three provincial municipal organizations over a 22 year period, I am very aware of the processes of emergency planning, emergency response and emergency reporting and analysis. The reports that we have seen seek to improve a system that was tested by the crisis a year ago when the flu broke out in the lower Fraser Valley. The outbreak was devastating for the people in the region but in assessing the lessons it is very important to keep in mind that the tragedy could have been much worse.
The disease spreads like wildfire through poultry farms. In Canada there was the potential for a vast outbreak. In fact, the control area had some 600 poultry farms all within a fairly dense region but only 42 commercial farms were implicated and the disease remained confined to the lower Fraser Valley. Our trading partners continued to accept products from other regions of Canada.
Clearly, Canada was doing many things right during this influenza outbreak. This is a tribute to the partnerships among all stakeholders, including federal departments and agencies, provincial and municipal governments, the private sector, the veterinary community and, not least, the people of the lower Fraser Valley.
However not everything went right. There are lessons to be learned so we can be better prepared should Canada face another crisis of this magnitude. Clearly, the CFIA, for its part, has been working hard to improve its emergency response system.
In a document entitled “Lessons Learned Review”, the CFIA outlined 17 major recommendations and some 50 individual action items to improve our emergency response system. Many of these action items improve our emergency response system and some cover familiar ground to the recommendations of the committee's report. The House should keep this in mind when determining how to respond.
The report's first recommendation, for example, calls for a public inquiry into the events of last year. I have not heard a convincing explanation as to what such an inquiry would find that we do not know already. Would such an inquiry call upon the same witnesses who appeared before the committee? Would they have anything different to say?
In my view, the most troubling implication of recommendation one is that it would require the CFIA to redirect resources to respond to the commission's business. These are resources that are better used in moving ahead on the action plan already in place.
The second recommendation calls for the Auditor General to examine the response to last year's crisis in order to provide benchmark information for emergency response effectiveness. The government would welcome this review. However a review would be most useful in 18 to 24 months, at which point action plan items from the lessons learned will have been implemented.
The third recommendation calls for a special animal disease response team. The CFIA has already put in place a similar system through area emergency response teams. As part of the action plan, the CFIA has committed to revising the structure of its emergency response team so that the roles, responsibilities and delegated decision making are more clearly defined. It is reviewing the protocols on when to activate local area and national emergency response teams. The agency is working with stakeholders to develop plans for foreign animal disease emergency support agreements.
Recommendation four would have the government do a cost benefit analysis to study the need for additional containment level three facilities. The government has agreed to proceed with this recommendation. I would like to point out to the House that the CFIA is also taking important steps to accredit laboratory facilities outside the federal laboratory system across the country so that it can use them to assist with surveillance and provide surge capacity in such emergencies. Four labs have already been approved, including the provincial lab in Abbotsford.
Recommendation five involves the methods to euthanize animals. The government has agreed to this recommendation and I would add that during the outbreak the CFIA considered various options to euthanize the birds but the alternatives were ruled out because of the operational requirements. The use of carbon dioxide to depopulate the flocks was consistent with recommendations of the American Veterinary Medical Association panel on euthanasia and l'Office international de l'épizootie, the international organization of animal health. The method was found to be an effective technique and the CFIA refined the process to maximize its effectiveness, particularly with respect to animal health and human health and safety issues. It has been recognized that carbon dioxide does present some challenges with waterfowl but no alternative has been suggested at this time.
Recommendation six involves compensation issues. Approximately $63.5 million has been paid out to British Columbia producers under the health of animals regulations. In addition, the Canadian agricultural income stabilization program may provide support to producers by covering some of their losses.
However the compensation question remains an open issue. All stakeholders, including the industry, must assume some of the risk and various marketplace insurance schemes provide part of the solution. The government agrees with the recommendation to review the existing compensation under the Health of Animals Act.
Finally, recommendation seven involves procedures to permit a pre-emptive cull to limit the potential spread of an outbreak of animal diseases. The government has accepted this recommendation. In fact, in partnership with the industry, the CFIA has already been putting in place a pre-emptive cull policy. An interim protocol is already in effect and a permanent protocol should be in place before the end of the year.
The committee has worked very hard to obtain a broad and detailed perspective of what took place during the avian influenza outbreak last year. In some respects, the thoroughness of the committee's efforts preclude the need for its first recommendation, establishing another commission to study the situation further.
While the committee was working so diligently to hear from the various stakeholders affected by the outbreak, other stakeholders were moving quickly to adapt the lessons learned. Some of the committee's measures that have been put in place in recent months echo the themes of its report.
There are some recommendations here that build upon what is now being done. Unfortunately, however, the report taken as a whole would distract stakeholders such as the CFIA from the important work they are now doing, so at this point I move:
That the motion be amended by deleting all the words after “that” and substituting the following therefore:
“that the Third Report of the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food, presented to the House, be not now concurred in but that it be referred back to the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food for further consideration”.
