Crucial Fact

  • His favourite word was tax.

Last in Parliament April 1997, as Bloc MP for La Prairie (Québec)

Lost his last election, in 2011, with 8% of the vote.

Statements in the House

Veterans Review And Appeal Board Act May 8th, 1995

Madam Speaker, I am happy to rise after the member for Châteauguay to speak to Bill C-67, an act to establish the Veterans Review and Appeal Board, to amend the Pension Act, to make consequential amendments to other Acts and to repeal the Veterans Appeal Board Act.

What changes will be brought about by this bill in its present form? To put it in a nutshell, we can say that this legislation merges the Canadian Pension Commission and the Veterans Appeal Board and that, in future, applications for benefits will be examined by the Minister of Veterans Affairs. His decisions will be subject to review by or appeal to the Veterans Review and Appeal Board. Finally, the Bureau of Pensions Advocates will become part of the Department of Veterans Affairs.

As my colleague, the member for Châteauguay, said earlier, the new Veterans Review and Appeal Board is an independent board consisting of not more than twenty-nine permanent members, to be appointed by the governor in council for a term not exceeding ten years, but eligible to reappointment. The chairperson and deputy chairperson are also designated by the governor in council.

This bill also amends the Pension Act. Part I, which defines the Canadian Pension Commission, and Part II, which defines the Bureau of Pensions Advocates, are replaced by a new part describing the minister's powers.

In a sense, the minister is inheriting all of the functions and powers held so far by the Canadian Pension Commission in terms of first applications and first decisions. The eligibility of applications for awards will thus depend directly on the minister.

Is there not a risk that decisions relating to veterans will lack a certain impartiality and independence?

When Bill C-67 was tabled for first reading on December 15, 1994, the secretary of state for veterans argued that a thorough change in structures was required in order to substantially reduce delays in the processing of applications for awards.

According to the secretary of state, this initiative is part of the review of all government agencies and commissions which was undertaken by the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs.

We share the view of the hon. member for Châteauguay, who is in favour of the government's basic objective of reducing administrative delays and speeding up the decision-making process in files management.

However, we also share the concern of the hon. member for Châteauguay, who is questioning the means proposed by the government party to achieve this necessary objective of reducing delays in the processing of applications.

We, of the Bloc Quebecois, believe that to subject first decisions to ministerial authority would be a step backwards and a disturbing measure. We wonder why it is necessary to repatriate pensions advocates to the department when their independence was previously considered essential.

The position of the Bloc Quebecois is that veterans' applications should be speeded up within structures that are impartial, transparent and fair. None of the suggestions put forward by the hon. member for Châteauguay challenges the principle whereby the decision process and the advocate system would remain independent from the minister's authority.

Like the Reform Party critic, we too deplore the lack of consultation with veterans' associations and the government's preference for outside consultants; in this case, it sought the advice of two management consulting firms. We recognize in this the Liberals' preference for lobbyists and the well to do, the owners of these management consulting firms.

The Royal Canadian Legion and the veterans of the Canadian navy and armed forces have both expressed serious reservations about Bill C-67, but the government prefers to listen to well paid management consultants. Party fundraising does have its price, it would appear.

Three citizens came before the standing committee to say how much Bill C-67 would harm veterans. I wonder if their remarks reached the minister, who will have most of the discretionary power in the future.

We agree with the principle of reducing processing time, but we have serious reservations about the means put forward to reach this goal. Other more concrete measures might improve the processing time without requiring a revamping of the administrative structure. We are concerned about increased authority for the minister and the decrease in services to veterans.

The Chrétien government is once again showing its lack of openness, its disregard for provincial governments and its centralizing tendencies. Once again, the Prime Minister is using public funds to treat his friends better, instead of serving the

interests of Canadians. The 29 vacancies of the Veterans Review and Appeal Board, high-paying full time jobs for a renewable term of ten years, will be filled by friends of the Liberals.

To prevent this new Liberal scheme, we strongly support the four motions put forward by the member for Châteauguay, which are aimed at increasing transparency within the federal government. These four motions ask for the appointments required for the new Veterans Review and Appeal Board, under clauses 4 to 34 of the bill, to be made only after consultations with the provinces and the appropriate committee of the House. This would ensure a better distribution of power by not leaving too much power in the hands of the minister himself.

These motions concern the appointment of permanent members and of temporary members, the designation of a chairperson and of a deputy chairperson as well as the designation of an acting chairperson and of an acting deputy chairperson. I strongly support these four motions put forward today by the member for Châteauguay.

Committees Of The House May 8th, 1995

Madam Speaker, I have the honour to table in this House the eighth and ninth reports of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts.

In its eighth report, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts reviews Chapter 29, "Collecting Income Tax Debts"; Chapter 30, "Goods and Services Tax: Audit and Special Investigations"; and Chapter 31, "Ensuring Fairness of the Income Tax System: Detection of Non-Filers and Special Investigations", from the 1994 report of the auditor general.

In its eighth report the committee makes a series of recommendations concerning these chapters.

In its ninth report the committee reviews two other chapters from the 1994 report of the auditor general of Canada, which concern the Department of Finance and Revenue Canada, namely Chapter 32, "Income Tax Incentives for Research and Development", and Chapter 33, "Tax Assistance for Retirement Savings". Following the review of the last three chapters, the committee formulates another series of recommendations.

Pursuant to Standing Order 109, the committee asks the government to table a comprehensive response to these reports.

[English]

Code Of Conduct May 1st, 1995

I was getting to them, if the hon. member will let me continue. As for the senators, they are living proof of the fact that, historically, the Liberal and Conservative commitment to developing a code of conduct that would truly be enforced is really lip service. We suggest that senators not sit on this committee but set up a Senate committee to develop their own code of conduct.

Another concern is quorum. We object to a quorum which, as the notice of motion stands, does not ensure participation from the official opposition. This principle is not reflected in the wording of the government motion, which states that a quorum of the committee be 12 members. In our view, this wording needs to be changed.

Time and time again over the past 30 years, through all kinds of committee reports and bills that died on the Order Paper, one government after another tried to regulate the conduct of parliamentarians to prevent conflict between private interests and democratic duties. The conflict of interests issue is the most important aspect of parliamentary ethics. I will therefore focus on this aspect and show that there is no real political will behind this government motion.

In theory, the purpose of a code of conduct for elected representatives is of paramount importance. The public expects these people to be able, to the extent that it is possible, do as they please as concerns their economic interests. However, it also expects that, in the performance of their duties, public office holders will not become involved in business in which they have a personal economic interest. It goes without saying that conflict of interest rules must be based on the principles of impartiality and integrity.

Decision makers cannot be deemed impartial and honest if they personally profit, or can profit, from decisions. Most conflict of interest rules governing parliamentarians are incorporated in three acts of Parliament, namely: the Criminal Code, the Parliament of Canada Act and the Canada Elections Act. For example, the Parliament of Canada Act prohibits a parliamentarian from receiving any outside payment for services performed regarding any issue reviewed by the House, the Senate, or the committees of the House or of the Senate.

The same act also provides that a person cannot be elected to the House of Commons if this person has, directly or indirectly, a contract with the government which involves public money. The case of a parliamentarian who does not receive public money but is entitled to other benefits under a contract, is probably not covered by that provision, but this issue is far from being clear.

Moreover, if a parliamentarian is a shareholder of a corporation which was awarded a government contract, the ban only applies if the contract concerns the performance of public works. Consequently, a parliamentarian could invest in a corporation and thus avoid the ban. This, you will agree, is quite a loophole.

There is of course no obligation to divulge one's financial interests. However, Standing Order 21 of the House of Commons provides that no member is entitled to vote on any question in which he or she has a direct pecuniary interest, and the vote of any member so interested will be disallowed.

I am only reminding the House of these rules of conduct for Canadian parliamentarians because the events of the past few years, and in particular this government's conduct, have made people rather sceptical about the Liberal government's political will to set a code of ethics to make public affairs fully transparent.

The two parties which have been in power over the past 30 years have pussyfooted around this crucial issue and have lacked the political will to introduce a serious law strictly governing their own conduct as parliamentarians.

In 1973, the federal government published a green paper called "Members of Parliament and Conflict of Interest". A brief summary of what has transpired over the last 30 years is that the two parties which have held power, the Liberals and the Conservatives, have never really had the political will to set a code of ethics for the elected.

The document I just mentioned proposed consolidating and widening the scope out the rules already in effect. The House of Commons Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections and a Senate committee reviewed the green paper and made many recommendations. On June 10, 1975, the standing committee introduced its report on the green paper, which, in general, approved its contents and recommended a few changes.

Two years later, on June 26, 1978, Bill C-62, the Independence of Parliament Act, along with new Rules for the House and the Senate, was introduced in the House of Commons. This bill died on the Order Paper when the session ended on October 10, 1978.

However, on October 16, 1978, a slightly modified version of the same act was introduced as Bill C-6. The accompanying Rules for the House and the Senate were tabled in the House on October 30, 1978. The bill was referred to committee on March 8, 1979, but there was no ensuing action and the bill died on the Order Paper when Parliament was dissolved on March 26, 1979.

At the end of the Liberal's term of office, on July 7, 1983, a federal study group was set up to examine the principles and rules governing conflict of interest and their evolution and to decide whether the issue should be dealt with differently. The report did not appear until May 1984. It was entitled "Ethical Conduct in the Public Sector" and was known as the Starr-Sharp report.

With a new government, there were new political practices. On November 15, 1985, the Conservative government asked the Standing Committee on Management and Members' Services to consider the appropriateness of setting up a register of members' interests. As part of its work, the committee was to decide whether it was appropriate to disclose the remuneration members received for sitting on the boards of directors of public or private firms or for performing other duties or occupying other positions in various organizations.

After consulting the members of all parties, the committee concluded that there was no need to set up such a register and that existing legislation on members' conflicts of interest was sufficient. And the saga continues. In February 1988, Bill C-114, Members of the Senate and House of Commons Conflict of Interest Act, was given first reading.

In September 1988, the legislative committee on Bill C-114 met three times, but was unable to finish considering the bill before Parliament was dissolved, on October 1, 1988.

In November 1989, the scenario was repeated with the first reading of Bill C-46, Members of the Senate and House of Commons Conflict of Interest Act. This bill was essentially the same as Bill C-114, with a few minor changes.

This bill died on the Order Paper when Parliament was prorogued on May 12, 1991. November 1991 marked the first reading of Bill C-43, Members of the Senate and House of Commons Conflict of Interest Act. This bill was almost identical to the bills I have already mentioned: Bill C-114 and Bill C-46.

Incidentally, the bill was immediately referred to a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons.

In March 1993, first reading of Bill C-116, the Conflict of Interests of Public Office Holders Act, which included amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act. Finally, in June 1993, a report from the Special Joint Committee of the House of Commons and the Senate recommended that Bill C-116 be set aside. The same day, a similar report was tabled in the Senate. Bills C-43 and C-116 died on the Order Paper, upon dissolution of the 34th Parliament on September 8, 1993.

This whole process, illustrating how the issue of a code of ethics for Canadian parliamentarians has been dealt with, is a political masquerade. All to make the Liberals feel good about themselves and rationalize the federal view of democracy in Canada.

Throughout the election campaign in the fall of 1993, the Liberal Party of Canada maintained that ethics would be an important aspect of its mandate. In the Speech from the Throne in January 1994, the government said that integrity and public trust in the institutions of government were essential. It would therefore appoint an ethics counsellor who, it was hoped, would be a symbol of government integrity and a guarantee of public trust.

However, as far as the most important aspect of the code of ethics-conflict of interest-is concerned, the ethics counsellor appointed by the federal government continues to report to the Privy Council and has no independent powers of investigation. He continues to report to the Prime Minister himself.

The Liberal Party's red book pointed out, and I quote; "The integrity of government is put into question when there is a perception that the public agenda is set by lobbyists exercising undue influence away from public view".

Recent events have shown that the whole Liberal strategy of a code of ethics for parliamentarians, as confirmed in the government motion before the House today, is just another way to deceive the public.

For instance, the provisions of the Broadcasting Act, which is the responsibility of the Minister of Canadian Heritage, do not mean much when faced by the powerful lobby of Power DirecTv, headed by André Desmarais, the Prime Minister's son-in-law. The Liberal government has even stooped to defend concepts dear to the hearts of Mulroney Conservatives and is now singing the praises of competition on a North American scale.

Reading the orders from the Minister of Canadian Heritage, we get the impression that Power Corporation is calling the shots and we can kiss democracy goodbye, in a federal system where capital is still king. We should be concerned about the narrow view taken by our institutions and our political representatives in this case. The government not only ignored its own legislation and the CRTC, which is responsible for implementing that legislation, it also introduced retroactive measures that will prevent Expressvu from launching its service next September. And all this in the name of competition. Meanwhile, the red book's ethics counsellor is camping in the Prime Minister's waiting room.

And what about a recent trip to Los Angeles by this same minister of Canadian Heritage, to meet the leaders of the US film industry, at the very moment that the Seagram consortium was acquiring MCA. At issue is the fact that MCA had a Canadian subsidiary, Cineplex Odeon. Investment Canada, which reports to the Minister of Industry, will have to determine the nationality of Seagram. If this company turned out not to be Canadian, the Department of Canadian Heritage would then have to issue a notice of validity for the takeover. Obviously, the real reason the Minister of Canadian Heritage travelled to Los Angeles was to assure the Liberals' friends at Seagram that Ottawa would give favourable consideration to the deal.

While the Government House Leader is tabling a motion calling for the establishment of a special committee responsible for developing a code of conduct for parliamentarians, behind the scenes this very government is flouting the most basic rules of democracy by favouring the friends of the Liberal Party and governing on behalf of the financial establishment and those with big money in Canada.

Before closing, I would like to go over in this House some elements of the Bloc Quebecois's dissenting report on Bill C-43 to amend the Lobbyists Registration Act.

As I said, conflicts of interest and lobbyists' activities are the main issues to be addressed in developing a code of ethics governing the activities of parliamentarians in modern democracies.

Western democratic institutions are currently facing a public credibility gap, as you will agree. A good example is the percentage of people who voted in the last presidential election in the U.S. Clearly, it has now become necessary to restore the public's confidence in government. If this goal is to be achieved, public policies must be discussed, debated, amended and, above all, set openly and publicly. This concern is at the heart of the society we plan to build in Quebec. Among other things, we want to leave the federal political scene because it has been dominated for too long by the Liberals' political scheming.

As we have seen, once in office, this government considerably watered down the commitments it had made in its red book during the fall 1993 election campaign. This about-face has raised in the people's minds legitimate questions regarding the Liberal government's real desire to develop a code of ethics for parliamentarians. Given the gap between election promises and concrete legislative measures, we can only conclude that the final version of Bill C-43 was probably dictated by lobbyists.

The Bloc Quebecois feels that, to restore the integrity of our democratic institutions, we must first do away with the futile commitments of the last 30 years, which mislead voters. We must also ensure that the administration of government business is as open as possible, in order to eliminate grey areas and assure the people that policy decisions are consistent with the general interests of the population and not those of powerful lobby groups.

After only 17 months in office, this government already has a long record attesting to its lack of openness. In addition to the examples mentioned earlier and to the damning legislative record with respect to a parliamentary code of conduct, we will recall that, on September 26, 1994, Canadian Press reported that, according to documents obtained under the Access to Information Act, lobbyists had met repeatedly with government members in the months leading to the tabling of the current Bill C-43 and others had threatened to take their case to court if the legislation required them to disclose their political ties. That takes some doing, Mr. Speaker.

In that case, as in many others, lack of transparency made it impossible for the public to know the nature and extent of lobbyists' efforts regarding Bill C-43. Ironically, lobbyists have managed to influence the development of legislation designed to limit their influence. Let us face it, as it stands, Bill C-43 is of no use to prevent the kind of troubling events surrounding the privatization of Pearson Airport or the matter involving the heritage minister himself.

What is worse, according to Mitchell Sharp himself, the Prime Minister's senior counsellor on matters of ethics, even if Bill C-43 had been in force at the time the discussions concerning the privatization of terminals 1 and 2 at Pearson Airport took place, the public would not have been better informed. The majority report on Bill C-43 tabled by the government members on the committee is a timid attempt to regulate the activities of lobbyists and ensure transparency in the management of government.

Again, the government's attitude in this matter shows that what the Liberals say about ethics has no foundation. They are only trying to soothe their consciences and look good in front of the electorate.

The business of the letter in support of an application for a licence that the Minister of Canadian Heritage wrote to the CRTC, a supposedly independent agency under his authority, brought to light the flaws of Bill C-43 with respect to the role of the ethics counsellor himself. We will recall that the Prime Minister delayed seeking the counsellor's advice on this thorny matter for more than three weeks.

By waiting so long and consulting the ethics counsellor only at the last minute, after he had made his decision, the Prime

Minister showed his lack of consideration for the ethics counsellor. The head of the Liberal government simply wanted to add another adviser to his staff. The appointment of an ethics counsellor, following a commitment made by the Liberals during the election campaign, was only a ploy designed to give to the public the impression that the government was taking concrete measures to ensure the integrity of Canadian institutions. The Bloc Quebecois believes that the issues of ethics, transparency and public confidence in democratic institutions and management of government business are not the prerogative of a political party, a government or a Prime Minister but, rather, of democratic institutions as a whole.

This is why, in its dissenting report, the Bloc recommended that the ethics counsellor be appointed by Parliament for a period of seven years, during good behaviour.

The Pearson airport scandal, in Toronto, provided a clear example of the laxness of the current disclosure rules concerning the activities and dealings of lobbyists. In its report, the Bloc insisted that lobbyists must disclose the representations they make to federal officials regarding legislative proposals. The Bloc essentially recommended that all lobbyists be forced to disclose the contracts for which they try to influence the federal administration.

We tabled over 20 amendments in committee regarding Bill C-43. All were rejected by government members who, in several cases, were not present when testimonies were given, and who did not take part in the discussions in recent months. We were hoping that the new rules, or at least the direction and commitments of the Liberal Party of Canada, would ensure full dress debate of such a vital issue for a democracy. The motion tabled by the Liberal government to appoint a special joint committee of the Senate and the House of Commons to develop a code of conduct is just another measure following many others which never helped change political habits in this country.

The Liberals' intentions regarding the development of a code of conduct, which reflect those of the Seagram family and Power Corporation, are only intended to fool the public and give the government good political conscience.

In conclusion, I would like to table an amendment to the government's motion. I propose, seconded by the hon. member for Bellechasse:

That the motion be amended:

(a) by deleting, in the first paragraph, the words "Special Joint", "of the Senate" and "Senators and";

(b) by deleting, in the second paragraph, the words "seven Members of the Senate and";

(c) by replacing, in the eight paragraph,

(i) the figure "11" with the following: "8";

(ii) the words "Houses" with the following: "opposition parties";

(iii) the words "Joint Chairpersons" with the following: "Chairperson";

(d) by deleting, in the ninth paragraph, the words "Senate and";

(e) by deleting the twelfth paragraph;

(f) by deleting the thirteenth paragraph.

Code Of Conduct May 1st, 1995

Mr. Speaker, the motion presented by the government House leader with respect to a code of conduct for Canadian parliamentarians is not something new in the history of parliamentary government, let alone democracy in the West. This government's proposal to appoint a special joint committee of the Senate and the House of Commons to develop a code of conduct is in keeping with the Liberals' habit of acting as if they had a clear conscience in front of the people while at the same time continuing to scheme behind their backs.

Before looking at what this Liberal code of conduct is really about, I would like to draw the attention of the House to specific points of the government motion presented by the government

House leader. This motion provides for a committee made up of eight members of the Senate and fourteen members of the House of Commons, as well as the members of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. This is absurd, in my opinion.

We, Bloc members, suggest that the membership of this committee be reduced to three members of the Bloc Quebecois, two members of the Reform Party and seven Liberal members of Parliament. Twelve elected representatives should be plenty to examine the professional ethics of the members of this House.

Cida April 5th, 1995

Will the minister confirm that, by setting the amount of the contract at $99,510, he was making sure that it would be awarded to his friend Jacques Saada, since, had he gone over $100,000, the contract would have had to be awarded through the tender call procedure?

Cida April 5th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, I want to tell the minister that, in the meantime, he is financially supporting the Liberal candidate who was defeated in the October 1993 election, with the money of the taxpayers of Quebec and Canada.

Cida April 5th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Foreign Affairs. We just learned that CIDA has completely cut its support to non-governmental organizations promoting public awareness to international development. That decision directly threatens the survival of over 80 of these NGOs in Quebec and in Canada, as well as that of the Quebec association for international co-operation organizations.

How can the Minister of Foreign Affairs justify cutting CIDA's support to NGOs promoting international co-operation, while awarding a generous contract of $99,510 to his friend, the unsuccessful Liberal candidate in La Prairie, Jacques Saada, for developing a simple communication plan on CIDA's program for the Maghreb?

Budget Implementation Act, 1995 April 3rd, 1995

Madam Speaker, in speaking to Bill C-76, I would like to draw the attention of this House to what is really at stake in the budget tabled last February 27 by the Minister of Finance. This bill is supposed to be an act to implement certain provisions of the budget, according to the wording in the bill.

These provisions will change the financial and social framework of this country, independently of any constitutional or administrative agreement with the provinces.

The creation of the new Canada social transfer to replace the Canada assistance plan and the program to fund established programs will completely change the division of financial resources between Ottawa and the provinces in the future.

Through this Canada social transfer, the federal government will reduce drastically its contributions to the funding of health and social programs. Clause 48 of part V of the bill mentions, and I quote: "Subject to this part -for the purposes of (a) establishing interim arrangements to finance social programs in a manner that will increase provincial flexibility; (b) maintaining the national criteria and conditions in the Canada Health Act ''.

Despite the talk of greater flexibility for the provinces, the federal government is going to reduce its financial contribution substantially and the provinces will have to implement all aspects of the Canada Health Act, including the key components of public administration, comprehensiveness, universality, portability, accessibility, extra billing and user charges. How can the provinces be flexible when they must comply with all provisions of the Canada Health Act while Ottawa is reducing its financial contribution to health care and social programs in general?

Given the current overtaxation of the middle class, which, it must be said, remains the real cash cow of all levels of government, and the chronic indebtedness of the federal and provincial governments, the provinces will have no room left to manoeuvre. Although the federal government is withdrawing from financing, it will continue to make the rules.

For 30 years, the provinces have been fighting against federal government interference in areas of provincial jurisdiction. Until now, Ottawa used to compensate for invading provincial jurisdictions by footing part of the bill. Today, Ottawa is interfering even more, even if it is paying less. It is transferring onto the provinces the horrible task of increasing taxes and cutting elsewhere. The federal government is literally putting the provinces in a straitjacket. It even goes as far as forcing the provinces to refer to the Canada Social Transfer in all their ads and documentation concerning the health services they provide. All this window-dressing only to cut $7 billion on the backs of the provinces through the implementation of the Canada Social Transfer.

So, Bill C-76 will offload the federal deficit onto the provinces; since the legislative framework for health-related matters will stay the same, the federal government will only have to transfer its deficit.

Because of the pressure exerted by the richer provinces, the federal government is seriously thinking about changing the envelope for the main provincial transfers, except of course for the equalization payments which will in any way be significantly reduced beginning in 1996-97. As I was saying, the government is thinking about reducing the envelope for all provincial transfers according to the population figures instead of the wealth index which is now being used. If distribution is based on population, as the government is contemplating, then Quebec will have to deal with almost 42 per cent of all the cuts made to the provincial transfers in 1997-98.

Bill C-76 even provides for new health criteria and paves the way for new criteria in the areas of welfare and post-secondary education. Is this what the flexible federalism the Liberal government has been pushing for is all about?

Education is a very sensitive area for Quebecers who make up a distinct minority in Canada. The prime minister's centralizing federalism does not recognize this reality, and that is why more and more Quebecers do not want to be part of a country whose government shows so little sensitivity to their cultural identity and their most legitimate aspirations.

Quebecers are puzzled about one thing: Quebec's debt is at $70 billion, whereas the Canadian government has borrowed about $126 billion in the name of Quebecers since 1972. Therefore, Quebec's share of the federal debt is 45 per cent higher than its own provincial debt, although the latter remains high.

Quebecers have come to wonder how a federal government that has done so poorly in managing their hard-earned money can still be trying to impose its will upon a Quebec government that is also closer to them from a cultural standpoint.

By withdrawing its funding and by forcing the provinces to comply with new national standards, the federal government will be dealing, in a few years, with provinces whose tax base will be considerably weakened. This will give yet more power to the central government which will have greatly reduced its fiscal obligations and which will be in a position to interfere even more in areas under provincial jurisdiction.

The newspapers reported last week that Jean-Claude Rivest, an independent senator, and Claude Forget, former health minister in Quebec, fear a fiscal coup by Ottawa after a victory for the "no" in the Quebec referendum. My colleague from Trois-Rivières talked about it very eloquently a while ago.

Mr. Rivest and Mr. Forget, who have good connections within the federal government as reported in the Journal de Montréal on March 30, have no reason to worry. With this Bill C-76 and with the budget tabled on February 27, the federal government has already launched its fiscal coup against Quebec, even though the referendum in that province has not yet taken place.

Neither the finance minister's budget nor the bill before us today contain any provisions about the tax system, especially as it applies to families and young households, the only ones that would be likely to stimulate consumption and economic activity and to give some breathing room to provinces, which could intervene more freely and more energetically on their territory and in their particular jurisdictions by involving the stakeholders.

The centralizing federalism practised by the Liberals goes against every attempt at decentralization toward the provinces. Therefore, we must strongly reject Bill C-76.

Statutory Program Evaluation Act March 29th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, I take this opportunity to commend my colleague, the hon. member for St. Albert, for taking the initiative of tabling Bill C-289. Incidentally, the hon. member sits on the public accounts committee that I chair and I share and certainly understand his interest in ensuring that an act is passed to provide for the evaluation of statutory programs.

The need for statutory program evaluation has clearly been established both in the public and the private sectors, especially at a time when costs are tightly controlled and we have to make the most of our scarce resources. The only thing standing in the way of this bill being passed and applied to major programs is an obtuse government unable to keep up with the times.

The public accounts committee has already devoted several meetings to program evaluation. The Auditor General of Canada, for his part, devoted chapters 8, 9 and 10 of his 1993 report to program evaluation, and made the following comment again in 1993, and I quote: "Our audit found that the story of program evaluation in the Government of Canada is one of high expectations and great potential that have been only partly fulfilled. Cabinet has been paying sustained attention to program evaluation data over the last ten years".

But this interest was given little more than lip service, really. The sixth report of the public accounts committee, tabled on November 21, reiterated the relevance of program evaluation. The auditor general indicated that most of the programs that were evaluated were not high expenditure programs.

In 1991-92, the evaluation of programs with budgets over $1 billion, that is to say 16 programs totalling $124.5 billion, showed that only two of these had undergone a comprehensive evaluation; the rest were only partially covered, if at all. In 1991-1992, twenty-four per cent of government's program expenditures were evaluated. That same year, 480 of the completed evaluations covered programs with expenditures of $250 million or less, as compared to 18 in the over $250 million category.

There is therefore a need to eliminate this kind of laissez-faire in government with respect to evaluating mostly low expenditure programs. That is why I agree with paragraph 8(2) of Bill C-289, which states that the Auditor General of Canada may review any program evaluation and submit a report on it to the House of Commons in the case of a program evaluation covering a statutory program with expenditures of $250 million or more each year.

I also support this bill because it is directly based on the main recommendations of the sixth report of the public accounts committee, which I signed last November.

This legislation would establish an objective decision making process regarding the continuation or the elimination of government programs, and it would help reduce the arbitrary and political nature of the decisions made. Having better documented and more objective decisions would give more weight to the role of managers and members of Parliament. An improved program evaluation process would result in a more efficient control of costs, given that the current deficit exceeds $37 billion for that the accumulated debt is close to $550 billion.

As the hon. member St. Albert pointed out, program evaluation is a modern day management tool. In this era of electronic highway and state of the art technology, why would the government keep ignoring the value of cost benefit analysis and objective criteria on which to base its decisions, and instead follow trends, rely on a gut feeling, or base these decisions on political or partisan considerations?

Program evaluation is definitely a protection against dramatic cost increases which become unmanageable over time. I should add that this explosion of costs which eventually become uncontrollable accurately reflects the Liberal Party saga of the last 25 years.

Bill C-289 is a rare attempt by this Parliament to get us out of the vicious circle of expenditures, debts and subsidies to friends of the party, in which the Liberals put this country two decades ago.

The purpose of this bill is to provide for the regular evaluation of government programs by a program evaluation process set by Treasury Board on a prescribed cycle. The President of the Treasury Board would determine the cycle for evaluating statutory programs. We could not agree more.

New programs would also be covered by this process within six months after the coming into force of an act authorizing a statutory program, the President of the Treasury Board shall, by order, prescribe the fiscal year as an initial evaluation year for the statutory program and prescribe the evaluation cycle for the statutory program. This whole process would tend to reduce the

risk of arbitrary decisions, and we therefore support section 3 of the bill.

In concluding, I have two suggestions for the hon. member for St. Albert: first, in subsection 7(4), the hon. member suggests 150 days for completing the evaluation of a statutory program after the end of the evaluation year. I think 90 days would be more reasonable. This means that tabling in the House would come after 120 days, instead of 180 as the hon. member initially suggested.

Second, considering the strategic role played by the auditor general in program evaluation, I would suggest to the hon. member that the program evaluation report and the auditor general's report connected with the former be referred to the Public Accounts Committee instead of a committee designated by the House as provided under section 9.

I endorse Bill C-289, and I urge the House to support this bill, so that the government will stop this debt spiral caused by unnecessary spending and programs that have outlived their usefulness.

Quebec Sovereignty March 14th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, in a study by the highly reputable firm of Rogers and Wells of New York, commissioned by the Government of Quebec, lawyers David Bernstein and William Silverman concluded that Canadian-American trade rules would not change with Quebec sovereignty.

According to these experts, the United States would renew Canadian-American treaties with Quebec, including the free trade agreement, in order to protect their economic interests.

Therefore, the rest of Canada will have nothing to say about trade between Quebec and the United States and even less effect on preventing Quebec from enjoying the benefits of the free trade agreement.

In other words, the day after sovereignty in Quebec, it will be business as usual.