moved:
That this House, recognizing that a bilateral Umbrella Agreement for Weapons Testing exists between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States, take note of the domestic, international and bilateral aspects of allowing the
Government of the United States of America to conduct cruise missile tests within Canadian territorial boundaries, and in particular, two cruise missile tests during the first quarter of 1994.
Mr. Speaker, following yesterday's highly successful debate on peacekeeping this debate today will be crucial for the government to help it in its decision-making process as to whether or not we should continue cruise missile testing.
The Prime Minister made a commitment during the election that Parliament would be more frequently consulted in matters of this nature, general policy matters.
The minister of human resources when in opposition was quite forthright in questioning the former defence minister to say that these tests under the renegotiated agreement of 1993 should not occur before the matter was discussed in the House of Commons. We are discussing that today.
One of the members opposite will waive the word "hearing" and will try to say that what we are going to do today, perhaps until midnight again, is not a hearing. What better hearing than to have all the members of the House of Commons participate live on national television.
Let us not get caught on words. This is a hearing. It is a full parliamentary debate on a very sensitive matter. I am sure the minister of human resources, who led our party in foreign policy in opposition, agrees, by his presence here today, with the procedure we are undertaking.
Again, as with the debate yesterday there is no whip in our party. The members have not been told what to say. I do not want to prejudge any outcome.
The government has to take its own responsibilities and will take those responsibilities in due course. The government wants it fully understood that the views of the members of this House will help it make up its mind when the final decision is taken.
I would like to give a little bit of background for some of the members who have not been in the House for many years. I had the misfortune of not being here for the last number of years but was here when the agreement was first negotiated by the Liberal government of Mr. Trudeau.
A cruise missile test is essentially a small, pilotless aircraft powered by a jet engine. Modern long range cruise missiles like those the United States tested in Canada over the past number of years have sophisticated guidance systems which enable them to fly predetermined routes at various altitudes. Indeed, the tests of the cruise missile in Canada have been designed mainly to prove the accuracy of the missile's guidance system.
Cruise missiles can carry either conventional or nuclear weapons but I want to emphasize that none of the missiles tested in Canada has in any way been armed in a nuclear fashion.
Unarmed cruise missile tests are conducted under a Canada-U.S. agreement called the Test and Evaluation Program. The agreement, signed in 1983, originally covered a 10-year period. It allowed the United States to test and evaluate their weapon systems and other types of equipment on Canadian soil.
The agreement was renegotiated by the previous government in February 1993 and extended for another 10 years.
[English]
For the first time the agreement is reciprocal and that is something new. Canada has obtained parallel access to American military test facilities. Furthermore, the same incremental cost recovery procedures now apply to both countries potentially yielding substantial savings for Canada.
Last spring the United States submitted its routine annual test forecast to the previous Canadian government asking permission for two cruise missile tests in the early part of 1994 within Canada.
It is very crucial to understand the sequence of events. In August 1993 the previous government advised American officials that the two tests were approved in principle and that they could proceed with planning. The planning did continue after our government took office.
However, before Christmas an official of the Department of National Defence conveyed to his opposite number in Washington that there could be a problem because of the commitments our party had made previously. The debate today reflects that caution that we gave to the United States.
The U.S. has sought to test unarmed cruise missiles over Canadian territory because our test corridor provides the most challenging operational environment for these systems. Our territory as we all know provides a unique set of conditions for testing not available in the United States. These include high latitude and Arctic temperatures as well as the range and topography needed to fully test the navigation system. Consequently the U.S. has attached a great importance to these tests as well as to the overall testing regime provided by the test and evaluation agreement.
The United States is mindful that a new government is in office in Ottawa that could indeed want to do things differently. All members of this House will recognize that cruise missile testing has always been a controversial issue for Canadians and I am sure some of that controversy will surface today in the House.
I would like to go back a little bit to retrace some of the recent history to give a better sense of how it has evolved in the last 10 years. When the government first agreed in 1983 to test these missiles, the context was quite different than that of today.
First, the cruise missile test was a cold war issue. It was in the early 1980s that east-west relations were at a low ebb. It was characterized by such things as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the downing of the Korean airlines flight 007 and the controversy over the deployment of medium range missiles in Europe. In this context the Government of Canada justified at the time cruise missile testing as an important contribution to collective defence against the Soviet threat.
Second, cruise missile testing was a nuclear issue. I emphasize that it was a nuclear issue. The air launched cruise missile that was being tested in our air space, AGM-86B was its code name, was a nuclear weapons system, unarmed of course, during the testing within Canada.
Testing then had to be within a context of Canadian policy, not only with respect to deterrents in defence, but also arms control and disarmament. Over time the context of the cruise missile testing has begun to change or it did change most notably when the cold war came to an end. Confrontation evolved into detente, which in itself was rapidly transformed into east-west co-operation on a full range of issues. We have witnessed one of the most remarkable political transformations in modern history. In the space of two short years revolutions in central and eastern Europe gave way to the collapse of the Warsaw pact, German unification and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
We also saw remarkable progress in arms control. Certainly the state of U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance has improved dramatically with the signing of the strategic arms reduction agreements which mandate deep cuts in these arsenals.
Of course, the changes made in the last 10 years were not all so positive.
The end of the cold war resulted in new security problems, including ethnic conflicts and disputes over the appropriation of resources which were unheard of during the cold war.
Moreover, throughout the last 10 years, hostile governments, in Libya, Iraq and North Korea for example, regularly challenged the international community.
As the situation evolved, so did the test program as well as the reasons justifying its very existence.
In 1989 the government agreed to test a new variant of the cruise, which was the advanced cruise missile. This missile represents a refinement of the original system. It is more accurate, able to fly farther and harder to detect by radar. In addition, cruise missiles have become significant as part of the conventional weapons inventory of many countries. I will take us back a couple of years to conflicts such as the gulf war. There is an illustration that conventionally armed weapons may be more important in terms of weapons systems than their nuclear counterparts. As we can see, cruise missile testing has never been a static issue.
In case one thinks that in the remarks I have made this afternoon I am justifying the future testing of the cruise missile, that is wrong. What I am trying to do is to put squarely before you-I understand I am supposed to talk to you, Mr. Speaker, and that was always the practice so please do not take offence-how we are trying to underscore the reasons why the cruise has been tested in the past. We want to underscore why the United States would seek to test cruise missiles again.
However, my remarks will in no way reflect upon our government's decision to deal with the specific matter of cruise tests in 1994 in the context of the test and evaluation agreement. In other words, whether or not these tests may proceed in the first quarter of 1984 will be a decision that cabinet will take after the deliberation today.