Lloyd Axworthy

[Kosovo, May 10th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, as the Prime Minister has said, the Chinese are currently engaged in the peace process.

Certainly the circumstances are regrettable, but at the same time this is, in my opinion, one more reason to continue to seek a resolution to this conflict through diplomacy. And I believe the Chinese share that view.

[Kosovo, May 10th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, I did not say that a partial withdrawal would be acceptable. I said that one of the major planks in the proposal put forward at the G-8 meeting on Thursday was that there would be a clear commitment to the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and the surrounding countries.

I said that there would have to be some way in which that could be implemented. That is as far as we went. What exactly and how we would be doing it are the kinds of details we are now discussing. Those will be the kinds of proposals that would be included in a security council resolution.

[Kosovo, May 7th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, as we announced yesterday in the agreement, we will be pursuing an article 7 resolution at the security council. An article 7 resolution is an authoritative mandatory requirement that applies to all UN members. Through that, we believe we will be in a position to have an effective engagement with the Belgrade regime.

In the meantime, there will be ongoing discussions. The Russians will clearly continue to carry out their own dialogue and communications. The secretary general will establish an envoy system. I think there will be full opportunity for Belgrade to respond we hope in a positive way so we can bring this conflict to a resolution.

[Kosovo, May 7th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, as hon. members are aware, the Prime Minister spoke recently with the Premier of China about a progressive initiative in the security council. Yesterday, we decided to approach the Chinese concerning the proposals contained in our agreement with the Russians.

I believe that there is now a commitment for real consultation with the Chinese in order to ensure that there is agreement in the security council, once we have details on the proposal.

[Kosovo, May 7th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, we have not been hesitating whatsoever. I have just spent the last nine days in a round of negotiations with a number of countries.

We were able to culminate an agreement yesterday at a G-8 meeting. A series of initiatives will go forward to the security council of the United Nations which includes a series of conditions that will end the repression and the violence that are taking place in Kosovo and that will provide the basis for a just and fair agreement.

I would say to hon. members of the New Democratic Party that I very much regret that they broke the Canadian consensus and decided to turn away from a very successful formula which was necessary.

[Kosovo, May 7th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, in the meeting we held yesterday I think we gave peace a very good chance.

Frankly I would say to the hon. member that the regrettable decision taken by her party to change its position does not contribute to that initiative. In fact it weakens the initiative by taking away the necessary pressure which needs to be maintained on the Belgrade regime to ensure that it will come to the table.

We have put down an offer that I think represents Canadian principles, which is to go to the United Nations and get a settlement that we can all be satisfied with.

[Questions On The Order Paper, May 3rd, 1999]

A key human rights instrument in the Organization of American States (OAS) system is the American Convention on Human Rights convention or ACHR.

Before Canada can ratify a human rights convention, we must ensure that we are in a position to live up to the commitments we would undertake by ratifying it. Since 1991, consultations have been conducted with federal, provincial and territorial officials to assess compliance of federal and provincial legislation with the convention. The review process has been complicated by the vague, imprecise and outdated language used in the convention. Many provisions in the Convention are ambiguous or contain concepts which are unknown or problematic in Canadian law. More importantly, many provisions of the Convention are inconsistent with other international human rights norms, making it difficult for us to comply with both the ACHR and those norms.

By way of example, the ACHR would preclude prior censorship, and therefore would conflict with Canada's international obligations to suppress hate propaganda and child pornography. The ACHR would preclude the extradition of nationals, and therefore would conflict with Canada's extradition obligations and our obligations to co-operate with international criminal tribunals or the future international criminal court. Serious concerns have been raised that the unusual wording of the ACHR provision on the right to life may create a conflict with charter rights. The ACHR contains a right of reply to innacurate or offensive statements in the media, which is not known in our law and may conflict with charter rights. The ACHR guarantees equality before the law but does not contemplate affirmative action.

In order to ratify the ACHR at present, a very large number of reservations and statements of understanding, SOUs, would be required. However, Canada's position with respect to reservations to human rights treaties is that reservations should be few in number and limited in scope. We are concerned that ratifying the ACHR with a large number of reservations and SOUs would be contrary to this position and would undermine our efforts to dissuade other states from ratifying human rights treaties subject to sweeping reservations.

Until such time as the concerns with respect to reservations and SOUs expressed by both levels of government have been satisfactorily dealt with, Canada will not be in position to ratify the ACHR.

Canadians are already entitled to bring petitions to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alleging human rights violations. Therefore, even without ratification of the ACHR, Canadians already benefit fully from the inter-American human rights system.

Question No. 217—

[Nato, April 27th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member for Mount Royal for her question. With the attention being paid to Kosovo, a very important statement coming out of the summit was overlooked. The NATO leaders made the commitment that arms control and disarmament is a vital part of maintaining NATO security. The communiqué issued clear instructions that there would be a review of the nuclear policy for NATO and we have asked our ambassador to start preparing recommendations in that regard. That was an initiative which Canada supported.

I want to thank all members of the committee who helped to bring about that very important initiative.

[Kosovo, April 27th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, in the statement given by the Prime Minister this morning he pointed out one very major initiative that Canada helped to create. We proposed that the international force that would implement the agreement would not have to be just a NATO force, that it could be broader than that. I think that was accepted by NATO members at the summit. That was one of the major areas of disagreement in previous negotiations with Russian emissaries.

That is one good example around which we can discuss establishing an international force that would implement the agreement and would have with it the—

[Kosovo, April 27th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, there is a very substantial difference between having a set of principles on which you do not compromise and looking for the means of achieving those principles in which you can accommodate and compromise. We on this side of the House are not used to compromising our principles. Maybe the hon. member is, but not us.