Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to participate in this discussion on Canada's role in Afghanistan.
In doing so, I would like to take us back to the origin of this mission in which our Liberal government essentially undertook to commit troops, and diplomatic and development efforts to Afghanistan following September 11, 2001. At that time it was learned, and perhaps intelligence was aware of this before the fact, that there were a number of terrorist camps in Afghanistan with the blessing or the support or both of the Taliban regime. It was decided that action had to be taken.
Osama bin Laden was the key leader in that endeavour at the time and the United Nations sanctioned the action in Afghanistan through the international security assistance force in Afghanistan, which is implemented by NATO. NATO provides the combat missions and the countries of NATO are all participants, some in very major ways, like Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and others, and some in a very minor way, but all countries of NATO are involved.
We were invited by the Afghan people to come in and help them after the initial conflict to try to rebuild their country, and help them develop the democratic institutions and the infrastructures that were needed.
We need to remind ourselves that the Taliban is a regime that has a very oppressive policy with respect to women's rights. They have a very oppressive regime when it comes to crime and punishment. They have policies and techniques that most westerners find quite abhorrent.
I supported our government's decision to stay out of Iraq. I think that was a good decision on the part of Canada, but I supported our commitment to Afghanistan. The part that we need to understand is that there are various parts of Afghanistan where the danger is more extreme. We know about the Kandahar region, where the Canadian troops are, that this is a very dangerous area.
Northern and other parts of Afghanistan are not quite so dangerous. This is where the NATO troops are deployed in various levels and in various numbers, but some of the countries, like Germany and France, committed their troops to Afghanistan with various caveats. They said that they would be involved in Afghanistan militarily, but they will not fight in the south, they will not have troops in the south of Afghanistan where the dangers are greater, or they will not fight at night. There are a number of caveats which are somewhat problematic.
In 2006, when I was at meetings in Arusha in Tanzania, I met with some Afghani MPs who were there and I made a point of chatting with them. They told me two things. First, the levels of corruption in Afghanistan were quite incredible, horrible in fact. The levels of corruption in Afghanistan had permeated all sectors of society: the military, the police, the judicial system, the private sector and pretty much everything.
Second, they also told me that in their judgment Canada was getting the short end of the stick with respect to the rotation in Kandahar because of the fact that Canada was in the south and had been in the south for a while, and there were other countries which refused to go into the south where the danger was greatest.
I certainly brought that message back and spoke about it at the time. That is something I support in terms of the rotation. That is what the motion essentially talks about, that Canada would not be in Afghanistan beyond 2009 unless there is a commitment of 1,000 extra troops and some equipment, including helicopters et cetera to assist with the mission in Kandahar. That should be, and is, the bottom line as far as Canada is concerned.
There has to be rotation of other NATO troops into Kandahar, into the south, to help share that load. We are hoping, on this side and I think on all sides of the House, that NATO will come through with that kind of effort.
My own personal view is that while Canada should get some relief in Kandahar and we should refocus our efforts in terms of developmental assistance, I do not see how our combat forces in Afghanistan can be involved in developmental projects without the risk of getting into some kind of combat operation.
I say that because if, for example, Canadian troops are providing some protection to a road building project in a part of Afghanistan and the Taliban decides to use some hit and run tactics on this particular project, I do not think we can expect Canadian troops to stand by while they see the Taliban scampering up the hills and phoning Kandahar to say, “Someone has to come and deal with these people”.
What is coming out of this compromise which seems to be coming from the House, and I hope it does, is that the party opposite has agreed that we have to have an exit strategy in Afghanistan. We cannot be there forever.
Therefore, the Conservatives have agreed to put a finite term on our mission in Afghanistan at 2011. I think on this side of the House there is a view now that we cannot micro-manage the military leaders in the field. Does that mean that they are given carte blanche to engage in combat? No, but I think the rules of engagement have to be very clearly defined and clearly understood.
However, I am of the view that we cannot have troops in Afghanistan without giving them the latitude and the flexibility that they need to protect themselves and the people that they are trying to protect as well.
In this area of southern Afghanistan the level of drug production, poppies, I am told, is equivalent to about 80% of the total poppy production and consumption in the world. Those poppies are converted into heroin and cocaine. Those drugs are causing huge amounts of destruction on our streets in Canada, around the world, and indeed in my riding of Etobicoke North. I think we have to deal with that.
What we have discovered, of course, is that when the combat troops get closer to the drug crops, the Taliban increase their efforts. They have a lot of cash. They hire more people to get involved in combat activities. Therefore, to the question that there is no military solution in Afghanistan, I think there is some validity to that argument.
By the same token, and I think the Russians are a good example of a country that found that out, when we are dealing with this type of insurgency, this type of terrorist group and given the terrain and topography of Afghanistan, I am not sure that a military solution is in the cards, depending on how we define a military solution.
I think we should be looking at another question and that is what are the consequences of leaving Afghanistan prematurely before the Afghani people have taken on the additional responsibilities for their military, their police, and to the extent that they can supplant this United Nations force? What are the consequences for the Afghani people by pulling out?
To pull out immediately would be totally irresponsible. By 2011 it gives the UN and NATO allies a chance to transfer some of those skills and some of the technologies to the Afghani people, so that they can carry on their mission.
The independent advisory panel on the Afghan mission, which was headed by our colleague on this side of the House, John Manley, the former deputy prime minister, came up in my view with a very balanced and reasoned report. I could quibble about whether a 1,000 troops is sufficient to do the job.
Nonetheless, I think the panel came up with a balanced report. I certainly can live with that, the qualifier being that NATO must respond with additional troops and equipment, so that our troops can get some relief because our soldiers are just as important as soldiers from other NATO countries. We need to ensure that the burden is shared fairly and evenly across all members of NATO.
