Andrew Leslie

[Income Tax Act, March 11th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, I believe if you seek it you would find unanimous consent to see the clock as 2:30 p.m.

[Committees of the House, March 11th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, I believe that if you were to seek it, you would find unanimous consent for the following motion related to travel arrangements for two standing committees.

That, in relation to the Pre-Study of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), ten members of the Standing Committee on International Trade be authorized to travel to Vancouver, British-Columbia; Calgary, Alberta; Saskatoon, Saskatchewan; and Winnipeg, Manitoba, in the Spring of 2016, and that the necessary staff accompany the Committee; and

that, in relation to its study on Canada and the Defence of North America, ten members of the Standing Committee on National Defence be authorized to travel to Colorado Springs, Colorado, United States of America, in the Spring of 2016, and that the necessary staff accompany the Committee.

[Citizenship Act, March 10th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, if you seek it, I think you would find consent to see the clock at 6:30 p.m.

[Citizenship Act, March 10th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to subsection 45(5), I request that the division be deferred until Monday, March 21, at the end of the ordinary hour for daily adjournment.

[Income Tax Act, March 7th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, I request that the vote be deferred to Tuesday, March 8 at the end of the time provided for oral questions.

[Canada's Contribution to the Effort to Combat ISIL, February 19th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, the intelligence cycle starts both at the top and the bottom. We have kinetic activities and those which support it. We have the observe, detect, orient, and react cycle, which is fairly well-known in military theorems. The bottom line, though, is that it has to be comprehensive, so it incorporates some of the ideas already articulated by the previous question of the NDP member and this member's question.

We do have to work on choking off the flow of supplies, monetary supplies and personnel, in this holistic approach. I submit that is exactly what the coalition forces are up to now. It is exactly the intent of the NATO command and control architecture that is co-ordinating the activities in Europe, and of course of our American allies who have the lead.

[Canada's Contribution to the Effort to Combat ISIL, February 19th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, I commend the member for his appreciation of the nuances and sophistication required in the modern and contemporary counter-insurgency fight. What he is suggesting is part of the tenets, the building blocks, in the whole-of-government complex approach.

However, there does come a time when we have to focus on giving the indigenous residents themselves the skill sets and tools to carry the fight to the local foe. That is the government's proposal. It incorporates some of the good ideas that the member has, but, as well, it is not abandoning the fight but carrying on the fight by training the local soldiers themselves, turning them from a militia into a professional force so that they can carry the fight to the foe.

[Canada's Contribution to the Effort to Combat ISIL, February 19th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, I believe the hon. member is referring to a situation wherein there were two types of uniforms, both green and brown. In the streets of Kabul, which was mainly stability operations and not necessarily focused entirely on counterterrorism, it was presence patrolling, which is in the pantheon of operational capabilities in the centre of the spectrum for counter-insurgency operations. In that context, our doctrine clearly states that presence, being able to be seen, to be readily identifiable when accompanying Afghan police in the busy streets of Kabul, is a marked difference.

I would also point out that we had tan uniforms available from when we went out to do the business in the mountains.

[Canada's Contribution to the Effort to Combat ISIL, February 19th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, ISIL is an evil, brutal, and completely ruthless collective of organizations that specializes in the use of terror to accomplish its aims. ISIL seeks to conquer and subjugate, with the interest and intent of establishing a quasi nation state. As such, it is an insurgency. The Canadian Armed Forces, indeed Canada, has learned many valuable lessons over the last decades in counter-insurgency operations.

Allow me to quote from the Canadian Armed Forces counter-insurgency manual, published in 2008 under the authority of the previous government: “lnsurgency is not a movement or people. lt is a competition, struggle or conflict involving different groups of people. As a manifestation of war, it is a competition of wills.”

At its root, an insurgency is a political problem—so eloquently referred to by the Minister of National Defence yesterday—and a wider range of agencies, elements, power, and capabilities, in addition to the military, must come together in unity of purpose to defeat an insurgency. Defeating an insurgency needs more than just bombing. There are lots of bombers available in the region, as so eloquently mentioned by the previous speaker.

Our CF-18s, pilots and ground crew, have done a great job, with bravery, professionalism, and discipline. Since we deployed our fighter ground attack aircraft, they have contributed about 2.5% of the overall coalition air strikes, and they have done a fantastic job.

However, should Canada continue to contribute to the fight? Yes, but what, where, and how should we contribute in the whole-of-coalition context? What is needed among the various tools in the coalition toolbox is worthy of study, and the Minister of National Defence and his team have done just such.

Let me tell a story, essentially a tale of what we can learn from history.

I first deployed to Afghanistan in 2003 as the Canadian task force commander. Then it was a stability operation with some counter-insurgency activities against terrorists. We lost excellent soldiers in that fight. Eventually, our skill sets improved. I went back every couple of months for seven years, and I eventually became the army commander for four years.

Our forces, of course, were very successful in and around Kabul. Then we shifted to Kandahar, with the intent of providing some security for reconstruction and development. This turned into arguably the toughest fight that the Canadian troops had seen since the Korean War. The cost in lives and resources was both tragic and staggering. Our contribution grew into a very powerful battle group, and it was very well equipped. I will give credit where credit was due. It was in large measure thanks to the previous government and its focus on getting the troops what they needed for the Afghan war, and a robust provincial reconstruction team that was doing most of the local fighting themselves.

With very little value added, we saw poorly trained Afghan militia observing from the sideline, themselves traditionally ferocious warriors, but lacking in the disciplined and modern contemporary skill sets. There was lots of allied air power available, and the Conservative government focused its efforts, after time, on training because that was what was needed. We had to get the local forces into the fight. After a relatively short while, we Canadians realized that our efforts to help the local government win would best be served by increasing the amount of resources and troops who contributed to the training mission, and to intelligence, provincial reconstruction, and actual regional stabilization. From about 2005 to 2010, this transition was under way and applied with great vigour, determination, and skill, by not only the Canadian Armed Forces personnel, but indeed all those who contributed to a whole-of-government approach.

In 2010, the Conservative government ceased combat operations in the direct fight and the killing, and focused the entirety of the mission on training. I will say it again. In 2010 and onward, the Conservative government ceased all combat operations in the direct kinetic fight and focused the entirety of its efforts on training indigenous forces. It worked. It was a sound decision. There were no Canadian CF-18s overhead, and all of our troops were involved in the training mission.

Therefore, what has changed? What lessons can we draw from the valiant efforts of our soldiers, lessons paid for in blood and treasure?

Let me say this again. The Conservative government withdrew all combat elements and rerolled them into a strictly training role. No one in the Conservative caucus argued against this idea at the time. I know, because I was the army commander. It was the right thing to do then, and it is the right thing to do now, because the great shortfall is in training indigenous forces.

Counter-insurgency operations conducted within a counter-insurgency campaign are aimed to defeat the insurgency through military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civil actions, something we got to know quite well, and Canada became really good at it. However, the overriding focus was on providing skill sets so that we could do better than probably just about anybody else in the world. That turned out to be the complex endeavours of training indigenous forces, assisting in regional stability, reconstruction of civil society, and humanitarian support. Yes, we can fight, absolutely, but at times, to fight smarter, we have to look at it in the whole-of-government context.

This whole-of-government approach includes everybody in the fight. Whether people are public servants, police officers, aid workers, soldiers, trainers, or helicopter pilots, whether armed or unarmed, they are all there contributing to the fight, just like our government is proposing to do in a much more sophisticated and nuanced approach than exists today in Iraq.

The former government learned that a multinational coalition fighting against insurgency had to adopt this sophisticated approach, this whole-of-government approach, and that it had to look across the wide aspects of all the tools available to the coalition to get the job done. The former government decided to refocus all of its efforts into training local forces, increasing humanitarian support and development assistance, and worked very hard and quite successfully to enhance regional stability. It provided additional intelligence assets and reconnaissance assets, and focused and refocused on training. This is exactly what we are doing, so how is it different? How can it possibly be different? We have learned from the lessons of Afghanistan.

I have a rhetorical question. It is quite a simple question. How is what our government is proposing to do in Iraq any different from what the previous Conservative government learned after many hard lessons, paid for in blood and treasure, in the experience in Afghanistan?

[Canada's Contribution to the Effort to Combat ISIL, February 19th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, I congratulate the member for his excellent speech. I wonder if he would care to build on his comments about the fighter support provided by allies in support of Canadian soldiers who may or may not be on the ground and draw that back to Afghanistan, where, as I recall, the Conservative government did not deploy Canadian CF-18s and relied extensively on international air power, with good cause and effect. As well, I do not recall the Conservative government ever releasing or discussing casualty counts prior to operations. Perhaps the member can confirm those facts.