James Bezan

[Tlicho Land Claims and Self-Government Act, October 29th, 2004]

Mr. Speaker, I may not have as much experience in the House as the parliamentary secretary, but that still does not give her the right to go out and negotiate deals that are flawed. We need to make sure that the deals we put in place, ones that are going to be used as templates, have to be faultless to a T, and every i and t has to be dotted and crossed.

[Tlicho Land Claims and Self-Government Act, October 29th, 2004]

Mr. Speaker, definitely there is concern that the Tlicho agreement contradicts our own Constitution and Charter of Rights. We need to ensure that the agreements we are negotiating reflect the desire of the Government of Canada and the people of Canada that all citizens are treated equally.

There is no doubt that it is important we get all these existing land claim settlements negotiated. We need to continue to urge the government to work toward that means. Unfortunately, the Tlicho agreement will be the template or the standard by which all future land claim settlements will be made. If there are flaws in this agreement, we have the chance to fix them now.

I would urge the government to make note of the concerns being raised by this side of the House, so we can put in place an agreement that will be comprehensive and applicable to all the future land claims currently on the table.

[Tlicho Land Claims and Self-Government Act, October 29th, 2004]

Mr. Speaker, today I rise in the House to register my opposition to Bill C-14, the Tlicho agreement.

Little attention has been focused on this agreement and it is almost certainly the most significant agreement concluded by the Canadian government in recent years. The effect of this agreement is to create a new third order of aboriginal government with concurrent but paramount jurisdiction over the federal crown. The result will be a Tlicho state governed by a Tlicho constitution which is arguably paramount to the Canadian charter. The agreement also appears to acknowledge or perhaps confer some degree of international authority upon the Tlicho government.

There are a number of provisions in the agreement which are flawed and debatable from a Canadian public policy perspective. To be fair, certain aspects of the agreement are visionary and reflective of a mature and sustainable system of self-government.

Today I will discuss four reasons why the agreement is damaging to the long term interests of Canada. They are first, the absence of finality in the agreement; second, incursions upon Canada's international autonomy; third, confusion of jurisdictional authorities; and fourth, the application of the charter in the adoption of governance structures which are racially based and which arguably contradict the charter.

The first point is the absence of finality. It could be argued that the agreement is generous to a fault in terms of the land, moneys and resources which are provided to the Tlicho. It is worth noting that the Tlicho lands will comprise the single largest block of first nation owned land in Canada. This might be justifiable if the agreement were a final agreement, but unfortunately it is not.

The agreement provides that the Tlicho will receive equivalent benefits to those granted in the future to any other aboriginal group in the Northwest Territories, whether by land claims agreements, self-government agreements, tax power exemption, or legislation. In other words, this agreement is not a final agreement at all.

Please note that this agreement achieves little of the certainty and finality of the Nisga'a agreement. Frankly it is difficult to discern what concessions the federal government even achieved in exchange for the obvious generosity of the agreement.

The second point is the incursion upon Canada's international autonomy. The agreement contains a remarkable section relating to international matters. The agreement states that it does not limit the authority of the Tlicho to enter into international, national, interprovincial and interterritorial agreements, which suggest by implication that the Tlicho government has the authority to enter into international agreements.

The agreement also contains the following remarkable provision which is self-explanatory: “Prior to consenting to be bound by an international treaty that may affect a right of the Tlicho government, the Tlicho First Nation or a Tlicho citizen, flowing from the agreement, the Government of Canada shall provide an opportunity to the Tlicho government to make its views known with respect to the international treaty either separately or through a forum”.

The agreement also provides for an arbitration mechanism between the Government of Canada and the Tlicho government in respect of international legal obligations.

Furthermore, the Government of Canada is obligated under the agreement to consult with the Tlicho government before taking positions before an international tribunal in circumstances where the Tlicho government has taken action giving rise to an international legal controversy.

It would be naive to assume that these provisions are merely reflective of poor drafting.

The third issue is jurisdictional confusion. The provisions of the agreement relating to the future governance of this part of the Northwest Territories are poorly drafted and in some respects contradictory.

The effect of the act would be to create a new third order of aboriginal government with concurrent and paramount authority over the federal crown in relation to matters affecting the Tlicho. The act is clear in making the provisions of the agreement paramount over the act itself and over any regulations passed under the act.

Unfortunately the agreement itself is internally contradictory resulting in confusion regarding the concurrent and paramount authority of the Government of Canada, the Government of the Northwest Territories and the Tlicho government.

The agreement addresses these interjurisdictional issues in at least three places and prescribes three distinct paramount provisions. Articles 7.7.2 through 7.7.4 prescribe the following hierarchy of authority: one, federal legislation of general application; two, territorial legislation implementing Canadian international agreements; three, Tlicho laws; four, territorial legislation of general application; and finally, specific federal legislation relating to the Tlicho.

In other words, Tlicho laws prevail over territorial laws and also over federal laws relating to the Tlicho. The federal government seems therefore to have rendered specific federal legislation relating to the Tlicho subordinate to Tlicho laws.

Yet another example of the concept of paramountcy can be seen where it makes the settlement legislation paramount over the provisions of any other legislation or Tlicho law. Yet the definition of settlement legislation refers to both territorial legislation and federal legislation. In other words, this provision creates the following hierarchy: first, the agreement; second, the federal settlement legislation, which is presumably Bill C-14; third, territorial settlement legislation; and finally, other legislation or Tlicho laws. This is inconsistent with the concept outlined in articles 7.7.2 to 7.7.4 that were mentioned earlier.

Unfortunately, article 2.10.7 prescribes yet another legislative hierarchy which applies in the event of arbitration, namely: first, there are federal laws of overriding national importance; second, federal laws implementing international agreement obligations; third, other federal legislation; fourth, territorial legislation implementing international Canadian obligations; fifth, Tlicho laws; and finally, other territorial legislation.

Certainly the general scheme is that the powers of the Tlicho government to enact laws are concurrent with those of the Government of Canada and the Government of the Northwest Territories. What is problematic is that there seems to be multiple definitions of how to determine who has jurisdiction in the event of conflict.

Finally, the agreement also contains the following rather optimistic provision:

Nothing in the Agreement shall prejudice the devolution or transfer of responsibility or powers from the Government of Canada to the Government of the Northwest Territories.

Assuming that similar self-government agreements are put in place across the rest of the Northwest Territories, it is hard to visualize what responsibilities or powers we have left for the territorial government. This clause also begs the question as to whether the Government of Canada has held back any of its powers with regard to the Tlicho people.

The fourth point is the application of the charter and the adoption of governance structures which are racially based and which arguably contradict the charter. The overall scheme created by the act, the agreement and the Tlicho constitution appears to have implications for the application of the charter to Tlicho citizens. Although both the agreement and the Tlicho constitution speak of consistency with the charter, it is noteworthy that the Tlicho constitution is quite clear in article 3.1 that the Tlicho constitution shall be the Tlicho nation's highest law.

Frankly, the entire legislation scheme is quite unclear as to the constitutional relationship between the Constitution Act of Canada, the charter and the Tlicho constitution. On its face, the agreement purports to adhere to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in that article 2.15.1 provides that the charter applies to the Tlicho government.

However, the agreement itself outlines a racially based governance system. It creates a category of Canadians called Tlicho citizens and prescribes an electoral system where only Tlicho citizens may be elected as chief of the Tlicho community government. In addition, at least 50% of the elected councillors must be Tlicho citizens, so too the grand chief must be a Tlicho citizen. To be a Tlicho citizen one must be a registered status Indian. Thus, the agreement creates a racially segregated electoral system which is arguably contrary to the charter.

I would note that article 2.1.1 of the agreement may insulate the agreement from charter challenge by declaring the agreement to fall within section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Those who are Tlicho citizens therefore acquire a very distinct status in the north. They enjoy the electoral franchise noted above. They have all the rights and benefits of other Canadian citizens. They also maintain their identity as aboriginal people of Canada participating in and benefiting from any existing or future constitutional rights. They receive all status Indian benefits. They also maintain all their hunting, fishing and trapping rights under treaties south of the 60th parallel.

The Conservative Party of Canada believes that self-government must occur within the context of the Constitution of Canada. To ensure fairness and equality, a Conservative government would ensure that the principles of the charter would apply to aboriginal self-government.

The Conservative Party of Canada believes giving aboriginal governments the power to raise their own revenues will reduce the cycle of dependency and that the performance and accountability of aboriginal self-government is enhanced when those who receive services contribute to the cost of those services.

The settlement of all outstanding comprehensive claims must be pursued on the basis of a clear framework which balances the rights of aboriginal claimants with those of Canada. In particular, negotiated settlements must balance the economic and social needs of aboriginal Canadians with Canada's need for certainty and finality of terms. Self-government agreements must reflect Canada's need for both efficacy and practicality in institutional structure and constitutional harmony so as not to impede the overall governance of Canada.

Bill C-14 fails to meet these criteria fully and therefore, must be defeated.

[Agriculture, October 29th, 2004]

Mr. Speaker, the ruminant livestock industry is in trouble and it continues to suffer due to BSE border closures. Over 100,000 ruminant producers need help now.

It is unbelievable that the government does not hesitate to insult our U.S. neighbours, but it lacks the backbone to negotiate with the U.S. government. The government has no plans to convince the Americans that the border has to be reopened to live animals right now and not later.

Will the government take a firm stand with the American government and proceed with legal action against the United States under NAFTA or WTO?

[Terrorism, October 26th, 2004]

Mr. Speaker, when it comes to anti-Americanism the Liberals just cannot kick the habit. We have had Liberals refer to Americans as “morons”, “bastards” and “idiots”. Then last week we had Liberal ministers picking sides in the U.S. election. Now we have the Liberal MP for Don Valley East blaming the United States for global terrorism. In an interview she said terrorism is “the result of the policies of the United States”.

Why does the Prime Minister continue to tolerate these damaging anti-American outbursts and why do Liberals blame the victim when it comes to terrorism?

[Agriculture, October 15th, 2004]

Mr. Speaker, the BSE border closure has caused a backlog of livestock across the country, and the need for more slaughter capacity is a must. New start-ups have been trying to access Farm Credit Canada's venture investment fund to start their operations. Many producers are skeptical as to whether the government's new loan loss reserve will entice lenders to invest in slaughter plants.

If the government's loan loss program does not work to expand plants or induce new start-ups, will the government commit to direct financing of new and expanding plants in every region of the country to deal with our backlog of livestock?

[Agriculture, October 12th, 2004]

Mr. Chair, just to follow up, the deadline is approaching, and not because they do not have their plan in place. They have a good plan. They have an opportunity to buy a plant in the U.S. and move it up here. The deadline is on the offer to purchase. If they do not have their financing in place, they will miss out on an excellent opportunity. Their lender agrees with the plan but wants the loan loss program. Since it has been announced, their lender says, “We want that loan loss to back it up”.

This operation needs to have this by the 15th of the month. We are only a few days away and still there is no application. We are going to miss out on an excellent opportunity to build a new plant in Manitoba.

[Agriculture, October 12th, 2004]

Mr. Chair, the hon. member across the way was talking about SRMs and how it has become necessary for us to remove SRMs in our food processing systems.

Because of the SRM criteria, we essentially have had to go to designating plants as being either for youthful animals or for mature animals. In Manitoba, we have a lack of processing capabilities and we have a group of producers who want to take those initial steps toward setting up a plant to handle the higher risk cattle, the mature cattle. They are right now in the final stages of getting their plans off the ground, but unfortunately they have not been able to get an application to the loan loss reserve program, purportedly by the government.

I want to know where the application forms are and when we can expect to see them. We have some tight deadlines coming down on this operation. Rancher's Choice Beef Co-op needs to have its financial plans in place by the middle of the month. I just want to ask the hon. member from the government side where those forms are.

[Agriculture, October 12th, 2004]

Mr. Chair, in his speech the hon. member talked about the isolation, or that the Quebec cow herd should not have been roped into the same category as the rest of Canada since the BSE crisis broke out in Alberta. There is one thing I want to acknowledge. I want to thank the Quebec industry. Cattle feeders in Quebec have bought a lot of cattle in Manitoba, especially this fall and last fall. Thanks to the generosity of the provincial programs that Quebec has, that has enabled those producers to come to Manitoba, where we do not have a lot of support, and outbid local producers in Manitoba and the rest of the provinces for those animals and to take them back to Quebec.

With all these animals moving from western Canada into Quebec, we have a huge migration of animals back and forth. I would like to know how he feels this might have impacted the overall health status of their own herd.

[Agriculture, October 12th, 2004]

Mr. Chair, I just want to follow up on the comment by the parliamentary secretary about how much this has cost the industry. He tried to paint the picture.

From my own personal experience as a cattle producer and from talking to friends and fellow producers in my area, I know that the losses on the farm at the primary producer level have been in that $300 to $400 per head loss. In my case it was over $43,000. The amount of money that I was able to get through support programs, which is also in comparison to other people in my area, was only around $45 a head. It is nothing compared to the financial stress and loss that the industry is going through right now. We have to look at why programs are not working and why the money is not getting to the producers.

The industry asked for a cash advance. I want to know why our government decided to go ahead and do a cash advance through the CAIS program when most producers, myself included, do not believe the program is a viable program, one that will be there in the long term and one that will provide the mechanisms to get the money out of the system.

I want to know why the government did not look at a different way to deliver money. Money flowed a lot easier through some of the other programs. CAISP is administratively burdensome. It is very long in the process and producers are still waiting on 2003 money, never mind having an advance on 2004. If the government really wants constructive criticism, the CAIS program is a key case in point. The government needs to take a hard look at other ways it can deliver cash advances.