National Defence committee  There are two major reasons for understanding it from a Canadian context. The first is, of course, to ensure that we are getting the maximum out of [Technical difficulty—Editor] Americans. We cannot appear to the Americans as being a free rider. During the Trump administration, I think we started getting a few hints that the special status—whereby it was automatically assumed that the Americans understood there was a special relationship with Canada and therefore we could probably pick and choose to a greater degree than perhaps the international environment called for—could become problematic moving into the future, and that we would be seen as separate.

National Defence committee  Go ahead, Jim. Age before beauty.

National Defence committee  Let's recognize that the 2% increase, when it was created by NATO, is a political target. Once again, what we're really talking about is, what is the need for the effect of the Canadian Forces going into this new environment? It really comes down to the ability to deter growing aggressor states and fight in a collective security environment should that deterrence break down.

National Defence committee  Jim's absolutely right in terms of the sensors, but I would like to add two things that Canada will have to be facing. It goes back to the issue about the Chinese tests as well. We are, of course, talking of the modernization of NORAD in terms of the North Warning System. That becomes part of it.

National Defence committee  This is part of the saving grace, when we look historically at that relationship, because of the strength that has been developed among those below the political level. There tends to be a political acceptability that North America has to be defended as a unit, but what has been the true strength of the NORAD agreement and North American co-operation overall is that it has created this very deep web of co-operation among the Canadian and American military decision-makers.

National Defence committee  We have to be careful in strategic terms, because there's a bit of a tendency to say that the sovereignty issue surrounding the Northwest Passage is a security issue—that somehow the Chinese and the Russians may want to take advantage. The Russians actually have a position that's quite similar to Canada's, in terms of their own northern sea route in the Northeast Passage.

National Defence committee  To give you a direct example, just look in terms of the issue of the replacement of a fighter aircraft. If we go to Finland, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands or Britain, we see they do tend to have a process that contains politics—all of the western countries do, let's be very clear on that—but they are able to compact the process by which they achieve that decision.

National Defence committee  Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to come to share some thoughts with the committee on the good work you're doing. I have two major focuses within my introductory comments. The first is the challenges that Canada has today and has traditionally faced in regard to its threat assessment and its capability.

National Defence committee  I just have to weigh in. We've talked about diplomacy. Diplomacy also comes from strength. You talk about the economic factors and all of these. It's not about economics. It's about how we have Canadian security. We also seem to be fixated on this one scenario that is just about the North Koreans firing a missile at North America before anything else happens.

National Defence committee  In the interests of time, first of all, from the military security perspective, we go for ABM, we look at how we can in fact improve the satellite surveillance systems we're talking about for the modernization of NORAD, and we consider the possibility for the next surface combatants.

National Defence committee  [Technical difficulty—Editor] any tweet or anything that the Koreans have in fact singled us out, though I would add that we have to be careful not to get too focused on whether we are in fact concerned if we have been singled out. Recognize that if we are dealing with an aggressor state that we can characterize as a bully, to give too much credibility when they do single us out, or to say that we had better not do anything because we might get singled out, is to basically give in to the type of aggressive behaviour that we see them using against the Japanese and South Koreans.

National Defence committee  If I could interject, I have to take an opposite position. I do not see, on the limited amount that we have for diplomacy.... In terms of the cost for diplomacy with the North Koreans, the North Koreans are not going to pay attention. I don't even know if they necessarily know we exist.

National Defence committee  Could I interject here? Let's be clear on one thing. We don't know what the costs are or what the Americans would require from us at this point. In other words, if we start saying that we're drawing away substantial resources for a price tag for participation, that may or may not be the case.

National Defence committee  Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to appear before the committee again, among such an esteemed set of colleagues as well. I have two points that I want to make in the five minutes I have before me. First is the nature of the problem, and second is what Canada should be doing.

National Defence committee  Yes, absolutely. That's a critical point. As you and Dr. Charron have pointed out, often when we face financial crises, the first thing that goes is training because that's the budget item where people can say, “Okay, as long as we can still get the procurement projects going and as long as they're paying for the individuals, the expense of the personnel, we don't have to worry about training and we can cut that back.”