National Defence committee  Chair, did you say I have one hour?

National Defence committee  Thank you, Chair. Thank you for the opportunity. I would offer these observations after 36 years of wearing our uniform. The environment in which Canada's men and women in uniform have served during my time of service has included the Cold War and the degree of pseudo-predicta

National Defence committee  —with our partners. From the Canada-U.S. perspective, military to military we have a high degree of coordinated planning capabilities. Our connection to our civilian authorities—national and state in the U.S., national and federal-territorial in Canada—is very high. It's routine.

National Defence committee  They are continuing to advance that. Then, the other domain that we need to continue to clearly work on is to understand, beyond the military cyber domain, the national critical infrastructure domain and how civil authorities see that domain being challenged and how we might be

National Defence committee  Defending our network infrastructure is uniquely our responsibility, and we have a very good relationship with the U.S. Cyber Command on that. As it relates to infrastructure beyond what belongs to us, it really belongs to other authorities, and they would need to speak to that.

National Defence committee  Thanks for giving me that platform, because this does work for us. It's still new in the Canadian experience, so it is still being learned and understood. Every time we practice, exercise, or operate is another learning opportunity that allows us to get better.

National Defence committee  Thank you. We call that in military terms the “after action review”. So “three things to keep” and “three things to change” is our language. Among the things to keep and reinforce are the coordinating mechanisms that allow domain awareness and the effective exchange of informati

National Defence committee  The mechanisms are the headquarters, the sensor systems, and the networks of people who collect and analyze the information and transmit it to their partners. Every morning, when I get an operational update at my operations centre, there are 23 networks informing my domain aware

National Defence committee  As it relates to recovering vast amounts of hazardous material, we have a limited capacity for our own use, and that could complement somebody else's capacity. The capabilities we would have to bring to that kind of complex response are not just limited to the ability to recove

National Defence committee  Well, we certainly have it where we're operating today, with our warships today and the bases we work in today, and whether or not that's transportable and usable, I really can't speak to that point. Greg.

National Defence committee  Thank you, sir, for the question. This may be my swan song, as I'm retiring this year, so thanks for giving me the platform. Mr. Harris more or less asked the question earlier on, what's different? Number one, the motivation to integrate three commands into one came from five-

National Defence committee  I believe the chief of defence intelligence had this conversation with you, as well, a few weeks back. We maintain our understanding of where subsurface capabilities are in the world. We do that with our own sensors and with partners. We benefit from contributing to, and deriving

National Defence committee  Absolutely.

National Defence committee  Thank you for that question. I'm very conscious that the American approach to environmental stewardship and safety in their Arctic is incredibly multi-agency. The U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. military environment, have a very robust and mature multi-agency view on the problem, an

National Defence committee  I'd say I'm not tracking...that's not responding to any missions. However, whether or not a particular aircraft on a particular base was the source of the response may be the point you're making. The search and rescue system is a network.