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Transport committee  Yes, we shared it with Transport Canada and it went into the minister's hands.

April 29th, 2010Committee meeting

Michael Skrobica

Transport committee  There are a number of screening models that combine various systems. One of them utilizes a full-body scan but also does a trace. A passenger pushes a bar, and it detects that, and thre's a vapour down at shoe level to determine whether there are any explosives carried in their shoes, as in the case of the shoe bomber Richard Reid.

April 29th, 2010Committee meeting

Michael Skrobica

Transport committee  The full-body scanner, do you mean? Yes, it's generally a more reliable machine. But as with any kind of technology, you're going to have the bleeding edge of technology at which new developments are going to have their problems, and we need to work through them. I would point out only that the type of machine that was given trials in Kelowna is indicative of where we're probably going to head in the future.

April 29th, 2010Committee meeting

Michael Skrobica

Transport committee  Annex 17 sets out a number of parameters you have to qualify for. On top of that, ICAO does an audit from time to time to determine whether countries comply with it. Canada was audited. The results have been kept secret, but I am told that there we're in substantial compliance with Annex 17.

April 29th, 2010Committee meeting

Michael Skrobica

Transport committee  I appreciate what the background of your question is. We don't think that behavioural analysis will play a significant role. There is potentially a place for identification of clear signs to note, and there is a trial program under way today in Canada. We believe more strongly, though, in the technological solutions.

April 29th, 2010Committee meeting

Michael Skrobica

Transport committee  One area that is questionable in which we could redeploy resources, both funding and personnel, is the non-passenger screening that we have at Canadian airports. As the testimony of John McKenna indicated, Israel and the United States don't have it. That doesn't stop the Americans from giving us advice that we don't screen a large enough sample of our non-passengers.

April 29th, 2010Committee meeting

Michael Skrobica

Transport committee  Let me talk about the behavioural analysis, to begin with. I know that the standing committee heard from a witness a short time ago who obviously was advocating an entirely different course for Canada. I would caution the standing committee that the gentleman is a salesman and that he wants to sell a product.

April 29th, 2010Committee meeting

Michael Skrobica

Transport committee  In the case of the Fort Hood incident, there were clear indications that the individual was having some difficulties.

April 29th, 2010Committee meeting

Michael Skrobica

Transport committee  They were flying as passengers.

April 29th, 2010Committee meeting

Michael Skrobica

Transport committee  The pre-screening would have to have a feedback system built into it, but if the person had applied for a NEXUS card, there may have been information on file that would have indicated that there were possible security problems, and he would have been denied it in those circumstances.

April 29th, 2010Committee meeting

Michael Skrobica

Transport committee  It would depend. For example, he was under review by the U.S. Army. If a person had had contact, as it would appear that they had, with individuals who were suspected al-Qaeda members, that would probably come up through a CSIS background check. As I understand it, there's a terrorist quotient check that is part of the NEXUS card background.

April 29th, 2010Committee meeting

Michael Skrobica

Transport committee  One of the things that perturbs passengers is a lack of consistency Canada-wide. You'll have a computer swabbed down for explosive trace in one location and not in another. There is an advantage to unpredictability, and it's certainly not with the law-abiding travelling public, but it does introduce an uncertainty factor to people who are trying to do something wrong.

April 29th, 2010Committee meeting

Michael Skrobica

Transport committee  To date, Transport Canada has managed CATSA through a measure called a security screening order, and we have had an opportunity to be consulted on it when there are significant changes. There was a study with regard to Canada's aviation security and CATSA in particular. I believe it was entitled Clear Skies.

April 29th, 2010Committee meeting

Michael Skrobica

Transport committee  No system is going to be 100% foolproof. Transport Canada and other security professionals like to describe security as the layers of arming your security—

April 29th, 2010Committee meeting

Michael Skrobica

Transport committee  —and no one thing is going to work. But we believe this is a smart way of trying to identify those people who can pose a problem. You talk about a Fort Hood situation. Well, I would suspect that if you do your screening properly you're going to try to identify people along those lines.

April 29th, 2010Committee meeting

Michael Skrobica