Finance committee  I don't, but what I've said previously at committee is worth repeating, I think. Right now, at least in our understanding of the guidelines, unless it reaches 35%, the bureau is not in the habit of challenging. I imagine it's changing, aligned with the fact that it's changing i

Finance committee  To add a bit of historical perspective, so to speak, it's important to put on the record that in the U.S., they're guidelines, but the guidelines came from the cycle I was discussing before. It started with the courts. It started with jurisprudence in the U.S., and then it was co

Finance committee  If memory serves me a little, I think the bureau reviewed that merger and didn't find that it reached the threshold of a substantial lessening of competition. Here we're talking about remedies, so I don't think it would have had a bearing on it.

Finance committee  I will take the first one. In every jurisdiction that we're aware of, it's typically a combination of the statute and then enforcement guidelines. At least, that's the case for the U.S., which we're more familiar with and which is very similar to us. In the statute, they don't h

Finance committee  If the intention is to follow the commissioner, we need to amend the legislation. There is no other regulatory mechanism, for example, to give instructions to the tribunal about what is a substantial lessening of competition.

Finance committee  Let's try a theoretical situation very quickly. Imagine four companies in the same sector, which we'll call the retail sector—we have four retailers. Two merge, and they are just under the threshold of substantial lessening of competition; therefore, they're allowed to go ahead.

Finance committee  It's asking us to opine on the decisions the tribunal has taken over the years. I think the tidbit about the “least intrusive” remedy is fairly universal. If you look at all the merger guidelines around the world, there's a network of enforcers, and they have this part. I think

Finance committee  Much lower is not how I would put it. The substantial lessening of competition is what has been established by case law. Our understanding of it is that it's not supposed to be a significant impact on the competition. It's not supposed to be substantial. I wouldn't say that the

Finance committee  Again, that would be my understanding of it. The commissioner came here and testified that in his view in the U.S., the authorities considered that it's zero harm to competition. At the same time, when you look at the text and the guidelines and so on, it never talks about zero c

Finance committee  I will let my colleague answer that.

Finance committee  That's correct. It would be a new “zero impact on competition” test, with the remedy. That's how I understand it.

Finance committee  The Supreme Court has said that the purpose of a remedy is to make sure that the merger does not substantially lessen or prevent competition. The merger is brought back into a situation where it could not be challenged.

Finance committee  Asking for consistency is maybe not the way I would frame it. You asked what a remedy should do. As interpreted, the remedy should make sure that the merger no longer substantially lessens or prevents competition.

Finance committee  That is my understanding of the commissioner's proposal and the proposed amendment.

Finance committee  I'm happy to try to do this. For the consideration of the committee, the way the act currently works is a test—it's a substantial lessening or prevention of competition. The system in Canada is merger as of right, so to speak, unless the commissioner challenges a merger. The th